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TO MY OLD COMRADES 
OF 
THE ~ N D  REGIMENT O P  CARABINEERS 
AWD 
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THE IST XEGIMENT OF CHASSEURS D'BFRIQUE. 
I 
1; J. P. FERRIER. 
P R E F A C E .  
THE Translator, having accomplished his very in- 
teresting, though laborious, task of rendering into 
English the ma,nuscripts of General Ferrier, is anxious 
to avail himself of this opportunity to congratulate that 
officer on having added these instructive volumes 
to the Eastern literature of this country. They can 
be more thoroughly appreciated here than in France ; 
and that they must prove of real value in England is 
evident when we consider how great are the interests 
involved in the development-commercial, social, and 
religious-of that vast continent which Providence 
has permitted to fall under our rule. 
As an old soldier also, the TranslatorAwishes to mark 
his sense of the frank and generous manner in which 
General Ferrier has spoken of the arduous services of 
the Anglo-Tndian army in Afghanistan ; more especially 
as at the period at  which he gave expression to these 
sentiments-1845-the entente between his own nation 
and England was by no means so cordial as happily 
i t  is now. The Author's criticisms, when unfavonr- 
able, are generally well-founded ; and though, no 
doubt, inaccuracies are to be met with' in some por- 
tions of the ' History of the Afghans,' it is evident 
that they proceed from defective information, and 
not from any ignoble desire to write disparagingly 
of the British Empire or our gallant soldiers. As 
to his comments on the Indian policy of this country, 
or the manner in which that policy has been carried 
out, the Translator cannot, agreeing as he does with 
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the greater number of them, feel a t  all surprised 
a t  their severity; indeed, he considers that we ought 
to accept these comments with gratitude, inasmuch 
as they present to us a more unprejudiced viem of the 
subject than me have yet seen. 
At  a very early period French travellers greatly 
distinguished themselves in the East, and the names of 
Tavernier, Bernier, and Thevenot justify the assertion ; 
but the travels of General Ferrier are even of a more 
interesting character than those of these pioneers 
in Asiatic adventure ; moreover, his sufferings were 
great while wending his weary way over the deserts 
of Central Asia, in some districts where European foot 
had never before left its imprint on the burning sands. 
The cruelty and hardships he then endured entitle him 
to the commiseration of every feeling mind, and the 
industry and perseverance that enabled him to  collect 
and to preserve the materials for his History and 
Travels, under circumstances so adverse, are worthy 
of all admiration. 
Important also are the opinions of one who is capable 
of giving us much sound advice, and critically examin- 
ing the conduct of Great Britain, in connection with 
the countries which join her Indian frontiers on the 
north and north-west. Our information regarding 
these countries, their inhabitants, and their policy, 
has hitherto come almost exclusively from officers or 
civilians in the East India Company's service ; it is 
profitable to see the same subjects treated by a 
foreigner and from another point of view, for reasons 
which must be apparent to many. 
General Ferrier has pointed out, in his chapter on 
the invasion of India, in ' Caravan Journeys,' the 
probability of the Sepoys joining the Russian army, 
and the princes and rajahs throwing off their alle- 
~ a i s & e t t e ,  Ingatestone, MmeA 27, 1858. 
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giance ; opinions which, no doubt, elicited expressions 
of indignation from many of his readers, especially 
those who were the servants of the East India Com- 
pany-but how fearfully has his estimate of native 
fidelity been justified since the publication of that 
volume ! 
The reader mill do well to consult the highly 
interesting notes and appendices of Sir H. Rawlinson, 
Sir John Login, and Ms. Danby Seymour, in ' Caravan 
Journeys,' as they elucidate many points in the History 
of the Afghans. 
The style of the author is rather severe, and there 
are several portions of the present work in which there 
was an opening for much touching writing and for 
appeals to the highest and best feelings of our nature ; 
even a few words only here and there would have 
considerably increased the interest of the subject, but 
the translator did not consider himself at  liberty to 
do otherwise than adhere strictly to the text. When 
there was a duplication of thought, or want of arrange- 
ment, he has endeavoured to remedy these defects; 
but otherwise the reader is in possession of General 
Ferrier's work in its integrity. 
WILLIAM JESSE. 
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THE origin of the Afghans, which is involved in obscurity, has 
given rise to a variety of opinions, and it is not easy to adopt 
any one in particular. Some pretend that they are descended from 
the soldiers of Alexander the Great, whom he left in these c o ~ t r i e s  
after he had conquered them ; and from some Greek colonists who, 
under the kings that succeeded that emperor, subsequently joined 
these descendants of his victorious legions. Others affirm that the 
Copts of Egypt, the Chaldaeans, and even the Armenians, were 
their ancestors ; but the majority of Eastern writers consider them 
to be the descendants of one of the ten tribes of Israel-and this 
is the opinion of the Afghans themselves.  ina ally, a few authors 
assure us that this nation is not of Jewish origin, but that those 
who introduced the Mahornetan religion amongst them were con- 
verted Jews. 
. The following is taken from the work of that celebrated orien- 
talist, M. Ruffin : "The  Afghans," he says, "had their origin 
from the Albanians of Asia, who, in consequence of their numerous 
revolts, were transported from one extremity of Persia to the other, 
and driven into Khorassan ; they were a very warlike peoplej 
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kilown under the name of Aglhvan or Av9han, and made them- 
selves famous in the history of Persia. Their Albanian origin is 
evident by the name itself, for agran is the Greelr word HA'AB." 
This opiuion, which has been contradicted by several authors, 
merits nevertheless some attention, because it is in accordance with 
the custom which tlie Persian monarchs are supposed to have fol- 
lowed, viz, that of removing from the shores of the Mediterranean 
or the Black Sea any population that gave them the least uneasi- 
ness or apprehension ; also that of bestowing upon the Greeks, a 
considerable number of whom were a t  all times in the Persian 
armies, a certain portion of territory, where they were allowed to 
establish themselves, as a reward for their services. The  historians 
of Alexander have made us acquainted with one of these colonies, 
anfl we learn from them that, when that monarch advanced into 
Bactria in pursuit of Bessus, he destroyed the town of the Brances, 
the inhabitants of which, descended from Milesim Greeks, he put 
to death, as a punishment for a crime committed by their ancestors 
-a most cruel and unjust act. 
The opinion of M. Xuffin is in opposition to that of another 
oriental scholar, M. Eugbne Bore', who, in his Letters on the East, 
thus explains himself on the subject of these Albanians :- 
L C  The Aghovans," he remarks, " were an ancient and distinct 
people, first brought to our notice by Pompey a t  the time of his 
expedition into the Caucasus. The Greeks and Latins, by an inac- 
curate transcript,ion of their name, called them Albanians; they 
inhabited the high mountains and the valleys bordering on the 
Caspian Sea, which now form the provinces of Daghestan and 
Shirvan. The Armenians were never able to subjugate this brave 
people, who were governed by feudal laws similar to those which 
existed in Europe during the middle ages.; they were Christians 
before they adopted the faith of Mahornet, and it is known that 
they preserved their liberty up to the period of the arrival of 
Bouzan, general of the Sultan Seljoolride PllIalels Shah. The Ian- 
goage of this nation differed entirely from that of the Armenians. 
. . . . . I n  short, we may say that the people mentioned by the 
Greelr authors under the denomination of Albanians cannot, on 
account of their peculiar language, be considered as of Chaldzan 
origin-an opinion which is in direct contradiction to that of their 
historian, Moses Galganderasti, who lived about the ninth century 
of the Christian .era, and who, with Moses of Chorenus, affirms - 
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that they are descended f?om Sisag, of the ~ r m e i i a n  race. We' 
hope to clear up this point after having collected from the moun- 
tainous district in which these pretended sons of the Aghovans 
lived, the remains of the language they speak. I t  3s with less 
reason still that some of the learned, led astray by a similarity of 
words, have confounded the Aghovans with the Afghans, feudal 
tribes dispersed over the south of Persia, and who, more than any 
other, recall to our minds the ancient Parthians. The  language 
. 
of the Afghans is analogous to that of the primitive Persian, and, 
in the opinion of Sir TVilliam Jones, they are neither of Jewish 
nor Chaldaan extraction. The supposition that they were identified 
with the Aghovaus, once formed, has led to the conclusion that 
they were the descendants of Jews, because the province of I<ir, to  
which the Assyrians transported the captive tribes of Israel, ap- 
peared to commentators to be the country watered by the Kour, 
the Cyrus of the Greeks." 
Some persons have with reason affirmed that Tamerlane, exas- 
perated a t  the depredations committed by the people inhabiting 
Mazanderan, south of the Caspian, transported the whole of them 
into the mountains situated between India and Persia. But they 
erred in supposing that. from this population are descended the 
Afghans of our own day, for the posterity of the unfortunate people 
who were removed to these mountains by the Tartar conqueror form 
at the present time a small tribe of E'imaks, known under the appel- 
lation of Firooz Kohis, after the city of that name (situated about 
siity-three miles from Teheran), ml!ere they were defeated and taken 
captive by Tamerlane : this tribe now inhabit the country between 
Herat and Meimana. Besides, the Tartar warrior and legislator 
mentions the Afghans, in his Institutes, as a nation which had for 
many years inhabited the Suleiman mountains, and was much 
given to pillage. 
The Afghan authors who admit the Jewish origin of their nation 
thus account for the removal of their ancestors to Central Asia : 
some declare that Afghans, who gave his name to the Afghans, 
was lineally descended from Abraham and Hagar by Ishmael ; 
ohers &rm that he was the grandson of Saul ; and dl think that 
Bakht ul Nasser * must have sent some Jewish prisoners into the 
mountains of Gour. These prisoners would soon have considerably 
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increased ; and though far from their mother-country, without do~ibt 
they would have preserved their faith, which was kept alive by 
the periodical reception of letters from their countrymen who, more 
fortunate than themselves, had returned to the Holy Land. Matters 
remained in this state until Mahomet announced himself as the 
messenger of God. A Jew, by name Khaled, whom he converted, 
wrote at  this time to his brethren in Gour to give notice of this 
happy event, and induce them to embrace the new faith ; but they, 
before adopting Islamism, sent several of their chiefs to the Prophet. 
Amongst these was Keys, who pretended to be descended in a 
direct line from Saul through forty-seven generations, and Abraham 
through sixty-five. Mahomet loaded him and his companions with 
favours, and gave him the title of Malelr* Abd-ul-reshid, a rank 
to whicl~ he was entitled as the descendant of the Jewish king. 
These Afghan ambassadors, now Mussulmans, accompanied Ma- 
hornet in several of his wars, and distinguished themselves by many 
remarkable deeds of vdour ; nevertheless, with the sanction of the 
Prophet, and after having received his benediction, they returned 
to their own homes, accompanied by a few Arabs, and with their 
assistance succeeded, in the space of forty years, in completely con- 
verting their countrymen to Islan~ism. 
Some authors affirm that Afghana was the son of Rhaled ; others 
say he was contemporary with Solomon, and assert that he was one 
of the principal officers of that monarch. 
These different versions,, which do not rest upon any sufficient 
proof, are  very difficult to admit ; the Afghans, however, thinlc 
that they have evidence of their Jewish origin in the following tra- 
dition. When Nadir Shah, marching to the conquest of India, 
arrived at Peshawur, the chiefs of the tribe of the Yoosoofzyes pre- 
sented him with a Bible mitten in Hebrew, and several articles 
that had been used in their ancient worship which they had pre- 
served; these articles were a t  once recognised by the Jews who 
followed the camp. This fact, supposing it to be one, if affording 
evidence sufficiently convincing to some persons, can only be con- 
sidered as authority with respect to the Yoosoofzyes; but it does 
not follow, therefore, that other Afghan tribes are branches from 
the same stem ; on the contrary, everything leads to the conclusion 
that, although they all speak a common language, the Pushtoo,. 
* Prince. 
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the tribes are not all of the same origin,--they are distinguished by 
marked characteristics, moral as well as physical. The Afghans 
of Kabul consider themselves as Indian Afghans, whereas those 
of Herat say they are Khorassani Afghans ; one tribe repudiates 
another, and denies its Afghan origin, and there is not the least 
sympathy betwcen them. W e  may believe that, being enemies 
in bygone ages, their union, such a s  it was, progressed only by 
degrees, with a view of delivering themselves from slavery, and 
repulsing the common enemy. The names of Patan, Rohilla, 
Afghan, which serve at the present time to designate the Afghan 
nation, are really those of so many distinct races now confbunded 
in one. I f  we could admit, as they do, their Jewish origin, we 
must also suppose that they would, on the spot to which they were 
transferred, have developed all the characteristics of an enslaved 
people, humble and degenerate ; but such is not the case, for we 
find the Afghans from the very &st, that is to say from the reign 
of Sebek-Taghee, courageous, and animated by a love of inde- ' 
pendence-always warlike and energetic, retiring to their moun- 
tain fastnesses to escape from tyranny, and leaving them whenever 
the smallest hope presented itself of seizing lands which they con- 
sidered they had any right to-it is only a primitive race who 
could have remained so strongly attached to the soil. 
No one has thought of the aboriginal people, nevertheless they 
must not be lost sight of, for, according to Quintus Curtius and 
Arrian, the Arians, Arrachosians, and others, were both numerous 
and brave. The conquests of Alexander did not lead to their exter- 
mination ; and i t  is very natural to suppose that their race has 
descended to the present day through intermarriages, though in small 
proportions, with the Greeks who remained amongst them, and after- 
wards with the Tartar and Persian conquerors who invaded them. 
Uowever, under all circumstances, there is little affinity between 
them and these two nations ; i t  is not thus with the Beioochees, with 
whom they have many points of resemblance, moral as well as 
physical. In  spite of the foreign domination which has weighed 
upon the Afghans for so many generations, we ought to believe 
them when they state that their race has never mixed with any 
other, for in our day they make no alliances except amon,@ 
themselves ; and the Afghan who should give his daughter in mar- 
riage to a stranger would clishonour himself; this, however, is rt 
remark which in a strict sense applies only to those tribes that 
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inhabit Afghanistan properly so called, for those disseminated 
through India connect themselves ~ i t h o u t  distinction with all 
B'ahomedan nations. 
The natives of India have known t,he Afghans for centuries under 
the name of Pataus and Rohillas," a designation which they now 
apply to them ; they also call them Pushtoonees, from the language 
they still speak; and it is not till the reign of the Sultan Abou- 
seid, of the race of Ghengis Khan, that certain Eastern writers 
speak of them under the name of Afghan, which is only the plural 
of the Arab mord fe&m t This was applied to them because 
they were almys in a disunited state amongst themselves, and 
continually addressing their complaints to the sovereigns on whom 
they were dependent ; nevertheless the name was but little used 
till the reign of Shah Abbas the Great, who, tired with their in- 
cessant lamentations, ordered them henceforward to be called by 
that designation only. 
There are almost as many classifications of the Afghan tribes 
as there are Eastern a~~thors  who have written on the subject ; not 
only are they not agreed, but they have called each other very hard 
- names to prove their accuracy. Being incompetent to decide 
which is right, we shall adopt the opinion of Abdullah Khan of 
- Herat as the one most deserving of credit, and we will precede it 
by giving his view of the manner in which the Afghans were 
brought to Afghanistan. The following is a translation of his 
manuscript :- 
" The  word Afyhan is derived from the Arab, that of aoughan 
from the Persian, and both one and the other are used in Hebrew. 
" Malek Thalut (Saul) king of the Jews had two sons, Afghan 
and Djalut-the first was the father of the Afghan nation and gave 
his name to it. After the reigns of David and Solomon, who suc- 
ceeded Saul, anarchy divided the Jewish tribes, and this continued 
to the period at which Bouktun Nasr $ took Jerusalem, massacred 
70,000 Jews, and after destroying that city led the surviving 
inhabitants captives to Babylon. Subsequently to this disaster the - 
Afghan tribe, struck with terror, fled from Judea and settled in 
Arabia : here they remained some considerable time, but as pas- 
turage and water were scarce, and both man and beast suffered 
extreme privation, some of the tribe determined to emigrate to 
* Boh in Pnshtoo signifies mountain, t Noise, tumult. 
and Bohilh au i u h a b h n t  of rnountaillx. $ Nebuchadneezar. 
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I-Iindostan. The branch of the Abdalees continued to reside in  
Arabia, and during the caliphat of Aboo Bekr their chiefs allied 
themselves to a powerful sheikh, by name Khalecl ibn Velid, of the 
tribe of Korech. The position and condition of the Abdalees was 
sensibly ameliorated in consequence of the assistance which they 
obtained from Khaled, but a t  the period when the Arabs subju- 
gated Fersia the Abdalees left Arabia and settled in this new con- 
quest, establishing themselves in the provinces of Fars and Kerman, 
and here they remained until Ghengis Khan invaded those districts. 
The tyrannical proceedings of this conqueror weighed with such 
terrible effect on the population, that the Abdalees q~ctted Persia 
and, passing by the Melrrane, Scinde, and Mooltan, arrived in 
India; but the results of this new migration were not more for- 
tunate, for they were scarcely settled here when their neighbours 
made war upon, and forced them to leave the n la ins and inhabit 
the rugged mountains of Suleirnan, considered as the cradle of 
the tribe, and called by them Kooh-I<hasseh.* The whole Afghan 
nation was brought together by the arrival of the Abdalees in 
the Suleiman mountains, and then consisted of twenty-four tribes, 
of which, as i t  has been already observed, Afghan, the son of 
Saul, was the father : this prince had three sons, named Tsera- 
Bend, Argoutch, and Rerlen, and each of them was the father of 
eight sons, who gave their names to the twenty-four tribes. 
" The following is the manner in which they are classed :- 
"Sons of Tsera-Bend. 
Abdal . . . . . .  
Yoosoof . . . .  
Baboor . . . . . .  
Wedr . . . . . .  
Lohooan .. :. 
Beritch . . . .  
Rhoognian .. 
Chiran . . . . . .  
"Sona of Kerlen. 
. . . .  Khattak 
Soor . . . . . .  
Afreed . . . . . .  
Toor ...... 
Names of tlie Tribes. 
. . Abdalees. 
. . Yoosoofzyes. 
. . Baboorees. 
.. Wezireea. 
. . Lohooanees. 
. . Beritchee~. 
. . IChooguianees. 
.. Chiiaueea. 
Names of the Tribes. 
. . Khattakees. 
.. Soorees. 
. . Afreedees. 
.. Toorees. 
Sons of Argoutch. 
Ghildj . . . .  
Kauker . , , . 
Djumourian . . 
Storian . . . .  
Pen . . . . . .  
Knss . . . . . .  
Takm . . . .  
. . . .  Naasar 
Sons of Kerlen. 
Zaz . . . . . .  
Bab . . . . . .  
Benguech . . . .  
Lendeh-poor . . 
Nnmea of the Tribes. 
. . Ghildjzyes. 
. . Eaukerees. 
. . Djumourianees. 
. . Storianees. 
.. Penees. 
.. Kaasees. 
... Takanees. 
. . Nassarees. 
Nnmes of the Tribes. 
. . Zazees. 
.. Babees. 
. . Benguechees. 
. . Lendeh-poorees. 
* Aden and the surrounding country as an Afghan author hns stated ? I do 
is .at the present time inhabited by an not think we should: a similarity of 
Arab tribe, which, as well as the prin- name and the alliance of the Afghan 
cipal Afghan tribe, is known by the Abdalees with the Arab tribe of Korech 
name of Abdalee. Are we to conclude are not fiufficient proofs in the affirmu- 
that t,hey have one and the same origin, tive.-Ferrier. 
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" The greater number of these tribes were scattered over India; but 
there, instead of increasing, they so diminished that scarcely a trace 
of any of them is to be found in.tllese days. The only exception 
to this remrtrk is the tribe of Yoosoofzyes settled in Cashmeer. 
Naclir Shah, desirous of ascertaining- their numbers, issued a de- 
cree that each family should bring a spear to his camp, and when 
these were counted they were found to amount to 600,000: at 
the present time there would not be half that number. This tribe 
has for more than thirty years been under the dominion of the 
Sikhs. Afghanistan, properly so called, is inhabited almost exclu- 
sively by Abdalees and Ghildjz~es, and of these we shall speak 
more especially. The first, although inhabiting every part of 
Afghanistan, are principally resident in Herat and Kandahar; 
the Ghildjzyes are established in t-he last-mentioned principality 
and Kabul ; the I<aulterees near the Bolan Pass ; the Baboorees, 
Nassarees, Lohooanees, and Babees, in Kanclahar and Scinde, where 
they are profitably occupied in conimerc.ia1 pursuits ; the Beritchees 
are in the neighbourhood of Pisheen ; the Chiranees and the Moh- 
muncls to the north-east of Kabul ; the Benguechees (Shiahs) between 
the last-mentioned town and the country of the Hazarahs,-these 
are divided into four branches, viz. the Bede-ltheelee, Chaloozanee, 
Djajee, and Bertedjee ; finally, the Chiranees are to be found every- 
where, though in small numbers : the remaining tribes are in India, 
or have become extinct. 
" Having only to consider Afghanistan Proper, I will now give 
more detailed information respecting the Abdalees and the 
Ghildjzyes, which form the bulk of the population of this country ; 
and as the offshoots in which they are subdivided are tolerably 
numerous, i t  will be useful to give here a tabular statement, which 
I have endeavoured to render as accurate as possible. 
"The powerful tribe of the Abdalees is known at the present 
time under the name of Dooranee, which was given to them by 
Ahmed Shah Suddozye on the occasion of his ascending the throne 
in 1747. When Nadir Shah ordered a census to be made of the 
Abdalee tribe, there were 195,000 families, and from these he 
raised 12,000 excellent cavalry ; but the Abdalees have decreased 
in number since Nadir's time. 
" Abdal, the son of Tsera-Bend, the founder of this tribe, had only 
one son, named Teryn, who had two sons, Zirek and Pindjpa : 
from the first originated three tribes, slid from the second five. 
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" The tribes that descended from Zirek are,- 
c " 1st. Roofelzye, more generally known under the name of 
Popolzye, divided into five branches, namely,-lst, the Hussenzalee ; 
2nd, Badoozye ; 3rd, Kalenderzye ; 4th, Ayoobzye ; 5th, Suddozye. 
The legitimate sovereigns who have reigned over the Afghans 
during the 17th and 18th centuries were of the branch of the 
Suddozyes. The tribe of the Koofelzyes numbered 20,000 
families. 
'&2nd. Barulcyze. This was in very ancient times one of the 
most distinguished offshoots of the Abdalees; i t  is divided into six 
branches-lst, the Mohamedzye ; 2nd, Kharzye ; 3rd, Sefretzye ; 
4th, Inguizye ; 5th, Gurjizye ; Gth, Etchelaye. The actual 
sovereigns of Kandahar and Kabul are of the branch of Mo- 
hamedzye. The Bamkzyes numbered 40,000 families. 
p " 3rd. Alikiouzye, which is divided into three branches-lst, the 
Djaloozye, to which belonged the chiefs of the Alikiouzye tribe ; 
21-14 Melazye ; 3rd, Serlcanee. Yar Mohamed Khan, of Herat, is 
of this tribe and the Djaloozye branch. The Alikiouzyes number 
20,000 families. 
" The tribes descended from Pindjpa are- 
" 1st. Isalrzye, numbering 10,000 families and divided into four 
branches, viz., lst, Ahmedzye ; 211d, Avazye ; 3rd, RI erdinzye ; 
4th, Biroozye. 
" 2nd. Alizye, numbering 10,000 families and divided into three 
branches-lst, Hassanzalec, to which the chiefs of the Alizye tribe 
belong ; 2nd, Alelczye ; 3rd, Guerazye. 
" 3rd. Noorzye, numbering 30,000 families and divided into three 
branches-lst, Tchalalczye ; 21-14 Bahaderzye ; 3rd, Derzakee. 
" 4th. Khaouganee, numbering 6000 families and divided into 
two branches-lst, Khaouganee Kelan ; 2nd, Khaouganee I<itchik. 
" 5th. Makoohee, numbering 10,000 families and divided into 
three branches-lst, Bedelzye ; 2nd, Firoozye ; 3rd, Sebzalee. 
"The tribe of the Ghildjzyes, from which sprung Mir Weis, Mir 
Mahmood his son, and Mir Echreff his nephew, had-Ghildj, the 
son of Argoutch, for its founder. Ghildj had two sons, Ibrahim 
and Thooran, from whom sprung the six tribes that follow, viz., 
lst, Suleiman-Kheilee ; 2nd, Outekee ; 3rd, Tookhee-from this 
came the branch of the Loods, which gave India its sovereigns; 
4th, Rhaleelee; 5th, Toorkee ; 6th, Euderee. The three first 
descended from Ibrahim, and the three last from Thooran. 
Founders. 
--- 
Abdnl and 
his son Teryn 
founders of 
the Tribe. 
TRIBES AND THEIR BRANCHES. CHAP. I. 
A TABLE of the TRIBE of the ABD~LEES. 
Stock. 
--- 
Zirek .. 
Pindjpa .. 
Tribes. 
--- 
Pnpolzye .. 
Barultzye .. 
Alikiouzye . . 
Iaakzye .. .. 
Alizye .. . , 
Noorzye . 
Khao nganee 
Makoohee . 
Branches. 
3ucldozye. 
Bussenxalee. 
Badoozye. 
Kalenderzye. 
kyoobzye. 
hlohamedzye. 
Kharzye. 
Sefretzye. 
Inguizye. 
Gurjizye. 
Etchekzye. 
Djaloozye. 
Melazgn. 
Serkanee. 
Ahmedzye. 
Avszge. 
Merdinzye. 
Biroozye. 
Hassanzalee. 
Alekzye. 
Cuerazye. 
Tchalakzye. 
Bahaderzye. 
Derzakee. 
Khaouganee Xelan. 
Khaouganee ICitchik. 
Bedelzye. 
Firoosye. 
Sebzalee. 
TRIBE of the GHILDJZYB. 
- I 
The primitive tribe of 
which corresponds with that of nation : the first divisions of this 
primitive tribe are called ferguefi, tribe ; the subdivisions of this, 
tirehs or branches. Thus the families which are descended from 
the first generation-Tsera-Bend, Argoutch, and Kerlen-as the 
Abdalees, the Ghilcljzyes, the Kaukerees, form the Taw, nation ; 
those which descend from these last, such as. the Popolzyes, Barulr- 
zyes, Ibrahim, Thooran, &c., are called Fergueh, tribes; and the sub- 
divisions of these (see the above tablej are called the Tireh, branches. 
The Abdalees and Ghildjzyes, by reason of their numerical 
superiority over the others, and also from the power they have 
Ibrahim.. . . 
Thoorsn .. I Suleiman-Kheilee, Outekee. Tookhee. Khaleelee. Toorkee. Enderee." 
the Afghans was called taijeh, a word 
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exercised, and continue to exercise, in Afghanistan a t  the present 
day, have arrogated to themselves a certain kind of supremacy 
over the other tribes, and consider themselves of an origin more 
noble than theirs : they even refuse to acknowledge their right to 
. 
the title of Afghan. I t  is more especially the Abdalee tribe that 
has put forth, and in the most positive manner, this pretension. 
Not only do they refuse the title of Afghans-and this even to the 
Ghildjzyes-but also there is a schism on the subject amongst 
themselves, and the Zireks affirm that they are of a more noble 
extraction than the Pindjpas. This scornful assumption has often 
given rise to sanguinary couflicts between them, and is based upon 
the fact that the mother of Abdal was a legitimate wife, whereas 
the mother of Ghildj was a concubine, which is, they say, proved by 
the name which was given him, for Ghildj in Pushtoo signifies 
bastard. 
On the other hand, the tribes of nTakoohee and Rhaouganee, 
though of Afghan origin, were not a t  the outset of the Abdalee 
tribe, but, by reason of the perfect friendship which always existed 
'between them, the ,Abdalees adopted them and classed them 
amongst the Pindjpas, and they have ever since been considered 
as belonging to that family. After the death of Nadir Shah an 
occurrence took place which will give some idea of the importance 
the Afghans attach to their belonging to the most noble tribe. 
Ahmed Shah had scarcely founded the dynasty of the Suddozyes 
when it was nearly overthrown by an intrigue fomented against 
him by the Serdar Noor Dlohamed Khan. Obliged to employ 
severe measures to repress the evil-disposed, he ordered that ten 
persons of each tribe taken from amongst the most guilty should b e  
put to death. It w a  the first time he had shed the 'tiIood .of his 
subjects, and the experiment was not ~ i t h o u t  danger, for the 
Afghans talked of avenging themselves and retaliating upon the 
Shah and his family ; but the sovereign authority triumphed, and 
from that moment it was admitted by the tribes that the king had 
the right of shedding blood without any one having the power to 
question it. The &Ialzoohees and Khaouganees had not been 
included in these acts of severity, 011 the ground that, not being 
Abdalees by descent, their fault was of less magnitude, and therefore 
i t  was possible to pardon them; but these tribes, affronted at  the 
exception, withdrew from the Shah's camp. An explanation 
naturally followed, and Ahmed Shah, to satisfy them, ordered ten 
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Makoohees and ten Khaouganees to he put to death, upon which 
they immediately returned to their duty, for they considered them- 
selves vilified by the esception that had been made in their favour. 
Independently of the tribes and branches that we have classified, 
those of the Abdalees and the Ghildjzyes are again subdivided into 
so great a number of tireh, or families, and there is so much con- 
fusion in these subdivisions, that it would be impossible for an 
Afghan, even the best informed upon the subject, to give a perfect 
list of them. There would be no exaggeration in stating their 
numbers at more than three hundred. These have been formed 
from time to time when the surplus population of a tribe has been 
obliged to separate from it and seek a fresh district, or when an 
influential relative of the chief had some misunderstanding with 
him and withdrew from his authority, with those who were attached 
to his own person. At  other times some successful conqueror broke 
up a tribe, to render it less powerful ; each subdivision then took the 
name of the new chief whose fortunes it followed, but they always 
looked upon themselves as members of the original tribe, though 
often separated by considerable distances from each other. These 
separations are also to be attributed to the fear entertained by the 
sovereigns of the numerical force of some of the tribes. Shah 
Abbas the Great was the last who adopted this measure on a large 
scale ; and to secure the permanent tranquillity and stability of the 
populations to which he had assigned a new territory, he carried a 
number of hostages with him to Ispahan. 
T h e  Abdalees, besides having the name of Dobranees, which 
they received from Ahmed Shah, are still called Suleimanees, from 
the mountains whence they came ; the district they then inhabited 
bears the appellation of Tobeh-filahuroof. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
Afghanistan conquered by Alexander -Reconquered, by the aboriginal inhabitants 
-Taken by the Tartars -Death of Mansoor - Success of Sebek-Taghee - 
Character of the Afghans at this period-Concession of territory t o  the 
Abdalee tribe- Ghildjzyes opposed to the Tartar dominion-The Brst sove- 
reign of Afghanistan- His son Mahmood- Cruelty of the  Tartar princes - 
Expulsion of Beiram - Khosroo Malek the laat of the Ghaznevide dynasty - List 
of the monarchs of that race - Afghan princes of Gour - Mnhmood Gouree - 
His conquests in India - Eldooz - Djellal Eddin-Afghanistan conquered 
by Ghengis Khan - Malek Kurt  - Chema Eddin Gouree - Their suzerainty to 
the Tartars - Conquered by Tamerlane - Description of the  Afghans by that  
. invader - Afghan rule in India - Mahmood 111. - Ibrahim Khan defeats Bellal 
0 and seizes Kabul and Kaudahar-Mirza Baboor - Assisted. by the  Persians - 
Defeated by the Uzbeks, but  successful in India-Fall of lbrahim Ehan- 
Death of Mirza Raboor- Succeeded by his son Humayoon - Protected by 
Shah Thamwp- Anecdote of the latter-Assists Humayoon with a Persian 
army - The Loods defeated - Their attempts to  ret'ake Delhi - The prophetess 
Eiemal Eddin - Shah Jehan drives out the Loods - Aurungzebe finally anni- 
hilates them -Kandahar ceded to Persia by Humayoon - Tnken and retaken 
by the Persians and Moguls - Afghan deputation to Shah Abbw -Extract from 
Sir John Malcolm's ' History of Persia'-Afghans quiet under Shah Abbas - 
Tyranny of his grandson Shah Seffee -Randaha taken by Shah Abbas 11. in  
1642 - Success of the Ghildjzyes - Their revolt suppressed by the  Shah 
I Hoosein-Ciourguin Khan -Deputation of the afghans to the Persian Court in 1706. 
AMONGST the conquests of Alexander the Great was that of Af- 
ghanistan, and at the death of this invader his lieutenant, Seleucus, 
succeeded to the sovereignty of the greater portion of his dominions 
in Asia. It is presumed that his son and grandson followed him ; 
but history does not inform us how or why, under the reign of the 
last-mentioned monarch, Afghanistan was taken from the Seleukides 
by the aboriginal chiefs, and soon formed, with Bactria, an inde- 
pendent state, which existed with some degree of splendour during 
one hundred and fifty years. After the lapse of that period the 
Tartars made tlxmaelves masters of the country, and appear to 
have held possession of it up to the tenth century. This blank 
remains in profound obscurity, and it is only from about the year 
A.D. 997 that we have any information which can elucidate the 
history of the Afghans. 
A t  that time Mansoor reigned in Tartary, and when he  died 
I an officer of rank, named Sebek-Taghee, threw off the allegiance 
he  owed to his successor, established his dominion over all the 
southern part of Afghanistan, and made Gliuznee his capital. 
The  Afghan tribes at this period were for the most part a nomade 
and barbarous people, living by plunder and rapine, and under 
a host of chiefs very careful of their independence, who were 
almost always at enmity with each other, and ready to sell their 
services to the highest bidder. Thence it often happened that a 
part of the nation was to be found in one camp, while another was 
opposed to it in-that of the enemies, and, like true Condottieri, they 
fought against one another without the least scruple. The disunion 
existing amongst the Afghan tribes in the present day may be 
traced back to the most remote times, and it is not surprising that 
with this sentiment they have so long delayed to organize them- 
selves as a nation. Their migratory habits also contributed to 
this result, and they mere for a long time a wild race dispersed 
over Persia, India, and the mountains of Afghanistan, but every- 
where and a t  all periods turbulent and dificult to govern, adapting 
themselves very little to the habits of those of a different origin 
within whose territory they established themselves. The consequence 
was, that on very many occasions quarrels arose in which many of 
the tribes were decimat.ed without pity, while the remainder were 
obliged to seek refuge in the mountains where they are to be met 
with in the prescnt day. The tribe of the Abdalees, the most 
powerful now existing, did not fix itself in the Suleiman range 
till i t  had received authority to do SO from Sebek-Taghee, who was 
desirous of reconlpensing them by this concession of territory 
for the support they had afforded him in his Indian campaigns. 
The Ghildjzyes, on the contrary, were always strongly opposed to 
the Tartar dominion over their country, which was so much the 
more dangerous for them, because their tribe was at that time 
exceedingly numerous. They carried their malpractices to such 
an extent, that Mahmood, son of Sebeli-Taghee, who succeeded 
him on the .throne of Ghuznee, was obliged almost entirely to 
exterminate them. But succeeding centuries have enabled the 
Ghildjzyes to recover from this disaster, and the tribe is now, 
next to that of the Abdalees, the most numerous and the lnost 
powerful in Afghanistan. 
Sebek-Taghee may be considered as the first sovereign who ruled 
over Afghanistan properly so called ; but the Afghans, in conse- 
quence of his Tartar origin, looked upon him and his descenclants 
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as tyrants and usurpers, and thought little of his good deeds 
and the benefits he conferred upon them. Mahmood, after the 
death of his father, carried his arms into Persia aud India, and 
with the spoils of war obtained in these countries enriched 
Afghanistan, and made Ghuznee, his capital, one of the most 
beautiful cities in Asia. His death took .place in 1028. His  de- 
scendants, little worthy of succeeding him, soon lost the  territory 
which he had added to the kingdom founded by Sebek-Taghee ; I 
their dominion was soon reduced to the Afghan provinces, in which 
their authority was not always respected; and if they preserved 
these during two centuries, they owed this circumstance much more 
to the difficulties in which their neighbours .were involved than to 
any fear they entertained of the Tartar dynasty. 
Beiram, one of these princes, seized upon an -Afghan chief, of 
the name of Sooree, who about, the year 1151 commanded in  the 
province of Gour, and put him to a cruel death to punish him for 
the resolution with which he had opposed him. T h e  barbarity 
of the Tartar prince on this occasion exceeded anything that can 
be imagined ; he made him suffer a thousand tortures, and insulted 
him by every species of outrage. 
Allah-Eddin, brother of this unfortunate Afghan an4 his successor 
in the sovereignty of Gour, determined to revenge himself by force 
of arms, and completely succeeded. He  seized the town of Ghuznee, 
abandoned it during seven days to the fury and excesses of an  
army burning with vengeance and possessed with an inherent pas- 
sion for plunder, and who carried the spirit of a savage temperament 
so far as to mix the blood of the vanquished with the mortar des- 
tined to repair the walls of the city. 
Beiram, thus vanquislled, retired beyond the Indus, and con- 
tinued to reign in the Punjab, abandoning the western provinces of: 
his kingdom to his victorious adversary. 
War was declared on several other occasions. between these two 
princes, when Beiram was less unfortunate, and his son Xhosroo Shah 
inherited the reduced territory he had preserved ; but the dynasty 
of the Ghaznevides was brought to a close during the lifetime of 
his grandson Khosroo Nalek. Attacked in 1160 by Mahmood 
Gouree, cousin and successor of Allah Eddin, Khosroo Malelr 
was overtbrown, and his kingdom annexdd' to that of Afghanistan. 
The following is a list of the Ghaznevide princes who reigned over 
the last-mentioned country :- 
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A.D. Hejirr 
Sebek-Taghee .. 976 . . . .  365 
Isma61 . . . . . .  997 .... 387 
Muhmood . . . .  997 .... 387 
.... Mohamed . . . .  1030 431 
.... . . . . . .  Massood 1031 422 
. . . .  Madood . . . . . .  1041 433 
.... . . . . . .  &l&sood 1049 441 
A.D. Kejirn. 
.... . . . . . . . . . .  Ali 1049 441 
Abd-ul-Reschid .. 1052 .... 443 
Ferakh-zad . . . .  1053 .... 444 
Ibrahim . . . . . .  1059 .... 456 
Massood . . . . . .  1098 .... 492 
Arselane Shah .. 1104 .... 508 
Beiram Shah . . . .  1108 .... 512 
The Afghan princes of Gour, from being simple chiefs of a smdl 
principality, were thus raised to the sovereign power in Afghanistan, 
to which they soon added divers principalities of India. Gour is a 
little province, well situated for defence, and in the heart of the 
most rugged mountains of the Paropamisus, but possessing none 
of those means of aggression which could enable the Afghans to 
hope for victory against one so powerful as that of Ghuznee. I t  
may be supposed' that Allah Eddin found a ready support in the 
other tribes of his nation, who submitted with r e g e t  to the dominion 
of the Tartars. The humiliation which the Afghans experienced in 
being treated as a conquered people, added to their feelings of 
nationality, must have excited heroic sentiments in their breasts, and 
made them triumph over the foreign race that oppressed them. 
B1ahmood Gouree carried his arms into the interior of India 
and seized Benares, in which city he committed a thousand 
atrocities. This prince left no heirs, and died in 1205. His 
empire, in accordance with his desire, was divided between 
his favourites and hjs freedmen. Afghanistan proper fell to 
Eldooz, but he was soon despoiled of it by a prince of Kharism, 
whose successor, Djelld Eddin, was in like manner obliged to 
retire before the victorious armies of Ghengis Khan. Ferishteh 
informs us that the descendants of this conqueror were in possession 
of Afghanistan up to the year 1251-the period at  which an 
Afghan or Patan King, which is synonymous, seized upon Ghuznee 
and  Kabul, and annexed them to the lndian empire. 
Less than a century later a new dynasty, which western authors 
mention under the name of Mdek Kurt," established itself in the 
province of Gour and extended its dominion over Kandahar and 
Herat from A.D. 1336 (Hejira 736) to A.n. 1383 (Hejira 785). 
The  first sovereign of this dynasty, Chems-Eddin Gouree, 
* The word Eurt is a corruption of dynasty urns of the  Afghan race.- 
t h e  word Gmr, which, united ~ 5 t h  that Ferrier. 
of Malek, signifies Prince of Cour. This 
CHAP. D. AFGHAN RULE I N  INDIA. 17 
nevertheless, aclmowledged the suzerainty of the Tartar monarchs ; 
this was the case also with his sons and successors, Rookn-Eddin 
and Fakhr-Eddin, but the third, Ghyaz-Eddin, threw off the vassal- 
age which had been laid upon him by the descendants of Ghengis 
Khm.  Chems-Eddin, Nalelr; Hafez, Moez Eddin IIoosein, a d  
Malelc Bagher, who succeeded him, preserved their independence ; 
nevertheless the latter claimed the support of the Tartars to main- 
tain him in the position he had usurped; but his reign was of 
brief duration, for his brother Noez-Eddin overthrew him, and left 
the reins of power to his son Ghyaz-Eddin, the ninth and last sove- 
reign of this dynasty. This prince was made prisoner by the 
Emir Tamerlane, who seized his territory as well as that of Ghuznee 
and Kabul. 
Tamerlane speaks of the Afghans in his Institutes as a barbarous 
people, devoted to pillage, and by no means so far advanced in 
civilization as the Tartars; but he limits the counhy they then 
occupied to the Suleiman mountains, from which me are left to 
conclude that he understood by the name Afghan or Aoughan 
only the tribe of the Abddees, who, since the days of Sebelc-Taghee, 
were in possession of the country mentioned in the Institutes. This 
circumstance is therefore confirmatory of the opinion we have 
already set forth on the uncertainty of the origin of the Afghans. 
From the conquest of Afghanistan by Tamerlane up to the com- 
mencement of the sixteenth century the information respecting them 
is exceedingly vague, and yet this epoch ought to have been one of 
the most honourable in the annals of Afghan history ; but a portion 
of the facts which relate to it occurred in  India, and beyond the ter- 
ritory the history of which we are ende$vouring to sketch : we shall 
therefore pass on very rapidly, and only have recourse to the manu- 
script from which we have already given some passages. 
The Afghan rule in India commenced at the death of Mahmood 
Gouree, which took place in 1205; thus, as we have already 
stated above, the dominions of this Mahmood were, for want 
of a direct heir, divided between his favourites and freedmen. 
The  Indian provinces fell to Routoob, one of his generals of the 
Afghan tribe of Lood. This tribe, seeing its chief the sovereign 
of a vast empire, with Delhi for its capital, left Afghanistan 
and settled themselves in India, where, protected and favoured 
by the monarch, they increased rapidly. Accustomed from their . 
infancy to a life spent in camps, and of rude and simple hitbits, 
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they with little difficulty obtained an ascendancy over the natiircs 
of India, and the fear with which t.hey inspired them resulted in 
their accepting with resignation the yoke of the Afghan dynasty. 
This d p a s t y  still held possession of that country in 1398, when 
Tamerlane conquered it. Nahmood 111. was then on the throne, 
and the invader allowed him to retain the supreme power as a 
recompense for the assistance which he gave him during those 
bloody massacres that obtained for him the title of the destroyer 
of humanity. 
Mahmood 111. died in 1450, a period a t  which an Afghan lord, 
also of the tribe of Lood, named Bellal, overthrew the reigning 
family. This new sovereign made Bps his capital. During his 
reign the empire was a prey to c,ontinual agitation; the revolts 
amongst the Loods were incessant, and Bellal vas at length driven 
out and succeeded by Ibrahim Khan, another Afghan chief of the 
same tribe, who subdued each of his competitors in turn; he in- 
vaded successively Icandahar and Kabul, meeting with scarcely 
any resistance, favoured as he was by the Afghan tribes. Suc- 
cesses so easily obtained increased his ambition, and he resolved to 
march upon the Tartar kingdom of Ferghana, already attacked in 
the rear by Chahee Beg, king of Bolchara, with whom he concluded 
a treaty offensive and defensive, stipulating that the conquered 
countries should be divided between them. Nirza Baboor, of the 
tribe of Gurlrani, and fifth in descent from Tamerlane,* was a t  
this time sovereign of Ferghana, who, dready despoiled of some 
of the best parts of his territory by Chahee Beg, and menaced on 
the south by Ibrahim Khan, despaired of being able to resist this 
combination of his enemies, fled from his kingdom, and placed 
himself under the protecticn of the King of Persia. This took 
place in the year 1498 (Hejira 904). Shah Ismael Seffavye re- 
ceived him in the most gracious manner, and soon afler gave him 
a force of 20,000 horsemen, commanded by Mir Nadjm, with 
which to recover his kingdom. 'Rlirza Baboor also took' the field, 
and commenced operations against the Uzbeks ; but he had 
scarcely laid siege to Bolrhara nhen the inhabitants, reinforced by 
the troops which Ibrahim Khan had sent to his support, attaclced 
the Persians during the night, routed them, and killed their leader, 
Mir Nadjm. This occurred in 1505 (Hejira 911). 
* He was t h e  son of Omnr Sheikh, was the son of Miranshfih, who lvas 
who was t h e  son of Aboo Seid, who the  son of Tamerlane.-firricr. 
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After this disaster Mirza Baboor retreated by the way of Balkh, 
the road t.o which city remained open : he was fortunate enough 
to be able to take Kabul, and within a brief space he had 
made numerous partisans in that country, which he entirely sub- 
dued. I n  1505 (Hejira 913) he seized upon Kandahar, and 
not long after the Punjab. The natives of India, seeing his suc- 
cess, wrote to him in 1511 (Hejira 916), and besought his assistance 
in throwing off the tyranny of Ibrahim Khan, promising to act 
with vigour the moment he should appear a t  the head of his 
army. This request consorted with the projects of vengeance that 
Mirza Raboor cherished against Ibrahim Khan, and he accepted 
i t  with readiness. He marched, therefore, against that monarch 
in 1525, defeated him, and took possession of the whole of the 
Indian territories of which Ibrahim had usurped the sovereignty. 
After this brief description of the transient power which the 
Afghans possessed in this part of India, the manuscript of Ab- 
dullah Khan of Herat proceeds thus. The natives of India had 
little reason to congratulate themselves in having requested another 
monarch to come and govern them, for Mirza Baboor oppressed . 
and plundered, and made them almost regret Ibrahim Khan the 
Lood. 
A t  the death of Mirza Baboor, sovereign of India and Afghan- 
istan, which took place in 1530 (Hejira 937), his eldest son suc- 
ceeded to all his dominions, but his brother Kamran, and his 
vizier Shere Khan, an Afghan of the tribe of Lood, revolted 
against him, and, assisted by those devoted to their interests, 
obliged him to fly; the Persians, on the other hand, had some 
time before attacked Kandahar and taken i t  from the Moguls. 
Notwithstanding this act of hostilit,y, Humayoon did as his father 
had done-he retired to the court of Persia and sought the pro- 
tection of the Shah Thamasp. This monarch, having been in- 
formed that the fugitive prince was approaching his territory, sent 
an order to the governor of Herat to receive him with every mark 
of respect, and to escort him to Kasbeen, the capital, in a manner 
worthy of his rank and with a splendour truly regal. After their 
meeting the two monarchs felt a lively interest in each other. The  
Shah Thamasp not only acceded to the wishes of his royal guest, 
but did everything in his power to anticipate them, as the follow- 
ing anecdote will show :- 
.Humayoon, walking one day in the streets of Kasbeen, came to a, 
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canal, the clear and limpid waters of which ran with a rapid course 
between banks covered with flowers and verdure ; the spot pleased 
him greatly, and turning to one of his officers he said, " If I had 
the means of doing so, I would here build a magmilicent mosque." 
A Persian nobleman who heard these words repeated them to the 
Shah Thamasp, who swore that the wish of H~lmayoon should not 
remain ungratified, and his architect, having been called into his 
presence, was ordered to construct a mquficent mosque, and 
within the space of six months, upon the site indicated by the 
exiled prince. H e  also forbade any of his servants from men- 
tioning the circumstance, and gave strict injunctions that I-I~tmayoon 
should never be permitted to walk near the spot until the edifice 
was completed. I n  six months the beautiful mosque was finished, 
and the name of the Shah's guest inscribed over the portal in the 
f a p d e  as having been the founder. EIumayoon, to whom no 
intimation on the subject had been given, was conducted to it. 
His  astonishment on seeing it was great indeed, and his gratitude 
to the Shah Thamasp for this delicate mark of his friendship not 
less. Subsequently the Shah gave him further proofs of his attach- 
ment; indeed he was prodigal of them. 
Humayoon, nevertheless, became at length sensible that the state 
of his aflairs in India would never improve if he continued to pass 
his time amidst the festivities of the co~wt at Kasbeen ; he therefore 
begged the Shah to give him some troops with which he might 
hope to regain his crown and punish the usurpers of his throne. 
T h e  King of Persia received this new request as he had done every 
other, and placed 12,000 cavalry, commanded by Beyram Khan, 
a t  his disposal. This officer had resided many years in India, was 
well acquainted with the habits and feelings of the people of that 
country, and the Shah charged him to re-establish Humayoon in 
all his rights. The march 'of this army upon Delhi was soon 
known, and the Loods a t  once made every preparation for defence, 
but  in vain. I-Iumayoon had scarcely arrived at Kabul when his 
Indian subjects revolted against Shere Ehan, and after having , 
killed a large proportion of his Afghans obliged him to fly from the 
country. On hearing this Humayoon travelled night and day to 
reach his dominions, leaving Beyram Khan and his Persians, with 
a crowd of Tartars and Parsivans that soon joined him, to follow. 
This numerous and well-trained army was broken into divisions on 
its arrival in India, and Humayoon sent them in various directions 
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with orders to massacre the Afghan Loods wherever they were 
met with and not leave one alive. These instructions were 
rigorously executed, and those who were fortunate enough to escape 
were reduced to a pitiable condition; but when they recovered 
from the terror into which they had been thrown, they showed 
themselves in arms at various points and again threatened the 
Emperor of the Moguls. Nevertheless they did not attempt any- 
thing in the lifetime of I-I~unayoon, but after his death, which 
took place in 1555, and in the reign of his son Mohamed 
Alrim Mirza, surnamed Djellal Eddin Akbar, Roouchen Bayazid, 
one of the chiefs of the Loods, who passed amongst them as 
inspired, in short almost a prophet, united the scattered warriors of 
the tribe, placed himself at their head, and declared his preten- 
sions to the throne of Delhi. For several yeass he kept up a 
desultory warfare against the 171oguls, but without obtaining any 
positive result, for death surprised him in the midst of it. His son, 
Omar Sheikh Riemd Eddin, continued the strife, and owed the 
success which he obtained, as his father had done, to the co-operation 
of the Prince Noor EddinJehanghir, second son of FIurnayoon, who 
had also raised the standard of revolt against Akbar. The Loods 
continued to carry on this party warfare for a considerable time, but 
without being able to grasp a second time the Indian sceptre, for the 
Moguls were too powerful. - 
ARer the death of Omar Sheikh Kiemal Eddii, a young maiden 
of the tribe of Lood, named Kiemal Khatoon, endeavoured to create 
a schism in the n4ahomedan religion as professed by the Afghans, 
the Moguls, and a few Indian tribes ; her preaching and that of 
her disciples was the cause of great commotions in the empire : the 
Loods, who were always at the head of every disturbance, suffered 
new misfortunes, and fresh massacres considerably reduced their 
n~unbers. These troubles were rife up to the commencement of the 
reign of Shah Abedin Mohamed Shah, surnamed Shah Jehan, who 
again persecuted the Afghan Loods, and in 1632 (Hejira 1042) 
drove them out of India, but the revolts, which had been excited by 
this religious schism, were not thoroughly put down until the close 
of the reign of Aurungzebe, who succeeded him. From this period 
the Lood tribe ceased to have any influence in India ; they made 
no further attempts to obtain power ; and we shall in future become 
further acquainted with their history in that of Afghanistan Proper. 
Mirza Baboor, the founder of the dynasty of the Mogds,' was 
enabled to hold possession of Eabul, which he left to his successors ; 
but he lost Eandahar, and this as well as the piincipalities of Herat 
and Gom fell into the hands of the Persians. Subsequently, how- 
ever, he retook Kandahar, against which he sent his son IKamran 
Dlirza, but soon after it was again in the powcr of the Shah Thamasp. 
Seffavye Humayoon, the succcssor to Bnboor, seized upon i t  once 
more, but, to mark his gratitude for the services which he had 
received from the Shah of Persia, he ceded it to him by treaty in 
1545 ; it contini~eci in the possession of Persia during the lifetime 
of Hunayoon, after which his son dkbar  retook it. It fell, how- 
ever, in 1609 (Hejira 1018), into the hands of the great Shah Ahbas 
S e f f a ~ ~ e ,  but only to revert to the Emperor Jehangir, who carricd 
Iiandahar by aseaul t. This was the last time but one that the Noguls 
were enabled to take this fortress, the advantageous position of which 
on the frontiers of the tn-o states made them dispute its possession 
. 
with so much tenacity against the Persians. The contest for it was 
again renewed in 1620 by Shah Abbas, and the efforts which 
Aurungzebe made to retake it at  n later period completely failed. 
The officers appointed by .the Persian monarch to govern Kandahar 
so oppressed the Afghans that they sent two of their principd 
Serdars to the Shah to obtain a relaxation of the rigorous measures 
to which they were subjected, and requested that the governor 
might henceforth be chosen from the chiefs of the Afghan tribes, 
promising that their fidelity should be proof against every tempta- 
tion. The following are the terms in which Sir John Malcolm, ' 
in his excellent worlr on Persia, speaks of this embassy ; the informa- 
tion is  taken from the Persian manuscript of 31irza Syud Mohamed 
of Ispahan :- 
'' I n  the time uf the Saffavean kings of Persia the Affghans were . 
often oppressed ; and on one occasion they were so discontented with 
their Persian governor, that they sent a secret deputation to 
Ispahan to solicit his removal and the appointment of one of their 
own tribe. Their request was granted; and two of the tribe of 
Abddlee were raised to the office of Reish Saffeed, or Kutlrhodah of 
the tribes, and their authority was confirmed by a royal patent. 
The name of one of these two persons was Seedoo, of the famly of 
Bameeyehi, from whom Ahmed Shah, the founder of the present 
royal family of Cabd, is lineally descended. The name of the 
other was Ahmed, of the family of Bareclrzehi, from whom the 
present Affghan chiefs, Serafray Khan and Futteh Khan, are 
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descended. The A5shans were delighted with this arrangement, 
and granted their entire and respectful obedience to the chief 
appointed by the Persian Government, Time has confirmed this 
i respect; and the superiority of the chiefs so selected has become an inheritance to their family. The race of Seedoo obtained sovereignty, 
while that of Ahmed has only gained high station and command. 
The Seedoozehis (or descendants of Seedoo) are held in such venera- 
1: tion, that, if one of them was to attempt the murder of an ameer, or 
I 
I 
I 
I 
lord of another tribe, it would be considered wrong to obtain 
safety by assaulting the Seedoozehis. If an Affghan acted other- 
wise he would be deemed an outcast in his own class or tribe. 
There is, however, an exception to this rule in favour of the 
descendants of Ahmed, and the Ahmedzehis may without sacrilege 
slay a Seedoozehi ; but a great number of the Affghans deny this 
privilege, even to the Ahmedzehis. Seedoo and Ahmed (this 
i 
I author adds) were raised to rank by Shah Abbas the Great, and 
derived their fortunes from that fountain of dignity and splendour." 
This respect for the Suddozyes amongst the Afghans has dis- 
appeared in our days ; and since they have been dispossessed of 
the throne, not only those who belonged to this branch, but also 
all the members of the tribe of Popolzye, from which it was 
derived, are persecuted and often plundered by the Mohamedzyes 
actually in power. 
So long as Shah Abbas lived the Afghans settled in Herat and 
I '  Randahar remained perfectly tranquil under his dominion ; but a 
Persian governor, appointed by his grandson and successor Shah 
Seffee, having maltreated them, they revolted. This sovereign 
managed to keep the Heratees in check, but his governor in Kan- 
dahar, a traitor to his duty, passed qver to the camp of the Mogul 
Emperor with the Persian troops under his orders, and gave up 
li the fortress to the Shah in 1634. Kandahar was taken from the Moguls by the Persians in 1642, 
E 
during the reign of Shah Abbas the Second. The conquerors of 
Dew1 subsequently made every effort, but in vain, to recapture 
the city, and were obliged tc remain satisfied with the possession 
of Kabul, which had belonged to them from the time of Baber. 
The Persians retained Herat and Kandahar in spite of the adverse 
feeling of the Afghans, who were always more anxious to be under 
the dominion of the Great Mogul, which they considered less bur- 
densome than that of the Persians. 
The Afghans of the tribe of Ghildjzyes, dispersed over the pro- 
vince of Iiandahar, were, however, the most restless and the most 
constant enemies of Persia, so that, towards the close of the seven- 
teenth century, they had pretty ncarly rendered themselves masters 
of the principality. 
In 1693, a little before his accessiou to tlie throne, the Shah, 
Sultan Hoosein, felt that it was absolutely necessary that they 
s h o ~ ~ l d  be put down, and with a vieu to effect this object he selected 
as their governor the MTalee of Georgia, Gourguin Khan, sur- 
named Shah Nawaz Khan, a clever and energetic man, and sent 
with him a well-appointed and nurncrous army, and instructions to 
take severe measures with the Afghans. 
Shah Nawaz Khan arrived a t  Kandahar in 1702, and treated 
the Afghans without pity, as a conq~~ercd but rebellious people; 
nothing could escape his inflexible and harsh proceedings-neither 
rank, age, nor sex was any protection ; his troops, surfeited with 
murders and pillage, reduced the women and girls to a state of 
slavery, and made them the unhappy victims of their base violence. 
The  Afghans, bewildered and alarmed a t  this sbte  of things, sent 
a deputation to Ispahan, in 1706, to entreat the King to put a 
stop to the calamities which weighed upon them; but this embassy 
did not succeed as a similar one had done in the reign of Shah 
Abbas, for their delegates were received with haughty and h a ~ h  
indifference ; and the inclividuals who composed the deputation re- 
turned to their countrymen to share with them the despair they 
also fel . 
Disappointed in their hopes, the Afghans could not dream of 
emancipating themselves by force of arms fi-om the heavy yoke 
of Gourguin Khan, for his vigilance was equal to his severity ; 
flight being impossible and complaint useless, and seeing no other 
mode by which they could put a stop to the cruelties that were 
practised upon them, they awaited in silence, and bowed down with 
grief, the moment when they should be able to take vengeance 
upon their oppressors for so many outrages ; and this was not far 
distant, for an act on the part of Gourguin Khan soon presented 
them with an opportunity. 
CHAPTER 111. 
The Kelauter of Kandahar is sent prisoner to Ispahan -His intrigues against 
Gourguin D a n  - He makes a pilgrimage to  Mecca - Obtains a fetuo from the  
chief mollah of Islain -Returns to Ispahan, and finally to Kandahar - Indig- 
nation of Gourguin Khan-Events consequent upon this -Opinion of Abdullah 
Khan upon them-Death of Gour,pin Khan-Mk Weis enters Kandahar- 
Statement of Mirza Nehdee - The Ghildjzyes declare their independence, a n d  
exterminate the Persian troops-The tribe of the Abddees establish them- 
selves in Herat-The Persian generals attack the Kelauter and we beaten- 
Kaee Xhosroo Khan besiege3 Iiandahar-He is defeated and killed with 30,000 
of his troops - Mohamed Roo,qtem aucceeds him, but is also beaten -The 
Afghans acknowledge Mir Weis as their sovereign chief -- Death of the  Mir in  
17'15 -His brother Mir Abdullah succeeds him - His negotiations with Persia 
-Is put  to death by the eldest son of Mir Weis, who succeeds him-Alayor 
Khan, Governor of Herat - Zeman Khan appointed by the Persian monarch to  
succeed him - Heyat Sultan - He marches against Randahar - Attacked by 
Assad Ullah and defeated-Ente~s Eerat-Persian campaign against the  
Uzbeks - Sefi Kooli Khan -1s defeated by the Afghans - Independence of the 
Afghans established -Assad Ullah lays siege to Furrah - Is attacked by Mir 
Mahmood of Rnndahar - A Belooch chief, Mir Mohamed, seizes Herat. 
AMONGST the Afghan nobles who had signed the petition to the 
Shah against Nawaz Khan was Mir Weis, the lielauter" of Kan- 
dshar, and chief of a branch of the tribe of Ghildjzyes. This 
Serdar had, by his amiable manners, liberality, persuasive powers,, 
and great intelligence, made himself much beloved by his countrymen. 
Gourguin Khan feared him, and knew that he was the principal 
instigator of the hatred mhich the Afghans bore him ; he therefore 
ordered the Kelauter to be arrested, under the pretext that he was 
conspiring against the government, and sent- him, with several 
other rich S+d t Afghans, to Ispahan, there to explain his conduct 
to the Shah. 
Mir Weis did not on this occasion belie his reputation for ability. 
On his arrival a t  the court of the Seffavyes, he a t  once perceived the 
corruption which reigned on all sides ; and scattering a little gold 
about him, he endeavoured to turn his captivity to account. I n  a 
* The dutiea of kelautw in Peivia are his other functions to superintend t h e  
not exactly defined. I n  different towm administration of the police, bu t  with 
they are more or less important: but very extensivs powers.-Fariw. 
in the case of Mir Weis, at  Kandahar, t Literally white beard, but in this 
the  office must have been Governor in instance eminent.-Tewio. 
chief. And he had probably amongst 
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solemn audience granted him by the IGng he succeeded in obtain- 
ing from the sovereign an acknowledgment that he was innocent 
of the accusations which had been brought against him ; and suc11, 
w s  his tact, and the ductile character of his mind, that in the 
course of a few days he became one of the priricipnl favourites of 
Shah Sultan Hoosein, and the friend of all the great nobles of his 
court. 
Assured of having for the future an influence over the degraded 
courtiers of the Persian King, the views of Mir TVeis took a wider 
range than they had hitherto done, for he concluded that a country 
thus delivered up to men so worthless and corrupt might become 
an  easy conquest if attacked by some brave men well led. Strong 
in the power of his own genius, he deeply reflected upon the mode 
in  which he might carry out so gigantic an enterprise as a n  inva-' 
sion of Persia ; and, to give himself the best chance of success, he 
determined to work upon his countrymen by that most powerful of 
agents, fanaticism. Instead of evincing a desire to return to his 
country, he solicited and obtained the Shah's pern~ission to under- 
take a pilgrimage to Mecca, and also his consent that the rich sejds 
who had accompanied him should return to Kandahar ; but before 
they left Ispahan he instructed them secretly to prepare the Afghans 
for revolt. A few days after their departure Mir Weis was on his 
way to the Holy City, where, having enlisted the sympathies of 
the chief mollahs of Islam, who, like the Afghans, were Soonees, 
he  found no difficulty in obtaining from them a fetzlo, in which 
they declared that his countrymen were bound by every means in 
their power to throw off the thraldom of the Shiah heretics. 
Mir Weis returned to Ispahan as soon as he had performed his 
pilgrimage, and occupied himself in carrying out the intrigue 
which, with no little ingenuity, he had set on foot before his de- 
parture. 
Like all Persian nobles in high situations, Gourguin Khan had 
enemies a t  court anxious for his downfall, as much from jealousy 
as in the hope of succeeding to the government of Kandahar, or 
replacing him by one of their own creatures. Amongst these 
enemies was the vizier of Shah Sultan Hoosein, who could not 
forgive Gourguin Khan and his nephew, the Sipahee Salar Kaee 
Kllosroo Khan, the estimation in  which they were held by the 
Shah, and the influence which they had almays employed against' 
him. Mir Weis, .with considerable penetration, saw that this. 
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personage intended to compass the ruin of both uncle and nephew 
by prejudicing the mind of the Shah against them whenever an 
occasion should present itself; he made, therefore, secret advances 
to the Vizier r i th  the hope of inducing him to associate himself in 
h k  design. The Vizier, well convinced of the bad feeling which 
the Afghan chief entertained against Shah Nawaz Khan, and 
believing him to be entirely devoted to the interests of the S'nah, 
entered into his views, and became one of Mir Weis's warmest 
protectors. I n  order the more rapidly to bring about the fall 
of Gourguin, the Vizier made every effort to support the M- 
ghan chief against him, and solicited the Shah's permission for 
Mir Weis to return to Kandahar. This feeble prince had been 
persuaded that Gourguin Khan and l i s  nephew, secretly sup- 
ported by the Tzar of Russia, wished to raise the standard of 
revolt in Georgia, a n j  declare themselves independent. This 
was sufficient to induce the Shah to give Mir, Weis permission to 
return to his native city, with orders to resume the important func- 
tions of Kelauter, satisfied that his fidelity and vigilance would 
enable him to penetrate the real sentiments of Gourguin, and a t  
the same t h e  serve as a counterpoise to his power, which had con- 
siderably increased, and given rise to some apprehensions. Mir 
Weis, well assured that every one would be in 'his favour, returned 
to I<andahar by Kerman and the Seistan, observing attentively on 
his journey the state of things in each locality. On his arrival he 
, saw that the power and tyranny of Gourguin Khan had attained 
their utmost limits, and thought that his adversary might rehse to 
recognise the firman which conferred on him the functions of Ke- 
lauter. But the Governor, though indignant at  his return, con- 
formed to the orders of his sovereign, and reinstated the Mir in his 
post. Nevertheless, to humiliate him in the eyes of the people, 
and to prove that he himself was absolute in his own govern- 
ment, he ordered him to send one of his daughters, a girl of great 
personal beauty, to his harem without delay-his intention being ' 
not to make her his wife, but his concubiie.' The Afghans, in- 
formed of the affront which had been put upon their chief, and eager 
* The manuscript of Abdullah Khan Mii, with whose talenta and influence 
is here atvariance with that of Mirw he was well acquainted, and that he 
Ali Mohamed, whose account of the wished by means of this marriage to 
transaction I have followed. Abdullah put an end to the differences that 
.:" Khan states that Gourguin Khan was existed between himself and that chief. 
really desirons of an alliance with the -F~wicr .  
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to avenge it, rushed immediately to arms ; but &Iir Weis, secretly 
assembling the principal chiefs, arrested their ardour, and they 
decided upon temporising in order that they might take measures 
which should better ensure the success of their plans. '< The time 
which must prove our courage," said he to them, " is arrived, b ~ t  
the prudence of the serpent that watches overcomes the strength of 
the lion who permits himself to slumber ; we must conceal our 
swords in a bed of roses, and those who have sufficient faith in me 
to place their destiny in my hands may be convinced that the most 
profound secresy is the first condition of success." 
After this conference N i r  \TTeis affected to submit to the go- 
vernor's wishes ; but instead of sending him his o m  daughter, he 
substituted one 'of his slaves, also a very beautiful girl, who, dressed 
in the richest attire, was conducted in great state to the harem of 
the Shah Nawaz Khan. Not less animated than X r  Weis against 
the oppressors of her country, his slave accepted, and with delight, 
the part she was called upon to perform. Gourguin Khan, not in 
the least suspecting the plot, believed the Afghan was really de- 
sirous of forgetting the past and being on friendly terms with him 
for the future ; he therefore trusted him implicitly. 
Mir Weis.profited by the favour which he now enjoyed with the 
governor to bring about his fall with greater certainty ; at the same 
time he secured the co-operation of the officers of the palace, and 
excited the turbulent Abclalee and Kaulteree tribes to commence a 
revolt, which soon spread its ramifications over all the southern part 
of the province of Kandahar. This rising occasioned Gourguin so 
much anxiety, that he decided on sending his best Georgian 'troop 
to put it down, and retained only twelve or fifteen hundred men near 
him to defend the citadel. 
Mir  Weis took advantage of the absence of these troops to put 
the projects he had so long meditated into execution, and sent 
- Shah Nawaz an invitation to a feast which he had prepared at  one 
of his country houses, situated about half an hour's ride from the 
city. This he accepted, and wit.hout suspicion, and such was the 
security felt by Gourguin after he had arrived there, that he quaffed 
immoderate quantities of wine during the repast, and with his 
suite, who had indulged to an equal extent in their l'ibations, even. 
tually fell asleep. Everything, in short, worked well for Mir 
lTTeis ; the conspirators slaughtered all the inebriated sleepers, after 
which the Kelauter dressed himself in the robes of Gourguin, 
and ordered the Afghans' in his own service to put on those of 
the Georgians who had accompanied their Walee. Thus dis- 
guised, they returned to Kandahar in the middle of the night, put 
to death the Persian troops on guard at  the gate, and entered the 
city without being recognised. The insurgents, a t  first but few in 
number, were soon reinforced by the Afghans from the environs, 
who had previously been prepared for the movement, and the Per- 
sian garrison was SO coiupletely exterminated, that not one soldier 
was left alive. Mirza Mehdee, a Persian, and a ~ ~ t h o r  f the ' Life 
of Nadir Shah,' gives a different account of the death of Nawaz 
Khan. H e  states that the governor had quitted Kandahar to 
chastise some rebels of the Kadreree tribe, when Mir Weis arrived, 
who fell upon the Georgian W a k e  at Dehchir, defeated and took 
him prisoner, and subsequently put him to death by the hands of 
Murad Khan, a low Afghan. This statement seems, however, to 
be inaccurate. 
The natives of different countries residing a t  Kandahar were 
at that time at variance with each other, and, after this tragedy was 
over, Mir Weis assembled them together with a view to their recon- 
ciliation. I n  his usual persuasive style of eloquence he showed 
them the advantages they might obtain from the liberty which had 
thus been given them, and invited them to form that bond of union 
which alone could emancipate them, and for ever, from the Persian 
yoke. H e  then drew forth the fitvo he had obtained from the chief 
mollahs at Mecca, which had an irresistible effect upon the feelings 
of this fanatical people, whose warlike instincts, having been power- 
fully excited, required only to be cleverly directed. They were 
not long in deciding what course to take, and swore that they would 
obey the Mir, inviolably attach themselves to his fortunes, and 
respect his person. 
Three days after this unlobked-for event, the Georgians who had 
been despatched against the rebels in the south, and succeeded in 
their mission, arrived under the walls of Kandahar. Here they 
were suddenly attaclred by five thousand Afghan horse, corn- 
manded by Mir TiVeis ; and though they fought with a heroism 
worthy of a better cause, they were unable to stand the unexpected 
shock or malcgpod their retreat: only eighteen escaped and re- 
turned with the disastrous intelligence t,o Persia Such is the 
account given by Mirza Ali Wohamed, from whom Abdullah Khan 
again differs. The  latter states "that Gourguin Khan himself. 
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marched at the head of his troops against the Abdalees and Icau- 
Irerees, who had taken up a position about twenty leagues from 
Kandahar, and, refusing to pay the taxes, masw.cred without pity 
every Persian they came in contact with. Gourguin Khan was 
scarcely ten miles from the city, when Mir Weis, having quickly 
assembled the principal chiefs and all the fighting men of the Ab- 
dalee, G.hildjzye, and Kaukeree tribes then in Kandahar, followed 
rapidly in the rear of Gourguin Khan. I t  was the habit of the 
governor and his Georgians to get drunlc regularly every day after 
sunset, and no precautions mere ever taken to guard a camp in 
which every one was plunged in debauch. Blir \$reis knew this, 
and fell upon them during the night : it was a massacre rather than 
a combat, for t.he Shah Nawaz and his troops were put to death 
almost without resistance, After this coup-de-main Mir Weis re- 
turned immediately with his men to Icandahar, to which he Iaid 
siege, and after a few days obtained an easy victory over the 
remaining half-starved Persians that defended the place. These 
he put to death, as well as those individuals who were not of Afghan 
origin, or who held an appointment under the late governor. Dis- 
cord ensued when the plunder was to be divided, and smords were 
drawn; but the Abdalees and Kankerees were beaten by the 
Ghildjzyes, and finally obliged to submit, nor could they have 
remained in Icandahar without their permission. The Abdalees up 
to this time had always inhabited the country to the south of the 
Urghendab and the I-Ielmund without -having ever obtained the 
consent of the Mogul or Persian kings to pass those rivers ; but 
now, by virtue of a fresh agreement with the Ghildjzyes, they were 
enabled to do so, and many of them settled amongst the mountains 
of the Siah-bend, situated between Kandahar and the principality of 
Gour. The emigration of the Abdalees into the principality of 
Herat dates from this period, and there in the course of a very few 
years they greatly increased in numbers and became very rich. 
Nevertheless the Afghans agree in stating that a branch of the 
Noorzyes had been established in the plains of Obeh and Chehrak 
for more than one hundred years before the bulk of that tribe came 
to reside in the principzlity." 
Mir Weis, having driven out the oppresors of his country, turned 
his attention to the manner in which he might best consolidate his 
work : he restored union between the different tribes, established a 
kind of discipline amongst them, and released them from the heavy 
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imposts which had till then weighed heavily upon their exertions. 
Finally, in 1713, the principal families acknowledged him as the 
Sovereign Frince of Iiandahar. 
The Court of 'Persia, instead of putting down this rebellion 
with vigour, adopted a system which exposed all its weakness. I t  
commenced by negotiating ; but Mir NTeis, having detained the 
ambassadors who were sent to advise him to return to his duty, the 
Shah a t  length determined to march an army upon Kandahar. 
With this view the chiefs who commanded in I<horasan were ordered 
to unite their forces and attack the rebels. This they did, and, 
though outnumbering the Afghan troops in the proportion of 
eight to one, they were, in consequence of the want of co-operation 
between the Persian chiefs, completely beaten by Mir Weis in three 
successive battles. These events took place in 1713. 
The Shah, on receiving information of this catastrophe, saw 
a t  once the imminence of t h  danger. The revolt might gain 
ground in other provinces of his empire, in which alarming indications 
had manifested themselves; however, two years elapsed before he 
ordered his army of 30,000 men to take the field. I t  was com- 
posed of Persians, Arabs, and Abdalee Afghans, at  enmity with the 
Ghildjzyes, and commanded by Sipahee Salar Kaee Khosroo Khan, 
Walee of Georgia, and nephew of the unfortunate Gourguin Khan. 
I n  this campaign Mir Weis was not successful. H e  lost all the 
territory he had &ken from the chiefs of Khorassan, was completely 
defeated by Kaee Khosroo between the Helmund and the Urghendab, 
and, retiring from thence, was obliged to seek refuge within the walls 
of Iiandahar, to which city his adversary soon laid siege. This the 
Sipahee Salar pushed forwrd with great activity and perseverance, 
and ravaged all the environs of the city, which, ere many days had 
passed, became a complete desert. As a reprisal for the acts which 
the Abdalees and Raukerees had committed, he put to death all 
the Afghans who fell into his power, and did not even spare the 
women and children. 
The besieged were soon reduced to the greatest extremity, and, 
alarmed at the terrible consequences that might befall them if the 
city was taken by assault, they insisted -that Mir TVeis should offer 
terms of accommodation to the Persian general. But Raee Khosroo 
Khan, thinking himself sure of success, and eager to avenge the 
death of his uncle by that of his murderers, demanded the uncon- 
ditional surrender of the place. The garrison saw by this reply that 
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they had nothing to hope for, and, gaining courage from despair, 
continued the defence with renewed energy, the abilities of their 
chief rising with the difficulties which he had to contend with. 
Mir Weis, having succeeded ill baffling the vigilance of the be- 
siegers and escaped from Randahar, assembled several tho~~sand 
Afghan cavalry, ravaged the localities IChosroo had spared for the 
purpose of supplying his own camp, and harassed the Persians day 
and night. T h e  result was obvious. The Sipahee Salar was obliged 
to raise the siege to obtain provisions, of which he stood greatly in 
need ; but constantly molested on his march, he found it impossible 
to secure a moment's repose for his troops, who, decimated and 
discouraged, began to disband. This new danger induced him to 
offer battle to the Afghans, who accepted it on the 26th of Ramazan 
1714 (Hejira 1126), and they so completely annihihted the Persian 
army, that only one hundred out of thirt.y thousand men escaped 
with their lives. Khosroo Khan, borne down with despair, threw 
himself at  the head of a few brave companions into the thickest of 
the fight, and there sought an honourable death, which defeat had 
made more welcome to him than life. This narrative is also from 
the text of Mirza Ali Mohamed; Abdullah Khan assures us that 
IChosroo did not attack the Afghans, but that, they surprised and 
defeated him in a night attack. 
Mohamed Roost.em, another Persian general of some repute, 
was subsequently sent with a third army to subdue Mi Weia, 
but he was not more fortunate than his predecessor. Defeated 
by the Afghans in several encounters, he owed his own safety 
only to a rapid retreat, which left the Mir absolute master of the 
whole province of Kandahar. After this fresh success all the 
Afghan tribes gave in their adhesion to him, and acknowledged Mir 
Weis  for their sovereiga chief, as the inhabitants of the capital had 
done after the death of Gourguin Khan. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, this adroit and courageous man could not continue the great 
work which he had up to this time so cleverly conducted, for he 
died towards the close of 1715, in the eighth year of his rule over 
the Afghans, and in the succeeding one to that in which he obtained 
his last victory over the Persians. I t  was also the very moment 
a t  which the measures he had taken with a view of insuring the 
independence of his country and ameliorating the condition of the 
people afforded every hope that they would be realised; but, 
though checked for a time, these hopes were not extinguished, for 
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those measures received a fresh impulse under the g o ~ e ~ x m e n t  of 
his son Mahmood. 
Mir lT7eis left two sons, Mir Mahmood and Nir Hoosein. The 
former, who was the elder, had scarcely attzzined his eighteenth year 
a t  the time of his father's death, and in consequence of this the 
Afghan chiefs declared that he was not competent to succeed him. 
Their uncle, Mir Abdullah, was therefore placed at  the head of 
affairs, but the expectations which had been raised by the bpld and 
characteristic conduct of his brother were not realised by him : 
his first act was to open a conference with the Persian govern- 
ment, whose suzerainty he agreed to admit, and also to pay a 
tribute, if the Shah would give him the government of Kanda- 
har, make i t  hereditary in his family,' and withdraw the Persian 
garrisons from the principality. 
Two years were consumed in these disgraceful negotiations, 
and, though the projects of Mir Abdullah were b ~ ~ t  imperfectly 
known to the Afghans, they were mistrustful of his intentions, and 
opposed him as best they could ; but when these projects came to 
be revealed to them by the Persians, who in so doing hoped to sow 
the seeds of dissension amongst them, they were in the highest 
degree indignant. 
The eldest son of Nir Weis, who was already distinguished by 
many of the qualities the Afghans had admired in his father, and 
who, though so young, had displayed daring acts of courage bor- 
dering on rashness when engaged with the Persians, took advan- 
tage of the discontent which the interested conduct of his uncle 
had given rise to in the minds of his countrymen, and seized the 
sovereign power of which he thought he had been unjustly deprived. 
The unpopularity of Mir Abdullah made his success easy ; he 
attacked his house with only fifty men, killed him with his own 
hand, and made the Afghan chiefs then a t  Kandahar elect him 
governor in the room of his murdered relative. The people thern- 
selves demanded his election, which, however, was not agreeable to 
a few ambitious Serdars ; but when they saw the young chief had 
t i  
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obtained the general support of the nation, they adhered to the new 
order of things. 
Abdullah Khan, the I-Ieratee, gives a different account of the 
I 
motives which led to this murder of the Mir. Abdullah, observes 
I that historian, was less active, less impetuous, but not less intelli-. 
I !  gent and prudent than his brother Mir Weis. After the death of 
the latter several Ghildjzye chiefs talked openly of their intention 
to dictate to those in power ; the seeds of much discord had also been 
sown amongst the tribes, and Mir Abdullah was perfectly aware that 
. 
he could not expect to retain the sovereign authority in any degree 
of tranquillity unless he could prevent new hoslilities on the part 
of Persia. T h e  negotiations therefore which he had entered into 
with the Shah had only that object in view, and there is no doubt that 
whenever he had found himself able to do so he would have thrown ' 
off a vassalage the light fetters of' which he now consented to wear. 
The  fiery Afghans could not understand the wisdom of this system, 
and the constant oppusition of his nephew Mahmood finished by 
lowering his influence with the Serdars, several of whom hoped 
and were desirous of occupying his position themselves. The  
Mir's death was as unjust as it was to be regretted, and the more 
to b e  deplored, as his successor displayed warlike qualities only, 
which led to the decimation of the tribes, and weakened them to 
such a degree that, under the reign of Nadir Shah, they again fell 
under the Persian yoke. The power also after Mahmood's time 
passed into the hands of the Abdalee tribe-to the injury of the 
Ghildjzyes, who had been the first to proclaim and establish the 
independence of the Afghan nation. 
A t  about the  period when Mir Weis died, the population of 
Herat tried also to withdraw from their allegiance to the Sef- 
faveans. T h e  Khorassians, of whom it was for the most part 
composed, had obtained from Nadir Shah the privilege of being 
governed by their own chiefs. Alayar I<han, who was governor 
of the province a t  the time of Roostem Khan's defeat, though not 
declaring himself independent as Mir Weis had done, acknow- 
ledged only from that time a nominal submission to the Persian 
court; but whether the Persian garrison of Herat, though very 
small, still inspired him with awe, or whether he hoped by cunning 
and temporising finally to become completely independent, he 
continued to keep up appearances, and observe a respectful bear- 
ing towards the Shah Hoosein ; and as anarchy reigned in several 
Persian provinces, he thought the monarch might possibly look 
upon these faint proofs of his obedience as submission. 
Alayar Khan, as well as Mir Weis, with whom he had secretly 
allied himself in a common determination to resist the Shah, died 
before he could put into execution the plans which he had con- 
ceived. T h e  court of Persia appointed Zeman Khan, Koortchee 
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Bashee, his successor. This officer, who commanded the troops 
quartered in the province of EIernt, was instructed to reinforce his 
division by enlisting all the volunteers in the locality and march 
against Mir Abdullali. If this chief had been as prudent as his 
predecessor, he might have hoped, if not to obtain a positive and 
complete success against the rebels in the south, at least some 
advantages which would, without doubt, have prevented Mir Mah- 
mood from undertaking the expedition which he made some time 
after in Persia ; but Zeman was a dull and dissipated man, and 
had not the tact to foment the elements of discord which existed 
amongst the Afghans. The Abdalee tribe, almost the whole of 
which was settled in his government, were the hereditary enemies 
of the Ghildjzyes, and might have been led against them with 
success ; but he had affronted thcm, and was obliged to take the 
field with a weak corps-d'arme'e composed almost entirely of Per- 
sians. Neither the importance of the undertaking he had to carry 
out, nor the burden of the responsibility which rested upon him, 
operated as any restraint upon his conduct, and his excesses were 
such that they effected his ruin even before he was in presence of 
the enemy. 
r A short time before this a branch of the Suddozye tribe had 
established itself in the neighbourhood of Suklrur, and their chief, 
Heyat Sultan, anxious to  obtain certain favours from Zeman 
Khan, committed a most fearful outrage against his own son. In- 
credible as it may appear, he sent Assad Ullah, a young and beau- 
tiful lad, to this wretch in human shape for an infamous purpose. 
The crime accomplished, the unfortunate youth took the first 
opportunity of making his escape from the Persian camp, and, re- 
turning to his tribe, which shared with him the feelings of fby that 
animated their young chief, they determined upon taking a d'eep 
revenge. Assad's first step was to seize his vile and unnatural 
parent and imprison him in a fortress, after which, accompanied 
by a few thousand horsemen, he skltrted in pursuit of Zeman Khan, 
and such was the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised the 
i Persian commander at midnight in the district of Zemindavar, before he had received the slightest intimation of his being in 
arms, attacked with great bravery and impetuossty the weary and 
sleeping troops, and put them nearly all to the sword. The  villain 
who had so deeply injured him was the first that fell, and by the hand 
of Assad ; after which the victorious youth marched on Herat, 
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and, having obtained an entrance to the city, exterminated the few 
Persians he found there. After this he again took the field, and 
made himself, dmost without opposition, master of the whole pro- 
vince, which, on the 26th of Ramazan, 1716, he constituted an in- 
dependent principality. 
A s  to the Persian troops which had succeeded in effecting their 
escape from the massacre at Zemindavar, finding themselves with- 
out a commander, they disbanded, and returned to Ispahan. All 
that the government could do to induce them to return to Afghan- 
istan under a new general was ineffectual ; they rcfused to march ; 
and the Shah Sultan Hoosein was under the necessity of relin- 
quishing his project for bringing that country again under his 
dominion. Assad Ullah Khan raised himself to power about a 
year before the period at  which Mir Mahmood became by the: 
murder of his uncle Prince of Kandahar. 
Persia, already so much weakened by the loss of two of her 
finest provinces and three armies, ravaged by the Uzbeks, menaced 
by Turkey and Russia, and governed by a degraded and super- 
stitious court who ruled the feeble Sultan EIoosein, had no little 
difficulty in making a stand against so many disasters. Neverthe- 
less, the Persian monarch made a last effort, and in 1719 raised 
an army of 35,000 men, well provided with artillery, which he 
placed under the orders of Sefi Kooli Khan, a general of re- 
puted talent, to whom he allotted the task of driving back in 
the  first instance the Uzbeks, and then of reducing Herat and 
Kandahar. 
T h e  Khan obtained an easy victory over the undisciplined 
hordes of Uzbeks, who, badly armed and badly led, having pillage 
only in prospect, and not the permanent occupation of Khorassan, 
took to flight a t  the first shock of the Persian army. Puffed up 
with pride a t  a success thus easily obtained, Sefi Rooli Khan 
pompously announced his intention to exterminate the rebel Af- 
ghans, to whom he sent an imperious order to come to his camp and 
implore his mercy. On the receipt of this message, Assad Ullah 
Khan moved forward to meet him at the head of 12,000 Afghans 
and Hazarahs, and, in spite of the disproportion of the two armies, 
attacked him directly. The Afghans were armed only with bad 
swords and worse matchloclrs, but they did not hesitate to face the 
fire of the formidable Persian artillery, and maintained during a 
whole day a most obstinate combat, in which 3000 of their best 
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troops lost their lives. The victory was still undecided at sunset, 
when by some accident never accounted for a dreadful explosion 
took place amongst the Persian artillery. This caused an instan- 
taneous panic in their army, and they took to flight, leaving on the 
field of battle a11 their baggage and the greater part of their guns. 
Sefi Kooli Khan and several members of his family, together 
with a large number of chiefs as well as 20,000 Persian soldiers, 
were slain in this battle fought near the village of Kariz. 
This victory decided the fortunes of the Afghans. Independence 
was henceforward theirs, and the power, but half-established, 
of Assad Ullah Khan was consolidated, not only in Uerat, but 
also through the greatest part of Khorassan, of which he took 
possession, with the exception of Meshed, its capital, and that re- 
sisted all his attacks. Seeing, that his efforts to reduce it were 
ineffectual, he was satisfied with keeping a watch upon it, and 
marched to the south of his territories, in order to extend them in 
that direction. He  seized, in the first instance, upon Subzawar, 
and afterwards moved on Furah,  to which place he laid siege, 
when he was attacked by Mir Mahmood of Kandahar, who thought 
these proceedings might be detrimental to his own interest, more 
particularly as Assad Ullah exhibited the courage and capacity of 
a good general, and belonged to the tribe of the Abdalees, the 
rival of his own. But Assad Ullah Khan was unfortunately killed 
at the commencement of the battle, a ball having struck him in 
the middle of the forehead ; his troops, discouraged, retired to 
Herat, where anarchy reigned during several months, until a 
Belooch chief of the Seistan, one Mir Xohamed, seized the power 
and established order in the city. 
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T l i ~  Persian Governnlent, while sending armies to subdue Kandahar, 
also employed the arts of negotiation, and tried to deceive suc- 
cessively Mir  \TTeis, his brother, and his son, ~ i t h  intrigues and 
proinises of which Eastern nations are so prodigal. Rut these 
chiefs did not fall into the snare prepared for them: nevertheless 
Mir Mahmood, w11o put his uncle to death because he had received 
certain propositions from the Shah, found somewhat later that this 
plan was a good one, and adopted it himself; less, however, 
because he was afi-aid of the Shah of Persia, than because he re- 
quired a fern years of repose to prepare hmself for the invasion 
which he had projected against that kingdom. As the victory over 
Assad Ullah Khan might awaken the fears of the Persians, and 
induce them to march one of their everlasting armies upon him, he 
hastened, immediately he had relieved Furrah, to inform Shah 
Hooaein that he had attacked the Abdalees only to prevent them 
from taldng the town from him, and that it was now entirely at the 
disposition of the Shah. The letter which Mir Mahmood sent to 
the Sha.h was placed in his hands by the same minister who had 
been the accomplice of Mir Weis, and on. t h s  occasion he did not 
give the lie to h s  own bme antecedents. Instead of enlightening 
his master on the manifest ambition of the Afghan prince, he did 
all that lay in his power to convince him that the ~hi ldjzyes  were 
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excellent vassals, who had rendered him a very great service, and 
furthermore that they had only exterminated Gourghin Khan, his 
nephew, and the Georgians, on account of the excesses they had 
committed, and to deliver themselves from a most odious tyranny. 
By such representations he sought not only to revenge himself on 
the Georgians, whose chiefs were his most dangerous antagonists, 
but also to endeavour to calm the resentment the Shah had always 
felt against him, in consequence of the efforts he had made to in- 
duce him to give Mir Weis permission to return to Icandahar. 
The yoor feeble-minded sovereign, deceived once more, bestowed 
upon Mir Mahmood the surname of Hoosein Rooli Rhan (the slave 
of Hoosein), and sent him a firman appointir~g him Governor- 
General of Kandahar, and making that high office hereditary in his 
family. Mir Mahmood accepted these honours with apparent 
gratitude and respect, and this good understanding between the 
I Mir and the Court of Ispahan enabled him to augment in all 
. security the force which he intended to employ in carrying out his 
ambitious projects. T o  clear away, however, all difficulties, he alsu 
wrote to the Shah and represented that the Abdalees recently 
established in Herat had been in revolt for the last two years 
and paid no taxes, and he solicited the Shah's permission to 
subdue them. Sultan Hoosein was foolish enough to consent to 
this expedition, which Mir Mahmood at once undertook, but, in- 
stead of directing his steps to the north, he sent there a small 
flying detachment, while he himself marched with the mass of his 
army along the banks of the Helmund and seized all the fortresses 
on that river, for they commanded the principal roads of the Seistan 
leading into Persia. I t  is true he took possession in the name of 
the Shah, but his secret purpose was tu fortify himself, and to 
collect provisions, in order that he might command an easy passage 
to the southern provinces, and at a future time with little difficulty 
invade the Persian territory. It will be remembered that his father 
had travelled through them on his return from Iiandahar, and 
the invaluable information which he then collected was now to be 
ntilized by his son, whose preparations for this invasion were pro- 
longed up to 1720. But even then his army numbered only 
12,000 men ; however, they were all piclced men, inured to war and 
hardships of every k i d ,  and prepared for any eventuality that might 
arise. Persia, on the contrary, was a t  this time in a most deplor- 
able condition ; everything was in disorder ; and the only emula-, 
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tion that could be said to exist at that court was who should ex- 
hibit the greatest weakness and degradation. The right of holding 
the appointments of the public service, instead of being a privilege 
belonging to high birth or a recompense for meritorious services, 
was sold to the highest bidder ; the troops, without discipline, re- 
ceived neither instruction nor pay, and, frequently disbanding them- 
selves, pillaged the villages and the caravans. The towns were 
infested with thieves, who o~enly followed their villanous profession 
with the utmost assurance, knowing they could do so with impunity. 
I n  short, everything announced the complete decadence of this great 
monarchy, which, attacked on all its frontiers, by the Afghans, the 
Tartars, the Russians, and the Arabs, seemed likely to become an 
easy conquest to the first who should attempt to invade it. 
I t  was the young Mahmood, breathing vengeance for the miseries 
which his country had suffered under the Persian rule, who was the 
first that engaged in this difficult enterprise. In  1720, under the 
pretest of attacking Cliedad Khan, a Belooch chief, who with his 
nomades was ravaging the province of Kerman, Mahmood placed 
himself at  the head of his small army, and traversed amidst unheard 
of difficulties the arid and desert countries of the south of Persia. On 
this march his soldiers were soon decimated by privations and fatigue, 
and of the 12,000 men who set out with him only 7000 arrived 
under the walls of Kerman, to which he laid siege with a courage 
and determination utterly disproportioned to the means of aggression 
a t  his command. Simultaneously with these operations he again 
endeavoured to put the Shah Hoosein on the wrong scent and lull 
the vigilance of his government, to which he wrote stating that he 
had besieged Kerman merely to force the Governor to furnish his 
troops with provisions, and thus repay him the expense of moving 
his army in the interest and for the benefit of the Shah of Persia. 
Mahmood was joined by a great number of Persian malcon- 
tents, who soon filled up the casualties in his army. The town, 
hard pressed, held out only for a few days, and then surrendered at  
discretion ; nevertheless the victor thought it necessary to punish 
the inhabitants for the feeble resistance they had offered, and not 
only them but  those of the whole district. During four months his 
soldiers, gorged with plunder, committed every imaginable excess, 
a t  the expiration of which time they were attacked and put to 
flight by the Persian General Leuft Ali Khan, who marched to the 
assistance of the invaded province with a very superior force. The. 
CHAP. IY. REVOLT AT KANDAHAR. 41 
defeat of Mir Mahmood was so complete that he was obliged 
to make a rapid retreat to Kandahar, taking with him only a 
miserable remnant of that army which had followed him with so 
much enthusiasm to the conquest of Persia! Not one man would 
perhaps have survived if the evil genius which presided over the 
destinies of that empire had not arrested the progress of her victo- 
rious commander. Leuft Ali Khan, the only good general the Shah 
then had, was, by way of recompense for the brilliant success which 
he had just obtained, deprived of his command a d  t h r c m  into 
prison. A court intrigue, originating in the Vizier, brought about 
this unjustifiable result, for the letter of Mir Mahmood had been per- 
fidiously misinterpreted by him to the Shah Sultan Hoosein. But if 
Mir Mahmood had not been defeated, more important interests would 
have obliged him to abandon the province he had just conquered., 
for he received intelligence that his rear was seriously menaced. 
Beiram Sultan Lakzee, governor of Funah, and Malek Djaffer 
Khan Sistanee, having formed an alliance, succeeded in cxciting a 
portion of the province of Kandahar to revolt against his authority. 
Supported by a few thousand men, they had even seized upon the 
city in the name of Shah Hoosein, but were driven from it by Mir 
Roosein, brother of Mir Mahmood. The  latter therefore hastened 
his return, and his presence soon restored order. His reaolu- 
tion had not been shaken for one instant, for he had reflected, and 
wisely,, on all that had passed, and had seen his own faults. 
These had arisen rather from ignorance than want of courage- 
they appeared to him therefore easy of correction : and the bravery 
and intelligence which he had shown in his fatal expediti& of 1720 
secured for him the obedience and admiration of his soldiers, which 
enabled him with little trouble to raise another and a larger army, 
one not less enthusiastic than the first. The Afghans of every 
tribe, even those living m the provinces of Herat and Kabul as well 
as the EIazarahs, hastened with alacrity to the standard of a chief 
who promised to enrich them with the spoils of their ancient op- 
pressors. The Belooches settled to the south of the I-Ielmund also 
furnished him with a contingent of several thousand men, and he 
determined to take an ample revenge for the disasters inflicted 
upon him by Leuft .Mi Khan. 
After having installed his brother Mir Hoosein as Regent of 
Kandahar during his absence, he again entered Persia, in January, 
1722, a t  the head of an m y  of 28,000 men, carrying with him 
immense stores of provisions in order to guard against the priva- 
tions his troops had suffered on his first expedition from the 
scarcity of food and forage. 
Mir Mahmood opened this campaign by rapidly crossing the 
Seistan, and without encountering any obstacle he reached the 
fortress of Barn, where he remained for a few days. This for- 
tress he repaired and strcngthened with weat care, and made it P. 
an  immense dep6t of provisions and munit~ons of war. The gas- 
rison Tvas ordered to collect wiclzin its walls all the corn which 
the inhabitants of the surrounding country could supply above what 
they required for their own use, and also to keep numerous beasts 
of burden ready to take the road whenever instructions were given 
to that effect. The  command of this important place was confided 
by Mir Mahmood to his relative Noor Ullah Khan, a brave and 
energetic man, on whose fidelity he could rely ; and having thus 
completed his preparations, he again advanced and arrived before 
Iierman, intending to besiege it once more, but the inhabitants 
opened the gates almost without offering any resistance : the garrison, 
however, in the citadel, composed of picked men, refused to sur- 
render. The commander wrote to the Afghan chief that, if his 
object was to. amass great riches and become Shah of Persia, he 
would lose his time and ~~eless ly  exhaust his resources in under- 
taking the siege of a place that was provisioned for ten years, and 
the defenders of which were determined to bury themselves beneath 
its ashes rather than capitulate ; but he added that if the Mir chose 
to march 'on Ispahan he might accomplish his purpose, and he 
offered to give him 18,000 tomauns towards t.he expenses of the 
campaign, if he would raise the siege. Mahmood accepted these 
conditions, far less because, according to the custom of his country, 
i t  .saved the honour of his arms, than because he had no heavy 
artillery to batter the place-the only guns at his disposal, those 
called in Persia zimboorek, being wholly inefficient for this purpose. 
Of these he had an hundred carrying a ball of from one to two 
pounds, each zimboorek being carried by a camel with the artillely- 
man who served it. 
Directly Mahmood had received the sum agreed upon he moved 
upon Ispahan by Yezd, the direct road, and made an attempt to 
take the latter town by assault as he passed ; but several attacks hav- 
ing, in spite of the brilliant courage of his soldiers, been vigorously 
repulsed, he abandoned this siege also. It was likely to provo 
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a lingering affair and occasion him the loss of much precious time, 
so he continued his march upon Ispahan without troubling himself 
about his rear, for the country was too denuded of the enemy's 
troops to give him any anxiety on that subject. As to his line of 
operations, that lay wherever provisions could be obtamed, and he 
4. 
carried with him a pretty large supply, which was renewed from 
time to time in the villages on his road. In this manner he arrived 
at Guluabad, a village situated ten miles from Ispahan, without 
having met one Persian vho attempted to oppose his passage. 
I-lere he entrenched his army, which had been somewhat reduced 
since its departure from Kandahar by privation and fatigue, as 
well as in the combats before Iceman and Yezd ; but these losses 
he had repaired by a few thousand Gheber recruits, who were not 
less desirous than the Afghans to revenge themselves on their 
common oppressors the Persians. Mahmood had still 23,000 com- 
batants under his command when he arrived at Guluabad, but, in 
spite of their courage and the advantage they derived from the re- 
putation of their arms, they could have been easily exterminated 
if the Persians had possessed the least sentiment of national 
feehg, and been animated by the remembrance of the ancient 
grandeur of their country; but this debased people learnt from 
their weak monarch only how to lament their misfortunes, instead 
of warding them off by fighting manfully to prevent them, and it 
was not till the last moment, when money and arms were distri- 
bnted amongst them, that they decided npon defending the capital 
of the empire. 
Mir Mahmood's troops arrived at Guluabad in wretched condi- 
tion : the rags they wore scarcely covered them ; they were destitute 
of warlike stores ; mith rare exception, their sabres were the only 
arm of which they could make any use, and their light artillery 
was unfit for siege purposes. Ispahan, on the contrary, besides its 
population, which was at this time estimated at more than 600,000 
souls, had a garrison of 60,000 soldiers; the city walls were 
strong, and the besieged in possession of a formidable artillery. 
Unfortunately, however, the spirit of the army was cowardly and 
superstitious, and it was in those days more advantageous for a 
minister to deceive and betray the monarch, or flatter his pre- 
dilection for theological discussions, than to do his duty. One 
I of his favourite generals, Fath Ali Khan Kadjar, assured Shah 
I.Ioosein he had heard from an old woman of Asterabad, who 
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was said to be inspired, that two l e e  of a he goat, boiled-with 
325 peapods in water over which a young virgin had repeated 
1200 times " L a  illah, illah l'a,"" made a broth which mould render 
invisible the men who drank it : the superstitjous monarch therefore 
ordered that his troops should be daily supplied with goat-soup 
thus prepared. A thousand absurdities equally efficacious were 
decreed for a like purpose ; and there were only one or two high- 
minded men who, stimulated by the calamitous state of affairs, 
endeavoured to raise the drooping spirits of the garrison ; but owing 
to the weakness of the monarch, they and the few followers 
who adhered to them soon fell victim to his imbecile conduct. 
Traitors alone were listened to and intrusted with the command of 
the troops ; there was no mutual understanding between them, and 
they daily accumulated acts of cowardice, treason, and folly, one 
upon the other. 
The Ethemail.:Dooulet, first minister of the Shah, and the Walee 
of Arabia, who was General in Chief, were always of opposite 
opinions. T h e  first asserted that, as they had hitherto done nothing, 
but had allowed the Afghans to arrive under the walls of Ispahan, 
it would be better to remain on the defensive, and let them wear 
themselves out in useless efforts ; but the TValee made light of 
the opinion of that eminent personage, and went out nearly every 
day skirmishing round the enemy's camp, in a manner, moreover, 
that appeared to be much more in the interests of Mir Mahmood 
than in those of his sovereign. His subordinate officers committed 
similar faults ; sorties were made without judgment or discipline, 
and the Persian troops gave ground a t  the first onset, while the 
rivalry existing amongst the comanders  produced d d y  collisions 
in their army, that frequently ended in bloodshed. 
A council of war having been summoned by the King, who 
presided in person, it was at  length decided that a general attack 
should be made upon the Afghans. Mahmood had only twenty 
thousand fighting men to withstand the Persians, but, accustomed 
to conquer, the power of this force was increased three-fold by 
their own courage : they heeded not the numbers of the enemy, and 
b h d l y  obeyed a prince who possessed all their sympathies, and 
who had the command entirely in his own hands; while the 
Persians, being formed into several divisions, all independent one of 
* God ia God, and there is uo God but him. 
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the other, and receiving different orders, were essentially deficient 
in combination and resolution, the chief elements of military success. 
~t daybreak on the 8th of April, 1721, the Persians left the city 
in great confusion to attack the Afghan camp. The Ethemad 
Dooulet and the Walee of Arabia had not been able to come to an 
understanding as to the order of battle, and were no better weed 
in opinion as to the attack ; thus each of them commenced with the 
corps-d'arme'e under his command, and in accordance with his own 
individual ideas, without dreaming of the mutual support they 
ought to afford to each other when required. 
A t  first the Ethemad Dooulct remained inactive, and, advantage- 
ously posted on the defensive, waited for the Afshans to advance, and 
this plan was approved by the majority of the other generals. But the 1 
Walee, s man of little reflection and of an ardent temper, looked upon 
this inaction as disgraceful, and, without listening to the advice of his 
colleagues, exclaimed, " We are not here to deliberate, but to fight.'' 
With these words he galloped forward to his men, who poured 
down upon the left flank, which gave way at the first onset. I t  now 
required a slight effort only to turn the Afghans and put them to a 
complete rout ; but the Arabs, far more anxiuus for plunder than for 
glory, rushed into the camp of Mir Mahmood and began the work of 
pillage. The Ethemad Dooulet, observing the Wdee  thus engaged, 
fell upon the Afghan right, which was moving up to attack the Arabs ; 
but Aman Ullah Khan, the most talented of Rilir Mahmood's lieute- 
nants, who commanded this ving, perceiving his intention, faced 
about, and for some time retired before the Persians ; then suddenly 
h+ing, he opened his squadrons and unmasked his one hundred 
zimbooreks, which instantly sent forth a hail of balls into their ranks. 
The enemy, instead of rushing at once upon the guns, which could 
not have been reloaded in time for another discharge, suddenly 
halted, and finally decamped. Aman Ullah, seizing the propitious 
moment without hesitation, fell upon the fugitives with his cavalry, 
and made a terrific carnage ; their artillery, consisting of twenty- 
four pieces of large calibre, which they had placed in their rear, 
were also captured, and turned against the royal army. From 
that moment the rout of the Persians was complete, and the soldiers, 
instead of entering Ispahan, regained each his own province, and 
there waited the issue of events. The  Afghans obtained an im- 
1 .  mense booty in this battle, in which 25,000 Persians remained upon 
1 the field: amongst them was Roostem Khan Gooulaye Agassee, 
I I 
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chief of the slaves, and Ahmed Khan, General in Chief of the 
Artillery, two of the most important officers in the army. 
This event spread the greatest consternation in lspahan, and the 
Shah held another council of war, at  which the Ethemad Doo~det 
proposed that the Icing should leave the capital without delay, and 
retire to Karsbeen, from whence he could make an appeal to his 
faithful subjects, raise a powerful army, and, returning, rescue 
Ispahan from the Afghan invaders. The Walee of Arabia, whose 
troops had bchaved so ill in the last battle, and had been the 
cause of the defeat, again held a different opinion, which obtained 
with the feeble monarch, who, influenced by traitors and cowards, 
blindly consented to his own ruin. H e  gave the JqTalee the supreme 
command of his army ; but in thus concentrating the power into one 
hand he did not succeed in imparting greater unity to the sub- 
sequent operations. The successive reverses which overwhelmed 
the Persians, instead of opening the eyes of the Shah to the inca- 
pacity of his general, served only to increase his absurd caprices, 
which always ended in partial defeats, and eventually so decimated ' 
and discouraged his army, that the troops were afraid to expose 
themselves bcyond the walls of the city. 
While the Shah Hooscin confided the destinies of .  lns empire to 
a man so little worthy of this trust, &Iir Mahmood, though a aon- 
queror, was a prey to the most cruel anxiety, for the number of 
his troops diminished without his having the power to recruit 
them ; a turn of fortune in favour of the Persians might place 
him in a most criticd position ; and a t  one moment such was 
his indecision that he ceased to give any orders to his gcne- 
rals. Finding that Ispahan did not surrender after the victory 
he had gained, he was on the point of retiring to Kerman to 
reorganize his army ; but having been informed of the alarm 
which reigned in the city, and that provisions were running 
short, his hopes again revived, and another motive arose to dis- 
suade him from fulfilling his intention of retreating. Instead of 
preserving that firmness of demeanour, which will frequently sus- 
tain a drooping cause, instead of energetically battling with his 
enemy, the Shah Sultan Hoosein was seen to drag the imperial 
purple through the mire, and, following the example of his go- 
vernor of Rerman, beseech his enemy to accept immense sums 
i 
of money to evacuate the Persian territory. I t  was evident that 
his proposition originated in fear and discouragement ; and 
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Mir &Iahmood was convinced that he should soon be master of 
the city if he persevered in the investment of the place. He 
hourly saw the Persian generals committing the grossest faults, 
and neglecting to take the most simple measures for their pre- 
servation. I-Ie knew that imprudent and ignorant counsellors gave 
the Shah advice which must infallibly lead to his destruction ; and 
these circumstances determined him to ahndon  his project of 
retreat and press the Persians with additional vigour. 
The errors, or rather the treachery, of the Persian nobles, 
enabled Mahmood to surround the city by a line of circumvallation, 
which it would have been impossible to defend with his small army 
if the \JTalee had made the least effort to dislodge him ; but he sent 
a succession of feeble detachments against the Afghans, which, 
badly directed, failed in every attack. Ferahabad and Djulfa, 
abandoned by the TTTalee, were now taken by assault, and, regard- 
less of the heroic resistance of their inhabitants, the general in 
chief made not the least demonstration in their favour ; i t  was 
supposed that the fanaticism of this barbarian was gratified by the 
ruin of Djulfa, for it was inhabited by Armenian Christians. In  
short, the Walee and his troops always moved in the direction 
where the enemy was not ; and if .he did meet the Afghans, he was 
sure to retreat under some frivolous pretext or other ; he boasted 
in loud terms, when in presence of the Shah, but always remained 
in a state of inaction when he ought to have shown energy and 
determination. 
Feeling that he was victorious on all points, Mahmood drew 
closer the line of circumvallation in which he held the Persians, 
who made not the least attempt to check his operations : debased 
by the tyranny and superstitious bigotry of the court, they became 
utterly helpless ; while the Afghans, elated by their success, and 
possessing all the elan of a people who had recovered their liberty, 
fought with the greatest enthusiasm. They carefully guarded the 
roads, intercepted the convoys of provisions that endeavoured to 
enter the capital, and laid waste the environs with fire and sword, 
preserving only what was necessary for themselves; until this 
country, hitherto so fertile, became an arid desert on which nothing 
could be seen but the bleached skeletons of men and horses, and 
the charred ruins of forsaken villages. 
At  the commencement of the war the rural population, harassed 
and plundered, flocked to the capital, where they were of no use in 
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the defence, and their presence only increased the scarcity, which 
soon became extreme, and many thousands of the famished citizens 
of Ispahan let themselves down from the ramparts and fled from 
the city, hoping to reach some other province where food was in 
abundance, But the Afghans, who closely watched their move- ' 
ments, slaughtered them without remorse, and but a veiy few 
succeeded in effecting their escape ; nevertheless the bare possi- 
bility of doing so induced crowds of them daily to make the 
hazardous attempt. Heaps of human bodies were seen here and 
there wanting the common rights of sepultwe, while maziy more 
floated on the surface of the Zendehrood, the tainted waters of 
which were no longer fit for the ordinary purposes of life ; and at 
length even these did not reach the capital, for the Afghans cut off 
the canals which supplied the city; the tanks were insufficient to 
meet the general consumption, and thirst was superadded to the 
pangs of hunger. Provisions of all kinds were soon exhausted ; the 
few camels and other bes t s  of burden which remained were sold 
at so high a price that the great men about t,he court could alone 
purchase any animal food; and the people were reduced to such 
extremities that they were compelled to give chase to the most 
unclean animals, which by their religion they were forbidden not 
only to eat, but even to touch. A t  night the inhabitants of one 
quarter made incursions into other parts of the city to search for 
provisions supposed to be concealed, and frequent scenes of'vio- 
lence and bloodshed were the result ; for here the father was often 
found armed against his son, and brother against brother; all 
affection was banished amongst the members of the same family ; 
they looked upon each other as deadly enemies, and fought 
for the wretched scraps of food they had perchance procured. 
At length meat of every kind disappeared, and the trees were 
stripped of their leaves and bark to satisfy the cravings of these 
miserable beings, who, searching the very dunghills and com- 
mon sewers, lived upon any soft substance, whatever it might 
happen to be, which they found there. Old pieces of leather 
were soaked, boiled, and eaten with avidity ; the plaster from 
the walls, mixed with sawdust, also offered them another spe- 
cies of food which was sometimes the object of angry dispute 
even to the d.eath. The population of Ispahan, so 'healthy, light- 
hearted, and rich a few months before, now presented the spectacle 
of a mob of attenuated creatures, wan and of a sinister aspect, 
- 
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scarcely able to drag themselves along the streets and public 
places, that were covered with the corpses 'of their countrymen, 
and. which, horrible to relate, were sometimes eaten to alleviate 
the terrible pangs of hunger. Many put an end to their own 
existence to avoid these sufferings. Amidst. all this appalling 
misery the people evinced to the last their devotion to their King, 
who assured them of the speedy arrival of his son Thamasp. This 
prince had succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Afghans, 
and gone to the north of the empire, where he expected to raise 
an army and march to the relief of Ispahan ; but five montlis 
having elapsed without any tidings of him reaching the capital, its 
inhabitants despaired of his return, and besought the Shah to bring 
their calapities to a close. This prince, more weak'than ill-inten- 
tioned, afflicted with the fearful condition of his subjects, determined 
to put an end to it ; besides, it was utterly impossible that he could 
prolong the defence. All his armies had been destroyed, the 
few soldiers that remained in Persia were in distant provinces, and 
. I 
many of them in the interest of ambitious chiefs, who, profiting 
. by the miserable state of their country, united with each other to 
create an independent power. 
Eight months had elapsed from the commencement of the siege, 
when, on the 14th of Sefer, 1135 of the Hejira, and 23rd October, 
1722, the Shah Sultan Hoosein left the city, escorted by the great 
officers of his court, and arrived at  the camp of Mir Mahmood, 
- in whose favour he publicly abdicated the throne, and with all 
solemnity delivered to him the sword and crown of the Seffa- 
veans, the attributes of lus power as monarch of the Persian 
empire. The  same day the invader took military possession of the 
, arsenals and other public establishments, but it was not till five 
, days after that he made his triumphant entry into Ispahan. Hi 
first act was to assign a place of residence to the fallen Shah, and 
a sufficient pension to meet his req~~irements ; his second, to order 
, a general massacre of the troops remaining within the city, not so 
much with a view of taking revenge upon them for the resistance 
I 
I they had made, as to strike terror into those who, under the command 
of the Prince Thamasp, might be tempted to renew the contest. ' 
This massacre continued during three days, after which Mir Mah- 
mood ordered it should cease, and occupied himself in restoring 
, tranquillity and security in the capital. Having very little confi- 
dence in the administrative powers of the Afghans, who, up to this 
E 
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period, haci never taken part in public affairs, and not daring to 
place any faith in the Persians so recently subjected to his rule, the ,. 
N i r  appointed two officers at the head of each department of the 
administration-an Afghan and a Fersian ; the former to watch 
the latter, alld a t  the same time acquire from him a11 that it was 
useful for him to know. 
The  measures taken by 31ir Mahmood to protect the vanquished 
from insult, the severe discipline he observed in his army, and the 
even-handed justice he dealt out to every one, soon acquired for 
him the esteem of the Persians. The Persian chiefs, who, traitors 
to their king, had furnished him with information during the siege, 
he treated with the greatest severity ; he, nevertheless, made an , 
exception in fayour of the Walee of Arabia, whose life he spared 
in conformity with a vow that he had made so to do if he should 
. 
come victorious out of the contest ; and in order not to give any 
opportunity for a false interpretation to the motives mhich dictated 
this, he loaded with favours those who had remained faithful to the , 
*. 
fortunes of the Shah I-Ioosein. ,: 
U p  to the day on which Mir Mahmood attained a position so 
elevated, his conduct was that of a man animated by magnanimous - 
2: - 
sentiments ; but, from the time he felt securely seated on the 
I - 
a throne of the Sefkveans, he adopted a line of conduct which tar- 
" nished the glory of his previous career; the innate ferocity of the < 
Afghan, suppressed for a time, soon reassumed its empire over his .L 
mind; he became suspicious and even cruel towards those who had 
served him with the greatest fidelity. But, in spite of his tyranny, 'i 
he endeavoured to tranquillise Persia by his judicious administra- .i 
tion, and to extend his doininion over those provinces which had * '  
not recognised his a~~thority. H e  wo~dd, perhaps, have succeeded, ? 
but for the change which had taken place in his character, and - 
which became every day more and more cruel. 
- * 
: 
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~h~ prince Thamasp - Mahmood sends an army against him - Kasbeen sur- 
renders to the Afghans - Duplicity and cruelty of the victors - The inhabitants 
t&e their revenge - Defeat of the Afghans - Nahmood is furious at  this - 
Reconciliation with Aman Ullah Khim - l\luhmood massacres the Persian 
nobles - Sanguinary scenes in Ispahun - State of the provinces - Prince 
Thamasp is proclaimed Shah - Assembles troops in the Azerbaidjan - The 
Turks and Rossians seize upon Armenia and Georgia- State of the Afghan 
. 
m y  - Desertions from Mir Mahmood's ranks - Shiraz besieged -Tyranny of 
Yahmood - Mi? Echreff appointed to the chief command- The Afghan almy 
march upon Yezd - Mahmood becomes deranged -Losses in the Afghan ranks 
-The ti.oops return to Ispahan-Mahmood in a paroxysm of puts t o  
death the sons of Shah Hoosein -Death of Nahmood - Mir Echreff succeeds 
him- He puts the Serdar Ullah Khan to death- Policy of Russia at this 
period - E c h ~ ~ f f  marches against the Turks-Battle of Kiemereh -Defeat of 
the Tulks -Treaty with the Afghans -Events in Afghanistan -The Russians 
take possession of Guilan - Echreff fortifies the Afghan quarter in Ispahm - 
Nadir joins the Shah Thamasp - He takes Nkhapoor - Echreff seizes Yezd - 
Battle between Nadir and Echreff-Defeat 01 the Afghans-Battle of Bagh 
Nirane - The Afghans retire from Ispahan - Conflict at  the Bend-emir- 
Retreat upon Shiraz-Destrnction of the Afghan army -Death of Echreff- 
Reflections. 
AFTER the abdication of his father in 1722, the Prince Thamasp 
Mirza assumed the title of Shah at Ihsbeen ; but when Mir Mah- 
mood despatched an army against him, the prince fled at  its 
approach, and retired into the Azerbaidjan. The inhabitants of 
Rasbeen, seeing themselves thus abandoned, immediately made 
their submission to the Afghans, to whom they gave a most 
fiendly reception. T h e  invaders reciprocated this feeling, and 
appeared desirous of being on the best terms with them ; but, after 
they had been some time in the town, renewed the scenes of car- 
nage which took place at Ispahan, and during three days gave the 
reins to their .passion for murder and pillage. The Kasbeenians, 
finding that submission had not disarmed the vengeance of their 
conquerors, assembled in arms after the first moment of sur- 
prise, massacred-in their turn nearly half the Afghans, and drove 
the remainder from the city. The survivors at  once dispersed ; 
some of them regaining Ispahan, .while others followed the Serdar 
Aman Ullah Khan, and Wi EchreE, the cousin of Mahmood. 
These.two Afghan chiefs h-ad, more than any others, contributed t a  
E 2 
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the victories and elevation of the .son of Mir Weis ; but Mahmood, 
jealous of' their popularity, instead of recompensing them for their 
services, basely accused them of treachery ancl threatened tliem 
with death, fi-om wh'ich they escaped to Icandahar. 
Mir 31ahmood Fas highly incensed a t  the defeat his troops sus- 
tained at Icasbeen, and not less so at  the defection of the two 
serdars; he mas also apprehensive that the Persian nobles whom 
he had retained at his court might attempt to overthrow him 01: 
take his life, and thought, therefore, that, having merely a small 
body of troops to make a stand against a general revolt, terror 
alone could retain the Persians in obedience. Well convinced of 
this, he determined upon adopting the most barbarous measures, and, 
having succeeded in reconciling himself with Aman U1la.h Khan, 
turned that circumstance to account by making it the opportu- 
nity for holding a great festival. To  this he invited all the Persian 
dignitaries of rank and other persons of note in Ispahan, who, 
anxious to  please their new sovereign, and entertaining no suspicion 
of his villanow design, accepted his invitation, and arrived at the 
palace to the number of one hundred and fourteen, but, instead of 
the banquet which they had expected, they found Afghan troops 
posted in the royal gardens, who, in conformity with the orders they 
had received, put them all to death. This horrible butchery accom- 
plished, the soldiers spread themselves over the city, and slaughtered, 
to the number of several thousands, the near relatives of the victims, 
as well as a great number of syuds ancl ulemas of the capital. I t  
was only when this bloody tragedy had been played out that 
Mahmood's fury was temporarily appeased. Two days after, five 
hundred youths, of the first families in the Icingdom, and who 
within the walls of thcir colleges had escaped this massacre, were 
taken from thence into the country, and hunted down like deer, the 
Afghans piercing them through with their jkreeds as t.hey fled 
terror-stricken across the plain. Not long after, three thousand 
Persians, who had taken service in the tyrant's army, experienced 
a similar fate; they were suddenly attacked a t  a banquet whic.h 
he gave them, and, being unarmed, were extermii~ated to a man. 
Finally, he put to death every Persian who had held any em- 
ployment or received any favours from the Shah's government. 
These horrible proceeclings, which lasted 'during a month, plunged 
all the first families of the country into -the depths of despair, and 
denuded Ispahan of half its population ; the carnage subsequently 
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extended itself to the provinces, and murder, pillage, and clesola- 
tion reigned on all sides. 
At length the cruelties of Nir Nahmood became a species of 
madness, but the ~ e r s i a n i  uttedy debased, did not attempt to 
deliver themselves from his frightful tyranny. In  the midst of 
these sanguinary scenes they lay prostrate a t .  the feet of him who 
had but yesterday deprived them of a father, a brother, a son, or a 
friend, and, while waiting till they received the same fate at his 
hands, were vile and degraded enough to submit to be used as the 
instruments of his ferocious na t~~re .  But the torrents of blood thus 
shed brought no sense of security to Mir Nahmood, and his posi- 
tion was certainly'well calculated to inspire him with uneasiness. 
Thamasp Mirza had recently been acknowledged Shah by the 
of Azerbaidjan, and a party which began to be powerful 
in that province had pronounced in his favour, and threatened to 
march, at no distant date, upon Ispahan. On the other hand, the 
Turks and the Russians, talring advantage of the distracted state 
of Pe~.sia, had seized upon Armenia, Georgia, Guilan, Ihrclistan, 
and a part of Iralr, ancl made further di~positions for advancing 
towards the south. The army of Mahmood numbercd only at this 
time a few thousand Afghans ; it is true, their name alone was in 
itself sufficient to make the ~~onquered tremble ; but the ranks 
of these. hardy and ferocious soldiers were daily thinned, and every- 
thing indicated that they would not be able to rcsist the storm 
which was gathering against them in the north. * 
All these considerations, and the retirement uf ~ i r  Echreff, a 
chief beloved by the troops, led to ,much desertion amongst the 
Afghans ; the most devoted servants and the nearest relatives of J l i r  
Mahmood fled from the effects of his tyranny, and he soon found 
himself isolated in the midst of his court. I n  this extremity he 
recruited his army with Kurds, who, as well as the Afghans, were 
Soonees, thinking that he could rely more upon them than upon 
the. Persians, who were of the hostile sect of Shiahs. H e  thus raised 
a new army, with which, in 1724, he took possession of several 
districts in Irak and Fars, though Shiraz, the capital of the latter 
province, did not surrender until it had stood a siege of eight 
months ancl suffered all the horro~s of famine. 
But the Afghan nation were not dazzled by these successes. . 
Mahmood never regained their confidence, and such was the im- 
pression his actions had produced that the reinforcements he had 
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haughtily demanded from Kandtthar arrived but tardily, and 
amounted only to the tenth part of what he anticipated, for no one 
would serve a prince who hdd clelivered then1 from the Persian yoke 
only to impose a more cruel and despotic tyranny of his own. The 
Serdar Jfir Echreff was at the head of these troops, and they 
insisted that 11e should be confirmed in his command as the abso- 
lute condition of their services. Mir Xahmoorl the more readily 
complied with this request, because, having been abandoned by 
his principal officers, the co-operation of his cousin had become an  
absolute necessity for him, not only to direct the military opera- 
tions, which, by reason of his bad state of health, he was unable to 
conduct, but also to retain in Persia, through his influence, many 
Afghans who would otherwise have left the country. O n  the 
arrival of this reinforcement Mir Mahmood marched upon Yezd, 
which he attempted to seize, but he was not fortunate in this 
enterprise. H e  issued orders to his troops which it was impos- 
sible to execute, and derangement of his intellectual faculties 
was clearly manifested upon this occasion; his eccentricities were 
very nearly causing a revolt in his army, which, indignant a t  
the losses it had sustained without obtaining any corresponding 
success, obliged him to raise the siege and return to Ispahan. 
This check soured and excited him, and his irascible nature 
was still more aggravated by the unreasonable demands of his 
officers, who were supported by the troops. Alarmed also a t  the 
progress of Thamasp Xirza, the Russians, and the Turks, and a 
prey to remorse, his mind was filled with visions of his victims 
ready to torment him, so that he abandoned himself to super- 
stitious devotion in the most exaggerated form; he shut him- 
self up in a subterraneous cell, observing the strictest fast, and 
when, at the end of two months, he left this retreat, he was in such 
a state that he  could scarcely be recognised. Livid, emaciated, 
and his features contracted, he seemed to dread the light of day, 
and reappeared more fearful and more cruel than ever ; haunted by 
the darkest suspicions, gloomy and taciturn, he shuddered a t  the ap- 
proach of his best friends, dreading to find in every one an assassin. 
During one of the paroxysms of his disease he was informed 
that the sons of the Shah Sultan Hoosein had made an attempt to 
escape, when, trembling with rage at  this intelligence, he ordered 
them all to be brought into his presence, and, drawing his poignard, 
put thirty-one of them to death with his own hand. Their unfor- 
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tunate father, hearing their cries, broke through the guards, and, 
to the scene of carnage, endeavowed to protect them at 
' . the risk of his own life ; a blow from Mahmood's dagger wounded 
him in the arm, and the sight of his blood alone recalled the Mir 
to himself, and induced him to spare two of the princes, still very 
young, the only ones that escaped from this fearful massacre. His 
insania was at length complete: to this were added an att,ack of 
paralysis, a painful disease of the intestines, and want of sleep, and 
in this condition he sometimes tore pieces of flesh from his body, 
and devoured them. His mother, as some say, in despair a t  his 
sufferings-or Mir Echreff, as others affirm, to obtain the power to 
which he was called by the general wish of the Afghans-ordered 
1 him to be smothered under the cushions of his own divan ; his re- 
mains were thrown to the jaclrals. But whoever gave the order for 
the death of i\Iahmood, it is certain that this prince was still alive 
when the Afghans acknowledged Mir Echreff as their sovereign. 
The antecedents of this young soldier and his brilliant qualities, 
in no way inferior to those of his predecessor during the first years 
of his reign, raised great hopes of him in the minds of his subjects. 
. . 
Accordingly, he applied himself earnestly to the task of mitigating 
the misery inflicted by his relative, and expressed publicly the 
' horror he felt at the merciless deeds which had rendered the very 
, 
name of Afghan odious ; he paid the greatest honours to the re- 
mains of the sons of the Shah Sa tan  Hoosein by magnificent 
funeral rites, at the close of which he declared to the assembled 
Afghan and Persian nobles that he devoted the memory of Mah- 
mood to the execration of future ages. I n  short, he did everything 
in his power to attach the Persians to his interests, and bestowed 
favours upon them, even to the detriment of the Afghans. T h e  
latter were not long in perceiving that they had chosen a master 
who was quite determined to take every advantage of the power 
they had just placed in his hands, for his first act was to. put the 
Serdar Aman Ullah Khan to death. This brave but ambitious 
general of Mir hahmood, as well as several other chiefs, had done 
everything to prevent his election, and he was also suspected of 
holding a secret correspondence with Shah Thamasp. No real 
crime could be imputed to them, but Mir Echreff'thougbt their deaths 
necessary to his security. He  confiucated to his own profit the 
wealth which they had accnmulated during the conquest of Persia, 
and this enabled him to meet the immediate necessities consequent 
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upon his succession and the embarrassments that met him on all 
sides. 
Echreff entertained no clelusions on the difficulty of his position. 
It was evident that he must put an end to the divisions amongst his 
own people, and obtain the confidence of the Persians ; he had also 
to repel the invasion of the Russians,- who had seized upon the 
Guilan ; that of the Turks, already masters of Georgia, the Azer- 
baidjan, Kurdistan, and part of Iralc ; and finally bo subdue the 
party of Thamasp Mirza, which had been organised in the south of 
the Azerbaidjnn and the Mazanderan. This prince was the only 
one of the t h e e  surviving sons of the Shah I-Ioosein, who was then 
in possession of his liberty : by the abdication of his father he con- 
sidered himself King of Persia, and had, as Shah, treated with the 
Russian and Turkish governments. T o  the first he had pro~nisecl 
the cession of the provinces borclering on the Caspian ; and to the 
second, the countries they h d  already seized, on condition that they 
assisted him in regaining the throne of his fathers. Agreeably to 
the terms of this treaty, which accorded so well with the views of 
territorial aggrandizement projected by the remarkable sovereign 
who then reigned in Russia, the army of Peter the Great disem- 
barked in the Guilan, and there established itself; and as every- 
thing denoted that the Russian generals did not intend to leave the 
positions they had taken up, Echreff turned his first efforts against 
the Turks. I n  his entleavours to establish peace he a t  first tried 
what he could effect by negotiation, offering to make great sacrifices 
to obtain that result. But the Sultan, Ahmed Khan, seeing the 
state of anarchy that reigned in Persia, determined to retain the 
provinces already mentioned; the negotiations, therefore, were 
broken off, and he  ordered,Ahmed Pasha, the Walee of Bagdad, 
and Hoosein Pasha, the Walee of Mosul, with the troops nnder their 
command, to' converge fiwt oil Kernlanshah, and afterwards to 
concentrate them on Hamadan. These two towns were already 
occupied by detachments of the Turkish army under the orders of 
S b d u l  Rahman Pasha. The Walee of Bagdad, who had the com- 
mand in chief, was instructed to send a flag of truce to Mir 
Echreff directly his army had assembled at  EIamaclan, and impera- 
tively demand that the Shah Hoosein and his sons, at  this time 
imprisoned in the fort of Teberruk, a t  Ispahan, should be set a t  
liberty. I-le mas also to insist upon the immediate evacuation of 
the Persian territory by the Afghans, as well as the restitution of 
~1 the treasure they had laid their hands on during their occupation. 
The rejection of any one of these conditions was to be followed by 
a declaration of war.* And in this manner the matter terminated, 
for the Turkish envoy was unable to come to any understanding 
Mir Echreff. Ahmed Pasha took the field with an army of 
60,000 men and 70 pieces of artillery, and marched direct u-pon 
Ispahan. Echreff met him about four days' march from the capital, 
his army not being half as numerous as that of the Turks, and very 
ill provided with artillery. A battle was fought a t  Kiemereh, a 
town situated behreen Ispahan and Boroodjird, and the victory was 
for a long time undecided, but at  length the Turks were routed, 
leaving 12,000 men upon the field, and 50 pieces of cannon ; the 
baggage also fell into the hands of the Afghans. Echreff showed 
. himself as great after the victory as he had been reasonable and 
moderate during the negotiations, and, retaining only the arms, 
returned all the booty his soldiers had made to the Turks. T o  
Alimed Pasha he wrote that he could not consider as legitimate 
spoils of war the plunder he had taken from misguided Mussulrnans ; 
,that his greatest desire was to live in peace with his brethren; that 
he trusted the Scltan would not again disturb him in the possession 
of a throne which he had taken from heretics, and to which he had an 
incontestable right by every law, human and divine. This .generous 
conduct, and the cession -to the Turks of the districts or Tauris, 
Zinguian, Sultanieh, Tefrich, Ferahane, Kezaz, Ihrdistan, Loo- 
ristan, and Koozistan, as well as admitting the religious supremacy 
of the Sultan, which Mir Echreff engaged to aclrnowledge in future, 
induced the Turks to make peace. This he ardently desired, for he had 
to contend with immeasurable difficulties ; and in these negotiations 
with the Turks, as well as his conduct in the field, Echreff displayed 
the talents of a consummate diplomatist and a first-rate &neia3. 
He  obtained from Turkey the formal recognition of his right to the 
throne of Persia : and the year following, the Sultan ~ h k e d  Khan 
sent Reshid Pasha to congratulate the Afghan chief on his acces- 
sion to the throne. Echreff afterwards sent Mohamed Khan, a 
* Abdullah Khan, the historian of is the only eastern authority which 
Herat, remarks in his manuscript, that records the death of the Shah Sultan 
Echreff was so thoroughly indignant a t  Hoosein as having taken place at this 
the insolence of this message, that im- epoch, I thought it right to mention 
mediately after the receipt of it he the circumstance in a note, adopting 
ordered the Shah Hoosein and his sons myself t.he opinion more generally ac- 
to be beheaded in the presence of the credited.-Femw. 
Turkish envoy; but as Abdnllnh Khan 
58 EVENTS IN AFGHANISTBF. CHAP. V, 
Beloochee, to acknowledge the compliment, and he was received at 
Constantinople with great honours. 
I n  consequence of the treaty thus concluded between Echreff and 
the Sultan, the Prince Thamasp was left to his own resources ; and 
mhen the Turks entered the Azerbaidjan he evacuated that pro- 
vince, followed by a few devoted adherents. Subseqnently to this 
he again took possession of Kasbeen and Teheran, and in these 
cities he resided alternately ; but no sooner had Echreff got rid of 
the Turks than he marched against and completely defeated the 
Prince, forcing him to retire into the Mazanderan. Nevertheless 
the troops of Thamasp refused to surrender Kasbeen and Teheran 
to the victor, who, called to Ispahan by the urgency of his a.ffairs, 
left an army to prosecute the sieges under the command of the 
Serdar Seidel Khan Nassaree, who soon reduced these cities. 
While Echreff was courageously fighting in Persia to establish 
his power, he lost his hold upon Kandahar, q-hich remained defini- 
tively in the hands of Mir Hoosein, a brother of Mir Mahmood, 
whom he had endeavoured to overthrow by an intrigue. In  the 
Seistan, the governor Malelc Mahmood, a descendant of the ancient 
Persian sovereigns, had taken the title of king, and subsequently 
seized upon the greater part of Khora.ssan. Herat had aclrnow- 
leclged his authority for many years past, so that the Afghans were. 
driven out in this direction. These changes were the cause of 
further complications amongst the chiefs, between whom,there was 
already anything but a good underatauding. 
It was, therefore, evident to Echreff that there was no hope of 
his being assisted by his own nation, and that for the future he 
could reckon only upon those who had, up to this time, followed 
his fortunes. H e  nom saw, without much regret, the R.ussians 
masters of the Guilan ; and when he was convinced that the posses- 
sion of that province would satisfy their ambition, and that they had 
110 intention of disturbing him in Irak, he determined to act with 
the utmost energy in the East, where his affairs were much em- 
barrassed ; but before leaving Ispahan he ordered t.he quarter in 
which the Afghans resided to be enclosed with high and thick walls, 
within which they would be secure against all the vicissitudes of 
war. Shah Thamasp, on the other hand, made every effort to 
recover the throne of the Seffavyes, and had the good fortune to 
secure the services of one of those extraordinary men that Nature 
produces only at long intervals. Nadir, subsequently Nadir Shah, 
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a powerfill robber-chieftain, offered his services to the son of the 
Shah Sultan Hoosein, who accepted them with eagerness. T h e  
military reputation of Nadir, to which was now added the autho- 
- rity derived from his position as commander-in-chief of the troops 
- of the legitimate king, attracted numerous partisans to his camp, 
, 
and he soon saw himself at the head of a large and well-disciplined 
army inspired by his own peculiar and energetic impulses. 
During the years 1726 and 1727 Nadir employed himself in 
reconquering that part of Khorassan which Malek Mahmood, the 
Prince of Seistan, had seized, and also in taking Herat ; after which 
he marched towards Mazanderan, that he might, in concert with 
his sovereign, adopt some plan for driving the Afghans from t,he 
lmgdom. The capture of the city of Nishapoor, and the slaughter 
of 3000 Afghans, was the prelude to this enterprise. After this 
he dislodged successively all the Afghan garrisons in Khorassan, 
. . and drove them from post to post, until they had entirely evacuated 
this province, which soon acknowledged, and to the fullest extent, 
the authority of the Shah Thamasp. 
While Nadir was thus occupied, Mir Echreff seized upon Yezd, 
which had resisted the arms of Mir Mahnlood : but the conquest 
was dearly bought, for he there lost his tried and veteran soldiers, the 
e'lite of his army. This was indeed a great misfortune, and, 
aggravated by the fact that, Mir Hoosein having declared himself 
independent in Kanclahar, he was unable to fill up the casualties 
in his army with Afghans, who were no longer anxious to take 
service under him. Mir Echreff was, therefore, constrained to 
recruit his army with Persians, ancl march without further delay 
against Nadir, whose victorious battalions were daily augmented 
by men eager to deliver their country, and take a deep revenge for 
the odious tyranny under which they had groaned for six years. 
Rlir Echreff had never been in such a critical position, and the 
measures of precaution which he toolr to protect his rear plainly 
showed the disquietude he felt; his soldiers participated in this 
. feeling, they hsd lost all confidence in themselves, and it was under 
such apprehensioris that they moved forward to meet the enemy. 
Shah Thamasp, i~npatient o recover his capital, was desirous that 
Nadir should march in all haste on Ispahan; but the prudent 
general respectfully but firmly declined to comply with his wishes, 
convinced that such a movement would be inopportune. Nadii felt 
confident that, if he kept his troops fresh, it would be easy for him 
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to beat the Afghans, if they attacked him after a long forced march, 
exhausted by privations and fatigue. In  acting thus he also had 
the advantage of choosing the ground on which he intended t,o give 
battle without removing from DIazanderan. The population of this 
province was entirely dcvoted to Shah Thamasp, and he could there- 
fore, in case of a reverse, effect his retreat in all security across the 
mountains, which offered at every step admirable positions for 
defence. 
The army of Echreff numbered 30,000 men, scarcely the half of . 
which, a t  the utmost, were Afghans, and on coming np with the forces '. 
of the enemy he found them entrenched in a well-chosen position on 
some small hills selected by Nadir. The Afghans, never having 
seen the Persians hold their ground, were anxious to attack at  once ; . 
but Echreff, who had a higher opinion of his adversaries, repressed, . 
perhaps inopportunely, this impulse, which might have given him 
the victory, and remained several days in a state of inaction. I t  
was only when it became impossible for him to obtain supplies that 
he decided upon giving his adversary battle, and on the 23rd of . 
Rebji-i-ul akher, 6 th of November, 1728, he took up a position in . 
front of his army 6chelloned from Moomineitbad to Boordj-meyoos, 
or Meimandoos. The latter place is situated about seven miles east 
of the town of Darnghan, having the village of Naimabad on thc . 
west, and at  the same distance from the village of Dell Hollah. The 
attack commenced along the whole line ; but the Persians received 
, 
it with great steadiness, and, perfectly cool, waited till the enemy 
had advanced within half musket-shot before they poured in their 
fire. The Afghans fought with the courage and sav'qe energy that 
mas natural to them and the confidence of men accustomed to 
conquer ; hut they were unable to malie any impresion upon their 
adversaries. Echreff, surprised at  a resistance to which his troops 
were not accuston~ed, attempted to clestroy Nadir's order of battle 
by turning his left flank ; but the Persian commander, perceiving 
his intention, formed his infantry into squares, and routed in detail 
with his cavalry Echreff's detachments, after which, leading the 
mass of h i  forces against the Afghan reserves, he pui them to flight." 
* Abdullah Khan states there were that  this sovereign held them in great 
ten French officers, for the  most part considerrtion, gave them the absolnte 
belonging to  the artillery, serving in authority over his troops, and that ha 
the Persian atmy, and tha t  his father, owed the greater portion of hia success 
who was placed by Nadir under their to the f ~ i t h f u l  support which they gitve 
special ordeiu, had frequently told him him,-Tewisr. 
CEAP. V. DEFEAT OF AFGHAKS. 61 
The $Iir's troops performed, indeed, prodivies of valour ; but they 9 
were unable to rally, and left 12,000 of their comrades on the field 
,f battle. The Persians, who lost only 3000 men, followed the 
retreating enemy and came up with them a t  the defile of Khar, 
called also by the Persians Tingui-serdaree." Here the Afghaus 
. rallied and renewed the fight; but they mere again defeated, and 
abandoned all their baggage to the victors-Nadir himself was 
wounded in this second engagement. The  distance from the 
defile of Khar to Teheran is forty-five miles, and the remnants 
of the Afghan army reached that city in one day ; they subse- 
quently pressed on to Ipsahi~n with all speed, spreading alarm, 
desolation, and death on their route. On their arrival there they 
hastened, with their families and their treasure, into the fortress 
which Echreff had constructed in the centre of the city ; but after 
having confided its defence to a garrison of picked men, the Afghan 
commander again took the field with his remaming troops, con- 
sisting of Afghans, Tartan, Kurds, and Ghebers, in all 20,000 
men, marched to the north of Ispahan, and at  a spot twenty-four 
miles from thence took up a position on a table-land in advance, 
and to the north-ebt of the village of ~Ioortchekhor. There he 
waited for the Persians, ovcr whom he still hoped to prove his 
superiority in arms. The Afghans were posted between the village , 
and a trench which they had thrown up in front of their camp in 
the form of a derni-lune, their right resting on a watercourse and 
their left on a caravanserai difficult to take. Seeing them in so 
, good a position, Nadir did not think it adyisable to attack imme- 
diately : he wished to refresh his troops, and for this purpose pitched 
his camp about two miles west of the high road and round the 
village of Bagh-mirane. The reconnaissances which he ordered to 
be made on the Afghan camp having satisfied him that it could not 
be carried in front, he determined to turn the position, and taking 
I advantage of a aarlr night, which occurred three days after his arrival, he found himselfat the near approach of day in the rear of 
the Afghans, separated from them only by the village. Fortune, 
which favoured him at all points, again declared for him, for 
a violent wind arose and drove clouds of dust in the faces of 
* This spot is cited by several travellers, and with reason, a s  being the Caspian 
Py1es.-Ten-ier. 
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the Afghans, and, favoured by this circumstance, Nadir fell upon 
them with the same intrepidity and vigour which he had already 
displayed. The  enemy, in despair, maintained an obstinate re- 
sistance ; but they had to do with men flushed with recent victories, 
which gave them the solidity of old soldiers. I f  the Afghans fought 
to preserve their conquest and their lives, the Persians were ani- 
mated by the remembrance of the irijuries they had suffered, and 
were burning to avenge. The village was a t  length carried, and 
afterwards the entrenchments, in defending which 4000 Afghans 
found a soldier's death. The survivors retreated in disorder to 
Ispahan, where each of them collected in the course of the night 
his most valuable effects, and at  daybreak, accompanied by their 
wives and children, mounted on mules and camels, fled southward. 
Mir Echreff, furious at his reverses, put the Shah Sultan Hoosein 
and his two sons to death, and in a gloomy and savage mood was 
the last Afghan that left the walls of Ispahan. H e  carried with 
him all his treasures and jewels, and, with 12,000 horsemen still 
under his command, directed his course on Shiraz, from which city 
he hoped again to reassume the offensive against the Persians; but 
Nadir did not allow Echreff time to reorganise his army, and after 
a few days' repose he was once more on foot, intending, if possible, 
to force him to evacuate the province of Fars. The  Afghans ad- 
vanced to meet the enemy as far as Peulee Khan, a bridge over the 
Bendemir, ten miles south of Persepolis, and disputed with tenacity 
and fury the'passage of that river; but they were again defeated 
and retired to Shiraz in the greatest confusion. Nadir doggedly 
pursued them step by step, invested the city, and informed the 
beleaguered host that, if Echreff was not delivered up to him 
within forty-eight hours, he would put every soldier to death, 
and with torture. The Afghans agreed to his conditions, on ascer- 
taining which the Mir  prepared for flight, and, accompanied by two 
hundred brave men who remainedfaithful to his fallen fortunes, cut 
his way sword. in hand through the investing army, talting in hot 
haste the road to Afghanistan-a portion of his army fell under the 
swords of the Persians, who gave their adversaries no quarter, and 
the remainder dispersed. As to Echreff, he was so rapidly pursued 
that he was obliged to abandon his baggage and treasure to avoid 
being made prisoner : his followers, seeing that they could no longer 
be of the least service, left him. When he reached the Seistan, 
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he had only two servants with him, and they, as well as the Mir, 
fell by the hand of Abdullah Khan, a Belooch chief, who sent his 
head and two large brilliants which were found on him to the 
Shah Thamasp." 
~ h u s  terminated the dominion of the Afghans in Persia. If any 
individual was capable of maintaining i t  for a longer period, it was 
Nir Echreff, who to extraordinary courage united great 
talents of every kind ; but the elements on which his power rested 
were too unstable for it to be possible that he could eventually 
come forth victorious from the conflict which arose between himself 
and the robber chieftain. This extraordinary invasion of Persia 
ended in the extermination of dl those who had taken part in it- 
a just retribution for the crimes and atrocities with which they had 
sullied their cause. During the seven years that the Afghans held 
Persia, that empire lost more than a third of its population ; the 
soil remained without cuitivation, the canals and watercourses for 
irrigation were dried up, and the greater portion of the public 
buildings complctely destroyed. The invaders had to contend 
against a people enervated, effeminate, and devoid of every senti- 
ment of honour and national feelmg; they triumphed, there- 
fore, by an obstinate determination to succeed, and, in spite of their 
inferiority in numbers, they did so. Such examples are, it is true, 
rare in history ; but the Afghans were better qualified to fight than to 
govern. T o  appropriate, wherever they went, and without any reason 
or pretext whatsoever, money or money's worth, was their practice ; 
revolts and disturbances naturally ensued, and necessitated the 
employment of a large army. They were in the end weak- 
ened by twenty combata, and found it impossible to recruit in 
Afghanistan, except in the small and scarcely organised state of Kan- 
dahar, which ceased to provide them with further reinforcements; 
they, were, therefore, obliged to admit foreign soldiers within their 
ranks, whose fidelity was at least doubtful, and who rarely acted 
i with vigour ; but they maintained themselves seven years in Persia, much more by the terror which their first victories and their cruelty 
. inspired, than by the material means at  their disposal. If Echreff 
vanquished the Turks, it was because he had the support of the 
* Several Eatern  authors contradict this account, and assert that' Echreff 
P died of dieease.-Atrier, 
6.4 REFLECTIONS. CHAP. 8, 
Persians, who detested them much more than they did the Afghans, 
and served voluntarily against them; but directly Nadir appeared, 
this unreal and unstable dominion was dissolved and overthrown in 
four successive battles. Shunned and dreaded everywhere for their 
turbulence and barbarity, they were repulsed on all sides, and found, 
with great difficulty, an asylum or even a shelter in those desert 
wastes ; the greater number of them mere tracked like wild beasts, 
and killed like them, or perished from misery and hunger, and it 
is doubtful whether more than a few huudred Afghans ever returned 
to their own country. 
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IT not having been our intention to write a history of Persia, we 
shall not follow Nadir Shah in his wars with the Turks and other 
nationalities under the Persian rule, but proceed at once to speak 
of his campaigns in Afghanistan. 
After the victory at  Shiraz Nadir reconquered in succession all 
the Persian provinces which had become detached from the empire. 
In the year 1730 he seized upon Herat, that city having revolted 
from his authority ; he also took Furrah, a strong and very im- 
portant fortress, situated about one hundred and forty miles south 
of the first-mentioned place ; but he did not extend his conquests on 
that side, and. it was only after having obtained several fresh vic- 
tories over the Turks, and imprisoned Thamasp, that he placed the 
crown of the Seffavyes on his brow. In 1737 he marched on Kan- 
dahar at the head of 100,000 men without meeting any resistance on 
his road, for the inhabitants submitted to his authority or fled at 
his approach. Nevertheless the population of the city, which had 
been considerably augmented by the influx of persons whom his 
victorious march had driven into it, prepared to resist the Persian 
invader. 
Mir Hoosein Khan, who was still in command there, reminded 
the Ghildjzyrs of the struggle they had made for their indepen- 
dence, their victories over the Persians, and their conquest of that 
country ; and, being eloqucnt as well as brave, he easily succeeded 
in exciting them to make a spirited defence. The position of Kan- 
dahar was at this time very strong, the city being situated at the 
foot of a rocky mountain which flanked it on the north and east: 
innumerable stone towers, connected by curtains, surrounded it, and 
followed the sinuosities of the mountain, the summit of which was 
occupied by a fort, believed to be impregnable, and commanding 
the citadel, placed half way between it and the city. Nadir Shah, 
against whom no  resistance had as yet been offered, was obliged to 
halt before these obstacles, to which art had also added all that 
could render the defence effectual. Despairing of being able to 
take the city by assault, he established a strict blockade, hoping to 
reduce the garrison by famine ; but it was in vain that he enclosed ' 
Iiandahar within a double wall, between which his soldiers were ' 
sheltered from attacks both from within and without; a year and 
a half elapsed without his having obtained the least advantage 
against the city-however, he was more successful towards the 
country, for his detachments brought the whole of the environs . 
under submission. When, therefore, he was master of the province, 
he resolved to carry the place, and ordered a general assault. The 
preparations for this had been most formidable, the bravery and devo- 
tion of the troops admirable, but, after a furious and desperate 
conflict of two clays' duration, Ibndahar was not only not taken, 
but not one of the advanced works was carried, though several 
attacks against them had been made. A fceling of discourage- 
ment began to pervadc the Persian army, when a newly-raised corps, 
of the tribe of the Bakhtyarees, which had already distinguished 
itself on several occasions by its firm aud courageous bearing, ob- 
tained an advantage which raised the hopes of the rest of the troops, 
ancl induced them to redouble their efforts. Though received with 
a storm of bullets, this gallant band had succeeded, by climbing the 
almost perpeniiicular rocks and clinging to their projections, in 
reaching a little plateau, from whence they were enabled to carry 
several towers on the north side of the mountain. Into these they 
managed, simply with ropes and their own strong arms, to raise 
some pieces of artillery, which opening their fire upon all the 
other towers, a breach was made, and in six hours the Bakhty- 
arees were in possession of them; the town and citadel were 
therefore obliged to surrender at  discretion. Mir Hoosein Khan 
retreated into the fort on the s m i t  of the mountain, where 
CHAP. VI. KADIR'S ~ O L I C Y  IN AFGE~ANISTAN. G 7 
he successfully resisted every attack, and might still have made a 
ptxacted defence had it not been for the generosity of Nadir, who 
to spare his life, aud give him high rank in his own army. 
This noble offer led to a capitulation, and &fir Hoosein afterwards 
became sincerely attached to the Persian invader, and one of his 
favourite generals. 
Once master of Kandahar, the Persian monarch took measures 
to consolidate his power, and, with a view of preventing the in- 
habitants from again offering a similar resistance, which their 
bravery, their means of defence, and the strength of the place 
might tempt them to do, he dismantled the fortifications, and trans- 
ferred the population to a new town which he built during the 
blockade at about a gunshot from the old city. But the new one 
was scarcely inhabited fifteer, years, for immediately Ahmed Shah 
Suddozye came to the throne he built a third city, atout one mile 
and a half further east, when the city of Nadir was deserted. 
T o  the conqnests of Herat and Kandahar Nadir was not long 
in joining that of Kabul, and thus becamc master of the whole of 
Afghanistan. By great political ability, and more especially by 
the generous manner in which he treated the people and their 
chiefs, he completely secured their good will, and raised a contin- 
gent of 16,000 horse in that country. They were recruited 
amongst those who could claim descent from the Abdalees and 
the Ghildjzyes, twelve thousand being taken from the former 
tribe, and four from the latter : the chiefs of these tribes, to the 
number of ten, namely, eight Abdalees and two Ghildjzyes, had 
the cainmand of these troops, the command in chief being given 
to Boor lMohamed Khan Alizye, one of them. This body of men 
accompanied Nadir Shah in all his expeditions, and participated 
powerfully in the successes and glory of that conqueror. They 
rendered him more especially a signal service, and certainly saved 
I his army from complete destruction, when, on his return from India, he was engaged with the enemy iu the mountains beyond Peshawur, 
and harassed on all sides by the Khyberrees. The Persian con- 
queror was in a most critical position on thai occasion, and extri- 
cated himself only by paying a large sum of money by way of toll 
to the mountaineers who closed the defiles against him. In short, 
this contingent of the Abdalees and Ghildjzyes showed so much 
devotion to Nadir, and rendered him such important services, that 
he at  length preferred them to his o m  troops, which led to great 
F ;! 
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jealousies oil the part of the Persians ; a i d  when Nadir was assas- 
sinated in 1747, they gave vent to their resentment, and at tach$ 
this ftl~oured corps with fury. Being vwy inferior in numbers, 
the Afghans vere obliged to consult their own safety by a prompt 
retreat, and returned to their country under their own commander . 
Noor Nohamed Khan, but they immediately took measures to deli- 
ver themselves from the Persiau yoke, by no lnrans 3. clifficult task, 
for, after Sadir's death, anarchy reigned in every part of the empire. 
The serclars who had se~ved in the Persian army were, as we 
have already remarked, ten in number. Ahmed Khan Suddozye, 
descended in a direct line from Sucloo, who had been ambassador 
to Shah Abbas the Great, nas the most noble amongst them ; 
, 
and Hadji Djemal Khan Mohameclzye, lineally descended from 
Mohamed, a companion of Sudoo in that embassy, was the most 
influential. Experience had clearly demonstrated to all thcse 
chiefs that the clivisions amongst themselves, much m6re than the 
power of their .enemies, had, up to that period, broight them under , 
the subjection of the various invaders of their country ; and they 
swore therefore to remain strictly united, and adjourned for one 
mont,h the completion of the code of l a m  which they had cleter- 
mined to give to thek nation. 
After the return of the Afghjn contingent to Randahar, they 
remained some days in the enjoyment of tlibse social and family ties 
to which they had been for so long a time strangers, and their tur- . . 
bnlent spirits took soine repose; but whether from a discontented 
feeling towards their chief, or intrigues which led them to rebel 
against him, they withclrew the chief command from Noor Mohamed 
Khan, giving its a reason that his origin was not sufficiently noble. 
After the fall of this personagethe principal serdars of the Abdalee 
m d  Gkilcljzye tribes assembled in the tomb of Sheik ~ ~ u r l c ,  
situated in the village of Naclir-abad, now IGchk-noolthood, thirty- 
five miles fi-om liandahar, to decide upon the best method of 
organising a regular government in Afghanistan. A t  this meet- 
ing i t  was agreed ihat a fusion of their nation with the Persians 
was henceforward impossible-that they ought to elect a chief 
taken from amongst t.hemselves, who should be obeyed in all things, 
and assisted in  giving that unity of purpose to all military opera- 
tions, and the civil administration, without which there was no 
chance for them to preserve their independence. This proposition 
was not agreed to without delay, and more especially without great 
difficulty; each tribe was anxious to advance the claims of its own 
for the throne, and the good understanding between the 
&iefswho represented the tlibes was far from being impressecl with 
of a conciliatory or unselfish character. Ahmed Khan 
Suddozye, whose family lived at Herat, where he enjoyed great 
was present at eight of these tumnltuous assemblies, 
and had listened attentively to all that had been said without offer- 
ing one word on the important questions which had been discussed. 
The dervish who had the care of the tomb of Sheik Seurk, and 
whose opinion was always reccived with respect, had rcmarked the 
reserved manner of Ahmed Khan, and the holy man, wearied with 
the interminable discussions and repetitions which had tdwn place 
during several days at these meetings, advised their breaking up 
the conference at  once. ('Why all this verbose t a k  ? " said he to 
the serdars ; " God has created Bhmed Khan a much greater man 
than any of you ; he is of the most noble of all the Afghan families. 
Maintain, therefore, God's work, for his wrath will weigh heavily 
upon you if you destroy it." After having pronounced these words 
in a most energetic manner, he took a handful of barley from an 
adjoining field, and, having formed it into a wreath, placed it on 
the head of Ahined Khan, adding, " and may this serve as your 
diadem." Hadji Djernal Khan, the most powerful of the serdars 
present at this meeting, and who appeared to have the greatest 
number of votes, immediately withdrew his pretensions in favour of 
Ahmed Khan, and supported his election with all the weight of 
his persuasive eloquence-conduct that obtained for him the general 
respect of the Afghans. The serdars, seeing that he who mould 
certainly have been chosen their sovereign was so disinterested, 
followed the example thus given them ; but they separated well 
convinced that Ahnle,d Khan, who had been the most silent of them 
all, had also been the most clever in not allowing his claim to be 
advanced till the last moment, when the diversity of opinions had 
wearied the meeting, and, above all, in having these qualifications 
brought forward by a third person, which made him appear modest 
and disinterested, when they well lrnew he was neither the one nor 
the other. 
Ahmed I<han, who took the title of Shah, was crowned in the 
mosque a t  Kandilhar towards the close of the year 1747, when 
there were great rejoicings, which were prolonged during several 
weclrs. The ceremony of his coronation was of the most simple 
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kind : the Mollah of the highest rank poured a measure of wheat 
on the head of the new monarch, announcing to the assembled . 
Afghans that he was the chosen of God and the nation. This 
emblematical investiture of the regal power is followed a t  the 
present day amongst the Afghan tribes each time that they elect a 
chief; the signification which is attached to this ceremonial is, 
that abundance and prosperity will result from the acts of him 
whom they make thc depository of power. 
T h e  Afghans were still in the midst of their coronation festivals 
when there arrived a t  Kandalitlr Eaghee Khan Chirazee, chief of 
the customs to Xadir Shah in Sciide and the Punjab, having in 
his custocly two kooroom, 1,360,0001., in money, diamonds, and 
shawls. This Ahrned Shah seized and immediately distributed 
amongst the officers and men of his army and the employes of the 
government ; and this great liberality on his part did more for his 
future career than all his private virtues and his uoble origin. 
Several tribes who had not as yet positively recognised his election, 
but the chiefs of which were on this occasion the recipients of his 
generosity, now attached theruselves to his person, and he profited 
by this feeling of unanimity to consolidate his power, and during 
the first years of his reign to raise a large army, with which he 
s~~bsequently marched on Kabul with a view to its capture. This 
was not so easy as an oflensive operation, for Naclir Shah had 
settled twelve thousand Persian families in the Eala Hissar, the 
citadel of that capital ; but Ahmed Shah having, through his parti- 
zans, entered into a secret un-~derstanding with them, they made 
common cause with the Afghans on their arrival, under a promise 
that their chiefs should participate in the official appointments and 
advantages in the gift of the sovereign, and be treated in all things 
on a footing of equality.* 
I n  spite of this defection, Nasser Khan, the governor of I<ahul, 
obstinately refused to recognise the authority of Ahmed Shah, and 
did everything in his power to recruit the garrison amongst the 
* The Persians inhabiting Kabul are them from the others, gave shem a 
known by the  name of ICuzzilbnshes, kind of red cap; hence their name of 
because they form part of one or more " Red head," Kezeel bash. These 
of the seven Turkish tribes that em- seven tribes were Oustadjsloo, Chamloo, 
braced t h e  party of the Shah Ismail, Nikaloo, Bnhmloo, Zoolkadder, Kadjar, 
the founder of the tribe of the Seffa- and &char. - lzcm'er. 
vyes. This sovereiy,  to distinguish 
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Hazarahs and Usbeks, but all in vain ; and despairing at length of 
being able to make head against the Afghans, he fled, after a fecblc 
conflict, to Peshawur. Ahmed Shah then took possession of Kabul 
~ h o u t  meeting with the slightest opposition ; appointed as governor 
of the province a clever man devoted to his person and interests ; 
and left the city in pursuit of Nasser Khan, who, abandoned by the 
greater part of his followers and seeing clearly that a longer 
resistance could only end fatally for himself, surrendered Peshawur 
to the Afghans and submitted to their king. 
Ahmed Shah was aware that war was a necessity to the people 
. . 
over whom he reigned ; their turbulent nature, and the rivalry which 
existed between the various tribes, would certainly have led to grave 
disorders against the prosperity of the state and been dangerous to 
his rising power, if they had remained inactive. Besides, the lring- 
dom of the Afghans was to be constituted, the limits and boundary 
of which had not up to this time been defined by any one. Ahmed 
Shah resolved to extend these limits wherever an Afghan tribe was 
to be found, and, in order to carry his views into effect, he remained 
no longer a t  Peshawur than was necessary to subdue and organize 
thc tribes which inhabitcd the mountainous districts of that province ; 
and when he was convinced that there was nothing more to apprc- 
hend from their opposition, he crossed the Tndus and marched 
against Lahore. 
Hayat Ullsh Khan, son of Zelteria Khan, honoured by Nadir 
Shah with the surname of Shah Nawaz Khan, who had succeeded 
his father in the government of this city, hearing the intentions of 
Ahmed Shah, assembled an army and took up a. posittion at a little 
distance north of Lahore. He  also wrote a letter to the Great 
Mogul at Delhi, Ahmed Shah Gourlranee," informing him of the 
advance of Ahmed Shah Suddozye ; the capture he had recently 
made of Kabul and Peshawur ; of his projects on Lahore, and those 
which he presumed he might have on India ; and for these reasons 
claimed his assistance. The Mogul Emperor conceded all that he 
desired, and placed himself at the head of the troops destined to 
co-operate with LIayat Ullah. Immediately the Lahore chieftain felt 
certain of this he did not wait for their arrival, for, thinking that 
Ahmed Shah Suddozye, when he saw him so well supported, would 
* Qourkanee is the name of the tribe to  which Tamerlane belougcd, also 
Mima Baboor and his descend,mts.-Terrier. 
not da1-e to tempt fortune against him, he made a bold demonstra- 
tion in the hope of arresting his march, and moved his camp to the 
left banlr of the Tchenab. The Afghans, however, neither halted 
nor clelayed their onward movement as he had expected, and soon 
arrived in his front; but as the river mas considerably swollen, 
the two armies were obliged to wait till it had fallen before they 
could attack. The impatience of the Afghan monarch in  articular 
was great, for he was anxious to engage his adversary before the 
Moguls, of whose expected arrival he was aware, had joined, but 
the want of pontoons obliged him to remain passive during severd 
clays. Directly his cavalry could attempt the passage of the river 
vith any security he put the whole of that arm in motion at mid- 
night and in profound silence, and crossed at a spot a few parasangs 
above the enemy's encampment. Ahmcd Shalt had conccived the 
idea of marching straight to Lahore, carrying the place by a coup- 
de-main, and balRing the vigilance of his opponent by leaving his. 
infantry behind him on the right bank and in sight of the enemy. 
Iris anticipations mere well founded, for the army of Shah Nawaz 
Khan, thinlting they had still before them the whole of the Afghan 
forces, slept in fancied security. On the following day, however, the 
Govwnor of the runjab learnt that Ahmed Shah was marching on 
the capital with his cavalry. Leaving therefore his infantry face to 
h c e  with that of his opponent, he hastened in pursuit of their horse 
with his own, and came up with them on the following day half-way 
between the Tchenab and the city ; but having reconnoitred and 
found the enemy much superior in numbers, he did not dare to 
attack, and filed along his flank, protectcd by a chain of hills, south 
of which he expected to fall in with Gourlcanee, who was marching 
to his assistance. 
The  Afghan King saw clearly the movement of his adversxy 
and divined his object, and, a fresh project having suddenly sug- 
gested itself to his mind, he perrnittcd Shah Nawaz to make this retro- 
grade movement \nthout offering ally opposition to it ; but when he 
supposed him to be a t  a good distance Ahmed returned by the road 
by which he had advanced, and fell upon the Sikh infantry on the 
left of the Tchenab, routed them completely, captured their artillery 
and a considerable booty. H e  then passed his own infantry over 
to  the right banlr of the river, and moved rapidly on Lahore, which 
be seized without difficulty. 
Shah Nawaz Khan, ashamed of a flight which must bc explained 
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. . to his by some reason or anot,her, attempted to justify it by 
exalting to the highest degree the numbers, courage, and clever- 
ness of the Afghans ; this imprudent speech brought. discouragement 
into the Mogul ranks, and their inclinations, which up to that period 
had been unanimous in favour of fighting, were transformed into an 
ardent desire for peace. 
. . After having fortified Lahore and confided it to the care of a 
.picked garrison, Ahmed Shah Suddozye marched to meet Ahmed 
;I. Shah Gourkanee, but he had scarcely traversed half the distance 
, . which separated him from the Mogul Emperor, when he was met 
, . - > .  by his envoy, who was the bearer of pacific proposals from his 
master. After long hesitation Ahmed Shah Suddozye decided for 
peace, for the chances of the war in which he was engaged were 
oreat.; his power was as yet in the bud ; he was also not without b 
uneasiness as to his rear, and even regarding the state of his own 
country; he. thought therefore that it would be imprudent on his 
part to risk his fortune on the ilncertilin issues of a battle, and 
therefore agreed that all the provinces in the Punjab which had 
been under the rule of Nadir Shah should remain in the hands 
of the Afghans, and should form the dower of a Mogul prin- 
cess, who was some little time afterwards married to the prince 
Timoor Mirza II., son of Ahmed Shah Suddozye. All the 
countries situated beyond the Sutlej on the left bank of the 
Inclus remained in the hands of the Moguls, and the rivers 
before mentioned were to form the line of demarcation between 
the two empires. A treaty based upon this convention was 
' 
signed by the two parties in 1750 ; and the Suddozye prince, 
afker having nominated governors in his new conquests, returned 
to ICandahar, where several Afghan serdars, jealous of the power 
of their sovereign and of the glory which he had recently acquired, 
secretly endeavoured to excite the masses against him. No sooner, 
therefore, had he arrived in his capital than they resolved to 
assassinate him, but the king, informed of this conspiracy a few 
moments only before the time at which they had fixed to carry it out, 
frustrated it en tirely by his firmness and presence of mind. The leader 
in this plot was the same Noor Mohnmed Khan, Alizye, who was 
removed from the command of the army when the Afghans returned 
from Persia, and upon whom Ahmed Shah had conferred the title 
of Mir or Prince of the Afghans ; his accomplices were Meuheubet 
Khan, Iiedoo Khan, and several other Afghans of less note, vho 
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with him .perished by the hands of the executioner, as well as ten 
men from each of the tribes most deeply compromised. These 
executio~~s were the first which had taken place by orclrr of Ahmecl 
Shah, and many of the chiefs, being apprehensive that he might on 
some other occasion adopt the same severe measures against them- 
selves, disputed his right to inflict the punishment of death. After 
the executions were over they agitated the question whether or not 
the [ex tulionis should be applied to the Shah and his family ; they 
also wished to limit his power, or rather to subject it to their 
approbation ; but Ahmed Shah suppressed with encrgy this feeling 
on the part of the chiefs, and his dete~mination and justice soon ,: 
produced tranquillity in the countries subject to his dominion. 
Reassured by this favourable result, he meditated the conquest 
of Rhorassan, a project which he had conceived immediately he ' 
ascended the throne. At  that period Shah Rolth, grandson of 
Nadir Shah, reigned in this province, where he had with difficulty 
established himself after great opposition on the part of the chiefs. ' 
His principal antagonist was Moomeen Khan, governor of Tchina- 
ran, who had even succeeded in taking possession of Meshed, 
and induced the army to proclaim him Shah of Persia ; but after 
having exercised the sovereign pnwer for a few days only, he gave 
umbrage to the troops, who mutinied and put him to death. This 
event enabled Shah Rolth to reassume his rights; his satisfaction, 
however, was not without alloy, for several other chiefs who had 
the same object in view as Moomeen I<han spread anarchy and 
confusion in all parts of I<horassan. Ahmed Shah thought, there- 
fore, that this was a most propitious opportunity for his purpose ; 
and in 1750 he marched into that provincewith an army of 70,000 
men.. Herat was then governed by the Arab Serdar Emir Khan, 
an old commander-in-chief of artillery under Nadir Shah, who held 
the city in the name of Shah Rolth Mirza ; this chief, feeling that ' 
he was not strong enough to meet the Afghans in the field, placed 
the citadel in a good state of defence, and 114th a garrison of picked 
men retired ,within its walls. To  the townspeople who were ready 
to defend the city he ordered that money, provisions, and arms 
should be distributed, and despatched a messenger to Shah Rolrh 
Mirza requesting his prompt assistance. 
T h e  inhabitants of Herat now sustained a siege for fourteen 
months in the most heroic manner, trusting always that this assist- 
ance, twenty times demanded, and as often promised by the prince, 
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would at length reach them ; finding themselves, however, deceived 
in their hopes, and being reduced to the greatest distress, they sur- 
rendered a t  discretion and opencd the gates. 
Emir Khan, who, from the citadel, witnessed the fall of the city, 
determined to make one last effort in its defence, and descended 
into the suburbs with his little band ; but being assailed in front 
by the Afghans and in the rear by some I-Ieratees who were of 
their party, his soldiers were soon exterminated, and the Emir 
hacked to pieces on the spot. Fifty men whom he left in the 
citadel were the only troops that surrendered to the Afghans, and 
their lives were spared. 
Shah Rokh M i m  had been prevented from going to the relief 
of Emir Khan by circumstances which he could not control, for he 
was hardly able to maintain his own ground in Meshed, the pos- 
session of which was Clisyuted by a score of competitors. The 
general-in-chief, Yoosoof Khan, had at  the outset beaten them dl, 
but this chief, ils brave as he wbs faithful, fell in a combat which 
took place between his troops and those of two princes of Khorasean. 
One of then], by name Mir Alem, belonged to an Arab tribe of 
the Seistan ; the other, Djnffer Khan, was chief of the I h d i s h  
colonies of Boodjnoord. These Khans, after the death of the 
- brave Yoosoof G a n ,  seized Meshed and imprisoned Shah Rokh ; 
but when the moment arrived for dividing the authority and the 
plunder they could not agree, and, assisted by their respective parti-. 
sans, came to blows. I n  this conflict 3lir Alem proved the victor, and 
remained sole master of the city. After having obtained this ad- 
vantage he made every preparation to resist Ahmed Shah Suddozye, 
repaired the fortifications, provisioned the place, and after having 
confided its defence to the inhabitants, whom he believed he could 
trust, he left Meshed, determined if possible to pounce upon Herat. 
In this attempt he was disappointed, for, on arriving at Toorbut- 
Sheik-Jam, he was himself surprised by the prince Timoor Mirza, 
who, with the advanced guard of the Afghan army, was marching 
on Meshed. Recovering from the first feeling of astonishment a t  
this untoward incident, Mir Alem attacked his adversary with the 
greatest intrepidity and made him give ground; but a charge of 
3000 Belooch cavalry commanded by Nasser Khan, chief of Kelat 
in Beloochistan, carried disorder into the Emir's ranks, and his army 
was cut to pieces. Mir Alem immediately gave up all idea of 
keeping Meshed, and retired in the direction of G.hain to his tribe. 
Nasser Ullah Khan, the son of Shah Rokh, who was in the field 
with a small pzrty of horse when he heard this good news, entered 
Xeshed, delivered his father, and placed him a t  the head of affairs. 
Anxious to terminate the object of his expedition, Ahmed Shah 
now appointed Dervish Ali Khan, Hazarah, to the government of 
Herat, and, rejoining his advanced-guard with the rest of his troops, 
a few days afterwards arrived under the walls of Meshed, which he 
invested on all sides, and vigorously besieged. His attacks were, 
however, repulsed with energy, and he suffered during several 
months considerable losses that were not compensated by any cor- 
responding success. l n  spite of the vigilance and the discipline 
which Ahmed Shah maintained, a night rarely passed without his 
being surprised by Nadir M r z a  or Nasser Ullah Khan, who, a t  
the head of a few select horsemen, came down upon the Afghan cc;lmp ' 
when they were least expected, and did not retire until they had. 
placed a good number of their adversaries A o ~ s  de combat. Asiatic 
armies have no conccption ho~v to protect themselves from night 
attaclrs by placing main guarcls, pickets, or videttes ; so that Ahmed 
Shah's forces were always surprised by these onsets, which, being 
cleverly conducted, annoyed them much. Mamech Khan Zafe- 
ranloo, governor of Tchinaran, who had attached himself to tlie 
fortunes of the grandson of Nadir, gave him also very usef~il 
support; he supplied the town with provisions, his cavalry made 
daily attaclrs upon the rear of the Afghans or pillaged and laid 
waste the environs of the city and thcir camp. Although the besieg- 
ing army amounted to an effective force of 60,000 men, they were 
never able to overpower, or even seriously to check, this handful of 
cavalry, who dealt such heavy blows and numbered not more than 
a thousand men. Matters remained in this state during four 
months, after which Ahmed Shah, who had not expected to meet 
with so obstinate a resistance, finished by listenmg to the proposi- 
tions that were made with a view to an amicable arrangement, and 
consented to raise the siege of Meshed on condition that his son 
Sindjar Mirza, who had remained a prisoner with tlie Persians 
after the death of Nadir Shah, should be restored to him. Several 
of Ahmed Shah's relations, whom Emir Khan had carried away from 
Herat where his family resided, were also to be given up, and on 
the reccipt of a large sum of money the Afghan l ing agreed to 
retire from before the place. 
These conditions having been duly fulfilled, Ahmed Shah, with- 
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out troublirlg himself about his rear, proceeded at once to lay siege 
to the fortified city of Nishapoor, situated in a plain exceedingly 
fertile, where his army could easily find subsistence. This t o m  
was then governed by two persons of equal authority-one, 
bbbas Iho l i  Khan, of the tribe of Beyat, which numbered 10,000 
families, residing- around Nishapoor, and on which he relied for 
support; the other, I-ladji Seif Eddin, a native of the city; and 
both determined to offer a stout resistance. Ahmed Shah was 
satisfied by simply investing the place, deferring the siege to a later 
period, when, accordil~g to a promise made him by the latter, he 
hoped to be able to obtain possession of the city. For himself, 
this persona&e in his letter to the Afghan monarch, he laid 
down his arms the very day of Ahmed Shah's arrival; but he 
added that it would require some time before he could overcome 
the obstinacy of Abbas Kooli Khan, who had decided upon fight- 
ing. In thus ,acting the cunning I-Iadji was only desirous of gaining 
time, and the Afghan sovereign was his dupe, for he negotiated 
and temporised so long, that the winter set in before he had 
opened his trenchcs; the snow fell heavily, the army were soon 
in want of provisions, and cold m d  hunger cruelly decimated the 
troops. At length the severity of the season was such that the 
, beasts of burden perished, and the Afghans were compelled to 
abandon their tents, baggage, ammunition, and artillery. After 
having destroyed the former and spiked the guns, they threw them 
into the kariz ,  or subterranean aqueducts, communicating with the 
surface by shafts, and then retreated, leaving a long line of corpses 
and baggage-animals on their track. Another division of their 
army, which had been detached against Ali Murad Khan, the 
chief of Tubbus, also nearly exterminated ; those who escaped 
the sword succumbed in their flight to the severity of the weathe- 
and such was the intensity of the cold that at the halt made a t  
Iiiaffer Kaleh 18,000 .of Allmed's soldiers died in one night, and 
on the following day very nearly the same number perished in 
attempting the passage of the Heri-rood, near the town of Russan. 
The river was frozen, but it gave way under the crowd of fugitives, 
who were swallowed up in the icy waters ; those who had retreated 
by other roads were scarcely more fortunate. The Serdar Djummeh 
Khan, who held a, command in this expedition, left a short sketch 
of it, and one of the incidents that he relates is worthy of mention, 
as it appears to us unique in history. H e  assures us that, in order 
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to preserve himself from the excessive cold, and therefore from 
death, which was the certain consequence, only one way suggested 
itself, which he adopted; this was, to disembowel some of his 
camels, in  the inside of which, enveloped in a blanket, he each night 
took up his quarters, and in this way he passed from one to an- 
other as they got cold, killing seventeen between sunset and sunrise. 
The  disasters of this retreat continued until the wretched remnants 
of the Afghan force reached Herat, a t  which time all that remained 
of Ahmed Shah's brilliant array of troops were a few miserable 
beings more resembling skeletons than soldiers. A few days after 
his arrival in the city, Ahmed Shah perceived thaC the governor, 
Dervish Ali Khan, profiting by his distressed position, was in- 
triguing to seize his person and raise himself to power upon his 
master's ruin ; but Ahmecl., anticipating his intention, ordered him 
, 
to be arrested and thrown into prison, appointing his son Timoor 
Mirza governor in his stead ; he then left for Kandahar, with a view 
of recruiting his army. 
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CHAPTER V I I .  
Second siege of Nishapoor by the Afghans - Clemency of the victor - He invests 
Meshed - Battle of Kalihak - Death of Ali Murad - Capture of Toon and 
~ ~ b b u s  - An ambuscocle -Treaty with Shah Rokh -Ahmed Shah retires to  
Herat- Campaign ag;l.inst the Usbeks-Beghee Iihan seizes Balk, Khulm, kc.- 
Assad Khan Gh~ldjzye - His successes in Persia - Defeat of Kerym Khan - 
&sad Khan h attacked in the mouutains-Last attempt of the Afghans to 
annex Persia - Nasser Khau, Beloouh, revolts -The combats of Pringnez and 
Meatook -Siege of Kelslt - Favourable terms made by Nasser Khan - Ahmed 
Shah proceeds to  India. - Insurrection of the Mahrattas - Ahmed Shah Gour- 
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Abdul Khalek Iihan - Abdullah Khan suppresses the insurrection - Ahmed 
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reasons for this -Death of Ahmed Shah - Yaghoot Khan - The Serdars 
declare for Suleiman Mirza-Character of Ahmed Shah. 
IN the following year, namely, in 1751, having completely 
repaired his disasters, Ahmed made a second inroad upon Kho- 
rassan. Every cavalry soldier carried with him two battements* of 
iron for casting shot, which were placed in store directly he arrived 
with his army under the walls of Nishapoor. The  siege of this 
city was now pressed with great energy ; the Afghan monarch 
cast a gun upon the spot, which threw a projectile weighing 
472 Ibs. English, and one month was employed in casting, boring, 
and placing this monster gun on its carriage. When fired i t  
produced a most terrible effect, the walls a i d  houses being pierced 
through and through, but it burst the very first time i t  was 
used. T h e  citizens of Nishapoor, ignorant of that fact, were 
so terrified by the destrilction which this single bullet occasioned, 
that they despatched several of their chiefs to Ahmed Shah t,o 
inform him that they surrendered at  discretion. Abbas Kooli 
Khan, who held the citadel, refused however to acknowledge this 
surrender, and attacked the Afghans s t  the moment they were on 
the point of entering the city ; but he was repulsed in an  instant, 
and reduced t,o bhe alternative of soliciting in person the clemency 
* A battement of Hemt is equal t o  6 lbs. English.-Farrier. 
of the conqueror. Ahmcd Shah clctaincd him as a prisoner in llis 
camp, and lie subsequently accoiillx~nicd him to Kabul : the Afghan 
conqueror, having perceived in this chicf very considerable talents, 
and a fiankncss of disposition in wliich Ilc t h o ~ g h t  hc could conficle, 
gavc him his sister i l l  n~arringc ; lie also bcstowed one of his 
daugllters on Abbas I<ooli's son, aftcr which hc scnt him baclc to 
Nishapoor, as governor of t h t  cit,y. ITil.lliflg thus satisfactorily 
established his power t l~crc,  Al~lnctl Shall, thiiilti~~g he had cause 
. 
cornplai~lt against Shah l iok l~  hlirza 311d his sons, who had been 
hostile to him in his second campaigu in I<horixssan, again laid 
siege to Meshed. Co11tcnl~~orane0~1~1y with this nlovcn~cnt lie 
dctachcd a corps of cavrdlry luldcr tllc orders of the Serdars Jellan 
Khan and Nasscr Rhan of ICclat, to s~tbtll~e tlic districts of Toon 
and Tubbus, and t;xke ~~evcngc fin- the dofei~.t whicl~ the Afghans 
had sustained during the prcc,cchg ycur at tlie hands of Ali 
Murad Rhan. Tl~csc Scrda.rs connnc~~cctl operations by devas- 
tating the country, aftcr which t h y  ~narcl~ccl against thc govcriior 
of 'Fuhbus, whom they nwt :~.t I<a.kl~nk, a. sninll villagc situated 
near Gourmabacl, and tlicrc fi)light oilc of t , h ~  nlost obstinate an~l  
bloody battles that is to bc found in thc annals of l'crsiaii history ; 
such was the tenncity and fury of t l ~ c  combatants, that, when 
ammunition failed on but;l~ sitlcs, t h y  dismounted from their 
horses, and, drawing their wbres, elid not ccc~sc t,o strike till the 
death of Ali Murad, who awivcd a t  the rlosc of the conflict; 
this determinccl the issue of thc l ~ t t l n ,  ;untl the remainder of his 
men, for thb most part of i h b  trillcs, took to fliglit. Much of the 
crcdit of this victory was lilorc cspccinlly duo to the bra.vel-y of 
Nasser I i l ~ a n  and his Bcloocl~ccs, who Lc:l~avc.~l lilic heroes. 
After this tlic Afyllms took posscssioii of Toon and 'Pubbus, 
and committad cvcry Iri11d of cxccss 1~1)on the i~~linbitluits of tliose 
towns : firc mcl sword did tllcir work, m ~ ( l  to tlicrsc wcro ;~ddcd viola- 
tion, murdcr, pillngc, ; ~ n d  tlov;rst,i~.t.ioi~ ; i l l  wl~icll ]laving indulged 
sufficiently, t h y  again jtri11cc1 th :  royi~l ( I ~ I I I I ~ ,  ~xrrying with them 
a considerd)le booty. Wljilc thc: sc~tl;lr..; of A1111wd S l ~ a l ~  \ w e  
obtaining thcsc s ~ ~ c c s s c s ,  that sove:r(-ig~i l~r~w~!cl  011 the siege of 
Mcsliecl with vigo~n., but hc I I ; L I ~ ,  111) to tllis pariotl, 1~cc1-1 S C ~ U C ~ ~ J  
more fortu~~i~.t,c tlian in t,lw I)lx!c.c!tli~~g yc;u-. 'I'll(: i i ~ l ~ d ~ i t ~ i i i t ~ ,  
aninlatcd by religioris fi~.ni~ticisrn, t l ~ f i ~ ~ ~ t l v t l  llc~nsc~lvc~s with intrc- 
pidity, ;mcl thc Afghans suflcl*cd hcilvy losscs in their encountcrs 
with the enemy ; their resources also climinisl~cd daily, and provi- 
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sions became very scarce, which obliged Alimed to detach 2000 
of his cavJsy in the direction of Subzawar and Shah Rood Bostam, 
to procure supplics. I n  this enterprise they perfectly succeeded, 
and were returning to camp with 2500 beasts of burden laden with 
plunder, which had greatly encumbered and delayed them, when 
on reaching the halt of Xbbasabad the foragers fell into an ambus- 
cade, in which were postcd 1500 lcadjar horse from the environs 
of Asterabad, who fell upon and completely routed them. A great 
number of Afghans were killed or made prisoners in this affair ; 
the plunder fell into the hands of the Icadjars, and the survivors, 
numbering scarccly a thousand, regained the Afghan camp. 
Ahmed Shah, seeing that his efforts to take Meshed would prove 
ineffcctud, and fearing that the winter, \+hich was now approach- 
ing, might cause a repetition of the disasters of the preceding one, 
accepted the terms offered him by Shah Rokh Mirza. These were, 
that Ahmed should leave him in quiet possessiou of Khorassan and 
support him against the ambitious chiefs of the province, on con- 
dition that Shah Rokh should acknoaledge his suzerainty, that 
money should be coined in his name, firmans and other official 
documents bear his seal, and the districts of Toorbut Sheikh 
Jam, Bakharz, Toorbut-hai-darieh, and Khaif, bc made over to 
him. A treaty, drawn up on this basis, was signed by the two 
contracting parties, aRer which Ahmed Shah, thinking that the 
power which he had thus consolidated was a sufficient guarantee 
against the ambitious projects of Assad Khan, an Afghan chief, 
of whom we shall have occasion to speak hereafter, returned 
to Hcrat, where he occupied himself in carrying out numerous 
rcforms in the army and administration. It vas from hence 
that he sent Beghee Khan, one of his viziers, with an army to 
subdue the countries beyond the Oxus, inhabited by Uebeks, 
Hazarahs, and a few Afghan families, who had not yet acknow- 
ledgcd his dominion. After having engaged in several combats, 
but not very scrious ones, Beghee Khan seized upon Meimana, 
Andclrhooye, Alihcheh, Shibbergan, Serpcul, Bslkh, IChulm, 
Badakshan, and Bamian: he organized the various districts he 
had conquered; and having appointed governors, with whom he 
left troops to keep the inhabitants in awe, he returned to Ihndal~ar ,  
where Ahrned Shah had previously arrived, and this sovereign, 
to recompense Beghee Khan for the ~ervices he had rendcred 
him, added to his title of vizier that of Sedre-azem. 
(t 
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I t  has been mentioned that in isolating Khoraesan from Persia, 
and placing the former under the authority of Shah Rolch Mirza, 
his vassal, Ahrned Shah acted with a view of protecting himself 
against the projects of Xesad Khan, an Afghan Serdar, of the tribe 
of the Ghildjzyes. After the death of Nadir this Serdar had been 
fortunate enough to maintain his authority in the Azerbaidjan, of 
which province he was govcinor. H e  was a man of great firmness, 
brave, and more enlightened than are ordinarily the individuals of 
his nation ; and his justice, his equitable views, and the partiality 
which he manifested in favour of the sect of Skahs, drew around 
him a great number of partisans. Seeing his power and popularity 
thus increased, he declared openly his pretensions to the possession 
of I r k ,  Khorassan, and even proposed to push on to Afghanistan, 
and dethrone Ahmed Shah, whom he considered as an usurper, for 
in  his opicion the throne belonged by right to a chief of the tribe 
of Ghilcljzyes ; but he was arrested in his march eastward, ancl 
recalled to Irak, by serious events that occurred in 1753. Kerym 
Khan, of the tribe of the Zencls, after h a ~ i n g  made his authority 
acknowledged in Fars and the other southern provinces of Persia, 
took advantage of the hatred which their populations felt for 
everything that bore the name of Afghan, to raise a large army, 
and with this he marched against Assad Khan, with the view of 
forcing him beyond the Persian border. This chief, who had 
already advanced as far as Damghan, retraced his steps, met his 
antagonist a t  Rasbeen, attacked him immediately, and with such 
effect, that Kerym Khan was completely beaten, and so hotly . 
pursued, that he was obliged to abandon Ispahan and Shiraz, 
without being able to offer even the slightest resistance. H e  
subsequently retired to the mountains in the south of Persia, to 
shelter himself from further pursuit ; and discouraged by the 
reverse he had just experienced, was on the point of seeking refuge 
in  India to enjoy the repose he so ardently desired, when he was 
dissuaded from taking this step by Roostein S~dtan,  the chief of the 
district of Khecht. This chieftain informed Kelym Khan that 
Assad Khan had committed the imprudence of entangling himself 
in  the defiles which led to his place of retreat ; that this ill-judged 
movement wo~dd  infallibly lead to his destruction, because the 
country people, who were on the side of the Zend chief* and 
* Of the army of Assad Khan one-third were Afghans, and the other two G e o r  
gians, Kurds, and Tiurks of Azerbdc?jnn.-Ferric,. 
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detested the Afghans, were acquainted with d l  the advantages 
and difficulties of the ground, and, profiting by such knowledge, 
would make the narrow gorges and defiles through which the latter 
were marching a last resting-place for his enemies. 
Convinced by this reasoning, Iierym Khan decided upon renew- 
ing hostilities, and placed his troops under the orders of Roostem 
Sultan, giving him full power to act as he thought fit; accord- 
' 
ingly this chieftain halted for Assad Khan a t  the defile of Rooma, 
which extends about a mile and a half along the summit of a high 
mountain, and through this the Afghans could only advance in single 
file. The Persians placed themselves behind the fragments of 
rocks which lay scattered along the p a ,  and waited till the enemy 
occupied it from one extremity to the other before they attacked, 
when, with a perfect unity of action and inconceivable energy, 
they fell upon the whole line. Every shot &om the long match- 
locks of these expert marksmen carried death into the Afghan 
ranks, while their bullets fell harmlessly against the rocks, behind 
which their adversaries had ensconced themselves. All those who 
could escape from this hornet's nest endeavoured to make good 
their retreat and regain the plain, but here they found ffesh 
opponents, who had' turned the position and attacked them with 
fury. I t  was in vain that Assad Khan tried to rally his troops 
and renew the fight ; his efforts were unavailing, and he was obliged 
once more to retire. A few days after, while continuing this re- 
trograde movement, he was overtaken by Mohamed Hoosein Khan, 
Kadjar, another aspirant to the Persian throne, when the remainder 
of his army was destroyed, and Assad Khan only escaped with his 
life by seeking refuge in Bagdad. Not meeting here with the sup- 
port he expected, he passed on to Georgia, where the Prince Hera- 
clius gave him no better reception ; and worn out and dispirited 
by his many disappointments and personal sufferings, and being 
, without a hope of success, he finished by making his submission 
to Kerym Khan, who gave him high rank a t  his court and 
treated him with every consideration. Assad Khan remained to 
the end faithfully attached to Kerym Khan, and this was the last 
attempt made by the Afghans to seize the throne of Persia. 
Ahmed Shah-experienced some disquietude in seeing Assad Khan 
thus submit to the Persian monarch, but Kerym Khan, having 
plenty to do in maintaining the tranquillity of his own kingdom, 
never again made the slightest hostile attempt to annex Afghan- 
a 2 
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istan to Persia : it was however believed a t  Kandahar that he was 
no stranger to the revolt of Nasser Khan, chief of Relat and 
Beloochistan, of which we shall have occasion to speak. 
Subsequently to his return from Khorassan Ahmed Shah had 
been under the necessity of proceeding three times to India, as 
well to establish his authority in the Punjab, where great agita- 
tion, fomented by the Mahrattas, was almost permanent, as to 
curb the turbulent spirit of that people, who were not less un- 
manageable than the Mghans. Nasser Khan had taken part in 
all these expeditions, and distinguished himself in each of them : 
he had recognised the suzerainty of Ahmed Shah from the time he 
ascended the throne, and had always been well treated and gener- 
ously recompensed by that sovereign ; but nevertheless the Belooch 
chief revolted against him and proclaimed his own independence in 
1'758. Ahmed Shah exhausted every means of conciliation 
towards Nasser Khan, whom he esteemed, without being able to 
bring him back to his allegiance, and a t  length sent a division 
of his army against him, but the chief, who had been for some' 
tlme prepwed for this crisis, was not intimidated, and directly 
he was informed of the arrival of Ahmed's troops he marched to 
meet them. A battle was fought near the village of Pringuez, 
situated about seventy miles from Kelat, in which the Afghans . 
were completely beaten, and obliged to retire to a distance of thirty 
miles from thence. The Serdar in command iminediately despatched 
a messenger to the king to demand reinforcements, and Ahmed, fear- 
ful lest such a check, though of little consequence in itself, shoull 
acquire importance from the exaggerated manner in which the 
circumstarlces might be detailed to the tribes recently subdued, 
put himself a t  the head of this second division, and hastened to 
the support of his discomfited troops. Nasser Khan, assailed by him 
near the camp o'f Mestook, situated three miles and a half from 
Pringuez, was defeated, and obliged to retire in all haste to Kelat : 
this town he had previously placed in a good state of defence, and 
within its walls he now took refuge. Ahmed Shah followed him 
close and invested the place ; the position of the citadel on an 
eminence was exceedingly strong, and this circumstance, and the 
want of unanimity that existed amongst the Afghan serclars, u7ere 
the causes that led to a protracted siege, and eventually to no 
advantageous result. I t  was in vain that assaults were made on 
five different occ;a<ions ; they all failed, because the various chiefs 
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would not, and did not, support each other ; and at length the Shah, 
perceiving he could gain nothing by prolonging the conflict, con- 
sented to a treaty which replaced Nasser Khan under his suze- 
rainty, and obliged him to furnish a contingent of troops on every 
occasion that the Afghan monarch made war beyond the boundaries 
of his kingdom. I n  this case the chief of Kelat was to receive a 
sum of money and munitions of war every time he took the field. 
Nasser Khan also stipulnted that he should not be compelled to 
furnish such contingent for the sake of supporting this or that 
Suddozye chief, or their successors of that or any other tribe, or 
be obliged to take part in the internal quarrels that might arise 
amongst the Afghans themselves. This was the only condition 
bearing the charactor of vassalage imposed upon .the Belooch chief, 
who was now exempted from the tribute which he had previously 
paid to Ahmed Shah ; and in order to make the treaty more binding 
the king married a cousin of Nasser Khan's, after which he returned 
.to Eandahar, and he was shortly obliged to leave for India to 
put down the troubles which had q a i n  broken out owing to the 
intrigues of the Mahrattas. This people incited the population to 
revolt, aud seized the country, which was the appanage of the Mogul 
Princess, the wife of Timoor h'lirza. 
" The Malwattas," remarks Sir John PUlalcolm, " became formid- 
able in the reign of Shah Jehan, and during thirty years that 
Arungzebe passed in the southern provinces of his empire his chief 
occupation was to subdue the Mahrattas ; but this he found impos- 
sible, for they never awaited his attack. The country was laid 
waste and his troops continually harassed by men who, fiom the 
lightness of their frames, were no burden to their horses, and who, 
fi-om habits of hardihood and abstemiousness, required little either 
for shelter or support. I t  seemed in vain to war with a foe who 
.was  intangible, and whose glory lay in the rapidity of his retreat ; 
.for the Mahratta soldier, though brave, boasts more of his power to 
e1,ude than to attack his enemy. JTThen the empire of India fell to 
pieces a t  the ' death of Arungzebe, and Mahomedan princes and 
nobles were all ranged against each other, the Mahrattas, by con- 
tinuing united, made a rapid and surprising progress. Besides the 
great possessions which they actually occupied, they had compelled 
not only the paramount sovereign of India, but almost every ruler 
of a province, to pay them a considerable part of their annual col- 
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lectiol~s,* that their habitations and fields might remain in safety. 
At  thc period when Nadir threatened invasion, the city of Delhi 
itself was subject to this d i s y n c ~ f i ~ l  tribute." -/- 
The disgraceful tribute of which Sir John Malcolm here speaks 
was agreed to by the Indian princes at  the period when Ahmed 
Shah marched against the confederation of the I\Iahrattas, and the 
latter used all the influence they possessed in the various princi- 
palities of India to force those princes to send their contingent of 
troops to take part in the war in which they were about to engage 
against the Afghans. 
Ahmed Shah Gomlcanee, the sovereign of Delhi, had been de- 
posed in 1753 by his vizier Ghazee Rlian, and that functionary 
placed his nephew Alemguiir on the throne in his stead. This 
prince, utterly destitute of ability, was assassinated by Ghazee in 
1760, when the usurper. seized upon the sovereign power himself ; 
and Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, heard of this event a few days before 
he arrived a t  DIooitan, as well as of the junction of the Mogul troops 
with those of the Pllahrattas. 
The  various populations of India had been in an unsettled state 
ever since Nadir Shah seized upon Delhi; but at the death of 
Shah Nahmood, emperor of the Moguls, anarchy was rampant. 
The princes of India, tributaries of the Mahrattas, ardently desired 
to deliver themselves from the yoke imposed upon them by this . 
confederation of plunderers, and Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, sent secret 
emissaries to their courts in order to work upon and strengthen this 
feeling. With a view of giving them time to do this he advanced but 
slowly, and occupied himself in orgmising the territory which he 
had recently conquered in Scinde and Mooltan. He  then entered 
the Punjab, which the Mahrattas evacuated a t  his approach without 
fighting, so that he arrived at  Lahore unopposed, and there he 
encamped. The Indian princes obeyed the injunctions of the Nah- 
rattas, and, in spite of the intrigues of Ahmed Shah, sent their 
several contingents, which, when united, formed an a m y  of 200,000 
men, of which 70,000 were cavalry, supported by twenty pieces'of 
artillery of large calibre and 200 zirnboorelrs. 
Ahmed did not take the field until the whole of this formidable 
* This was levied under the various t Sier Musakhereeu. 
names of Ckoute, Desmokee, kc. 
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army vas assembled in the environs of Delhi. H e  then advanced 
to meet it, and came up with the enemy on the banks of the river 
Bar;  but in consequence of the depth of that stream and the want 
of pontoons, he was obliged to wait a few days until the water had 
This mas all the more disadvantageous to him, inasmuch 
as he could only obtain provisions for his troops on the side occupied 
by the enemy ; and as the Mahrattas were vigilant in watching the 
fords which they fortified, the Afghans soon felt the effects of 
a scarcity in their camp ; some of them murmured loudly, and 
others prepared to desert, when a fortunate occurrence, the result 
of the clever policy of their sovereign, took place, which, producing 
abundance at once, revived their hopes. Shooja-ed-Dooulet, the 
Prince of Lucltnow, had submitted to the Mahrattas only because he 
could not avoid it, and, suddenly leaving them, proceeded to the 
Afghan camp, followed by several other Indian rajahs and 25,000 
men, which made the effective force of Ahmed Shah's army 85,000 
men-45,000 being cavalry and the remainder infantry-with seven- 
teen pieces of cannon and eighty zimbooreks. There were about 
10,000 non-combatants in the Afghan army, whereas in that of 
the Mahratta confederacy one-thirclmight be set down as belonging 
to thaj class, such, for instance, as servants, sutlers, drivers in charge 
of oxen, ponies, camels, &c., and thus not more than from 100,000 
to 110,000 troops could be brought into position. 
Shooja-ed-Dooulet, having provisioned the Afghan army, and 
overcome the hesitation of the Serdars, vho considered the passage of 
the river as a thing impossible, i t  was resolved to give battle. On 
the 7th of January, 1761, therefore, Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, ordered 
the Serdar Samut Khan, Yoosoofzye, to cross the river with 5000 ca- 
valry and attack the BIoguls-which order he promptly obeyed ; but 
the greater portion of his horsemen were carried away by the rapidity 
of the current, and the fire of the enemy's artillery made such havoc 
amongst them, that the survivors remained in a state of indecision. 
Ahmed Shah, perceiving this corps required support, sent two others 
to its assistance ; but the Serdars Delaver Khan, Isakzye, and Zal 
Beg, Popolzye, who commanded them, and who mere at  variance 
with Samut Khan, did not heartily executeethe order they had re- 
ceived, and allowed Samut's troops to be cut up. The king saw the 
state of affairs at a glance, and, alive to the least thing that might 
compromise him as to the issue of the conflict, mounted his horse 
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and plunged into the river, followed only by hilie guards. The Serdars 
comman&ng the divisions which had remained immovable were ' 
now obliged to advance, for the troops were ashamed to see their 
sovereign braving death while they remained passive spectators 
of the combat. The Mahrattas redoubled the fire of their artillery 
to repulse this attack, and this was so terrible that the surface of the 
river mas covered by the corpses of men and the carcases of horses, 
and its waters became crimsoned with their life-blood. But the . 
afghans gained at length, though with heavy loss, the opposite 
shore, and with hearts burning for revenge fell upon the enemy, 
whom they finally put to the rout; 20,000 of them remained on the 
field of battle, also their artille~y and baggage, and the victors 
, 
obtained a rich booty. This memorable and bloody battle was 
fought on the plains of Paniput, a few pasasanlgs north of Delhi. 
Shooja-ed-Lhoulet had up to this time formed but an incor- 
rect estimate of the bravery of the Afghans; but after ha6ng 
been an eye-witness of it, and remembering that they were not 
very conspicuous for their notions of gratitude, and might perhaps 
be wanting in that which they owed to him, he regretted that he 
had assisted them-nevertheless he remained faithful to his new 
ally ; as  to Delaver Khan and Zd Beg, who had not obeyed the 
order of Ahrned Shah to march to the assistance of Samut Khan, 
and feared his anger, left the camp by stealth, taking with them . 
their men, even before the issue of the day was known. The king, 
without making himself very uneasy at  this defection, continued 
rapidly to advance, and seized upon the Mahratta country, after which 
he passed into the Mogul territory, when the usurper Ghazee 
Khan, seeing his kingdom invaded, determined to obtain, if possible, 
the mediation of Shooja-ed-Dooulet, and thus make his peace with 
Ahmed Shah. The  Prince of Lucknow was not werse to under- 
taking this negotiaiion ; but on condition that Ghazee Khan, as in 
duty bound, should surrender the crown to the legitimate sovereign, 
and further pay a n  enormous contribution to the expenses of the war. 
These severe terms having been accepted, Ahmed was desirous of 
placing Shah Alem, the son of Alemguir, on the throne, and, 
upon his refusal to be r~instated in his rights, his son Jehan-booght, 
a s  yet only a child, was raised to the musnud. 
Matters a t  Delhi having been thus settled, Ahmed Shah pro- 
ceeded in the direction of the Punjab to maintain order there, and 
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was preparing to march to the southern provinces of India when he 
learnt that the Mahrattas had moved upon Delhi. He  returned, 
therefore, in haste to the support of his new ally; whom he had the 
good fortune to save from the danger that menaced him, for the 
Mahrattas retired at his approach. Whether Shooja-ed-Dooulet 
had really intrigued with them to bring about the fall of Jehan- 
4 booght, or whether the serdars, jealous of his influence with the 
Shah, deceived Ahmed in order to effect his ruin, the result was 
that the Afghan monarch, who ought to have shut his eyes, a t  least 
for the moment, to the accusations brought against the Prince of 
Lucknow, demanded from him a large sum of money ; but Shooja,' 
indignant a t  the request, dctermined not to comply with it, and, 
clandestinely leaving the camp with his troops, retired to his own 
country. This desertion, added to that of Delaver Khan and Zal 
Reg, with their 10,000 horse, seriously reduced the strength of the 
Afghan army, so that Ahmed Shah was no longer in a position to 
prolong the campaign, but, satisfied with the immense treasures lie 
had collected during the wzr, he returned towards his own terri- 
tory, to which he was, as it happened, recalled by an event of some 
importance. 
Some ambitious, and consequently discontented serdars, had, after 
their flight &om the royal camp, joined Delaver Khan and Zal 
Beg, who, supporting the revolt of a nephew of Ahmed Shah's, by 
name Abdul Khalek Khan, proclaimed him king a t  the fortress of 
Girishk, and subsequently moved in triumph towards Kandahar. 
Previously to this Hadji Djemal Khan, of the branch of the Zer- 
gueranees, had likewise proclaimed himself king a t  Randahar after 
the departure of Ahmed Shah for India, and had even coined 
money in his own name ; but having heard of Ahmed's victories, he 
thought it would be more prudent to renounce the royal position he 
had assumed and stand on one side. Abdul Khalek, less judi- 
cious, made incredible efforts to secure his object. When Ahmed 
Shah became thoroughly aware of what was passing in his capital, 
he considered the circumsta.nces of so little importance, that he did 
not think it necessary to return there in person, but sent the Isakzye 
Serdar, and Abdullah Khan, surnamed Shah Pecend Khan, with 
a strong division of cavalry, to put down the rebellious proceedings 
of his nephew and the serdars who had joined him, recommending 
the Khan, above all things, to use the utmost despatch and endea- 
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vour to arrive at  Kandahar before they could reach it fiom Girishk ; 
he was not, however, in spite of his exertions, able to do so until after 
the revolt had taken root there, and Suleiman Mirza, the eldest son of 
Ahmed Shah, who governed in the absence of his father, had been 
expelled from the capital. The greater number of the revolted ser- 
dars had only supported the usurper because they believed the report 
which had been circulated by Delaver Khan and Zal Beg that 
Ahmed had lost the battle of Paniput, and met with great reverses 
and disasters in India; but they deeply regretted their folly in this 
unlucky bi~siness when they were made acquainted with his success 
*and  saw Abdullah'Rhan and his cavalry make their appearance. ' 
Thinking, therefore, that the only way to obtain the Shah's pardon 
was to make a prompt submission, they, with few exceptions, went 
to the camp of the latter, to whom they delivered up the city, and 
also Abdul Khalek hiniself. When he left Delhi, Ahmed Shah 
had gone to the Punjab, and thence to Peshawur, 'to re-establish 
his authority, which had been somewhat questioned ; and' it was 
during this journey that he received a letter from Abdullah Khan, 
announcing. the manner in which he had terminated his mission-- 
the king, in his reply, desired him to strangle his nephew secretly, 
a command which he imrnedialely put into execution. 
T h e  disorder a t  Peshawur was great when Ahmed arrived 
there, as well in the town as in the neighbourhood; and several 
months elapsed before tranquillity was restored, and matters resumed 
their ordinary course. A t  this period snow covered the ground to - 
the depth of three feet, and the Shah was obliged to wait for the 
spring until he could return to his capital ; he wrote, therefore, to 
his son Suleiman Mirza, desiring him to take every possible means 
in his power to capture the serdars Delaver Hhan and Zal Beg, who 
had so treacherously deserted him, and to put them to death. The 
prince wrote therefore to the latter, feigning a friendship and pro- 
mising perfect oblivion of the past-and this in the name of his 
father-if he would pa.y him a visit a t  Kandahar. Zal Beg ac- 
cepted the invitation, and, with perjury truly Eastern, Suleiman 
Mirza put him to death directly he entered the town. Delaver 
Hhan was less inclined to confide in the prince's word than his 
. 
unfortunate friend, and instead of proceeding to Kandahar, as 
he had previously promised to do, he fled to Herat, and placed 
himself under the protection of the prince Timoor Mirza, second 
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son of Ahmed Shah, and governor of that city. From a spirit 
of opposition to his brother Suleiman, with whom he was on bad 
terms, Timoor received the fugitive in a somewhat eager manner, 
and showered honours and benefits upon him, which mere increased, 
even to prodigality, each time that the reiterated orders arrived 
at  Herat to put him to death. 
Ahmed Shah left Pesha~vur at the commencement of spring," 
and remained the whole summer at  Kabul, arriving at Kandahar 
, about the middle of autumn, a t  which period he experienced an 
attack, and with more intensity than ever, of that terrible malady. 
which had forced him long before to substitute an artificial nose of 
silver for his own, which had sloughed away. This malady, called 
by Abdullah Khan Djuzam (which in Persian signifies leprous, 
and a small ulcer) arrived towards the close of this year a t  such 
a fearful height, that the Shah determined to proclaim his second 
son, Timoor Mirza, his viceroy and successor to the throne of 
Afghanistan. The serdars, astonished a t  this decision, which 
appeared to them unjust, inasmuch as it mas to the prejudice of 
his eldest son Suleiman Mirza, assembled, and, having come to a 
resolution, presented a respectful request to the Shah Ahmed i n  
favour of that prince. In  this document they allowed a feeling 
of something like discontent to appeay,'that they had not been con- 
sulted in a matter of so grave a nature. The Shah replied, that in 
acting t h ~ ~ s  he had not consulted his own particular bias, and that 
in making his selection he had been guided entirely for the public 
good. " Timoor," said he, " it is true, is younger than Suleiman, 
but he is infinitely more capable of gove~ning.you t,han his brother." 
The serdars wished for a proof; the Shah simply replied that 
Suleiman had never been able to conciliate the esteem and affection 
of the tribes ; that he was violent without clemency ; that he had 
never been able to foresee or put down a revolt ; and, in short, that 
. . he hastily put to death the Serdar Zal Beg. " But," said the 
serdm, "it  was by your order." " Did I not also order Timoor 
to put Delaver Khan to death? " replied Ahmed ; " and what did 
he do ? Political reasons might induce me to order two culprits to 
be put to death, but other secret reasons, which were known to the 
* The manuscript of Abdullah is entirely Gthout dates, the author is therefore 
unable to give any.-Pe~-rier. 
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prince Suleiman, ought to have led him to disobey me, as his brother 
did." The  serdars appeared satisfied with these replies, which 
seemed to embody, as it were, his opinions for the future guidance 
of the princes of the blood. 
When Ahmed Shah had induced the serdars to acknowledge 
his son Timoor lMirza as his successor, he retired to a palace he 
, . had built a t  Tobeh-Maharoof, situated in the midst of the Suleiman . 
mountains, the cradle of his tribe. From hence he watched over 
the government; but after four or five years had elapsed, his 
disease having rendered him incapable of any further continuous 
labour, he entirely abandoned ~ u b l i c  aflairs to the governors of 
the various provinces of his empire, and expired shortly after, 
namely, in 1773. Yqhoot  Khan, the chief of his eunuchs, and 
a person in whom he had great confidence, kept his death a 
profound secret, and wrote imrnecliately to Tinioor Mirza, who 
was still governor of I-Ierat, to come with all speed to Kardahar 
and take possession of the throne. At the same time that he 
transmitteci this information he set out hmself, talring the royal 
corpse with him ; this was placed in a litter, and the curtains being 
carefully drawn was completely concealed from every one. The  
adroit eunuch approached the litter &om time to time, as if to 
-receive some order from his sovereign, or give him some refresh- 
ment, remarking to those of his escort who wished to make any 
request or a n  inquiry about his health, that, being extremely unn~ell, 
the Shah had ordered that no one should be allowed to disturb 
him. Yaghoot Khan also took with him the Shah's jewels and 
treasure, which were carried by mules, and always preceded 
the royal litter, so that he might be able to have his eye con- 
stantly upon them. No one discovered the deception during the 
greater. part of the journey; and it was only about a day's march 
from Kandahar, when the prince Suleiman Nirza came out to 
receive his father, that it was necessary to make the Shah's death 
public. T h e  se;dars, who were present on this occasioli, were 
nearly all attached to the party of this prince, from whom they 
had received brilliant promises, and they immediately returlled ~ t h  
him to the city, and proclaimed him Shah of the Afghans. 
Xhmed Shah, Sudclozye, reigned twenty-five years and a few 
months : he was free finom most of the crimes commonly found in 
individuals of Eastern nations ; such as drunkenness, whether from 
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wine or opium, duplicity, avarice, cruelty, and one which need not 
be mentioned; he was always a most firm supporter of religion. 
On his accession to the throne he changed the name of his tribe, 
which was Abdalee, to that of Dooranee, which signifies a person of 
noble and ancient birth ; and he took the title of Doorveranee, i. e. 
]~e  a?.ound whom convages the noble and ancient tribe. 
In order to increase the numbers of the Afghan nation Ahmed 
connected with i t  all the tribes of doubtful origin, Eimak or Belooch, 
speaking the P d t o o  language, who were settled in the various 
provinces, particularly in the district of Furrah and on the banks 
of the Helmund. There was a clause in his will forbidding his 
succesors to cut off the nose or ears of any one, no matter whom ; 
and this mas based upon his own sufferings, for the Ieprous disease 
having destroyed his nose, arid Nadir Shah, to punish him for an 
act of insubordination, having cut off one of hk e m ,  he had deeply 
felt the deprivation of these orgari. He  also desired the Doora- 
nees to ally themselves one with another, and not to give their 
girls in marriage to strangers ; that for the future the succession 
should go entirely to the son and to the exclusion of the daughters, 
who up to that time had part,icipated in  the property left by their 
father; that a t  the death of an Afghan his nearest relative, the 
father and son excepted, should marry his widow; and if there was 
no relative, the widow should reside in the house of her deceased 
husband, and live on the proceeds of his property till her death ; 
that when a married woman died without having a child, her 
father, brother, or other relative could not demand her dower from 
the husband ; he also abolished divorce, and withdrew -from the 
master his right to kill his slave. H e  abrogated the custom of 
bending the body and kissing the earth before the sovereign, whom 
he commanded henceforth to be saluted by carrying the hand 
straight to the forehead ; he granted permission to sit in the pre- 
sence of the monarch only to the syuds and priests, to whom he 
conceded the privilege of dining every Thursday evening with 
the sovereign, in order that he might be able to converse with 
them on the sciences and religion. The laws he made during 
his reign he caused to be rigorously executed, and commanded 
that his descendants and successors should do the same after 
him. H e  accumulated great riches, but they consisted of the 
plunder which he had taken from his enemies ; the revenues of 
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Afghanistim, properly so termed, never found their way into his 
private coffers : he gave his troops their pay in person. The name 
of Ahmed Shah becamc glorious throughout Asia after the battle of 
Paniput, which was olie of the causes that led to the rapid decay 
of the Mogul empire. The petty chiefs of Khorassan, who all 
acknowledged his suzerainty, and oFered but .a timid opposition, 
he would have brought into complete subordination, had it not, 
been for the  six campaigns which he made in the Punjab, India, 
and Beloochistan, which absorbed all his time. He  saw that 
repose demoralized his troops, and he kept them always in a high 
state of discipline. I t  was by this.system that he was enabled to 
maintain himself securely upon the throne, as much as to the great ' 
clemency that he constantly manifested, and which induced him so 
continually to pardon the rebellious chiefs who could not bring them- ' 
selves to bow under the yoke of obedience, and between whom he 
was obliged to be the peacemaker. His reign was remarkable for 
the good which he spread around him, and his generosity and simple ' 
arid modest demeanour in the midst of courtly pomp made him 
loved by allwho approached his person ; he was of easy access, and 
administered justice upon the most equitable principles, without a 
harsh word even to those who deserved it ; he was conciliating, p e ~ -  
suasive, and no one ever complained of the judgments that he gave. 
EIe greatly extended the limits of his empire, which, at the moment 
of his decease, were as follows: the frontier to the north was defined 
by the O m s  and the mormtains of Eiafferistan ; to the south, by the 
sea of Oman ; to the east, by the mountains of Thibet, the Sutlej; 
and the Indus; and to the west, by Khor'asan, Persia, and , 
Kerman. 
But Ahmed Shah is much more deserving of eulogy for the talent 
with which be subjected the various Afghan tribes to his laws, . 
than for having given such a vast extension to his kingdom, or for 
the victories h e  won. The princes who prior to him governe'd 
the Afghans exercised but a nominal aut.hority over the nomade 
tribes, for they listened only to the orders of their own chiefs. 
Ahmed Shah conciliated the majority of these, and reduced to 
obedience the few .who were hostile to him. The  nine Serdars 
who had served with him in the army of Nadir formed a Council 
vhich he always consulted in questions of state : he adopted 
no measure of importance without their approbation, and never 
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failed in any promise that he made them. His government in 
short resembled much more a federative republic of which he was 
the head, than an absolute ponarchy. After a victory he always 
gave up a large part of the spoils of the enemy to his soldiers ; he 
never adopted an arrogant tone of superiority with their chiefs 
which could hurt Dhe feelings of those with whom he had once 
been on equal terms, and who had elevated him to the sovereign 
power. 
FORM..TION .OF AFGHAN CHARACTER. C ~ A P .  VIII. ' 
C H A P T E R  V I I I .  
Kabul becomes the capital - Sons of Ahmed Shah - Dervish Ali Khan - Afghan 
principles - Walee Khan and his sons put to death- Flight of Suleiman Mirza 
- Timoor Mirza esters Kmdahas -Resides at Kabul - Euzzilbash cavalry 
organised - Timoor marches againat Sciude - Conflicts between the Kaloras 
and Talpooras - Timoor Shah takes Bawalpoor- Establishes the ICaloras in 
Scinde - Fresh disturbances in Scinde - Medad Khan is beaten at Djioond - 
Fethi Khan Talpoora succeeds to power- Timoor takes the field against the 
Emir of Bokhara- Bdkh and Akhcheh become independent - Timoor returns 
to Kabul - Events in Khornssan - Afghan army marches on Jleshed - Mamech 
K h u  - Capture of Tchinolm - Death of Medad Khan - Fresh insurrection 
in Khornasan - Afghan army advances into that province - Conspiracy to take 
Timoor Shish's life-The plot fails-Ameleh Khan is put to death-Talue 
of ns oath in au Afghan sovereign -Death of Timoor Shah - Character of that 
monarch - Sons of Timoor. 
/ THE Afghans never really enjoyed their independence till the 
reign of Ahmed Shah, and the national disposition was probably 
modified at this epoch. The liberty of speech and action in which 
they were permitted to indulge contribnted without doubt power- 
fully to develop that independent manner and rustic pride which , 
still characterize them in our own day-a conquered nation for 
generations, they became all a t  once conquerors. This sudden tran- 
sition took place it is true under Mir Mahmood, but was only 
thoroughly developed under Ahmed Shah, Suddosye ; i t  inspired 
them with confidence in themselves and roused a superiority which 
had up to that period been dormant ; in a word, the national mind 
had been formed. 
T h e  city of Kandahar was considered the capital of Afghanistan 
during the reign of Ahmed Shah, but he only resided there during 
the autumn and winter ; he went to Kabul in the spring and 
summer, alternately changing his place of abode from one city 
to the other, that he might constantly enjoy an agreeable and 
temperate climate. His  son Timoor Shah altered this state of 
things ; for he withdrew the title of capital from Kandihar and 
transferred it to Kabul, which was subsequently the royal resi- 
dence during the whole period that the dynasty of the Suddozyes 
occupied the throne of Afghanistan. 
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Ahmed Shah left eight sons, namely, Suleiman Mirza, Timoor 
Mirza, Chahab Mirza, Sindjar Mirza, Yezdan bakhch Mirza, 
Silrander Mirza, Darsb Mirza, and Perviz Mirza. T h e  Prince 
Timoor, Walee of Herat, named by his father as his successor, did 
not hear of his death till he received the letter written to him by 
the eunuch Yaghoot Khan, bnt he learnt before he left Herat 
that his brother Suleiman Blirza had been proclaimed king a t  
Kandahar by a few Serdars, at the head of whom was the Shah 
Walee Khan, first minister of the deceased Shah. The delay 
which took place before Timoor proceeded to his capital arose 
from the uneasiness occasioned him by Dervish Ali Khan, 
Hazarah, a subtle chief, and a dangerous traitor, who had re- 
cently escaped from the dungeons of Herat, in which Ahmed Shah 
had imprisoned him after his return from Meshed. A party 
hostile to Timoor had rallied round this Khan ; nevertheless the 
prince, under a promise of pardon, was clever enough to induce 
him to come within the precincts of his palace ; where, according 
to Afghan usage, which consists generally in a perfect disregard 
of the value of the most solemn oaths, he put him instantly to 
death, and gave the command of the Hazarahs to the Ssrdar 
Mohamed Shah Khan, a member of the same tribe. After this he 
appointed his own son, Mahmood Mirza, Governor of Herat ; but 
as he was desirous that he should accompany him to Kandahar, he 
named Islam Khan, Popolzye, his vizier, as the Zom~nz tenens of 
his son in t.hat office, after which he assembled his troops and 
marched against Suleiman Mirza. On his arrival a t  Furrah he 
was joined by a great number of partizans who had already 
abandoned the cause of his brother, but amongst all those who 
deserted Suleiman the most important accession to his cause was 
the Shah Walee Khan, who had great influence over the Afghans. 
This personage brought his two sons and two of the principal 
Dooranee Serdars to the camp of Timoor, which was then at 
Siah-ab ; but the prince, fearing to be hampered in the government 
by this old servant of his father, and desirous also of striking 
terror into the traitors by a severe example, ordered their heads 
to be struck off directly they appeared before him. The party 
of Suleiman Mirza, terrified by these executions, was at once 
dissolved, and t.he usurper finding himself thus deserted fled to 
India, accompanied by four followers who alone remained faithful 
to him. 
1T 
Timoor, surrounded by all the great and powerful families in the 
kingdom, and accompanied by a numerous army, now made his 
public entry into Ihndahar with much pomp and circumstance, 
and was at once acknowledged king by the assembled Serdars ; Lut 
he made only a short stay in this city, the population of ~ h i c h  
had become odious to him from having taken his brother's part: 
as a punishment he deprived it of its title of capital, which as 
we hare already said he transferred to Kabul, to which place 
h e  at once proceecled with hjs army, leaving his son Mahmood 
provisional Governor of Kandahar. The reign of Timoor con- 
- 
tinued for twenty years, and during this period he almost always 
gassed the winter at Peshawur, and the remaining seasons of the 
, 
year at Kabul. On ascending the throne he augmented the pay , 
of the Afghan chiefs, and gave the tribes a great extension of 
territory; seve~al of the serdars received appointments of great 
trust and high command and titles much esteemed at the court of 
an Asiatic sovereign. 
The Serdar Payendeh Khan, son of that Hadji Djemal who had 
renounced his pretensions to the throne in favour of Ahmed Shah, 
Suddozye, was confirmed in the command of the powerful tribe of 
. 
the Barulrzyes, and honoured with the title of Sera-fraz Khah. , 
Delwer Khan, the Serdar who deserted at the battle of Paniput, ' 
received the title of Medad Khan, and the pzda of Serdaree 
Serdarane, " General of Generals." Kazee Feiz Ullah, Pich-nawaz . 
of the king, received the title of Kelane Kelauter, " Greatest of 
the Great." Timoor Shxh had such an implicit confidence in this 
Serdar that he never did anything without consulting him. Abdul 
Latif Khan, one of the descendants of Sheik Ahmed Zindeh Pjr, 
was appointed lieutenant of the kin-gdom and receiver-general of the 
taxes. Noor BIohamecl Khan, Baber'ee, was made president of the 
court of accounts ; and lastly, Iltifat Khan, chief of the eunuchs, 
was appointed chief treasurer and custoclian of the crown jewels. 
All these personages had the rank of ministers, and Timoor ordered 
as a general rule that' the principles of justice, equity, and a mild 
course of conduct should be observed towards every one ; but he re- 
commended them to employ the chiefs of tribes as little as possible 
as public functionaries, for up to this period they had generally 
held the appointments, and almost always abused their authority. 
The  Shah's guards were selected from the tribe of Isakzye, and to 
this the Serdaree Serdarane belonged. A division of 12,000 
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ICtnzilbash horsemen was also organized under t.he command of 
the Serdar Mohamed Khan Beyat, the pay of their officers was 
augmented, and Timoor.chose from amongst these the companions 
of his debauched habits, for he had a great predilection for wine 
and other pleasures. He  paid with great punctuality every half- 
year the salaries of the officers of his court, and the army every 
year. 
Timoor Shah was only twice at the head of his troops to meet 
his enemies ; all the other wars in which he was engaged mere con- 
ducted by the Serdaree Serdarane, Medad Khan, Isalczye. T h e  
first occasion on which Timoor took the field was in 1779 in the 
campaign against Scinde, which had revolted. The governor of 
this province, a vassal of the Afghan sovereigns, and admitting 
their suzerainty, had endeavoured to throw it of?' a t  the time tbe 
Mahrattas rose in his htlier's reign, and Ahmed Shah had subdued 
him even before the battle of l'aniput, making him pay a very 
large sum of money as arrears of tribute, and as an indemnity for 
the expenses of the war; after which Ahmed forgave him, and 
m~intained him in his government. This chief belonged to the 
tribe of the Kalora, and had the title of Emir of Scinde. Mir Fethi 
Khan, chief of the Talpoora tribe, a rival of his, attacked him in 
June, 1779, massacred a great number of his people, and dispos- 
sessed him of his government. T h e  Kalora chieftain fled to 
Kandahar. from whence he addressed a petition to Timoor Shah, 
who a t  once took the field with his army to reinstate him in his 
rights. The king began by seizing Bawalpoor, in which place he 
found immense riches, and upon these he laid his hands. The in- 
surgents after this success did not hold their ground anywhere, and 
their chiefs fled from the province, which the Shah placed under 
the control of the .ICdora Emir, and then returned to Kabul ; but 
he had scarcely left Scinde when the chief of the Tdpooras, 
again entered that territory and once more drove out the Kaloras. 
The embarrassments under which Timoor laboured at  that time 
prevented him from promptly repressing this fresh outbreak : aud it 
was only in 1786 that the Serdaree Serdarane Medad Khan could 
march there with a small corps d'armde, with which, on its entering 
Scinde, the contingent of the Khan of Kelat was to form a junction ; 
this chief, however, was bound to the Talpooras by family ties, and 
on various pretences did not bring the ,reinforcement which by 
treaty he was obliged to furnish. In  spite uf this contretemps 
n 2 
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Medad Khan marched upon the insurgents with his small force, . 
but, being attacked by vcry superior numbers near the village of 
Djioond, he was beaten and obliged to retire and fortify himself in 
that locality. 
Mir Fethi Khan then entered into negotiations with the 
Serdaree Serdarane, demanded to be iiwested with the same rights 
that the Shah of Afghanistan had formerly aclrnowleclged, and 
which had been held by the chief of the Kaloras, promising for 
the future an exact payment of the tribute as well as the sum then 
due for arrears. Medad Khan accepted this arrangement, which 
was confirmed by his sovereign, bnt Mir Fethi Khan, who only 
wished to gain time to collect his treasure and his forces, in order 
that he might defy his s~~zerain  with the greater chance of success, 
a ion as refused to pay the tribute the third gear after his install t '  
Governor of Scinde, and proclaimed his independence. Timoor 
Shah being unable to send troops and thus oblige him to return 
to his duty, Scillde remained independent of Afghanistan upAo 
the time of the Shah's death. 
The second occasion on which this sovereign took the field in 
person was in his conquest of Sarmncand and Bokhara, to punish 
the inhabitants of Balkh and Akhcheh, who had d r i p  out t,heir 
Afghan governor and revolted against him at the instigation of 
S~lltan Murad Khan, Emir of Bolchara, and of n'ravar-ul-nahar. 
T5Then the Shah approached Balkh, those who had raised the 
standard of rebellion, and in whose support Sultan Xurad Khan 
had sent a contingent of troops, left the town to oppose the Shah, 
and encamped at a short distance froin ,him. If Timoor Shah had 
a t  once attacked the Uzbeks he would most certainly have crushed 
them, for his al-my was much superior to theirs, not only in numbers 
but in the spirit of the troops ; but the rivalry which existed between 
the aerdars, and the vexation felt by those who coinnunded the 
tribes at  being obliged to leave their lucrative appointments, caused 
them to temporize and thus compromise the success of the Afghan 
arms; and his attempts to conciliate these chiefs were so prolonged 
that the army was at last completely without provisions. 
The fall of Timoor Shah was the object of the serdars, and this 
they hoped to accomplish without its appearing to be their fault, 
trusting that his successor would grant them the advantages which 
they had hoped, but in vain, to receive from him. The king pene- 
trated their design, and to avoid an irreparable disaster came to an 
understancling with the rebels, withdrew from the conquest of 
P;Savar-ul-nahar, and retired to Kabul, preserving a feeble appearance 
of authority on Ballrh and Althcheh, which from this day became 
pretty nearly independent. They accepted, it is true, a governor 
named by Timoor Shah, but they took care previously to point out cer- 
tain persons from amongst whom that officer sl~onlct be taken. The 
authority of the governor thus chosen was very limited; thc people 
he governed merely furnished him with the means of subsistence for 
himself and a very small number of personal servants ; but they 
paid him neither taxes nor salary and subjected him to every bind 
of annoyance. The consequence of this was that Timoor Shah 
was at length unable to find any person who would accept the 
appointment of governor of these turbulent citics, which led to a 
hundred jokes and witticisnls more or less vounding to the feelings 
of the sovereign, particularly from those who were hostile to him. 
The Loutis, who ~vandered from town to t o m  with monkeys and 
other animds, taught them to cast earth upon their heads (a sign 
of the deepest grief amongst Asiatic:;) when they were aslrecl whejher 
they would be governors of Balkh or Akhcheh. 
From t l ~ e  period at which Timoor Shah succeeded to the throne 
Khorassan had been in a permanent state of revolt. Shah Rokllrh 
Nirza, who recognised the suzerainty of this sovereign as he had 
done that of his father, claimed his assistance against his old friend 
Manlech Khan of Tchinaran, who had five years before seized and 
continued to hold possession of Meshed, in which city he exercised 
R most fearful, tyranny. Timoor Shah sent 30,000 men, under the 
orders of the Serdaree Serdarme, to overthrow the usurper. 
On his arrival a t  Meshed Mamech Khan left the city and shut 
himself up in his fortress of Tchinaran, in which place Medad 
Khan thought it would be as well not to disturb him ; he contented 
himself therefore by ordering his villages to be pillaged, his territory 
ravaged, and, replacing Shah Rokh a t  the head of the government 
of Meshed, he returned to Kabul; but he had scarcely reached 
the c~1pit.d when news was brought to him that Mamech Khan 
had been enabled to collect a few thousand horsemen, and once 
more devastate the province, and that his position became every 
day more menacing. Timoor Shah was obliged to send Medad 
Khan to put down this fresh revolt, and on his arrival Mamech 
Khan win retired within the walls of his fortress, but this 
time the Afghans laid siege to the place, and soon forced him 
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to surrender at discretion. The Serdaree Serdarane, however, 
treated &Ia.mech with generosity, left him in possession of his 
Khanat, and was sabisfied with accepting a light contribution in, 
money towards the expenses of the war and a thousand beasts of 
burderi loaded with provisions : after which he set out on,his return 
to Kabul;  but the simoom blew with such intensity when he arrived- 
in the plains of Furrah that he died, and with him a great number 
of his soldiers. 
A few days subsequently to this circumstance the Rhorassanees 
were informed of it and immediately rose against the Afghans and 
their protCg6 Shah Rokh Mirza, which obliged Timoor Shah to send 
a third army the following year to reduce them to obedience. H e  
placed these troops under the command of Ahrned IGan Noorzye, : 
son of Nasser Ullah Khan, who, although with great difficulty, suc- 
ceeded in putting down the revolt. From this moment up to the 
end of the reign of Timoor, the Afghans were never engaged in 
any conflict; nevertheless the year preceding the death of that 
prince was remarkable for an event in which the Shah was nearly 
coming to a violent end. 
I n  accordance with his usual custom Timoor went to pass a few 
months a t  Peshawur, but this year he remained at  that, city a longer 
period than usual, detained there by an insurrectional movement 
which threatened to develop itself further and extend as far as 
Lahore. Arseleh Khan, of the Mohmund tribe, and Yqhoot  Khan, 
chief' of the eunuchs of the late Icing, who with several other 
Afghan chiefs were dissatisfied with Timoor, determined upon his 
ruin. It was agreed amongst them that Yaghoot Khan, who 
commancled the guard of the royal harem, should connive a t  the 
entrance of Arseleh Khan and his people when the king retired 
there, and put him to death, after which they were to proclaim his 
nephew, Iskander Khan, a son of Suleiman Mirza, king in his 
stead. 
On the day agreed upon for the execution of this conspiracy, 
2500 hill-riflemen, and as many resolute inhabitants of Yeshawur, 
well armed, suddenly assembled in a large open space covered 
with ruins, habitually deserted and situated on the side of the 
grand square opposite to the citadel, on which a few thousand 
Kuzzilbash horse, forming the king's guard, were always en- 
camped. I t  was about two hours after noon, the time a t  which 
eastern nations take their siesta ; the palace guard were therefore all 
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asleep, or very nearly so, and the conspirators made choice of this 
moment to penetrate into the citadel by a sally-port, of which 
Yaghoot Khan had given them the key. By a rare chance 
Timoor Shah had not yet fallen asleep, and, hearing the tumult 
and a distant hubbub of voices,- he perceived a t  once that he was 
threatened by some impending danger, and quickly retired to the 
summit of a tower a t  one of the angles of the citadel looking into 
the large square. The assassins, never thinking for a moment that 
he would hide himself in a place where no one ever put his foot, 
did not search for him there and went on ; but when they returned 
they were attracted by his shouts, and saw the king waving 1Js 
Cashmeer turban in the air as a signal of distress to the Goolam Kuz- 
zilbashes, who were snoring below ; the conspirators endeavoured 
to get at  him by breaking the doors, but one of them, being iron- 
bound and padlocked, resisted all their efforts to open it, which gave 
the guards time to come up and vigorously attack the insurgents, 
who were quickly reduced to the simple contingent of the moun- 
taineers, for the Peshawur men had dispersed when they saw that 
the alarm mas given. The Goolams, who were soon supported by 
other troops, cut the conspirators to pieces, and but very few of them 
were enabled to escape-drseleh Khan fled to his tribe, who lived 
in the valleys enclosed between the mountains of the I-Iaicht-naggar, 
a rough country, full of difficulties, in which the Afghan cavalry 
would have had but very little chance of success had they ventured 
to pursue him. Timoor employed cunning in his attempts to seize 
the culprit ; he feigned forgiveness and a wish to pardon Arseleh 
Khan, declaring daily at his dur.bar, and also in private, that he 
admitted he had been occasionally unjust towards him, and that 
he desired nothing more than to be able to repair the injuries he 
had done him. H e  made theae sentiments well known in public; 
and when he knew they had reached the ears of Arseleh Khan, he sent 
one of the p e a t  nobles of his court to him, accompanied by a large 
suite of servants carrying a Koran, on a page of which he had 
inscribed an oath that he would pardon his fault, and a5xed his 
seal to this document. Arseleh Khan, placing confidence in the 
sanctity of the book which had received on its pages this solemn 
promise from the Iring, invited the envoy and his suite to lodge 
in his own house, treated him with great splendour and consi- 
deration, and after a few days returned with the embassy to 
Kabul ; the Khan's throat was cut the day that he entered the city. 
Timoor Shah, a little reassured by the death of this chief, now 
ordered a massacre of the pople of Peshawur who had joined in 
the revolt, and fixed the extent of i t  to one in three of its inhabit- 
ants ; this command v3s unfortunately but too well obeyed, and 
Peshamr  mas very nearly depopulated by these executions, which 
were preceded and followed by a general emigration. 
From this period Timoor Shah became suspicious, morose, aqd 
restless, and his clemency, which had till then rendered his reign 
remarkable, entirely ceased, and it terminated in an act of unpa- 
ralleled cruelty. His  last days passed away in alternate paroxysms 
of remorse and fear ; he could not qtLiet his conscience and a1)solve 
it from the guilt of the wholesale slaughter of which we h n e  just '' 
spoken, nor the nwrder of Brseleh Khan, brought about by per- 
jury, and also having carried off by force the wife of an Afghan 
of I<andahar, to give her to a certain Mohamed Khan, one of his 
favourites, who had conceived a passion for her. Timoor Shah 
survived only ten months after the attack on his life; and his 
death, in 1793, was occasioiled by an inflammation of the intes- 
tines, accompanied by violent fits of vomiting. Several of his con- 
temporaries, whom me have had occasion to consult on the subject 
of his death, assure us that he was poisoned by one of the women 
of his harem, the sister of a Popolzye chief, who was hostile to him. 
I n  spite of the several acts which have just .been mentioned, the 
reign of Timoor Shah is cited in Afghanistan for the justice, 
equity, and paternal feeling with which 1~ treated his subjects. 
H e  had many difliculties to surmount ; for the serdars who had 
placed his father on the throne, and divided with him the direc- 
tion of affairs, considered themselves much more like the tutors 
of. his son than his councillors. The king endeavoured for a 
long period to release himself from this thralclom, but, seeing that 
his efforts were vain, he gave himself up to that life of ease and . 
effeminacy with which European authors have so sharply re- 
proached him, without ,reflecting whether it was possible for him 
to follow a different line of conduct. They would have been less 
severe if they h a d  given themselves the trouble to inquire what 
were the causes of this apathy. They heard from the Afghans 
that which they have themselves repeated; but we must not forget . 
that this people admit amongst the number of their great men 
those only who gorge themselves with pillage, who carry war and 
devastation everywhere, and who satisfy them in their eager desire' 
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fur riches; i t  was only by employing such means that the great 
Ahmed Shah, a sovereign, be it observed, highly to be respected 
an Afghan, was enabled to make himself popular with the plun- 
dering tribes of which his nation was composed. His son, instead 
of enriching them by continual wars, was obliged to come to the 
assistance of those he had to protect by taking funds from his own 
treasury ; and this was quite enough to bring upon him the slander 
and ill feeling of the people. An Afghan loves to live at other 
people's expense ; everything which tends to make him respect the 
property of his neighbour, to be subject to laws which prevent him 
&om ransacking and destroyicg, is opposed to his nature ; is it, 
therefore, astonishing that, being animated by'such sentiments, the 
reign of Timoor Shah should appear to him weak and effeminate ? 
1 had occasion, dduring my journey in Afghanistan, to converse with 
some respectable serdars, who, having held high positions at  the 
court of this sovereign, were able to appreciate his character. These 
individuals assured me that the intelligence and activity of this 
pince were equal to his courage and firmness ; and it was these 
qualities which had led his father to give him the preference over 
his other sons; but it would have been absolute folly for him to 
have entered into an opcn struggle wit,h the old serdars, who were 
venerated by the Afghans, with a view of concentrating all the 
power within his own hands, for this contest could terminate only 
to his disadvantage, and would have ended in his complete ruin. 
H e  preferred the wise and prudent path of reasonable concessions 
to that dangerous, and always uncertain, one of civil war ; if he 
was debauched, it may be affirmed that in this he only imitated 
the majority of Eastern sovereigns-even those who rank highest 
in the pages of historians. They have always considered, and will 
always consider, so long as there is no change of habits in Asia, 
the abuse of the physical powers and pleasures as the first and most 
imprescriptible of their rights. Timoor, however, without doubt 
would have been less effeminate if, like hi5 father, he had had 
the power in his own hands; but, not having serious subjects to 
attend to, he gave himself up to frivolous ones. 
When the serdars who had been the companions of Ahmed Shah 
were dead, their sons succeeded to the influence which the former 
had taken in the itEairs of government, and Timoor was unable 
to resist their demands. These chiefs disposed of the tribes ; they 
could alienate them from him in a moment, and he was, therefore, 
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obliged to be on good terms with them. Unfortunately these young 
serdars lvere passionate and ambitious; being without the espe- 
rience of their fathers, they never knew how to preserve amongst 
themselves that union which had existed amongst the.latter ; and 
Timoor, instead of finding in them the characteristics which are . 
necessary to triumph over clifficulties, passed his time in endeavour- 
ing to heal their misunders~andings, which could not be done with- 
out a great deal of tact, so that their feelings should not be wounded 
and that he should still appear to preserve the authority of a sove- 
reign over them. I t  was the just medium that Timoor adoptcd 
with them all, and the clever concessions which he made to ambitious 
chiefs eager for change, which assured to him a reign of twenty ., 
years, exempt from the scenes of anarchy that stained with blood 
those of his successors. I t  was in consequence of his sons not 
having followed their father's example that they were hurled from 
the throne of Afghanistan, and ended their days by the sword or in 
exile. 
Timoor Shah left thirty-six children ; of these twenty-three were 
sons, namely- 
Humayoon Mirza.-His mother was of the tribe of Suddozye. 
Mahmood Mirza, I-ladji Firooz Eddin Mirza. -Their mother 
was of the tribe of Popolzye. 
Abbas Mirza, ICohendil N1irza.-Their mother was of the tribe 
of Isakzye. 
Zeman Mirza, Shoodja-001-Moollc 31irza.-Their mother was of 
the tribe of Yoosoofzye. 
Ahmed Mirza, Mohamed Sultan Mirza, Yezdane Bakhch 
Mirza.-Their mother was of the tribe of Noorzye. 
Rechver Mirza, Sultan Ali Mirza, Nadir Mirza.-Their mother 
, 
was a great-grandchild of Nadir Shah. 
Eyoob Mirza, Hassan Mirza.-Their mother was a Popolzye. 
Echreff Mirza, Muzafer Mirza, Djehan Wala Nlirza.-Their 
mother was of the tribe of Etchekzye. 
Mohamed Murad Mirza, Mirane Mirza, EIoosein Mirza.- 
Their mother was of the tribe of Mohamedzye. 
Achem Mirza, Chapoor Mirza.-Their mother was a Mogul. 
I t  is essential that the reader should notice with attention the 
names of those princes who are born of the same mother, because 
the half-brothers habitually detest them, and in cases of revolt 
are nearly always united against them. I n  taking up arms they 
are nearly always sure to have the support of the tribe to which 
their mother belonged. 
Nearly all these princes were, as may be seen by the above 
table, born of Afghan mothers, with the exception of Kechver, 
Sultan Ali, and Nadir, .who were descended from a great-pand- 
&ild of Nadir Shah, and Achem and Chapoor Mirza, whose 
mother was a daughter of the Mogul Emperor Ahmed Shah Gour- 
kanee, whom Timoor married in 1750. A11 these princes had 
each from ten to fifteen children ; those who survived the disasters 
which have befallen their dynasty have sought refuge in India, 
where the greater number of them are pensioners of the East India 
Company. 
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accompanied by Mnhmood takes Furrah and ICandah~w - The anuy deserts 
Zeman -Battle betweeu the brothem -Zeman is beaten and his eyes p n t  
out  -Vefadar Khan is executed - Zemm retires to Eokhara- Character of 
the Shah. 
AFGHANISTAN, at  the ,death of Timoor Shah, comprehenclecl the 
principalities of Cashmeer, Lahore, Peshswur, Kabul, Ballill, 
Khulm, Kandahar, Mooltan, and Herat ; those of Kelat and 
Beloochistan, as well as Persian Khorassan, acknowledged her as 
suzerain. Scinde also, though not having paid for five years the 
tribute agreed upon by Mir Fethi Khan, chief of the Talpooras, was 
nevertheless classed as amongst the number of her dependencies. 
Less far-sighted than his father Ahnlcd Shah, the deceased prince 
had neither designated the son who ' w a s  to succeed him to the 
throne, nor obtained the recognition of m y  one of them by the 
serdars. T h e  majority of his sons at  the time of Tirnoor's death 
were governors of various provinces. The eldest, I-Tumayoon Mirza, 
his successor to the throne by right, was at I h d a h a r ,  Mahmood 
Nirza a t  Herat, Abbas Mirza at Peshawur, Zeman Mirza a t  
I<abbul, Shoodja-001-Moollc a t  Ghuznee, ICohenclil a t  Cashmeer ; 
and the royal corpse had not received the rites of sepulture when his 
sons were already disputing the succession. The majority of them 
had hastened to Kabul to be present when their father drew his 
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last breath; the others, amongst whom were Humayoon &firza 
and Mahmood Mirza, remained a t  their governments, where 
they had made themselves beloved by the people, and might rea- 
sonably hope for their assistance and support in retaining their 
power. Mahmood Mirza had promised his support to Humayoon 
Mirza to aid him in seizing upon the throne, supposing that his 
to i t  was disputed ; and the latter, in acknowledgment of 
this service, had promised to confirm him in his government of 
Herat. The good understanding was not so complete amongst 
the other brothers assembled at  Kabul. 
-4bba.s Mirza, the fourth son of Tirnoor Shah, renowned for his 
Herculean strength, had, in the first instance, a chance of obtaining 
possession of the throne ; but the serdars having refused to sanction 
his election before his father's obsequies were performed, the un- 
toward delay moclified the chances which he might have had of 
success ; for each serdar attacliecl himself to one or other of the 
princes, and endeavoured to influence him in favour of his own 
particular interests. The  consequence of this was a complete dis- 
' sension amongst the chiefs-each party flew to arms, and blood 
flowed in the streets of Kabul. 
The  most powerf~il and influential of all the serdars was Pay- 
endeh Khan, a son of that Hadji Djemal who withdrew his pre- 
tensions ,to the crown in favour of Ahmed Shah. Like his father he 
was the head of the family of the Mohamedzyes, and commanding- 
in-chief the tribe of the Barultzyes. This  position gave him great 
influence amongxt the people, who, after the descendants of Sudoo 
had been raised to the throne, had withdrawn from them a portion 
of their regard, which, replaced by fear, had been bestowed upon 
, 
the descendants of Moharned, whom they considered as alone capable 
- 
of maintaining their privileges against the excessive power which 
they had given to their kings. Payendeh Khan gave his adhesion 
to Zeman Mirza, the fifth son of Tirnoor, and succeeded in at- - 
taching to his party the most influential of the Afghan nobility 
and the chiefs of the Kuzzilbashes a t  Kabul. Amongst the 
former were Ahlned Khan, Noorzye ; Fath-Ullah Khan, Suddozye ; 
Noor Rlohamed Khan ; Emin-001-Moolk ; Emir Islam Khan, 
Djevanchir ; Djaffer Khan, Djevanchir ; Moharned Khan, Beyat ; 
Emir Ullah Khan, Logheree ; and many others of as high rank 
and equal power. With their assistance he was enabled in the first 
instance to calm the general excitement, and subsequently to ele- 
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vate the Prince Zenian to the sovereign power in the following 
manner :- 
O n  the proposition of Payendeh Khan, the princes agreed to 
assemble with the chiefs of tribes in order that the latter might . 
proceed in all liberty to the election of a sovereign taken from 
amon@ the former. Each of the sons of Timoor, accompanied by 
the serdars, came to this meeting ; and in conformity with an under- 
standing which had been already agreed to, no one had any arms, 
either concealed or otherwise, about his person. The place selected 
for this gathering belonged to Payendeh Khan ; he had previously, 
and with great secrecy, strengthened all the doors and windows, 
and arranged the apartments in such a manner that no prison could 
have been more secure. When the princes were assembled, and , 
some time had been occupied in discussion, Zeman, whose pzr- 
tisans had purposely abstained from appearing there, suddenly, 
under some slight pretence, left the assembly. Payendeh Khan, 
who, to prevent any suspicion, had not uttered a word in favour of 
his candidate, followed him out of the room, after which all those 
who remained in the house were placed under lock and key, and 
troops stationed round it. 
T h e  various factions, deprived of their chiefs thus retained pri- 
soners and receiving no instructions, allowed them~elves to be per- 
suaded by Payendeh Khan, and acknowledged Zeman Mirza as 
their king. The new sovereign kept h ~ s  brothers in confink- 
ment during five days without giving them anything to eat save 
two or three ounces of bread daily, the only way in which he could 
bring them to recognise his election. \]'hen they and the chiefs 
who had shaved their captivity were released, they resembled so 
many skeletons, and left the inhospitable and treacherous roof 
under which they had passed these five days of suffering, only to 
be transferred to the citadel of the Bala Hissar, within the walls of 
which Zeman thought it would be prudent to place them. 
T h e  new sovereign commenced his reign by settling a pension - 
upon the old and devoted servants of his father, and by various 
concessions attached to his person those serdars who had been 
opposed to him ; but some few others, for the sake of example, he 
put to death ; and as, after all, the Afghans were obliged to have a 
king, they contented themselves with the one that had thus been 
elected, who met with no further opposition in Kabul. 
Humayoon Mirza, informed of the blow thus levelled a t  his 
rap. Z. HIS TYRANNY. I11 
'. 
' righ;hts as the eldest son of Timoor, protested against the usurp- 
ation of Zeman, and accelerated his preparations for war ; his 
brother, Mahmood Mirza, did the same ; and a good many par- 
tisans came forward at  their appeal to overthrow the usurper. 
~~t &man Shah, who could dispose of the greater and the richest 
portions of the kingdom, who was in possession of the royal trea- 
sure and the most warlike of the troops, did not remain inactive ; 
a very short space of time he had assembled a sufficient force to 
put down his two antagonists, and, directly he mas in a position to 
take the field, he marched on Kandahar. Though Bfahmood had 
not yet come to his assistance, Humayoon Mirza advanced boldly 
to meet Zeman, and came up with him at the little town of Kelat-i- 
Ghildjzye ; a battle ensued between the rival brothers ; Humayoon 
was completely beaten, and obliged to fly into Beloochistan, where 
he found an asylum at Kelat with the Emir Nasser Khan. 
Mahmood Mirza, retained at  Herat by the necessity of calming 
the excitement that reigned there, was not able to act up to 
the promise he had made his brother I-Iumayoon to come to his 
support ; and Zeman, after the defeat of the latter, made prepara- 
tions to subdueMahmood, when several revolts which broke out a t  
Kabul forced him to return there. A t  this period evil council- 
lors obtained a power over the mind of the Shah ; they persuaded 
him that. the weakness and condescension of his father to the 
se rdar~  had alone checkeil the increasing impulse given to the 
prosperity of Afghanistan by his ancestor Ahmed Shah, and they 
recommended him to alter this system, and concentrate the absolute 
power in his omn hands. 
T o  effect this object Zeman Shah commenced by taking the 
great appointments of the state from those who had inherited them 
as sinecures since the reign of that monarch. Even Payendeh 
Khan himself, to whom' he was indebted for his throne, was not 
made an exception by the instiptors of this violent change, for 
his influence considerably diminished, and these dismissals did 
not long suffice to appease the fears that his ambitious advisers 
suggested to Zeman Shah. Individuals of consideration were 
attracted to court on the faith of solemn oatns, arrested, im- 
prisoned, or put to death, and these sanguinary executions spread 
consternation in Kabul, the citizens of which were soon brought 
under a yoke of iron. Such useless cruelties alienated the 
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Afghans from their new sovereign ; and his brothers, who were 
released from tlie citadel almost immediately after they had been. . 
incarcerated, dispersed over the different provinces, and every- 
where excited disobedience to his authority. Obliged to conspire in 
secret in presence of the troops that were sent to suppress the disor- 
ders of which they themselves were the instigators, they nevertheless 
ceased not by their intrigues to endeavour to accomplish the fall of 
their relative, and continued very dangerous to his power. Shah 
Zeman, fearing that a general reaction would be manifested against 
him, was afraid to put those who were in his power to death, as i t  was 
in the first instance his intention to do ; but these quarrels between 
the sons of Timoor Shah were the prelude to scenes of carnage, in  
the midst of which the dynasty of the Sudddzyes was to end. 
I t  was about this time that Agha Mohamed Khan, founder of the 
dynasty of the Kadjara in Persia, sent Nohamed Hoosein Khan, 
I<5t~aguzloo, as ambassador to Shah Zernan, requesting the cession 
of Balkh, which he required in order that he might be able to 
undertake in all sccurity the expedition which he proposed to make 
against Beghee Khan, a t  that period king of Bolchara. Z e m m  
Shah, being then greatly embarrassed, could not refuse this con- 
cession to the Icadja~,  who was a t  Meshed with a numerous army ; 
he consented, therefore, not only to his demand, but promised , 
also to assist him with his own troops. Subsequently Agha 310- 
hamed Khan having been called to the west by the ,menaced 
invasion of the Russians, this treaty was never carried out. 
During the events that we have related above the fire was 
smouldering which was so soon to burst forth in the midst of the 
Afghan nation. The  Punjab, annexed to the Icingdom by Ahmed 
Shah, attempted to regain its independence, and the Shah Zeman 
immediately took the field to chastise the rebels ; but he had scarcely 
crossed the Indus when he learnt that, assisted by the Emirs of 
Beloochistan, his brother Humayoon had seized upon Kandahar. 
This intelligence obliged him to put off his expedition to Lahore, 
and he set off by forced marches, and by the direct road across the 
mountains, to attack t$e former city. On the approach of his brother, ' 
Humayoon was betrhyed by his Afghan pwtisans, who wished to 
seize and deliver him up to Zeman ; but, assisted by the Beloochees, 
he  succeeded in escaping from them, and again fled to Beloochistan. 
The Shah sent a thousand cavalry in pursuit of him, from whose 
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clutches he escaped for several days ; but having, unfortunately for 
him, returned on his road to gain Herat, they came up with and 
arrested him in the district of Zen~indavar~ after which, and in 
obedience to the orders they had received from Shah Zeman, they 
put out his eyes. The  Shah, delighted with this fresh act of cruelty, 
which, he fancied, ought to strengthen the power he had usurped, 
thou& of marching against the Emirs of Scinde, as much with the 
desire of punishing them for the support they had given to FIuma- 
yoon, as to force them to pay the arrears of tribute which they 
owed, and which they had ceased to pay several years before the 
death of Timoor Shah. 
Shah Zeman had reached the Bolan Pass when he heard 
that Mahmood Mirza, after having established his power a t  
Herat, had ji~st talien the field with an excellent army, and in- 
tended to advance upon his rear while he was engaged with his 
enemies in Scinde. Forced therefore by necessity, he came to terms 
with Fathi Ullah Khan Talpoora, and for the sum of 300,0001. 
gave up the remainder of the arrears, which amounted to three 
times that sum, and confirmed him in the gov'ernment of 
Scinde, after which he moved by forced marches to meet his 
brother. 
Mahmood Mirza, quite as well informed of the movements of 
Zeman as the Shah was of his, halted when he heard of the king's 
return to Kandahtlr, and having taken up a position in the mountains , 
of the Siah-bend, across which he had advanced, only moved forward 
when he learnt that Zeman mas two or three marches from his 
encampment. The two armies came in sight, and attacked at  
Gourrek, a large village situated -between Girishk and Zer~lindavar, 
and fought with fury during fifteen successive hours. At  length 
fortune declared itself against Mahmood Mirza, who, beat.en, 
turned, and cut off from his communications, was obliged to fly and 
retire within the walls of Furrah, followed only by a hundred of 
his dependants. 
' After this Shah Zeman, without giving himself any further 
trouble about his antagonist, marched straight upon Herat, and 
encamped under its walls, but several assaults which he made 
were repulsed with energy, and he was on the point of retreating 
when the mobher of Mahnlood Mirza arrived in his camp to make , 
proposals in the name of her son, who she assured Zeman had no 
desire for the throne, and would be quite satisfied simply with the. 
I 
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government of &rat. The Shah, who was anxious to carry his 
arms to other points that were seriously menaced, was delighted 
with the proposition, and accepted i t  immecliatetly. 
Iiamran Xirza, the son of Malimood, and Hadji Firooz Eddin, 
his brother, who had been appointed governor of the city in 
i7Xahmood's absence, had remained within the citadel, and were 
afraid to go into the town lest the fortress should be taken from 
them by some treacherous act on the part uf the garrison. Not 
having received any information respectiag the transaction which 
had just taken place between the two brothers, their joy was not 
greater than their astonishment when they saw Zeman Shah in full 
retreat, which they attributed to the arrival of i\lahmood Mirza a t  
the head of fresh forces. Desirous, therefore, of making a d i ~ e r -  
sion in his favour, they assemblecl in haste the troops that nrere at 
hand, and pursued the Shah ; but they had scarcely reached the 
rojal  residence of Roouz-bagh, situated sewn miles south of &-at ,  
when the Parsivan, Kdech Khan (a serdar of the Taymoonis, suze- 
rain lord of Khaff, a man of great influence in the principality, and 
reputation in warlike affairs), who had been intrusted by Kalnran 
and Firooz Eddin with the command of the citadel during their 
absence, despatched a inessenger to Zeman Shah to inform him 
that he held the fortress at  his disposal, and that he ought to come 
immediately and occupy i t  wit11 his own troops. 
The princes, informed of this unfortunate circumstance, returnecl 
instantly to Herat, which still held out for them, and attacked the 
citadel on all sides ; but it was in vain that they cannonaded it. 
Xalech Khan, whom they summoned, and ordered to return to 
his duty, answered only by redoubling his fire. The place was 
strong, well provisioned, and capable of resisting any assault for 
several months, while it required only two days for Zeman Shah 
to come and occupy it. Directly he appeared, the princes, see- 
ing themselves abandoned by their p~rtizans, fled in the direction 
of Ehorassan ; and Zeman, meeting with no further opposition, , 
. . 
took possession of Herat, where he remained four months. He 
appointed his soil Raissar Mirza governor of the province, and 
gave the command of the Heratee troops, as well as 1000 Afghan 
horse, to the Serdar Kalech Khan, who had delivered up the place 
to him. Zeman Khan, Popolzye, was appointed Vizier to IIiaissar 
Mirza, and received the title i l l  p u ~ t i b z ~ s  of governor of Persian 
Khorassan, which Zeman Shah had the intention of uniting with 
Afghanistan. With this view he left a corps of troops with the 
popolzye Serdar, independently of those commanded by Icalech 
Khan, in order that he might be enabled to invade that province, 
$he conquest of which was resolved upon. After having taken these 
measures the king returned to liandahar, where he remained but 
a &ort time, and a few days after arrived at  Kabul. 
But Mahmood IiIirza, without either money or an army, could 
do but little, and came to the determination of going to Teheran 
and demanding assistance from Feth Ali, the Shah of Persia, 
who had for some years been seated on the throne of the Kad- 
jars ; and this sovereign promised him support and his reinstalla- 
tion in the government of Herat, on condition that he admitted 
his suzerainty. This occurrence took place in the year 1798, 
&ring which the revolt of Sedik Khan obliged Feth Ali to pro- 
ceed to the Azerbaicljan ; but before his departure he recommended 
Mahmood Mirza to the care of the Emir Assad Ullah Khan, 
governor of Iiachan, and son of the Etl~emacl Dooulet, Hadji 
Ibrahim of Shiraz. Mahmood Mirza followed the Emir Assad 
Ullah Khan to Hachan, but, observing that Feth Ali Shah prolonged 
his stay in the north of his kingdom, the prince got weary of wait- 
ing for the support that had been promised him, and wrote to the 
Shah, requesting that he might be permitted to leave the residence 
which he had assigned him. The King of Pelsia having consented 
' 
to. this request; Mahmood proceeded to - Khorasan, where he hoped 
to be able to raise some recruits ; nor was he deceived in this 
hope, for RIir Ali Khan, an Arab, the governor of the district of 
Ghain, espoused his cause, and they took the field with 3000 
infantry, marching in the first instance in the direction of Furrah. 
The inhabitants of this city were favourable to the cause of Mah- 
- mood, and directly they heard of his approach they came out several 
days' march to meet him, when a great number of them enrolled 
themselves in his army. 
The news of the arrival of Mahmood Mirza had spread rapidly 
in Herat, much exaggerating his succces, and he was described 
as having arrived a t  Furrah with 50,000 men, subduing every- 
thing on his road. These reports carried consternatinn into the 
minds of the citizens,; all those who had deserted the Prince 
Mahmood, dreading his anger, made their preparations for de- 
pzrture ; and the Prince Kaissar, himself believing in the accu- 
I 2  
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racy of the intelligence, repaired and provisioned the citadel in 
great haste ; but more truthful accounts followed and modifiecl the . 
alarm of the prince and the scared inhabitants. 
The report of' this triumphant march brought to Mahmood Nirza's 
standard a reinforcement of several thousand men ; amongst these 
was the Noorzye Serdar, Djabber Khan, who brought with him a 
contingent of a thousand horsemen ; but when he saw what a small 
army Mahmood's was, he repented of the step he had taken, and 
under cover of a dark night quitted the camp, and proceeded in 
great haste to Herat, where he made the real state of things 
known. Reassured by this iriformation, ICaissar Nirza assembled 
the troops of Kalech Khan, and, uniting them to those of Zeman 
Khan, Popolzye (who, on learniiig the news, had returned " 
promptly from Khorassan, in  the direction of which he had moved), 
nlarcliecl with these two &visions against his uncle. Mahmood, 
seeing that Furrah wasfavourable to his cause, left that town on his 
right, advanced at once to meet his opponent, came up with and at- 
tacked him near the village of Emaret, and routed him completely. 
Thevanquished army retired in haste to Herat, and closed the 
gates. Nahmood Mirza followed, but, being unable to invest 
the place entirely by reason of the smallness of his force, he 
determined to encanlp a t  a spot on the banks of the Heri-rood 
about three miles from the walls. The Vizier Zeman Khan, having 
discovered that the sympathies of the Heratees were in favour of 
Jfahmood, conceivecl that a temporizing line of conduct could 
not but be advantageous to the latter: he resolved therefore, as 
force was not on the side of Haissar, to obtain the victory by cun- 
ning. After having obtained the pelmission of 'that prince, he 
wrote a letter to Mir Ali Khan, the Arab, as if it was the reply to 
some terms of arrangement which the latter had made to Eaissar 
Mirza, and which consisted in his obtaining some favour of that 
prince, in exchange for which Mir Ali promised to deliver Mah- , 
mood Jlirza into his hands. The adroit Vizier confided this letter 
to an intelligent man, and advised him to manage in such a ' 
way that he should be suspected and arrested by some of the 
prince's troops, and then preteud great anxiety that the letter in 
question should not be seen. The scheme was carried out as he 
wished ; the camp guard seized the messenger and conducted their 
prisoner to Mahmood Mirza, to whom they presented the letter 
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which they had taken. Xahmood, alarmed at the marc thus 
revealed to him, asked the advice of an Afghan noble, BIo- 
hamed Akrem Xhan, as to what steps should be taken, and he 
advised him to avoid by flight the trap that had been laid for 
them. 
Nevertheless, the contents of this letter did not remain so entirely 
a secret from Mir Ali Khan, but that he received some information 
respecting it. He  hastened, therefore, immediately to Mahmood, 
and swore and prot.ested in the most energetic terms to the truth of 
his devotion to his person and his cause. The prince feigned to 
believe him; but, when night came, he fled from the camp, ac- 
companied by his son Iiamran, his brother Hadji Firooz Eddin, 
the Serdar Alrrem Khan, and a few devoted servants ; and when he 
thought himself in safety he sent his son and his brother to Teheran 
to claim the promised assistance of Feth Ali Shah, proceeding 
himself to Bokhara to endeavour to interest the Emir in his 
favour. 
Mahmood Mirza had scarcely left the camp and his ally Mir 
Ali Khan, than Icaissar Mirza was inforn~ed of the fact, and he 
profited by the confusion and astonishment into which this event 
had thrown the Ghainians, to fall upon and rout them thoroughly- 
a great many were made prisoners and brought to Herat. A s  for 
Mir Ali IChan, he had great difficulty in effecting his escape, and 
reached Ghain with only a few horse, having met much privation 
and danger on the road. 
Shah Zeman, then at  Kabul, was soon informed that his brother 
Mahmood had returned to Afghanistan, and some false reports 
'induced him to believe that Kaissar Mirza, after having been beaten 
at Emaret, had also evacaated the city of Herat on the approach 
of Mahmoocl, who hai3 taken possession. H e  therefore assembled 
his army without loss of time, and took the field with a view to its 
recapture, for the country and the roads were so thoroughly scoured 
by the partisans of Mahmood, that no messenger l~arl been able to 
reach him with true intelligence of the actual state of things; it 
was only 011 his arrival at Herat itself that he knew positively what 
was passing. Delighted to find that the evil mas not so great as 
he had anticipated, he encamped his army on the banks of the 
I-Ieri-rood, and, followed by his court, subsequently entered the 
city. When he learnt that his brother had gone to Bokhara he 
immediately despatched the Kazee, Abdul Irak, to the Emir 
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of that country, to represent that by the terms of the treaty 
concluded between Tiinoor Shah and the Emir he was bound , 
to deliver up Nahmood Mirza to him as a disturber of the tran- 
quillity of the Afghan kingdom ; but that, nevertheless, if he 
found himself bound by the duties of hospitality, he should 
remain satisfied if he would order the prince to be watched a t  
Bolchara in such a manner that he could not escape and again 
foment discord in his dominioris. Sultan Ali Murad detained the 
Afghan envoy for some time a t  his court without giving him a 
categorical answer : he finished, nevertheless, by promising that 
Mahmood Mirza should be detained in his capital, and that he 
would answer for i t  with Itis head t l ~ u t  he should not have it. The  
Kazee left Bolchara without having comprehended the mcaning of ' 
these words of the Emir, who had dwelt especially upon the last 
part of his reply, the real and secret intention of which was to ' 
gratify upon the fugitive prince the mortal hatred which he felt for 
the family of the Suddozye:; his death was indeed only deferred 
at the earnest request of a great and influential Uzbek nobleman, 
by name Fez1 Ahmed, who interested himself in 11is behalf. Mah- 
mood, informed by Fez1 Aluned of the plot which mas in prepara- " 
tion against his life, managed to deceive the kigilance of his guards ' 
and fled to Khiva, when Mohnmed Rahim Ichan, the sovereign of 
that Khanat, for some time treated him with great hospitality ; but 
as in the end he was unable to render him the assistance which he 
required to renew the war, Elahmood Nirza left Khiva and rejoined 
his son and hls brother at  Teheran, to which city he had sent them 
subsequently to his flight from the camp of the Emir of Ghain. 
After a residence of four months a t  Herat, Zencan Shah received. 
letters from the governor of Peshawur informing him that on his 
departure from Kabul the Sikh mountaineers of Yambou had made 
a descent upon Lahore, and plundered and sacked the city. . 
T h e  Serdar Ahmecl Khan, at  the time governor of Lahore, did 
his best to frustrate their intention ; he went out and attacked 
them, but his solcliers fled a t  the first onset, and the Khan was killed 
in endeavouring to cover their retreat. On the receipt of this dis- 
astrous intelligence, Shah Zernan appointed Mir Efzel Khan, son 
of the Serdaree Serdarane, Medad Khan, vizier to his son Kais- 
sar, after which, taking. with him Zeman Khan, Popolzye, in whose 
military talents he had the greatest confide~lce, he left immediately 
for Kabul by the difficult and mountainous road which traverses 
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'the country of the Waznrahs, Poocht I<ooh, accompanied only by 
one hundred and fifty horse. As to the mass of his army, artillery, 
and baggage, he sent them by Kandahar, under the conduct 
of his minister Vefadar Khan and the ~ e r d i r  Ahmed Khan 
Noorzye. Zeman Shah, who arrived in the capital in twelve days, 
took a large sum from his treasury to make formidable prepara- 
tions for carrying on the war with activity ; and directly the troops 
which arrived by way of Kandahar had joined those he had just 
raised he left for the Punjab. The  Silch mountaineergabandoned 
Lahore at his approach and retired into their fastnesses ; he there- 
fore took peaceable possession of the city. As the inhabitants had 
taken no part in the last revolt, in which they had been maltreated 
by the mountaineers, he thought he could place confidence in 
them, and consented to the request whicl~ they made, namely, 
that in future the governor of Lahore should be selected by the 
Shah from amongst the principal Sikh chiefs, to ' the exclusion of 
the .Afghans. H e  chose, therefore, for this post one of them, by 
name Runject Sing, who had even then acquired a great reputat,ion 
for talent and courage ; and after having duly installed him, Zeman 
Shah depimted on his return to Kabul. This march was for him 
and his army one long series of misfortunes; his artillery and a 
great part of his baggage were lost at the passage of the Jelum ; 
the rain, which fell in torrents and almost daily, had so broken 
up the roads that they were impassable; the soldiers, worn out 
by their suReerings, either dropped to the rear or deserted, and 
the plundering tribes took advantage of the distressed condition 
of the army to pillage the baggage and strip the stragglers, who 
' 
were incapable of defending themselves. I n  fact, it was the de'his of 
. all army of attenuated men, which, harassed by a thousand miseries 
and privations, that Zeman succeeded in bringing into Peshawur. 
Here he remailled a month to rest and refresh his troops, after 
which, having installed his brother, Shooja-001-Moolk, as governor 
of the city, he proceeded to Kabul, where he made but a very short 
stay, for he was under the necessity of going on to Kandahar 
in spite of the severity of the winter to suppress the disposition to 
revolt in that city. 
Such revolts originated more especially in the discontent which 
the powerful tribe of the Barukzyes felt a t  seeing their chiefs, the 
&Ioharnedzyes, set aside and debarred from holding any public 
appointment, and meeting with no consideration at  court. The 
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reader should remember that, from the day on which Sudoo and . 
Mohamed had been raised to a superior rank by Shah Abbas the 
Great, the descendants of the first had enjoyed under the Seffavean 
dynasty an almost regal power in Afghanistan. The descendants 
of the second, without having so great an influence, held nevertheless 
the highest appointments in the state, and were not less venerated 
than the Suddozyes. IlThen Ahmed Shah ascended the throne, 
he, out of gratitude to Hadji Djemal, a chief of the Mohameclzyes, 
respected the privileges of that family, the chiefs of which constantly 
held the most important commands in his army and the great 
offices a t  his court. Timoor Shah, who followed the example of 
his father, had the tact always to attach them to his party, and 
Zeman Shah was the first who clued to alter this state of things, ,' 
which, sanctioned by time, had all t h e  force of law. 
Payendeh Khan, chief of the Mohamedzyes, was, as we have 
already remarked, stripped of all the appointments that he held, 
and this was the first grievance of the Barultzyes against roya1t.y. 
The prime minister of Zeman Shah, Vefadar Khan, although be- 
longing to the royal tribe of Popolzye, was of low extraction. 
T h e  Shah did nothing without having first taken his advice, ' -  . 
and this personage was the instigator of all the harsh measures . 
Ghich the Shah had adopted %%inst the great families of the 
kingdom ; Vefadar Khan found his own interest in the confiscations 
which habitually followed, and they also delivered him from dan- 
gerous rivals. Zeman remained deaf to the milder counsels 
which were given him, and a fatality seemed to urge him for- 
ward from day to day in this impolitic and unjust path. The 
prime minister, having sprung from the lower ranks of the no- 
bility, was despised by the. higher, and he revenged himself by 
oppressing them and elevating unknown persons in their place, 
who became so many tools in his own hands. The system 
thus adopted by Zeman of governing in the most absolute 
manner, without the concurrence and support of the serdars, had 
nevertheless, up to this time, produced only irritation in the public 
mind, and some partial revolts ; but the discontent was general, 
particularly amongst the most influential and powerful chiefs, who 
had all of them been more or less despoiled. Although Vefadar 
Khan was not ignorant of the extent to which he was detested by 
these persons, he played nevertheless a double game, and nourished 
in their minds sentiments of hostility to the king. The Khan en- 
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deavoured to compromise his sovereiq in their eyes, by making 
them believe that, in whatever he did, he simply executed the wishes 
of the Shah, and that his intervcntion with the king was the means 
of saving them from much greater disasters. His friendly pro- 
testations were always accompanied by hypocritical marks of inte- 
rest in their behalf, such as the remission of a tax or the conces- 
sion of some land, and led them to believe that he had great 
difficulty in procuring these favours fiom the Shah, regretting that 
it was not in his power to render them a greater service, thus lead- 
ing them to hope that they would be in a much better position 
in future. In this way he by turns flattered and caressed all par- 
ties, boasting everywhere the favours he had panted, and seeking 
every opportunity of laying upon the king all the odium of his 
tyranny and the bloody executions 4f which he himself was the 
sole originator, hoping by such conduct to overthrow his s'overeign, 
and by these intrigues attain himself the regal power. He  fancied 
he should obtain his end by exciting, when the propitious moment 
arrived, a tumult amongst the people, and expected to receive the 
support of the new serdars of his own creation, who were devoted to 
him. His numerous emissaries glided amongst the populace, and, 
though apparently perfectly disinterested, worked upon them for the 
vizier's own purposes. The brothers of the king also were undcr 
his influence, and he made use of them and led each in his turn 
to believe that he was endeavouring to raise him to the throne. 
The intrigues and underhand practices of this ambitious man proved 
that he had as much craft and subtlety as he had talent for go- 
verning ; th'e steps he cook were always well considered, and to 
the point, and his plan was so well conducted that i t  might have 
succeeded if he had had the boldness to bring it more rapidly to 
an issue; but the heads of a few more serdars, who had taken 
umbrage a t  him, were wanting : he temporized, therefore, and this 
delay was fatal. 
T h e  Afghan serdars, for the most part discontented, formed 
a secret league, in order that they might come to some un- 
derstanding as to the measures that must be taken to free them- 
selves from the iron yoke and sanguinary persecutions which 
weighed upon them ; but to give a greater chance of success to 
their enterprise, they delegated five of the most powerful amongst 
them, who alone were to decide upon the means to be ernployed- 
the others binding themselves to be ready on the day appointed, 
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and to execute without hesitation whatever should be determined 
upon. A s  the police of Vefadar I h n  was perfectly organized, 
and  nothing escaped their Argus eyes, t.he five delegates fixed upon 
the house of a dervish, in high repute for his sanctity, as their 
place of meeting, for his residence had been always frequented by the 
most cousiderable of the Afghan nobility, who went by the appella- 
tion of his murids. H e  never received more than six persons a t  a 
time, and  his door was shut against every one until these six de- 
parted to make way for others. Payendeh Khan had the clever- 
ness to induce this holy man to join the conspirators, and he trusted 
that, by meeting a t  his house and taking advantage .of the custom 
so long established there, he and the other delegates would escape 
the inquiries which might arise. After a lively discussion a t  " 
one of these meetings, in which each of them stated the griev- 
ances of his tribe, it was admitted that their nation had suffered 
' 
beyond what any men of spirit could tolerate-that Zernan Shah and 
his minister ought to be overthrown, and the first replaced by 
the prince Shooja-001-Moolk, his half-brother, at that time governor 
of Peshawur. 
T h e  chiefs present at this meeting were Payendeh Khan, Mo- " 
hamed Sherif Khan, Moonshce Bashee (cashier-in-chief), Yoosoof 
Ali  Khan, chief of the eunuchs, Sultan Khan, Roorzye, and Rahim 
Khan, Alizye. Before sepnrtzting they fixed upon a day for the 
execution of their project, and also drew up several articles, forming 
a kind of constitution, which they were to give to their countrymen. 
T h e  principal clauses in this document were, that henceforth the 
crown should be elective ; that the Serdars alone had t.he right to 
vote a t  such election, and also to depose those sovereigns who 
proved themselves unworthy of the trust which had been reposed in  
them. But unfortunately the conspirators procrastinated, and their 
plans were betrayed to the prime minister by the Moonshee 
Bashee. Vefadar Khan, thinking this an  admirable opportunity 
of getting rid of his principal opponents a t  one fell swoop, im- 
mediately informed the Shah of the conspiracy which had been 
revealed, who recommended that the greatest secrecy should be 
observed, and a t  once relieved his guards, of whose fidelity he 
was doubtf~d,  replacing them by others on whom he thought he 
could rely. T h e  following day he made considerable presents 
to  his servants and officers, am1 also to the people, to dispose 
them in his favour, and on the succeeding one sent for all the 
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chiefs who were concerned in the plot ; but separately, and under 
the petext that he was desirous of conversing with them upon 
public affairs, so that they should not have the least suspicion 
of his motive. However, on their arrival at the palace, they were 
seized and imprisoned in the citadel. A few hours after the Shah 
asce,nded the throne in great state, and, ordering them to be 
brought into his presence, demanded why they had conspired 
against him? to which they replied, that they had sworn to de- 
throne him, but not to put him to death; that they never could 
have had an idea of attacking his royal person if they had not been 
firmly convinced that dl their representations to induce him to 
dismiss his vizier would be fruitless ; it was his ruin alone they were 
bent upon, and it was t.he hope of putting an end to this wretch 
that had led them to conspire against their king. After having 
listened to this avowal, Zeman Shah ordered them to be exe- 
cuted in his presence, their. bodies to be left on the public square 
outside the citadel, and remain there for three days exposed to the 
public gaze. 
As he now feared some movement on the part of the Barukzyes, 
the chief of which tribe he had just put to death, he ordered 
that all the Mohamedzye serdars should be arrested, but the 
greater part of them, having been warned in time, were enabled to 
save themselves by flight, or take refuge in the mosque of Ahmed 
Shah,-a sanctuary never violated. Fethi Khan, the eldest son of 
Payendeh IShan, who was more particularly sought after by the 
express orders of the Shah, with a view of putting him to death, 
also escaped the vigilarice of the solcliers that were sent in pursuit 
of him. Having received notice of their intentions, he got over 
the walls, and, having excellent horses awaiting him in a garden 
adjacent to the city, he reached Girishk, seventy-three miles distant, 
in eight hours. From thence he took the road over the mountains 
and across country, in order that no trace should be found of him, 
I 
and directed his course to Persia, where he rejoined Mahmood 
Mirza, who, a s  we have already remarked, had, for the second time, 
taken up his residence a t  the court of the Kadjars. On this occa- 
sion, as on the former one, he hod been very well received by Feth 
Ali Shah, who had placed himself at  the head of an army, with 
a view of reinstating him in his government of Herat ;  but on 
his arrival at Nishapoor he learnt that fresh disturbances had 
broken out in the Azerbaidjan, which obliged him to return to Imk 
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with his troops, and dismiss Mahmood Mirza, to M-horn he p v e  a 
subsidy and assigned Turchiz as his place of residence, promising 
that he mould send him troops when ordcr was restored in the 
north of the empire, so that thc prince might proceed against Herat. 
I t  was at Turchiz that the Serdar Fethi Khan joined Mahmood 
Mirza, and the greater part of his brcthers soon arrived a t  the 
same place, who, like him, hacl also their father's death to avenge. 
After the sanguinary executions of the chiefs a t  Randahar, the 
Afghans in all parts of the lringdom rose against Zeman Shah. 
T h e  Punjab and Pesha~vur in particular openly raised the 
standard of revolt. There aere also some attempts at  insurrection 
in Kabul, which obliged the IGng to proceed there in great haste ; 
but fearing also for the tranquillity of Kandahar, he left there " 
a part of his army, and the Serdar Mil- Ali Klian, a devoted, 
energetic, and intelligent man, as governor. 
While Zeman Shah was in a state of complete uncertainty 
as to what stcp he should take to pacify his kingdom, Fethi 
Khan, who had, as nell as his brothers, devoted himself to 
the cause of Mahmood DIirza, urged that prince to enter Afghan- 
istan once more, and ovelthrow his brother. Their pressing soli- ' 
citations at length prevailed, and he marched on Ghain, but, 
on his arrival in that district, he saw that the inhabitants did 
not feel disposed to parclon him for the check they had sus- 
tained, owing to his flight when they furmed part of his army 
before Herat, and that in consequence they were very little inclined 
to  assist him. Mahmood almost regretted having left Turchiz, 
and thought of returning ; but Fethi Khan somewhat restored his 
courage, and induced him to renounce this intention. A t  the 
same time he sent two of h n  brothers to the fortress of Furrah, 
to endeavour to  keep matters quiet and obiitin intelligence ; this 
was easy enough, for the inhabitants of that town were entirely 
devoted to hlahmood Nirza, to whom they opened their gates 
when he presented himself before them, accompanied only by 
eighteen horsemen, which formed d l  his army. This success 
obtained for him the support of some chiefs of Khorassan, and he 
soon found himself a t  the head of a small force. H e  then made * 
a n  appeal to the Afghan nation, and in the manifesto which he 
issued he drew a vivid picture of the cruelties and vices of Zeman 
Shah and his ~ninister Vefadar Khan, and announced his design 
of marching on Kabul, to deliver the people from their oppres- 
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sion. The tribe of the Rarultzyes, who recognised Fethi Khan. 
as their chief, hastened en masse to place themselves under the 
orders of their young general, and this example was soon fol- 
lowed by the greater number of the Dooranee tribes, when Mah- 
mood marched on Kandahar. The governor, Mir Ali Khan, in- 
formed of his approach, went out to meet him a t  the he.ad of 
four thousand cavalry, but, completely routed and forced to fly, he  
had scarcely time to refre within the citadel. Mahmood Mirza 
followed him step by step, and invested the city, which he be- 
sieged without success during forty-t~-o days. At  length, on 
the forty-third the assault was given, and Fethi Khan, who 
conducted it ,  was the first man that scaled the malls, and his 
soldiers followed rapidly. They were treacherously aided by 
Balrhch Khan and Hassan Khan, two Afghan chiefs, who, osten- 
sibly of the Shah Zeman's party, mere secret.1~ doing all they 
could to make that of I\fahmood Mirza triumph, and but for their 
help the place would not have been taken without great difficulty. 
When Mir Ali Khan saw that the affi~ir was desperate, he .ordered 
these two traitors to be brought into his presence, and, feeling 
sure of their perfidy, put them to death on the spot, after which he 
mounted his horse and escaped by a secret door, accompanied 
only by a fern horsemen. 
Directly Mahmood Nirza was in possession of Kandahar h e  
was obliged to levy a large sum upon the inhabitants for the 
maintenance of his army ; but the persuasive manners and talents 
of Fethi Khan induced them to support this contribution with- 
out murmuring, and they remained devoted to the prince. On 
hearing what was passing a t  Kandahar, Zeman Shah sent an 
army of 15,000 horse, under the command of the Serdar Ahined 
Khan, against Mahmood, for he was averse to leaving the capital 
himself for fear he should lose it in his absence. This officer 
was but little satisfied with the Shah, and still less so with his; 
minister Vefadar Khan, and, in the hope that he would be better 
treated by Mahmood,'he went over to .him, with all his army, a t  
Mookpoor. I n  anticipation of ulterior events, Shah Zeman had, 
after the departure of Ahmed Khan, assembled fresh troops, but: 
when they heard of the defection of the corps under that serdar 
they a t  once disbanded and retired to their homes. An outbreak 
occurring at  the same ti-me in Kabul, Zeman Shah was under the  
necessity of evacuating the city and retiring in the direction of 
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Jellalabad. On leaving the gates of the capital lie had with him 
only two hundred cavalry and four hundred artillerymen, with their 
guns, stores, and anlniunition ; his minister, Vefadar Khan, and the 
Serdar Zeman Khan, Popolzye, were the only chiefs who re- 
mained faithfill, and they retired with hinl and his party withill 
the fgtified village of Koleh Aclieg, the name of its owner, and im- 
mediately set to work to repair the walls and provision it. From 
hence a fi,esh appeal was made to the partizans of the Shah, and, 
as the royal treasure was still in his hands, he was joined by a 
pretty good number of' recruits, but much more in the hope of 
, 
receiving high pay than from any devotion to his person. How- 
ever that might be, Zeman again found himself in a position to ' 
give battle to his brother. 
After the 15,000 cavalry of Ahmed Khan had joined the army 
of lllahmood Nirza, the prince marched rapidly upon and seized 
Iiabul, without meeting with the slightest resistance. The Emir , 
Islam Khan and Djaffer Khan, two Ihzzilbash chiefs, who only 
could have defended the city, were allied by marriage to the 
Mohameclzyes, and went over to their side t.he moment they 
appeared. 
Nahmood, thus successful, decided upon dislodging Zeman 
Shah from the fortif ed position he had taken up. The task was 
a difficult one, for the latter had snved all l~ i s  artillery, while 
the prince had not one single piece to oppose to him. Never- 
theless, he hesitated not, and again took the field. The armies 
of the two brothers met at  the halt of Ouchpane, when that of 
the Shah was completely beaten and dispersed, and he had t.he 
greatest difficulty in regaining ILleh Acheg. Mahmood fol- 
lowed him, and immediately assaulted his adversary's stronghold, 
but, defended by both nature and art, and ga~risoned by brave 
men determined to die for their king, it resisted for eleven days 
the continuous efforts of the besiegers. Iilowever, the time had 
arrived when they could hold out no longer, and the Shah, accom- 
panied by the serdars who were with him, escaped during the night, 
and retired into another small fortress near Jugdulluk, also belong- 
ing to Acheg Khan. This chief, alarmed a t  the probability 
that disastrous consequences might result to him for the hospi- 
tality he had shown to his sovereign, sent a messenger to Wahmood 
to inform him of the Shah's retreat. The  prince immediately 
sent a serdar, with a strong escort and a surgeon, to the spot 
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which the Khan had designated, when Zeman was taken prisoner, 
and, in conformity with the orders of Mahmood, his eyes were 
. - immediately put out - a punishment he richly merited for the 
same cruelty which he had practised upon Humayoon Mrza, 
his elder brother. Vefadar Khan, Zeman Khan, Popolzye, arid 
Mohamed IChan, the brother of the Vizier, also taken prisoners 
with Shah Zernau, n-cre sent to Kabul, and there publicly ese- 
cuted. Thus terminated the career of this ambitious minister, who . 
could only govern by intrigue and murder, and this in order that 
he might supplant his master, which he mould have done, had not 
his courage failed him at the moment his plan was on the eve of 
execution. H e  perished by a death to which he had condemned 
hundreds, and which he so thoroughly deserved himself. 
Though blind, Shah Zeman, with the assistance of a fern devoted 
friends, subsequently managed to deceive the vigilance of his guards, 
and fled to Bokhara, where fresh misfortunes awaited him. Elis 
daughter, who followed him in his exile, and who was remarltable , 
for her great beautyj was torn with violence from him by the Emir 
I-Iaidar Turreh, who had inherited from his father a hatred of the 
Suddozye family. After this abduction he mas on the point of 
putting Zeinan to death, which would infallibly 'nave happened, if 
he had not again succeeded in malring his escape. 
From Bokhara this Iring, hitherto so powerful, but now so unfor- 
tunate, went to Herat, which was then governed by the Prince 
Had,ji Firooz Eddin, half-brother of- the Shah Mahmood, who 
respected hie misfortunes and gave him a generous rec.eption ; 
and after having treated him in the most hospitable manner 
during several months, he gave him an escort which secured 
his safe retreat to India. Zeman retired to Loodisna, where 
he lived on a pension from the East India Company, devoted to 
the observances of his faith, and did not a t  any subsequent period 
mix himself up with the revolotions of which his country was so 
frequently the theatre after his fall. H e  was still living in 1846. 
This prince, like all the Afghans, was cruel ; but this arose much 
. more from the fact. that he was influenced by a bad minister, 
in whom he placed too much confidence, and who knew how to 
inspire him with chimerical fern, than because he was of a na- 
turally cruel disposition, and wished to gratify it. His greatest 
crime was, that he was absolute, and would reign on that principle. 
This wounded the pride of the serdars, and was in opposition to 
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the received opinions amongst them as to the extent of the sove- 
reign power. Wi th  a different vizier, he might have hoped that 
his reign would be as long, and possibly more glorious, than that 
of his father, for he was personally very brave, very active, always 
on horseback, bringing one wax to a conclusion only to commence 
another; nor was he wanting in intelligence: but he lost all his 
future chances by making the Mohamedzye chiefs discontented, for 
their rights to the great offices of the state mere quhe as sacred in 
the eyes of the Afghans as those of the Suddozyes to the throne. 
T h e  moment he endeavoured to abrogate those rights his fall be- 
came certain ; but, in  spite of the sanguinary executions he was 
guilty of at the instigation of his minister, the Afghans have a 
greater respect for his memory than that of any of the ot,her sons 
of Timoor Shah. 
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CHAPTER S. 
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AFTER seven years of conflict and misfortunes 3Iahmood Mirza 
ascended the throne of his fathers in the year .1800, and when 
Zeman Shah was overthrown he took the title of Shah, and 
made his solemn entry into Kabul. H e  behaved with the ut- 
most generosity to his troops, even to s u c l ~  an extent that he 
exhausted the greater part of the treasure accumulated in the 
coffers of the state by his ftther and grandfather. H e  also. 
enriched the chiefs who had assisted him, and gave them the 
highest appointments a t  his court: the Serdar Fethi Khan received 
the title of Shah Doort Khan; * Shere Mohamed Khan, son of 
the Vizier Shah Velee Khan, was named Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, and 
to him was delegated the government of the kingdom ; the Serdar 
Abdu1l;~li Iihan, Ali Kioozye, father of Y ar Mohamed Iihan, 
who had been confined in the Bala Hissar by Shah Zeman, was 
rcleased from that fortress, and made Governor of Cashmeer ; and, 
finally, he scnt his son Ramran Mirza, with several brothers of the 
Serdar Fethi Khan, against siooja-001-~oolk,  who commanded at 
Peshawur, to take the city and seize that prince. Shooja did 
not wait for them, but fled a t  their approach; so Ramran took 
possession of Peshawur without any fighting. 
* Friend of the king.-Ferrr'er. 
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A few capital punishments, which Mahmood ordered after his 
installation to power, excited a little irritation a~uongst he nomade 
tribes, the chiefs of mhich had more especially felt the effects of 
his anger ; but as these rigorous measures affected his adversaries 
only, the Shah's party felt no uneasiness, and considered that he 
had a right to chastise those who had been opposed to him,. 
Nevertheless the Ghilcljzyes, the born enemies of every Abddee 
sovereign, revolted a t  the outset against his authority, and were 
desirous of placing one of their own tribe upon the throne; 
Mahmood was obliged to send the Serdars Fethi .Khan and 
Ahmed Khan against the rebels, who beat them in four or five 
encountcrs, and terminated the revolt by malrng them conform 
to the existing state of things. 
On the other hand, fortune came to the aid of the Shah Mahmood ; 
for ICaissar Mirza, the son of Shah Zeman, lost the government of 
Herat, and this without any attempt on the part of Mahmood to 
dispossess him of it. T h e  circumstances were as follows :- 
Mir Etiel Khan, the Vizier of I<aissar Mirza, conceived the 
idea of overthrowing the prince immediately after the fall of his- 
father, and a t  this intrigue he worked ardently, and formed with 
great ease a powerful party on which he coulcl entirely rely. 
When he thought he was sufficiently powerful, he resolved on 
putting I<aisaar to death, but the prince, informed of the plot in 
time, escaped from Herat, and sought refuge a t  Uaff-rooge, a town 
of Khorassan, leaving his wives and children under the protec- 
tion of the Serdar Iialech Khan, who, though less influential than 
Mir Efzel Khan, was still sufficiently powerful not to be apprehen- 
sive on account of the support-and protection -he gaye to this 
unfortunate family. 
After the flight of Kaissar Mirza, Mir Efzel, well convinced that 
Shah Mahmood, occupied at this time with the Ghildjzyes, could 
not by any possibility come and disturb him, endeavoured to esta- 
blish his authority in Herat. 'l'hs: inhabitants, who were attached 
to him, would not agree to this except with a certain reserva- 
tion; but, on the other hand, they rejected and repelled the 
secret intrigues of Ralech Khan, the antagonist of the usurper, 
who wished to assassinate him. The Heratees demanded that 
Efzel Khan, though retaining the appointment of vizier, which 
they guaranteed him, should receive as governor, in the place of 
Kaiasar Mirza, one of the blood royal, unless he preferred the 
. 
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return of that prince himself; but Mir Efzel, fearing the resent- 
- ~ merit of the latter, hastened to find a succes~or apreeably to the 
wishes of the people. 
Hadji Firooz Eddin, who, as we have already remarked, retired 
to Teheran, had on leaving that capital gone on a pilgrimage 
to Mecca. On his return Afghanistan was groaning under the 
sanguinary executions of Shah Zeman, and the war was then going 
on between him and Mahmood Mirza ; the Hadji, who was anxious 
- not to be a witness of these sad scenes, retired therefore to Turchiz 
in Khorassan, whiqh the Shah of Persia had assigned to him as his 
residence, and here he occupied himself in the purchase and sale 
of horses, camels, and other beasts of burden. An envoy from 
Mir Efzel Khan came to him there, and- proposed for his 
acceptance the government of Kerat ; but this prince, devoid of 
ambition, and caring little for the grandeur of such a position, 
declined the offer, preferring to continue his commercial pursuits. 
This refusal was not at  all to the taste of Mir Efzel, who, pressed 
by the intrigues of Kdech Khan, was more earnestly solicited from 
day to day to recall Kaissar Mirza. T o  allay, therefore, the 
impatience of the people, he pretended that' he had received a 
letter fro111 I-Iadji Firooz Eddin accepting the government of the 
city ; .this, however, he had himself forged, and, contemporane- 
ously with making the letter public, despatched in haste a few 
horsemen to 'l'urchiz, who, under the pretext of wishing to purchase 
some, horses, induced the prince to meet them in a retired spot, 
when they carried him off by main forc,e, and brought him to 
Herat, nolens volens, where he was obliged to accept the title of 
Governor. 
I<aissar Mirza, seeing that his uncle had carried the da;y 
him, would not submit to the decision of the Reratees, 
and marched against Herat at  the head of a small .army of 
Afghans and Khorassanees, which he had succeeded in raising. 
IIadji Firooz allowed him to advance as far as Shekivar, a 
village situated twenty-one miles west of Herat, where he 
attaclred his adversary, when Ixaissar was completely worsted, 
and obliged to take to flight. 111 acc,ordance with a plan 
upon previously, and of which the troops had been 
informed, the prince after his defeat directed his course south- 
ward into the plain of Bakooa, where the fugitives went to 
rejoin him ; when they a11 arrived he marched against I<andal~ar, 
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hoping to surprise Kamran Mirzn, who commanded there, and 
capture that city. In  this attempt, as it turned out, he was 
successful, but a few days after the inhabitants revolted, and drove 
him out of Kandahar. Kamran Mirza, who had retired to Kelat 
i Ghildjzye, waa recalled by them, so that these two princes 
succeeded each other three times during the space of two months, 
according tts the party which supported either had the upper hand ; 
nevertheless Kamran Mirza finished by remaining master of the 
position, and Kaiesar fled once more. 
Mallmood Mirza had been the sovereign ruler of Afghanistan 
during two years and six months, when the city of Kabul became 
the scene of sanguinary disorders, originating in a religious scllism 
between the Afghans, who are Soonees, and the I<uzzilbashes 
of the sect of Sliiahs; these riots seriously compromised the 
power of Shah Mahmood, nevertheless he surmounted the diffi- 
culty, but the support he gave to the heretical Shiahs alienst.ec1 
the Afghans from him, and contributed greatly to his fall, which 
took place some short time after. 
Thcse disorclers were occasioned by a circumstance arising out of 
the horrible inclination the Persians have for a vice which it would 
sully these pages to mention. Some of the I<uzzilbashes secreted 
for sevcral clays a young Afghan lad of great beauty in their house, 
during which timc he was treated in the most infamous manncr, 
and this not only fi-om their depraved passions, but from their 
hatred to Soonecs. Restored to liberty, the youth informcd his 
parents of what had takcn place, when they immedilttcly complained 
to Shah Mahmood ; but the king, not wishing to alienate the Kuzzil- 
bashes, whose adhesion had been, and might be again, of great 
service to him, refused to legislate upon the matter, and forwardecl 
it to the religious tribunal .from which it came. The injured 
parties, although dissatisfied in that. the Shah eluded their com- 
plaint, nevertheless conformed to his orders, and proceeded to 
the mosque to co~~su l t  the Syud Mir VaEz, a man highly venerated 
by the Afghans, and whose hostility to the Shah Mahmood was no 
secret to any one. When the complainants appeared, the Syud 
was preaching to an immense crowd of persons, and they inter- 
rupted him to make known their business with loud cries and 
rending their clothes. On learning the nature of it, Mir Vaez 
at once gave them a fetvo authorising the extermination of all the 
Shiahs in I<abul, whom he held in detestation. When it was 
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known that this fetvo had been issued, the Afghans assembled in 
arms, and in great numbers, around the mosque, and afterwards 
went,. ful l  of excitement, to exterminate the Ihzzilbashes. The 
first place to which they proceeded was the quarter of the Khaffis, 
a people originally from Khaff, massacred all those whom they met, 
and pillaged and burnt their houses. Recovered in some degree from 
the first movement of surprise which this sudden attack had caused 
them, the Kuzzilbashes assembled, fully determined to defend their 
property and their lives to the last extremity. Nevertheless, their 
situation became every moment more critical, for, after a stout de- 
fence of two days, they saw, on the morning of the third, all the 
heights that commanded their position occupied by the Afghans 
from the neighbouring villages, who had come to the assistance of 
the citizens. The Shah Mahmood had sent Mooktar ed Dooulet 
and Ahmed Khan several times to the assailants, to endeavour to 
prevail upon them to desist from their sanguinary intentions, but 
this step, instead of appeasing, only irritated them the more, 
excited as they were by the mollahs and some serdars, who were 
jealous of the favour .shown to the Ihzzilbash chiefs by the Shah. 
ARer four chys' fighting, during which four hundred persons at  
least, and on either side, had lost their lives, the Serdar Fethi 
Khan, who, by reason of the alliances which existed between his 
family and the Kuzzilbashes, had, up to this time, refrained from 
taking any part in the affair, became alarmed, and, apprehensive 
that things might take a still more serious turn, was anxious to put 
some bounds to the furious harangues of Mir VaBz, who spared not 
even royalty itself. Fethi Khan therefore stepped forward, and, 
with his brother, declaring in favour of the Kuzzilbashes, rushed a t  
the head of their partisans upon the disturbers of public order, and 
dispersed them with matchlock and sabre, to the great regret 
of the serdars opposed to Mahmood, who were also envious of the 
favour in which he was held by his sovereign. From this moment 
they conspired against them, and swore to overthrow them both. 
An occasion for doing this did not present itself for two years, when 
Fethi Khan was obliged to march with an army to Bamian to put 
down some disorders amongst the I-Iazarahs. Immediately after 
his departure, Mir VaEz, the Serdar Ahmed Khan, and Moolctar ed 
Dooulet, the principd chiefs of the conspiracy, sent an express t a  
the prince Shooja-od-Moolk, the younger brother of Shah M.ah- 
mood, requesting him to come immediately to Kabul, and overthrow 
the latter, promising to give him their support and that of the 
Afghans in general. This prince, who had received information of 
this plot long before, was not very far distant fi-om Peshawur, which 
11e had secretly approached, and, on the receipt of the letter written 
him by the conspirators, advanced rapidly towards Kabul with a11 
the men he could collect. Shah Mahmood was one of the last 
persons who heard of his arrival, for no one had revealed the fact to 
him, and he only ascertained it by remarking the excitement which 
everywhere ~revailed. He was not a person who could suggest to 
himself the energetic measure5 which the esigencies of the momcnt 
required, and the man of action who had placed him on the throne, 
and through whom he governed, namely, Fethi Khan, was at  a 
distance, and wholly ignorant of what was passing at Kabul- 
a11 the warriors who had been despatched to him by Shah blah- 
mood had also been detained, and could not join him in person, 
for he was closely watched in his palace. 
Feeling the imminence of his danger, Mahmood took refuge in 
the Bala IIissar, and the inhabitants, satisfied by keeping an eye 
upon him from the outside of the citadel, went in crowds to meet 
Shooja-001-I~Ioollr, whom they brought into the city in triumph, 
and placed on the throne amidst the loudest acclamations. , 
I have, up to this point, followed the manuscripts of two Eastern . 
authors, whose works I have frequently quoted in the course of my 
narrative : that of Mirza Ali Mohamed has led me only to the 
close of, the Afghan dominion in Persia; from that period, up to the 
arrival of Shah Shooja at Kabul, I have drawn my materials from 
the writings of -4bdullah Khan IIeratce, pich-Ii7rettnet, gentleman 
of the chamber, or equerry, to the Shah ILmran of IIerat; but a 
I must add that his narrative is very summary and destitute of 
dates; and I have been obliged to make researches elsewhere to 
find those I have recorded. I have also joined to the information 
taken from his manuscript many othcr particulars which 1 collected 
myself during my travels in Afghanistan, from the mouths of con- 
temporaries of Shah Timoor and of his sons, who themselves took 
part in the evcnk of those times. The reign of Shah Shooja-ool- 
&'Ioollc is the one upon which I am not so well informed, and, 
having no European library to refer to, it will be impossible for me 
to fill up the very important omissions which, without doubt, exist 
in the history of this reign. 
The first act  of Shall Shooja, as king, mas to seize Shah 
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Mahmood, delivered up to him by his own guards, and to 
order the lex taliouis to be enforced by putting out his eyes, as 
Jfahmood had done those of the Shah Zenlan; Mooktar ed 
Dooulet having interceded for him, Shooja revoked this order out 
of consideratio~l to his supporter; but he detained the ex-king a 
prisoner, and confined him in a dungeon of the Bala Hissar. 
After having taken this precautionary measure, the king confided 
a division of his army to his nephew Raissar Mirza, the son of 
Shah Zeman, in order that he might turn Kamran Mirza, a son of 
Mahmood Shah, out of Icandahar, where he commanded; but, 
meeting half-way Alem Khan, nephem of the Serdar Ahmed Khan, 
he learnt, greatly to his satisfaction we may presume, that this had 
already been done. The inhabitants had risen a t  the instigation 
of Alem Khan, and driven Kamran from the city ; no opposition, 
therefore, was offered to the prince on entering I h d a h a r ,  of 
which, in virtue of new orders from his uncle, he became govelllor. 
On leaving the city, Ramran Mirza took the road towards Herat, 
where his uncle Hadji Firooz Ecldin gave him a kind reception, and 
confided to him the government of the district of Furrah, adjacent to 
ICanclahar, where he was in a position to observe the events that 
were passing in that city, and to lay hands upon it by surprise, or 
otherwise, as occasion might present itself. 
Some time after EIaclji Firooz Eddin, influenced by his mother, 
who was also the mother of Shah Mahmood, consented. to march an 
army against ICabul, and make an attempt to release his brother ; he 
gave the command of these troops to his son Malek ICassem Mirza 
and his nephcw Kamran Wirza. The prince ICaissar, tardily in- 
formed of their march, came out nevertheless from Kandsthar and 
attacked the EIeratees near Iialeh d'Azim Khan, but he was beaten . 
and forced to fly once more, leaving the victol~smasters of Icandahar. 
H d j i  Firooz Eddin had scarcely obtained this success when hc 
learnt that Mohamed Velee Mirza, Governor-General of Khorassan, 
had marched an army commanded by the Nziib Mohamed Khan 
ICacljar to take Herat. Ele therefore recalled his nephew a i d  his 
son, who abandoned in their turn Kandahar to ICaissar Mirza. 
While awaiting their arrival, Hadji Firooz Eddin assembled in 
haste a few thousand horse of the Eimak tribes, and moved out 
of Herat to meet the Persians; the encounter took place near 
Chekivan, but he was beaten and obliged to make a speedy retreat ' 
into I-Ierat, which w3s soon besieged by the victors. The Persians 
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had good artillery, and their troop; had received for some time past 
a certain amount of instruction and organization on the European 
system ; they might therefore hope to make themselves masters of 
the place in a short space of time. But this hope was not realized, 
owing to their want of vigilance, for the Afghan princes, returning 
from Kandahar, fell upon their rear, which they put to the rout, 
while Hadji Firooz sallied from the city and attacked them in ' 
front, so that, taken between two fires, they must have thought them- - 
selves fortunate in being able to effect their retreat with the loss 
of a few hundred men killed and three or four guns taken. They 
repaid themselves however for this check by ravaging the country 
through which they retreated, and bringing with them to Meshed 
more than one hundred thousand cattle. 
This was the first time after the death of Nadir Shah that the 
Persians put forward their claims to Herat ; since then they have 
made very many attempts to take it, without more success than in 
this instance : nevertheless they have exercised from this period a 
certain influence upon its governor, who, for the sake of being a t  
peace ~ 5 t h  them, acknowledged, although evasively, the suzerainty 
of the Shah of Persia after this attack ; and agreed to pay a tribute, 
, 
the terms of which were left altogether undetermined: neither the 
amount nor the time it was to be paid was stated ; it was much or 
little according to circumstances and the means which the Persians 
might have of enforcing pzyment. Shah Shooja had enough trouble 
to consolidate his power in Kabul, for a thousand factions were in 
a state of agitation around him ; he punished some and compro- 
mised matters with others, and had at  length succeeded in establish- 
ing some order. The Serdar Fethi Khan, after his return from 
&mian, attached himself to his party and became one of his minis- 
ters ; it was this chief who advised him to give up his life of repose 
and make war, which alone could conciliate and obtain for hini the 
respect of the Afghans. As the Shah had a predilection for a 
military life, this advice was adopted, the invasion of Scinde re- 
solved upon, and, after having asembled an army of 30,000 men, 
the king marched on that country. The chicf of the Talpooras 
endeavoured to avoid the storm, and sent his minister W d e e  
Mohamed Khan to the Shah, offering to pay him 320,0002. which 
he was indebted to him for arrears of tribute ; but the Serdar Fethi 
K l ~ q  who saw the king was inclined to accept this offer, opposed it 
in every way that he coulcl. His advice wodd most probably have 
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been listened to if disastrous intelligence had not been received from 
Kabul: the northern tribes were in a state of agitation, and the 
capital itself was not tranquil ; which reasons induced the Shah 
to terminate his misunderstanding with the Emirs of Scinde and 
accept the 320,0001., which having done he returned in great haste 
to Kabul. Having restored tranquillity there, he made an expe- 
dition eastward, with a view of retaking possession of Cashmeer, and 
reducing the Serdar Runjeet Sing, Governor of Lahore, to obedience ; 
but he failed in this enterprise also, and returned to Kabul, having 
suffered considerable losses. 
Though Shah Shooja's reign was so short, it was nevertheless one 
of those which had the chance of being prosperous. The 
Afghans seemed t,ired of the demon of discord, but unfortunately 
there was nothing of a conciliatory character about the Shah; be 
alienated those whom he had the greatest interest in attaching to 
his cause, and an unforeseen occurrence, by which he ought to have 
obtained strength, served only to excite in him the love of absolute 
authority, and in the end turned to his prejudice. 
The British government, after having subdued in succession all 
the sovereigns of India one after the other, saw itself menaced in 
the middle of its triumphs by a danger against which it sought 
to protect itself by all the means in its power. The Emperors 
Napoleon and Alexander had just agreed to undertake an hostile ex- 
pedition against India, passing through Persia. Feth Ali Shah, who 
then reigned in the latter count.ry, was not SO stanch an ally that 
England could trust him ; she thought therefore of establishing 
her first line of defence beyond the Persian frontier, and sought the 
friendship of the Afghans to form her advanced guard. With this 
policy in view, the Governor-General of India sent Mr. Elphinstone 
as ambassador to Kabul, where he made a treaty of alliance offen- 
sive and dcfensive with Shah Shooja-001-Moolk; the ambassador 
was exceedingly well received, and each day the Shah gave him a 
fresh entertainment in the royal palace. The  siege of Herat, which 
Mohamed Velee Mirza had just undertaken, and t l ~ e  result of 
which had been so unfortunate, was the counterpart to this embassy. 
I t  is well known how the rupture which took place between France 
and Russia; and the ascendancy obtained by England a t  the court 
of Teheran by scattering her gold on all sides, led to the failure of 
Napoleon's plans, which might otherwise have been completely 
successful, and overthrown the then political state of India. 
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Shah Shooja-001-i?lIoollr had the repubtion, and with reason, 
of being the most talented of the sons of Timoor Shah. With 
great firmness of character and tried conrage, it was plainly to be 
seen by more than one circumstance that he was not a man to 
support, intrigues, or serve as an instrument to a pal'ty. I t  was, 
therefore, a little against the grain that the serdars had submitted 
to the coercicrn of Mir Vaez, Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar-ed- 
Dooulet, the result of which was the elevation of Shah Shooja to the 
throne ; for they clearly saw that under such a sovereign they must 
take a straight course and obey witho~~t  making those representa- 
tions which the Afghans love so much to present to their superiors., 
Pressed by circumstances, they could not do otherwise than accept 
the candidate for the throne without conditions, for his usurpation 
was the only means by which they could withdraw themselves 
from the vengeance of Shah Mahmood, and that of the Serdar 
Fethi Khan, in the eyes of whom they had become ostensibly 
compromised since the unfortunate day when the Soonees and 
Slliahs had massacred one another in the city of Kabul. Never- 
theless, they still hoped that .in accepting Shah Shooja as king he 
would keep his authority within just limits; but they were mistaken, 
for the Shah, who at once penetrated their intentions, cut short. 
' 
all their demands from the very clay he ascended the throne, - 
by an act of sovereign power of the most absolute character. This 
tyrannical' feeling soon Became habitual to him, .and it increased 
by degrees with all those who displeased him, however powerful or 
influential they might be. The Mohamedzyes themselves were 
deprivecl of their appointments, and their chief, Fethi Khan, dis- 
graced by the king. The  serdars, who vegetated in obscurity and 
were the least to be feared, were taken from their retreats and 
placed in positions of importance-in a word, Shooja shook himself 
free from the yoke, and transformed everything, and he never after- 
w a d s  gave any proofs of that independent spirit which had led . 
others to have such an high opinion of him when he was only a 
prince of the blood. But it must be admitted, and tb his praise, 
that he was always grateful to those who had raised him to power : 
Mir Vdz ,  Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, were much 
more his friends than his dependents ; but this friendship could not 
preserve them from the sac1 fate that awaited them ; and they fell all 
three from the elevated rank in which fortune had placed them by 
the revolutiolls which the Barultzyes and their numerous adherents 
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stirred up amongst the Afghans. Mooktar.ed-Dooulet, obliged to 
give up the post of vizier in favour of the Serdar Akrem Khan, 
was in prison, and it was without doubt from the day that he retired 
from affairs that the decadence in the reign of Shah Shooja may be 
dated. The Serdar Ahmed Khan, less unfortunate than Mooktar, 
died sword in hand, while putting down a revolt in which the 
most faithful of the Shah's friends lost their lives. The sons of 
these two chiefs, who exercised so great an  influence over the 
Afghans, took from that time part in the revolt, and from this 
moment the reign of Shah Shooja-001-Moolk was nothing more than 
a succession of dangers, sufferings,-and bitter anxiety. If he had 
been content to remove with some show of reason those who impeded 
the march of government by their intrigues, or if, while repressing 
them with more severity, he had acted with jmtice on the flagrant 
proofs of their crimes, the restless disposition of the Afghans would 
not have been alarmed, and he might have aspired to a reign not 
less glorious than that of his grandfather Ahmed Shah, with whom 
he had more than one point of reeemblance. But he was capricious 
and singular like his brother Zeman, whose cruelty was necessary 
to consolidate the power in his own hands. 
Discontent soon became general amougst all classes of Shah 
Shooja's subjects, even amongst his most devoted adherents, who 
also m~umured loudly ; but without talting into consideration their 
irritation and remonstrances, he continued to give vent to his 
haughty and absolute disposition. T h e  Afghans, who saw.in him 
the most talented of the Suddozyes, resisted for a long time the 
wislles of their eerdars, who, habituated to raise and depose their 
kings, were anxious to be rid of him ; and the want of agreement 
on the choice of a successor which they must give the nation 
was the l;?a.on why they delayed his fall indefinitely. There is 
even some probability that this prince would have been able to 
maintain his hold upon the throne if the Serdar Fethi Khan had 
not been amongst the numbel. of his adversaries ; Shooja imagined 
he could despise him, and, instead of conciliating him, which would 
have been the wisest course, he did everything to increase his dis- 
satisfaction. This false policy cost. him dear. 
After his disgrace Fethi Khan, disliking Kabul as a residence, 
proceeded to Randaha~,  his 'native city, and in the environs of 
which the greater part of the tribe of the Barukzyes ~esided. When 
he arrived I L i s s x  Mirza was governor, and he ~romised that he 
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should be respected and protected by him as long as  he did not 
interfere in the affairs of government. Fethi Khan was not then in 
a position to make conditions, and mas obliged to accept those which 
were offered him; but he prepred everything in secret for the 
restoration of Shah Mahmood. Whether Kaisar  was informed of 
this, or whether he thought the step necessary to his uncle's safety, 
he ordered the serdar to be seized on his leaving an audience which 
had been accorded him; and the officers who were commis- 
sioned to arrest him precipitated themselves upon him with such 
violence that he fell with his face to the ground, and knocked out 
several of his teeth. Profiting by this circumstance, they gagged 
him to stop his cries, bound his feet and his hands, and made him 
a close prisoner; his young brother, Dust Mohamed Khan, who 
was near him, assisted by a few servants, attempted his rescue, but, 
overpowered by numbers, he was obliged to tihe to flight to escape 
the same treatment. He  succeeded, however, in collecting a few 
hundred Barukzyes in the city, and with these attacked the citadel, 
but, received by a volley from the garrison, he was obliged to retire, 
and, hastily leaving' the town, retreated to the fortress of Girishk, , 
the governor of which was devoted to his family. After this he 
scoured the plain of Bakooa with the Barukzyes who had followed 
him, plundered the caravans, and soon found himself in possession' 
of 6!)01., which he spent in obtaiiling recruits and adherents to his 
cause. 
The Serdar Fethi Khan had previously to his arrest despatched 
his brother Shere dil Khan to Ihbul ,  with the view of facilitating 
the escape of Shah Mahmood from prison, and recommended him, 
above all things, not to permit my Afghan to take part in this 
enterprise, but to employ Kuzzilbashes exclusively. This Persian 
tribe, a s  we have already stated, consisted of 12,000 families when 
they were brought to Kabul by Nadir Shah, but subsequently to the 
death of that conqueror their numbers had considerably augmented. 
Up to the reign of Shah Mahmood the Afghans treated them 
upon a footing of equality, but after the sanguinary conflict 
which arose between them on the occasion of the horrible crime 
committed by these Persian colonists they were oppressed in every 
kind of way, though Fethi Khan llad always remained on good 
terms with them, which led them very naturally to assist him in 
delivering Shah Mahmood. The undertaking was a difficult one, 
for Shah Shooja, kept him closely guarded ; but whatever night have 
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been the vigilance of his gaolers, the I<uzzilbashes finished by 
evading it. Tools were sccretly conveyed .to the prisoner, al:J 
such was the energy with which he used them, that in eight hours 
he had dug down to the conduit by which he was to escape beyoncl 
' the city wdls. I t  was night when he gained the outside, and the 
Kuzdbashes, who were on the watch, conducted him to a tomb 
in a churchyard situated near the walls of the Bala Hiaar,  
Lnd, having covered the place of his retreat with branches and 
earth, they retired, rccornmending him to have patience for a few 
days until the pursuit which it was certain would take place began 
to slacken. The next morning s hundred emissaries were dc- 
spatched 011 every side, with orders to put him to death directly 
he fell into'their hands, but the majority of then1 soon returned to 
inform the Shah that their endeavours to find hiin had been 
unavailing. After having passed several days in this subterranean 
abode, i\lahmood learnt that his brother had made useless search for 
him : he therefore left his retreat in the middle of the night, and, 
accompanied by Shere dil Khan and a few devoted adherents, 
galloped southward, when they were soon joined by Dost 
Mohamed Khan, in whose company they plundered three rich 
caravans With the proceeds of these robberies they were enabled 
to raise a small force, after which they acted upon a larger scale ; 
the villages were in their turn put under contribution, and they 
then laid siege to ICandahar. 
During three months Kaissar niirza repulsed all the attacks of the 
besiegers, but after this, being without either provisions or nmnitions 
of war, he came to a compromise with them, setting the Serdar 
Fethi Khan a t  liberty, on condition that they raised the siege and 
retired from Randahar. When the serdar was released, hIahmod 
Shah was strongly inclined to break his promise, and constrain his 
nephew to give up the city, but Fethi Khan prevented him; he 
represented to him that the, throne was at Kabul, and not a t  
Icandahar, and this determined Mahmood to march on the capital ; 
they left, nevertheless, two thousand Barulczye horse encamped - 
within a short distance from the former city. 
When Shah Shooja heard that ICandahar was besieged by 
Mahmood, he collected his troops and left Kabul with 25,000 
picked men to relieve it, but after s few days' march more than 
half deserted; the I<uzzilbashes especially all left his court and 
returned to Kabol, which obliged the Shah to fall back on his 
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capital, but he had scarcely arrived there when a revolt forced , 
him to evacuate it, and he retired and took up a position in a vast 
plain swrounding the gardens of Neemla, near Gundamuck. Shah 
Mahmoocl and Fethi Khan, who followed him close, remained in 
. 
Kabul only long enough to take possession of i t  ; they then confided 
i t  to the care of the KuzzillDashes, and hastened against Sliah 
Shooja, whose army was advantageomly posted and numbered 
20,000 combatants. Though mustering only 3000 horse, Fethi 
Khan charged them with irnpctuosity at  a moment when they 
least expected it, and before they had even t'inie to form up in 
order of battle : the result was a complete rout, for it threw 
' the mass into utter confusion; fear took possession of them, and 
they fled fiom the field. Akrem Khan, the vizier of Shah Shooja, 
was killed, and the king escaped to the mountains of the Iihyber, 
abandoning on the field of battle all his baggage and tlie royal 
treasure, which, independent of a sum of 2,000,0001., contained 
precious stones of immense value. Shah Mahmoocl secured an 
enormous booty, and entered Kabul amidst the acclamations of 
the  inconstant people of that city, mounted on an elephant which 
Shah Shooja had orderecl to be richly caparisoned for his own 
triumphant entry into the capital. 
Shah Shooja, remained only a short time in the Khyber, and 
retired soon after towards the south, where he hoped, by joining 
his nephew, Kaissar Mirza, to take the off'ensive and regain his 
crown. Directing his course towards Kandahar by the mountains 
bordering the I n c h ,  he obtained some recruits on the road ; but in 
spite of the secrecy with which he endeavoured to conduct his march, 
it became known, and, to add to his disgrace, his nephew was. 
driven from Kandahar by the Serdar Poor clil Khan, a brother 
of Fethi Khan. BRer this Poor dil Khan attacl~ccl Shooja 
with superior forces, who was fortunate in being able to eswpe 
, 
by a rapid flight ; this was in 1509, four months having elapsed . 
between his first and second defeat. Powerless rather than dis- 
couraged, he retired shortly after to Loodiana, where he resided 
near his brother the Shah Zeman, living from that time, like that 
prince, on the bounty of the East Iudia Company, but not before 
he had gone through miny severe trials. 
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SIR ALEXANDER BURNES, an enlightened and conscientious traveller 
in Afghanistan, gives a sketch of the life which Shah Shooja led 
after the battle of Neemla. This narrative was taken from a 
little work written by Shah Shooja himself; I made every endea- 
vour when in Afghanistan and Persia to procure this book, but 
without result-as it is highly interesting, I present it here from 
the pages of Burnes. 
After Shah Shooja-001-Moolk had been defeated a t  geemla he 
had wandered as a fugitive in various corners of his domitions; 
and his adventures, which have been detailed by himself in a 
small volume, are replete with interest. After his discomfiture a t  
Kandahar he was seized by Ata Mohamed Khan, the son of 
his formcr vizier, and subjected to much indignity. He  wxi  for 
I 
I some time confined in the fortress of Attok. The lancet was fie- quently held over his eyes ; and his keeper once took him into the 
middle of the Indus, with his arms bound, threatening him with 
instant death. The object of such severity was to extract from 
him the celebrated diamond called Koh-i-Noor, or mountain of 
light, which he was ltnown to possess. I n  the mean while Ata  
Mohamed Khan proceeded to Cashmeer, and carried the cap- 
tive monarch in his train. 0 1 1  the fall of that valley he was 
released by Futeh Khan and joined his family at  Lahore. His  
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queen, as I may well call the WaRadu 13egum, the most influen- 
tial lady of his harem, hail used every ~ersuasion to prevent 
Shooja's placing himself in the power of Runjeet Sing, but he dis- 
regarded her advice, and in the end had ample reason to regret 
his having neglected it. This lady was a woman of most bold and 
determined character; and her counsel had often proved valuable 
to her husband, both in his da):s of power and disaster. 
A t  Lahore, while a t  the nlcrcy of the Silths, and absent frok 
her husband, she preserved her own and his honour in a most 
heroic manner. Runjeet Sing pressed her urgently to surrender 
the Koh-i-Noor, or valuable diamond which was in her possession ; 
and evinced intentions of forcing it from her. H e  also sought to * 
transfer the daughters of the unfortunate king to his own harem. 
The queen seized on the person who conveyed the message, and 
had hiin soundly chastised. She also intiniated to the Naharadja, 
that, if he continued his dishonourable demands, she would pound 
the diamond in a mortiw, and first administer it to her daughters, 
and those under her protection, and then swallow it herself : add- 
ing, ' May the blood of all of us be on your head ! ' This lady 
succeeded in the end in escaping from Lahore disguised as a 
Hindoo ; and planned the deliverance of her husband, which shortly 
followed. This was only effected at the expense of' the great 
diamond. A narration of the circumstances relative to its sur- 
render would prove interesting, but it would be out of place in 
this sketch. I t  is sufficient to mention that an imprisonment of 
the closest nature, insult, and even hunger, fell to the lot of this 
ur~fortunate monarch. 
" The ungenerous part which the king of the Silths was ellacting 
towards her husband aroused the energies of the queen, who had 
settled herself a t  the British station of Loodiana She arranged 
the placing of liorses on the road, and Shooja and his people 
made every exertion in Lahore. They hired all the houses which 
adjoined those in which they lodged, and opened a pasage into 
the street by c u t h g  through seven walls. A few hours after 
the household had retired to rest, the Iring descended by the aper- 
ture and issued into the street in the dress of the Punjab. T h e  
city wall had yet to be passed, and the gates were shut. Shooja 
crept through the common sewer of the city, and fled with two 
or three servants towards the hill country of Kishtwar. Here he 
once more raised the standard of a monarch, and planned an 
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attack on Cashrneer, in which he was assisted by the Xajah of 
Kishtwar. The expedition would have been successful, for the 
Governor of Cashmeer had evacuated his frontier position, but an 
untimely season bloclted the roads with snow, interrupted the 
supplies, and once more frustrated the hopes of Shah Shooja. 
Wandering by a cheerless and ungenial country, the Shah a t  
length reached the British station of Sabathoo in the outer Hima- 
laya, from which he repaired to Loodiana, where his family had 
found an asylum. He  here joined them, and has since shared the 
bounty of the British Government. Few monarchs and few men 
have been subjected to greater reverses of fortune than Shooja-001- 
Moolk ; and we find our sympathies enlisted in his cause by,& 
Irnowledge of his misfortunes." 
Shah Mahmood had now for the second time reaped the h i t s  
of the clever combinations of Fethi Khan, whose military talents 
were completely developed. I t  was much more in answer to 
his appeal that the Afglians, particularly the powerful tribe of the 
Barukzyes, had responded, than from any wish which they had 
to see Shah Mahmood again upon the throne. This prince, 
although tried by many vicissitudes, had learnt nothing by adver- 
sity; he wished for power bith reference only to the sweets of 
life and the pleasures which i t  procured, leaving to others the cares 
of government. I t  was on the Serdar Fethi Khan that he heaped 
these, either because he was convinced that it was impossible for 
him to reign without the co-operation of that chief, ur from a feel- 
ing of gratitude, or, more likely still, because he was convinced of 
his great capacity ; he made him his prime minister, gave him 
the most extensive powers, and laid upun him the difficult task of 
governing the Afghan nation. From this time he gave himself 
up .to, and gratified, his depraved inclinations ; , efl'erninate and 
I self-indulgent, he thought of nothing but his pleasures and orgies of every kind and description, living in utter ignorance ( of all that was passing around him. Fethi Khan did not abuse this unlimited confidence, and soon restored to his country the. 
splendour and glory of the days of the great Shah Ahmed, which 
had totally disappeared since the pacific reign of his son Timoor. 
The  name of Fetlii Khan soon became celebrated and popular 
througl~out Central Asia ; the Afghans more especially held him 
in the greatest admiration, and had, on the contrary, t,he greatest . 
contempt for their Iring. Nevertheless such was at  this epoch - 
L 
the veneration they had for the Suddozycs, that they never 
thought of dethroning him in fhvour of his fortunate and able ' 
general. I t  is true many persons have given Fethi Khan credit 
for the most ambitious views, but on a close examination of the 
facts one remains convinced that this chief was sincere when 
he protested his devotion to the Shah, and was contented with the 
high position to which his sovereign had raised him. What indeed 
could he gain by becoming king ? only another title, which would 
haye caused him immense embarrassment, and a host of enemies, 
without giving him more power. All the affairs of the kingdom 
were submitted to his discretion ; he made his brothers in succession 
governors of all the provinces; he had the administration of the 
finances and the army ; his orders were not subject to the least 
control. What  could he desire more ? Nothing ! and Shah 
Mahmoocl considered himself extremely fortunate in having as 
his minister a man who fulfillecl his responsible and arduous 
duties so well. But those who envied the minister did not find 
him to their liking, and were constantly seeking for an opportunity 
of inspiring the weak monarch with chimerical fears ; amongst 
these was his son Iiamran, but his intrigues had no other result in 
the first instance than to cause his own removal from office, and 
under the following circumstances. 
Kamran Mirza, after having rejoined his father under the 
walls of Kandahar, returned with him to Ihbul .  This prince, 
although still young, had already become remarkable for his 
haughty exterior, cruelties without number, and a great inclination 
for debauch, and he mas on the point of proceeding to Kandahar as 
governor of that province when. he made himself conspicuous by 
. 
circu~nstances of a most odious character. His cousin Kaisear 
Mirza, son of Shah Zeman, had not followed the example of Shah 
Shooja, as after having been removed from 'his government, of 
which Kamran was going to take possession, he made his sub- 
mission to his uncle Shah Mahmood, and remained from that tjnle 
a t  Kabul ~~ncler  the special protection of the Serdar Fethi Khan. 
I<amran Mirza, who still entertained great resentment against the 
.prince for all the disappointments he had made him feel on various , 
' occasions a t  Kandahar, ordered him to be seized one morning, and 
put to the torture, with a view of forcing him to give up some 
diamonds which he had forgotten to take with him in one of his 
hurried flights from that city, and which he pretended had fallen 
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into his cousixl's possession. Shah Mahmood, having been informed 
of this circumstance, immediately interfered, and made him release 
his nephew, but a few days after, Kamran, meeting Kaissar 
Mirza in one of the royal gardens, apostrophized the latter in most 
opprobrious terms. Kaissar had the imprudence to reply, when 
Kamran felled him to the earth with a wrestler's club which he 
took from the hands of a person in his suite. Fethi Iihan seized 
this opportunity of representing to Shah Mahmood how his son 
with such a disposition might compromise himself with a nation so 
susceptible as the Afghans, and it was determined between the king 
and his minister that no appointment should be given to I<amran 
Mirza, and that he should for the future remain at court under the 
surveillance of his father. From this moment the hatred of the 
prince was redoubled against the vizier, and he was ever after 
mixed up in all the intrigues and conspiracies that were' formed 
against him. 
The first object of Fethi Khan, after the restoration of Shah 
Mahmood to power, was to make the Emirs of Scinde and Belooch- 
istan return to their duty ; he then reduced to obedience the 
greater part of the tribe of the Hazarahs, settled in the heart of 
the mountains of the Pasopamisus. He  also restored order in all 
the provinces; made the laws, the observance of which had been 
' very much relaxed, to be respected; regulated the adminis- 
tration, which, up to that period, had been in a most intricate 
state, giving rise to the most nefarious exactions and embezzle- 
ments of the most scandalous kind ; and lastly it might be said 
that security reigned everywhere. This remarkable man. united to 
a superior genius a great aptitude for governing and for war: 
not one of his predecessors had been able to reduce rebels 
to obedience with the same promptitude, or keep them after- 
wards in the path of duty; he struck hard, but he was generous 
after the victory was gained, and shone by his excessive libe- 
rality : always in the midst of combats, he still found time 
to direct the helm of sta;te, and was ready for everything,- 
in activity he had no equal. H e  was the eldest of twenty-one 
brothers, all men of mark, who powerfully assisted him by their 
support; he placed them, as we have already said, at  the head 
of the provincial governments, putting much more faith in 
them than in the princes of the blood or ambitious serdars, 
who, jealous of his fame, were occupied only in creating embar- 
L 2 
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rassments for him, or in endeavouring to injure him in the 
opinion of his sovereign. Hadji Firooz Eddin was the only prince 
whom he allowed to remain unclisturbecl in his government of 
I Ierat ;  and this, simply because the troops were occupied else- 
where ; his fall was therefore delayed. H e  intrusted the govern- 
ment of Beloochistau to his brother Rahim dil Khan, who re- 
sided a t  Shikapoor. Poor dil Khan was installed a t  Kandahar ; 
Sultan Mohamed Khan a t  Peshawur ; Shere dil Khan at. Glluznee ; 
Kohendil Khan a t  Bamian; and the others under their orders 
in districts of these provinces; he nevertheless ret,ained some of 
them near his person. Amongst these were Moharned Azim 
Khan, Djabber Khan, Nawab Assad Ullah Khan, who were men 
of capacity, and assisted him in the administration of affairs. 
His  young brother, Dost Mollarned Khan, had the entire charge 
and manqement of his household, which did not prevent hiin from 
mounting his horse and fighting like his other brothers. 
After having completed the preparations for war, in which he 
had been engaged during two years, Fethi Khan marched in 
1811 against Cashmeer, which had thrown off the Afghan clomi- 
nion, and was then held by the Serdar Attah Mohamed Khan, a 
son of the vizier Akrem Khan, killed a t  the battle of Neemla. H e  
would also have willingly marched against Runjeet Sing, governor 
of Lahore, who, after the fall of Shah Zeman, had proclaimed his 
independence in the Punjab, but it would have been undertaking too 
much a t  a time ; moreover the vizier preferred making use of him in 
his plans for the reconstruction of the empire, and falling upon 
him afterwards when he had no further necessity for his services. 
EIe therefore induced him to sign a treaty, in which he gave him 
nine lacs of rupees (90,0001.), to be taken from the revenues of 
the p-o&ce of Casllmeer, on condition that the Sikh a m y  should 
assist him in reconquering that country : this treaty was con- 
cluded on the banks of the Jelum, where the two chiefs met, 
attended with a su.fficient escort. The Afghan minister had I 
with him eighteen of his brothers, who advised him to put an end 
to the Sikh chieftain a t  this meeting, offering themselves to 
be the assassins. Fethi Khan rejected this proposition, but 
much less because he would not be guilty of a base action, 
a thing which Asiatics never loolr upon in the light that we do, 
than because he required the support of the Sikh army, twelve 
thousarld men of which formed a junction with his immediately 
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after the treaty was signed. On receiving this augme~ltstion of 
his forces, he proceeded towards Cashmeer, by may of Bember. 
The little army of the rebels had posted themselves in the defiles of 
the Pir-pindjal to dispute his passage, but, seeing themselves me- 
naced in front by Fethi Khan, and in fhe rear by his brother 
Kohendil Khan, who had turned their position with a corps of 
cavalry, they retired without fighting. The Afghans had, there- 
- fore, no one to disturb them in their advance, and they took pos- 
session of the plain of Cashmeer without opposition. The city also 
had scarcely been invested when it surrendered at discretion, and 
. 
the citadel alone, to which the Serdar Attah Mohamed Khan had 
retired, continued to offer any further resistance ; nevertheless, after 
thirteen days of negotiation, that chief, rather than be besieged, 
capitulated. H e  was a inan of great talent, energetic, brave, 
influential, and respected by the Afghans. Fethi Khan wished to 
make a friend of him ; he treated him, therefore, with great dis- 
tinction, and recommended hi111 to the good offices of Shah Mah- 
mood. Runjeet Sing tried, but without success, to induce Fethi 
Khan to confer npon him the government of Cashmeer ; but the 
vizier, who saw the drift of his proposal, namely, to reimburse 
himself in the first instance the expenses of the war, and after- 
wards to ensure to himself the payment of the sum guaranteed , 
by the treaty, eluded his request, and confided the administration 
of this fair province to his brother, the Serdar Mohained Azim 
Khan, who, after him, was the eldest son of Payendeh Khan- 
Runjeet was therefore minus his expenses, and did not even 
receive the nine lacs of rupees which had been promised him. 
Frustrated in hi ambitious design, he turned his attention to 
Attok, a fortress situated on an eminence close to the Indus, 
commanding the principal passage of that river; and the go- 
vernor, who was a brother of the Serdar Attah Khan, having sur- 
ren.dered this important place to him, in consicleration of rt lac 
- of rupees, and certain promises which satisfied his ambition, the 
Sikhs, on entering Attolr, openly abandoned the Afghan party, and 
hstened to put the place in a good state of defence. 
\Vhen Fethi J.<han was informed of the desertion of his allies, 
he quitted Cashmeer to march against Runjeet ; sending for- 
bvarii his brother Dost Mohamed Khan, a t  the head of two 
thousand horse, to clear the way, and followed close with all his 
forces. On the approach of the advanced guard of the Afghan 
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the Sikhs descended into the plain of Tchatch, which lies to the 
east of Attok, and toolr up a position about three miles and a half 
from the fortress, on some hills where they had not only the 
advantage in the ground, but also that of securing the only 
spring of water in the country. Dost Mohamed Khan, who, 
for a reason so important, felt the necessity of seizing this point, 
and desirous of distinguishing himself in the first command 
with which his brother had intrusted him, fell with impetuosity - 
upon the S i k h  without waiting for the arrival of the Afghan army, 
which followed him a league in the rear. In  this charge he 
captured the enemy's astillery ; but his silccess did not last 
long ; the Sikhs rallied, and, after having received reinforcements, 
renewed the attack with a force eight times. superior to his. 
Finding that he had committed himself, he sent an express to 
Fethi l a a n  to hasten his marcb, and while awaiting his reply 
valiantly resisted the enemy, and would neither retire himself, nor 
c x d d  the Sikhs force him to do so. Unfortunately the Dost's mes- 
sage never reached Fethi Khan, the messenger taking a wrong di- 
rection and losing his way. The vizier was also led iuto error by 
persons ill-informecl of what had transpired, who assured him that 
his brother had been killed and his division nearly destroyed, and he 
made therefore an e'chelon movement towards t,he Indus in order 
to avoid the Sikhs, ordered the heavy baggage to be burnt, and 
crossed the river without being disturbed by the enemy. Though 
tardily made acquainted with the movements of the Afghan army, 
Dost Mohsmed hesitated not to retreat by the road it had taken, 
the Sikhs retiring to Attolr. Fethi Khan, under the pressure of 
threatening circumstances which arose in the west of Afghanistan, 
was obliged to give up for the time his belligerent policy against 
Rur~jeet Sing ; indeed he was compelled to weaken the garrison of 
Cashmeer to reinforce his army. This encouraged the Sikh chief- 
tain to make several inroads on the territory of that province, the 
revenues of which he seized, an act the Afghan governor could not 
prevent. 
Before entering upon the details of the new campaign which the 
Serdar Fethi Khan had to sustain against the Persians, it is neces- 
sary, in order that the reader may comprehend the motives which 
led to the war, that we should look back a little ,a t  the events 
recorded in the preceding pages. 
I t  has been mentioned that the prince Hadji Firooz Eddin, 
T"C---' 
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removed with violence from Turchiz by the orders 
Khan, had in the year 1800 been elected, in  spite of himself, 
sovereign Prince of Herat. The just and mild character .of his 
rule had obtained for him the love and respect of dl classes of the 
.population : ambitious individuals, who wished to overthrow him, 
were unable to find support anywhere, and during the sixteen years 
that he had governed this province he was never seriously disturbed 
except by the unfortunate expedition of Kaissar Mirza, and 
those which were almost annually sent against him by the Shah 
of Persia, Feth -4li, who laid claim to the principality as having 
once formed part of that kingdom. But up to this period Hadji 
Firooz Eddin had paralyzed his efforts, sometimes by repelling . 
the' Persians by force of arms, but more frequently by paying a 
small tribute which was exacted from him ; nevertheless, he had 
always protested against the pretensions of the Persian monarch, 
and declared that Feth Ali Shah had no more legitimate claim 
upon Herat than he had upon the other countries which had 
emancipated themselves from the donliniou of Persia during the 
last century ; that the dynasty of the Iiadjars had, it is true, esta- 
blished itself on the ruins of a vast empire, but that these remains 
had been absorbed in the organization of several kingdoms, which 
in forming themsel~es had taken less account of territorial limits 
than of the races which inhabited them ; that none of them had the 
right to impose laws upon the others without their consent ; that the 
independence of these races, particularly that of the Afghans, had 
been made sacred by the elevation of the Suddozyes to the throne, 
the king then on the missnud being the third of that tribe ; that as  
the granclson of Shah Ahmed, founder of this dynasty, he reigned 
as the legitimate sovereign over a province the majority .of the 
inhabitants of which were Afghans ; in short, that Feth Ali Shah 
in his capacity of Shah of Persia was not more justified in  making 
, 
this claim upon Herat, than the Afghan princes would be in laying 
claim to the possession of Ispallan, Shiraz, or Rerman, for the 
simple reason that Mir Mahmood and Mir Echreff had reigned 
over those provinces. In  support of these arguments, I-Iaclji 
Firooz Eddin sent detachments of troops across the frontier to the 
assistance of some chiefs in Khorassan whom Feth Ali Shah had 
not yet been able to bring under his rule. Of this vast province 
he really possessed only Meshed ; Nishapoor, Koochm, Boojnool-cl, 
Tubbus, Toorbut, Haidarieh, and Ghain were pretty nearly incle- 
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penclent, and, ~ ~ n d e r  the anthority of the khans with whom the 
Governor of Herat had just entered into alliance, a.nd in exciting 
whom against Feth Ali Shah he hoped to give the Persian army 
enough occupation to prevent it from being sent against himself. 
H e  *a, however, mistaken, for after a vigorous efl'ort Feth Ali 
Shall finished by triumphing over their insubordination. T h e  
anger which this sovereign felt against Hadji Rrooz Eddin, who 
had povoked it, became fatal to the latter ; he soon saw Herat 
menaced by a formidable afmy, and necessity obliged him to have 
recourse to the aid of Shah Mahmood, whose assistance was almost 
as  dangerous for him as the enmity of the Shah of Persia. 
When the Persian battalions were all assembled a t  Meshed, 
Hoosein Ali Mirza, son of Feth Ali Shah, took the command. Kalech 
Khan, the celebrated Serdar of the Taymoonis, a man dreaded by 
the Heratees, also joined the Persian prince with a contingent of ex- 
cellent troops, and, if they had at  once entered upon the campaign, 
there can be no doubt that they would have talcen Herat ; but 
FIoosein Ali Mirza delayed the march of the army for a reinforce- 
ment of several guns of large calibre which he coulct have done 
. very well without. This gave the Vizier Fethi I h n  time to come 
to the relief of the place ; his troops cleared the two hundred 
leagues which separated them from Herat with a rapidity unex- 
ampled in that country, and arrived there before the Persians 
had even crossed their own frontier. 
I t  was not without good reason that Hadji Firooz waited till 
he  was in the last extremity before he claimed the assistance of his 
brother. Duriug the sixteen years that he governed Herat he 
had always been independent of him, though they were on good 
terms. I t  was only when the successes of Fethi Khan in Belooch- 
istan and Scinde made him fear that he should be removed from 
his government, that he wrote to the latter protesting the truth of 
his respect for and submission to the king; but directly the 
vizier had left those provinces to proceed to Cashmeer, he kept only 
half the promises he had made. It is true he coined money 
in the name of the Shah Mahmood, but he never paid him a far- 
thing of the tribute which had been agreed upon. 
~ e t h i  Khan, who was too much occupied in the'East to enforce 
a more complete submission, appeared for the moment to rest 
satisfied with this state of thiugs at  Herat, but Hadji Firooz 
..Eddin clearly understood that the vizier was only temporizing with 
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him, and that, as soon as he was  relieved from the embarrassments 
which had arisen with Runjeet, he would in his turn be obliged to 
conform to his brother's views. I t  was, therefore, with very great 
r e g e t  that he saw himself obliged to call thi.s general to. his 
assistance, whom he had so great an interest in seeing employed 
anywhere rather than a t  Herat ;  but there was no time to 
' 
hesitate, for the danger that menaced him left him no other alter- 
native. 
Fethi Khan arrived at Herat towards the close of 1816. I-Iadji 
Firooz received him with great honours, and made him pro- 
testations of fidelity and friendship; but his conduct betrayed 
the fears that mai led him, and contributed more than anything 
else that had occurred up to that time to deprive him of his 
government. Well convinced that if Fethi Khan entered the city 
his own power was at  an end, he permittcd him to do so with an 
escort of fifty horsemcn only ; the army was obliged to encamp 
under the walls. The vizier dissimulated his displeasure, and 
even accepted the proposition with an outward appearance of 
respect; but he rendered this of a very illusory character by 
the choice he made of tlie persons who accompanied ,him. All  
these were allied to some family or other in ~ c r a t ;  arid they soon 
b 
induced their relatives to make common cause with them ; so that 
on the fourth day after the vizier's. arrival they delivered up to him 
the gates of the city- the citadel surrendered on the following day. 
He also arrested Haclji Firooz Eddin, and sent him, but under 
honourable escort, to Kabul, to give the king an account of his long 
administration. Fethi Khan had not up to this point passed the 
limits of justice ; but whether he was animated with a certain feeling 
of resentment against t.he prince, or that his orders were exceeded, 
he was deprived of all his riches, and, as- they were concealed in his 
harem, this sacred asylum was forced, and the party deputed to 
seize them, of whom his brother Dost Mohamed was the com- 
mander, made an .indiscriminate pillage ; the princesses were 
even stripped of their clothes, and the Dost himself tore off a sash 
ornamented with precious stones which supported the trousers of 
the daughter of Shah Mahmood, the wife of his own nephew 
Malek Kassem Mirza, son of Had$ Firooz Eddin. 
Mir Efzel Khan, Isalrzye, who h d  much assisted in the elevation of 
I-Iadji Firooz Eddin to power, afterwards became his prime minister. 
H e  was the most influential person a t  Herat after the governor, 
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and strongly opposed any appeal to Fethi Khan for assistance, but 
the advice of Hadji Agay, one of his officers, had prevailed over his. 
Foreseeing that which subsequently took place, Mir Efzel Khan 
resigned' the command of the army and retired to Persia before 
the arrival of the vizier, and it was a happy thought of his, for the 
latter put out the eyes of EIadji Aga?, and Efzel Khan would have 
shared a similar fate. 
After these measures, which Fethi Khan thought necessary 
for the securhy of the lringdom, had been taken, he marched 
against. the enemy, encamped in fiont of the town of Kussan, 
about sixty miles from Herat, situated in the plain of Ki&r 
Kaleh, on the extreme frontier of Persia and Herat. The battle 
cominenced at dawn of day. The Persian prince, Hoosein Ali 
Mirza, had a splendid army under his command, which he dis- 
posed as follows :-In the first line he placed four regiments of 
regular infantry, under the orders of the Serdar Zoolfagar Khan ;* 
this general, to give confidence to his newly organised troops, who, 
appreciating only cavally, were grievously disconcerted a t  not 
being in that a m  of the service, ltilled his magnificent Arab 
horse in front of his division, and placed himself at  their head on 
foot. In  spite, however, of this proof of courage, when his corps 
was attacked by the cavalry of Shere dil Khan, brother of the vizier, 
i t  was completely routed ; they rallied, however, after a time behind 
the caravanserai and ruins on one side of the plain, and furiously 
recommenced the combat, which lasted till four o'clock in the after- 
noon, when the Persians, having 10,000 men hors de combat, began 
their retreat. A charge of cavalry rnade just at  the right moment by 
the Serdar Kohendil Khan, also a brother of the vizier, turned t,his 
retreat into a complete rout, and the Persians precipitately aban- 
doned the field. Fethi Khan immediately advanced to ascertain 
the position of things in his front, but he received a spent ball in 
his mouth, and, falling from his horse, was obliged to be carried to 
his tent. This fact having become known amongst the Afghans, 
they thought their chief was dead, and the Persians victorious ; and 
losing a t  once all the courage they had so recently displayed, 
broke as if seized with a sudden panic. T h e  first fugitives who 
arrived at  Herat spread terror through the city ; a part of the inha- 
bitants left a t  once, and the remainder prepared to receive their 
* The Sabre of A1i.-Ferrier. 
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new masters, when Fethi Khan :arrived very Zc p r o p s  to restore 
for his wound was not a serious one, and he was always 
able to direct the affairs of government. 
The Persians retreated with scarcely a halt as far as Meshed, 
and were not a little astonished to learn a few days after their 
defeat that the Afghans believed that they were the victors, in 
spite of their having lost their artillery and baggage, which were 
' 
, not, it is true, taken possession of by their adversaries until nine 
dais  after the battle. 
After this victory, which disgusted the Persians for some time 
with the idea of attempting to take Herat, Fethi Khan occupied 
himself in fixing the revenues of the province, and in recon- 
structing the dilapidated fortifications of, the city. His  just and 
enlightened administration obtained for him the esteem and affec- 
tion of t.he inhabitants. I have had opportunities of conversing 
with many Heratees who were acquainted with this remarkable 
. man, and they spoke of him with veneration. His  virtues were as 
great as his courage ; he was completely devoted to the glory and 
interests of his country; his fame was carried to the highest point . 
by his last victory ; and he was making his preparations for the 
conquest of Khorassan, when a fearful catastrophe deprived 
Afghanistan of this worthy man, and annihilated the generolls 
designs which he had conceived for her, and which would have 
made that kingdom as prosperous and powerful as it had been 
under the g r e a t ~ h m e d  Shah. 
Eamran Mirza, a monster of vice and ferocity, guiltless of ever 
having felt one noble or generous sentiment, witnessed with the 
greatest displeasure the successes of Fethi Khan, by whom he had 
been prevented from taking part in the government on account of 
the murder of Kaissar Mirza. From that day- he had thought only 
of taking vengeance upon the vizier, and sought every opportunity of 
rendering him an object of suspicion to his father, to wllom he spoke 
in depreciating terms of all his actions; he tried also in every possible 
way to excite the jealousy of the other serdars, who were already 
only too much disposed to side with him, and who always fell in with 
his views when he brought any complaints to the notice of the 
Shah ; but Mahmood, delighted to find himself powerful with so 
little trouble, and enabled to gratify his own depraved inclinations 
without being obliged to take any part in pubiic aEairs which . 
were so well conducted, refused for a long time to believe in the 
disloyal and infamous accusations brought against his minister. 
Obliged however to listen continually to a repetition of them, and 
thinking over his extraordinary success, and the influence he had 
obtained in consequence, he at  length finishecl by entertaining a 
few misgivings, but he was completely amazed when he saw 
I-Iadji Firooz Eddin arrive at  Kabul. This prince protestecl 
loudly against the manner in which he had been treated by 
the vizier, the invasion of his harem, the loss of his property, 
and spared no exaggeration to make his brother believe the 
accuracy of his statements. ICanlran i\Iirza cnme to his aid, 
and used every effort to convince the king that his royal dignity 
had been insulted in the person of his brother, thus brought 
before him loaded with chains like a vile criminal, and also in 
that of his own daughter, the wife of Malek Kassem, from 
whose person Dost Mohamed Khan had stripped the last vest- 
ment which could protcct her from his gaze and that of his 
associates. The serdars, who were ~L':L~OUS of the vizier's power, - 
supported these representations, bringing to the notice of the feeble 
monarch a host of other disgraceful actions of which they said 
Fethi Khan had been guilty. They assured the Shah that he had 
determined upon his ruin ; that the king ought to be before- 
hand with him, and put him to death ; that therc were at his 
court twenty chiefs braver and more capable than he was; until 
at  length Mahmood Shah, yielding to the lowest feelings of 
jealousy, had not the strength of mind to resist their arguments, 
and he gave a n  order that the eyes of Pethi Khan should be 
put out.. 
Kamran would not rely upon any one but himself to execute 
this diabolical sentcnce : he kept the king's instructions as secret as 
he could, and left for Herat immediatcly, towards the close of 
1817, to b e  sure of his victim. The prince had broken his parole, 
for i t  had been agreed between Mahmoocl Shah and his vizier 
that he was not to leave the court, and that fact must have been a 
warning to the latter, who was also told by his friends of the fate 
that awaitcd him; hut he would not believe in such base cruelty 
and ingratitude, and took no precautions to guard himself from 
the malice of his enemies. H e  received the son of his sovereign 
with the most profound respect and the greatest honout, and, 
instead of evincing any r n i s t r ~ ~ t ,  seemed as if he wished to induce 
him to forget the past, intreating him that he would for the future 
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go hand in hand with him in consolidating the power of 
Suddozye dynasty and raising the glory of the Afghan nation. 
The vizier had been to him every morning to receive his orders 
since the prince arrived at I-Ierat; the best intelligence seemed to 
exist between them; and Fethi Khan had already accused his 
friends of having given themselves up to chimerical fears, when, 
one day on entering.the Bagh-Shah (a royal palace outside the 
city, and the residence of the prince), he was arrested with his 
suite, which consisted only of twenty persons, and his eyes were 
immediately put out. 
The same fate was reserved for the three brothers of the 
vizier, namely, Poor dil Khan, Shere dil Khan, and Kohendil 
I<han, who, during the time that this abominable cruelty was 
being committed, were in the royal palace of the Tchahar-bagh in 
the city, quietly playing at chess. Generally speaking, they ac- 
companied their brother in his visits to the prince, but on this day, 
Poor dil Khan being indisposed, he dispensed with their attend- 
ance. When Kamran saw that the three other victims had 
not come within reach of his vengeance, he was suffocated with 
rage, and sent a detachment of soldiers to arrest them immedi- 
ately. Fortuna.tely, however, one of their servants, hearing by 
accident of the danger which threatened them, ran to the palace 
and, informed them of what had occurred, but  he had scarcely 
fulfilled this act of devotion when the satklfites of Kamran Mirzs 
filled the court of the Tchahar-bngh. Flight was .now almost 
impossible, for every mode of egress was carefully guarded, 
and the only mode of escape was to put a bold front upon the 
matter, which the three brothers did. They were accompanied 
by only two servants, one armed with a sabre, the other with a 
daggkr, and Poor dil Khan, being unwell, retired to a terrace of 
the house with them; but Shere dil' Khan, arming himself with 
the sabre, and Rohendil Khan with the dagger, rushed upon 
the soldiers wit.h such impetuosity and resolution, that the fellows, 
thinlting, in all probability, that they were supported by their 
servants, fled terrified from the hause. Taking advantage of 
this moment of panic, the two heroes promptly rejoined their 
brother, and from the terrace leaped on to that of a home 
adjoining the palace without being seen, and escaped to their 
residence with the utmost haste. After having 'armed them- 
selves to the teeth, they mounted their horses, and accompanied by 
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a few of their followers took to flight, but on arriving a t  the city 
gates they fo~md two hundred soldiers there to dispute their 
passage, and through these they had to cut their way. Shere 
dil Khan and Kohendil Khan were fortunate enough t,o do so 
without receiving a scratch, but Poor dil Khan, weakened by siclr- 
ness, had his horse killed under him, when a score of men threw 
themselves upon him, bound his hands, and carried him to Kamran 
M i a .  T h e  prince, seeing that two victims had still escaped him, 
dissimulated the regret he felt, and assured Poor dil Khan, whom 
he put in prison, that no harm would befall him, hoping that he 
would be able to make use of him a t  a future time as a means of 
securing by craft his principal adversaries. 
Eamran Mirza remained some time longer a t  Herat, endea- 
vouring by promises and presents to secure the army to his own 
interests ; but always preoccupied with the idea of completing his 
sanguinary work, and putting to death the brothers a d  adher- 
ents. of Fethi I<han, he went to ILmdahar, where'-he hoped to 
succeed in this object. 
KAMRAN'S PROJIISES. 
.. . CHAPTER YII. 
Shere dil Khan raises Kandahar - Kamran proceeds there - Poor dil ICh,zn 
escapes - Cruelties of Kamran upon Fethi Khan - Brothers of the Vizier- 
Dost 3lohamed Khan - Cause of his quarrel with Fethi Khan - He seizes Kabul 
-Flight of the Royal Family - Mahmood and Kamran meet at Ghuznee - 
Dost Mohsmed puts them to flight - Murder of Fethi Khan-The Shah and his 
son are p~wsued and arrive at Herat -Misunderstanding between the princes- 
They acknowledge the suzerainty of Penia- Quarrels between Nahmood and 
Kamran- Hadji Firooz and Kalsch Khan attack Hamran- The latter is killed 
and Hadji Firooz made prisoner -Kamran and the Persians at  variance- 
Revolt of Forrah.- Ksmrau proceeds to that place - Noustapha Khan and 
Mohamed Hoosein revolt at Herat - Cause of this - Djehanguir Z r z a  ir  
proclaimed chief, and afterwards deposed- Hadji Firooz suc&ecls him -Death 
I of Menhvali Khan- Hadji Firooz retires to Meshed - Moustapha Khan closes 
the gates of Herat against Eamran- He besieges the city, but retires on the 
approach of Shere dil Khan- The latter also retires-Cruelty of Moustapha 
Khan - Conspiracy of Syud Yir Sedik- Ramran enters Herat - Miserable end 
of Moustaphu Khan - Vengeance of Kamran - Reflections on the Afghans. 
AFTER their flight from Herat Shere dil Khan and his brother 
sought refuge in the fortified village of Nadalee, situated about 
twenty-three miles from Girishk, which belonged to Adeh, the 
mother of Fethi Khan. From thence they despatched emissaries 
in all directions to rouse the nomade tribes. A great number of 
the Barukzyes responded to their appeal, which formed the nucleus 
of a little army, and ibis was soon increased by numerous deserters 
from the royal forces, who would not serve under Kamran. 
The pi ice ,  observing that the detachments which he sent from 
the city were constantly destroyed or repulsed by the partizans of 
Fethi Khan, employed the arts of cunning to lead his brothers 
to fall into his net. H e  had dragged about with him the unfor- 
tunate minister, and endeavoured to persuade Poor dil Khan, 
whom he took from his prison, that he had put his brother's 
eyes out only to raise him to the post of vizier: a t  the same 
time he gave him a magnificent robe of honour, made him a 
serdar, promised that the firman of vizier should be sent to 
him as soon as Shere did Khan and Kohendil Khan had made 
their submission, and pressed him to write and tell them to 
come to Kandahar. Poor dil Khan appreciated this brilliant 
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promise a t  its exact value, but he appeared as if he believed the 
prince and entered into his views; he assured him of his entire 
devotion, and behaved as if he intended to keep his word, 
but two days afterwards he fled, and to their great joy reached' 
his brothers a t  Nadalee, for their measures had been almost 
paralyzed up to that moment by the fear they experienced 
that he would be treated by Kamran in the same way that he 
had dealt with their eldest brother. His presence also brought 
fresh recruits to their ranks, for the ~ f ~ h a n s -  had great confidence 
in him; they considered him as one i f  the mosttalented of the 
sons of ~ a i e n d e h  Khan, and in the differences which existed 
between themselves almost always requested him to be the 
arbitrator. 
Icamran Mirza, irritated by the flight ofPoor dil Khan, which he 
might have foreseen, revenged himself on the unfortunate. Fethi 
K l k ,  upon whom he inflicted a thousand ou t ra~es  and cruel 
tortures. Having perceived that a ray of light still remained in  
the eyes of his victim, he himself introduced a hot iron into the 
orbits in order to dry up every part. It was in this condition that 
the butcher dragged him to Ghuznee, mhere the Shah Mahmood 
awaited him, but his colwageous minister never asked for mercy, 
and, by his firm and resigned bearing, showed himself as greet in 
adversity as he had been generous in the esercise of his power. 
such cruelties pactised upon such a man merited punisIlment 
indeed, and seventeen brothers of the victim soon united to take 
their revenge. Their names were as follows :- 
The Vizier Fetlli Khan 
. . . .  ,. 
Dead. 
Mohnlned Azim Khan.. By the same mother 
Tiruoor Khan . . . . . . . .  
Poor dil Khan . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . .  
I ,  
. . . . . . . .  
Shere dil Iihnn 
Iiol~endil Xhau By the same mother 
12ahim cl i l  Khau . . . . . . . .  
Mir dil Khan . . . . . . . .  
Dost Moharned Khan . . . . . .  
Emir Mohamed Khan.. . . . .  By the same mother D&. 
Djemal Khan . . . . . . . .  I ,. 
Sultan Mohamed Khan . . . .  Living. 
Yar Mohnrnrd Khan . . . . . .  
Pi r  Nohamed Khan . . . .  Living. 
. . . . . .  Syud Mohanled K h n  
Nawab Assad Khan . . . .  
. . . .  
Dead. 
Narvsli Samut Khan 1: ) By the same mother 
Namab Djabbar Khan . . . . . .  Living. 
DjumhB Khan . . . . . . . . . .  Son of a slave .. ,, 
Moharned h i i n  Khan, who, after Fethi Khan, was the eldest 
of the sons of Payendeh Khan, governed Cashmeer. Being ill at 
the time he heard of the atrocious cruelties inflicted on his hlind 
brother, he could not then joiii his relatives, but  he raised t h e  
standard of revolt in this province against the Shiih Mahmood, 
and sent Dost Mohamed Khan before him to Kabul, in order 
that he might work upon the population to rise in favour of their 
cause. This young chief was the very man for such an under- 
taking, for, as i t  has been shown, he  had already made him- 
self remarked on se~era l  occasions for courage and military 
talents, though at  the moment his. services were required he  was 
in prison, and the following were the reasons that led to his 
captivity. 
A few days prior to his attacking the Persians a t  Kirtar Kaleh, 
Fethi Khan ordered him to give up some magnificent pearls the  
Dost had purchased, but which the vizier had already selected for 
himself, and stated thus much to the merchant who had them o n  
sale ; he also required him to restore the girdle ornamented with 
brilliants which he had taken from the daughter of Shah &h- 
mood when he broke into the harem of Ijadji Firooz Eddin. But  
Dost Molia~ned obstinately refusing to  comply with his wislies, 
it produced a rupture between them, when the latter, fearing 
the consequences of hi brother's anger, departed secretly from 
the royal camp, and went to Cashnieer ; Mohamed Aziin Khan, 
who was own brother to the vizier, took his part, and demanded 
that the brilliants and the unlucky pearls should be surrendered 
to him for the pdrl~ose of being forwarded to Fethi Khan, w l ~ o  
had foreseen that the theft would give rise to complaints and  fresh 
intrigues against his family. 
The  Dost, again refusing to restore these valuables, was detained 
a prisoner until they came to release him in order that he might 
a s i s t  in avenging the brother by whom and for whom he had been so 
severely treated. The voice of honour, and revenge for blood, a n d  
still more the conviction that he had been in error, spoke more pow- 
erfully to his heart than his resentment ; he therefore collected a 
small corps of men, and advanced boldly against the capital. Shah 
Mahmood, plunged in debauch, w s  incapable of watching over h is  
own safety, andfrom the nloment the insurrection broke out con- 
fided the care of Kabul to his grandson Djehanguir M~rza,  son of 
Kamran, with whom h e  associated, as his lieutenant and respon- 
. . . . . . .
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sible adviser, his new vizier Mohamed Attah Khan, Popolzye : . 
after this Mahmood retired to the fort,ress of Ghuznee, from . 
whence he wrote to his son to come and rejoin him. Dost Mohamecl 
Khan, having completely beaten the detachments w11ich Djehanguir 
Mirza sent against him, entered Kabul, and obliged that prince 
to seek safety in flight; he also took Attah Mohamed Khan 
prisoner, had his eyes put out on the public square, and sub- 
sequently sent him away into the mouutains. 
After having been rejoined by Djehanguir Mirza, and a few sol- 
diers who were with him, it was not long before Shah Mahmood 
was surrounded by the troops which his son Kamran brought from 
Kandahar-much weakened it is true in numbers, and much 
discouraged, bnt still ablc to afford him the hope of reducing 
the insurgents if he had been a clever man. The army having 
halted a few clays a t  Ghuznee to give I h n r a n  a little repose, 
116 marched to Kabul to put down the rebels; but Mohamcd 
Azim Khan, who, now re-established in health, had just joined 
Dost Mohamecl, sparea him half his journey, and, midway be- 
tween Ghuznee and Kabul, offered him battle at  the head of four 
thousand men. The  prince, who had twelve thousand, was not in 
the least doubtful of success, but he was wrong in his estimate 
of the feeling of his troops; for, on the night preceding the 
conflict, they passed over to his adversary. Mohamed Azim and 
the Dost pursued ICainran immediately to the walls of Ghuznee, 
and soon obliged his father and himself, and those who supported 
their part.y, to evacuate the town. 
Shah Mahmood, made desperate by this last disaster, ordered 
Fethi Khan, who had now been deprived of his eyesiglit. eight 
months, to bc brought into his presence, and commanded him to 
write to his brothers, and desire them to return to their duty. But 
the unfortunate vizier calmly replied that in losing his sight he  
had lost also all his influence over his fellow-men, and that he no 
longer occupied himself with the affairs of this world. The king, 
enraged a t  this answer, orclerecl him to be put to death, and his ' 
enemies, the nobles of the court, were charged with the execution 
of the sentence; Iiamran Mirza, himself the most cruel of the 
Suddozyes, struck the first blow, and a t  this signal the rest drew 
their daggers, rushed upon him, and strove who should make hiln 
feel the greatest torture and suffering. They flayed him alive, 
disjointed his members, which they drew from his body one by one,. 
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and a t  length decapitated him; which put an end to his a g d e s .  
His corpse, thus mutilated, was abandoned to the public execu- 
tioner, who cut it in pieces, threw them into a sack, and carried 
them to Ghuznee, where they were interred. 
Not a sigh or complaint escaped Fethi Khan amidst these 
horrible tortures : he was sustained by the courage of a hero, and 
the calm of a pure conscience. 
A general cry of -indignation arose from one end of Afghanistan 
to the other against the murderers of this great man, and those 
who had remdned faithful to the Suddoqe party, not from:a feel- 
ing of sympathy, but from a sentiment of duty, now left i t ;  eveo 
the personal friends of the king were moved with compassion at  
the manner in which his old and faithful servant was put to death ; 
and there were very few serdars whose jealousies were not subdued 
by his sad end. 
Shah Mahmood, a wanderer and a fugitive, had now only a 
few servants around him, repulsed, harassed, and tracked, and 
obliged to shuu inhabited places, he dared not stop even in. 
the most desert spots, so hot was the pursuit. The dangers he1 
underwent were incessant ; he suffered every kind of privation, 
having nothing to support life but roots and wild fruits. Nearly 
dead from hunger, and in the last stage of despair, the fugitives 
endeavoured to reach Kandahar, which Kamran,. on leaving 
Ghuznee, had confided to the care of Gul Mohamed Khan, 
Popolzye ; but he soon learned that the city had fallen into the. 
hands of the Moharnedzyes, and that with the assistance of Mir 
Efzel Khan, Isakzye, Poor dil Khan had seized it. After Fethi 
Khan lost his sight, Efzel returned from Persia to live in the midst 
of his tribe, encamped in the environs of Koohnichine, a fortress 
situated on the banks of the Helmund, which belonged to him, 
and Poor dil Khan, without giving himself any concern as to the 
antagonistic feeling which existed between Mir Efzel Khan and his - 
elder brother, came to him and demanded his assistance and 
that of his tribe ; this was conceded, and the Mir joined the 
Blohamedzyes. The two chiefs then marched against Kandahar, 
which surrendered to them after a feeble resistance ; but the go- 
vernor Gul Mohamed Khan escaped, and reached I-lerst, the 
garrison of which was devoted to Kamran Mirza, and the former 
knew how to keep them in obedience. 
Sl-la11 Mahmood, being informed of this forhnate circumsbnce,. 
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immediately directed his steps towards that city, but, being com- 
pletely without provisions and menaced 011 all sides, he was obliged 
to take the least frequented and accessible roads ; the number of 
his followers diminished day by day, hunger, fatigue, and priva- 
tion accompanying them everjwhere. I t  was in this condition 
that they crossed the Paropamisan chain, inhabited by the Haza- 
rahs Poocht-Kooh, who, though enemies of the Afghans, never- 
theless inspired them with less terror than the latter. A t  length 
Mahmood reached Herat, having with him only his son Kamran, 
his brother Haclji. Firooz Edclin, and eleven servants who were 
devoted to him. 
But discord soon divided this royal trio. Kamran Mirza hacl 
only desired the fall of Fethi Khan in order that he might himself 
direct the government ; he commenced therefore by seizing upon 
all authority; Shah Mahmood, who, not without reason, attributed 
his misfortunes to his son, resisted these attempts and determined 
to govern for himself, .which daily produced between them the 
most violent scenes ; and, Hadji Firooz Eddin, wearied with these 
intertninable discussions, obtained permission from the king to retire 
to Meshed, which he did immediately. 
For some time after ..their arrival a t  Herat Mahmood and his 
son were alarmed . b y  the threats of the Persians, who seemed 
disposed to set up anew their claims upon the city, but Shah 
Mahmoocl and Kamran did not make this matter so much a question 
of amour propre as did Hadji Firooz Eddin, for they admitted 
without protest the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia, bound them- 
selves t.o pay, him tribute, and thought themselves fortunate in 
being able to remain on such conditions the peaceable possessors 
of the Iast refuge that they were able to find i n  Afghanistan. 
I n  1819, a short time after this agreement had been concluded, 
Kamran Mirza, tired of the tenacity with which his father main- 
tained his rights a s  sovereign, drove him from Herat, but Shah 
Mahmood, having collected a small army amongst the Eimalts, 
laid siege to the city in 1820. He  was however beaten and 
obliged to fly to the Hazarahs Zeidnat : nevertheless he did not 
consider himself vanquished, and for a . time appeared to have 
recovered the energy of his youth to fight his son. After having 
reinforced his army he returned in 1521, and besiegcd Herat a 
second time ; but having invested it for a few days, the serdars 
interfered between father and son, and effected a reconciliation, 
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upon the understandiug that Shah Mahmood was to have the title 
of king, and enjoy all the honours, and his son the power he so 
much coveted. 
While these two princes were disputing in the west the posses- 
sion of one corner of Afghanistan, the other portions of the king- 
dom passed into the hands of the Mohamedzyes and the Sikhs. 
The former mere too much occupied with their mar against t.he 
latter, and their differences with one another, to carry their arms 
against Herat, and repaid themselves by agitating that province 
with rumours and secret conspiracies, so that Kamran had at  first 
great difficulty in making his authority respected, and when i t  was 
a little strengthened he had to repulse the attacks which were 
made by his adversaries from the exterior. 
When Hadji Firooz Eddin, by no means satisfied with the con- 
duct either of his brother or his nephew, retired to Meshed; 
he met there the famous Serdar Kalech Khan, Taymooni, who 
represented to him how wrong he had been to leave Herat, where 
neither Mahmood nor ICamran had the least chance of being 
able to maintain his position, while he, Firooz Edclin, who had 
governed that country for years to the general satisfaction of the 
people, would most assuredly have been before long raised by 
them to the sovereign power. This serdar said, in short, all that 
he could to awaken his ambition, and offered his support to 
reinstate him in power. The  prince for a long time resisted 
these arguments, but at length, overcome by hie solicitations, de- 
cided upon taking Kdech's advice and reign again over a people 
and a province which he had rendered happy and flourishing 
for sixteen years .of his paternal administration. Kalech Khan 
made all the preparations which could suggest themselves to the 
mind of a clever man, and the expedition was undertaken in 1822. 
I t  was kept so secret that I<amau Mirza, vho had gone to hunt in 
the country round Ihssan, a town situated about fifteen hours from 
IIewt, on the road to Meshed, was surprised by the advanced 
guard of Hadji Firooz, and very nearly made prisoner; the 
devotion of four of his servants, who defended his house, and 
were all killed at the entrance, while he gained the fields by a back 
door, alone secured him the opportunity of flight. Arrived a t  
Herat, he immediately despatched his minister, Attah Khan, and 
several other officers, in a11 directions to assemble the contingents of 
the nomade tribes, who promptly arrived to his assistance and , 
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relieved the city. ?S71iile these troops, under the orders of Attall 
I i h q  kAli ICioouzye, attacked the army of Hadji Firooz, the 
prince Kamran left the city a t  the head of t ~ o  thousand Afghans, 
and fell upon the enemy's rear. The conflict lasted thirteen hours ; 
very little powder was expended, for the two armies fought with 
cold steel foot to foot, and perhaps no more ohstinate battle was 
ever fought under the walls of Herat ; when it was over there 
might be counted more dead bodies than living men. The vic- 
tory nevertheless remained for a long time uncertain, but the 
death of ICalech Khan turned the tide of battle in favour of 
. Kamran. This serdar had singled out and pursued the prince 
with fury, arlcl in a few yards more he would have crossed 
swords with the miscreant tort.urer of Fethi Khan ; but fortune 
mas not in the ascendant for him, his horse came down in a 
ravine and injured the khan's neck in the fall. IIis soldiers, 
seeing him in this disabled state, turned and fled, and, the enemy 
having made him prisoner, Kamran sabred his foe himself-on 
this occasion as on every other lie showed himself ferocious in the 
combat, and cruel when victorious. IIadji Firooz was also 
captured, and he worlld not have been spared any more than his 
general if Shah Mahmood had not interfered energetically in his 
favour; but he was subsequently confined in the citadel, where he 
was closely nratched. 
The prince Kamran was scarcely delivered from this danger 
when he was called upon to deal with another. The united 
chiefs of Khorassan attacked Herat in 1823; this expedition 
was undertaken by order of Fcth Ali Shah, King of Persia, 
to force I h m r a n  to pay the tribute, which under various pre- 
texts he had never done. During three months the Khoras- 
sanees made many unsuccessful efforts to take the city, and they 
did not leave the province until they had completely ravaged it. 
These inroads of the Persians were frequently renewed, and 
I h m r a n  repulsed them all by force of arms whenever there was a 
chance of his coming victorious out of the contest ; but he much more 
frequently met czncl bent to the storm, as I-Iadji Firooz had been 
forced to do before him, by paying a small tribute to the Sha.h of 
Persia, a$ in conforming to some frivolous ceremonies of vassalage. 
Kamran Mirza had scarcely shaken off these enemies from 
without when he had to contend with disagreeable complications 
within the province of Herat, and in the year 1824 they extended 
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to the districts which up to that time had been pretty quiet. 
That of Furrah more particularly pushed matters to the last 
extremity : the inhabitants finished by separating theniselves from 
the capital to form an alliance with Kandahar, and Kamran was 
obliged to march in person with an army to reduce them to 
obedience. 
Before departing on this expedition the prince took every pre- 
caution to preserve the tranquillity of Herat in his absence. A t  
the time Shah Mahmood accommodated matters with his son, he 
lost all his influence, and was forced by Ramran to retire 
to the Bagh Shah, a palace situated about a gunshot from 
the city, where he could at  his ease give himself up to his 
depraved inclinations. The  citadel with a good garrison was 
confided to the charge of Moustapha Khan, Zoori, who had 
always been devoted to him, and he appointed his maternal uncle 
Miharned Hoosein Khan governor of the city, with the title of 
vekil. These two personages were to have equal authority and a 
voice in the direction of affairs, and Kamran hoped that in opposing 
one to the other he would be able to secure a greater guarantee 
for their fidelity. His eldest son, Djehanguir Mirza, was left in 
I-Ierat to control their actions, but t.hey held this prince in little 
consideration, who became simply the promulgator of the orders 
which they gave, and not the representative of the  regal authority. 
The Vekil Mohamed Hoosein Khan had great influence in the 
city, and the Serdar Moustnpha Khan a still greater in the army. 
At first they seemed to act perfectly well together; but they mere 
united only in appearance ; each sought secretly to overthrow the 
other, and to put Kamran on one side that he might govern in 
his place. They also attempted to dissimulate their ambitious 
purpose from one another, when an occurrence wholly unexpected 
arose, and made them participate in concert in a revolt which 
each of them had individually premeditated. 
The troops left for Furrah in the hope that, as stated by 
Kamran, they would receive their pay directly they arrived in that 
district, but this promise not having been performed they began 
to murmur, and the prince was forced to send to Herat for money. 
One of the officers of his household, by name i\leuhvalee Khan, 
was charged with this mission, and to him lcamran gave a 
note of hand for six thousand tomauns, which he ordered his uncle 
Mohamed Hoosein Khan to pay with the least possible delay. 
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Mcuhvalec Khan perfornled this duty in the most haughty and 
arrogant manner, because the money was not ready ; the Veld  
begged him to have patieuce for a few days, but the officer de- 
maiided that the sum should be give11 him on t3he instant, and apos- 
trophized EIoosein Khan in menacing and opprobriol~s terms. The  
Serclar Bloustapha Khan, who xas present during this altercation, 
representeci to his colleague that Meuhvalee Khan must be cogni- 
zant of some evil intention which Kamran entertained towards them : 
c c  For," said he, " if a subordinate addresses us in such a manner, 
what will not the prince do when he returns? " The imagination 
of these chiefs, already prepared for revolt, soon became heated ; 
they immediately arrested the messenger, and decided upon over- 
throwing ICamran ; but when they came to discuss the basis upon 
which the governmcnt mas to be established, and who should be its 
chief, they found it was not easy to come to an understanding 
betneeu themselves, and the question was adjourned. Never- 
theless, they agreed upon the main point-namely, the over- 
throw of the prince I<an~ran ; and also that his son Djehanguir 
must be comprumised in the eyes of the people, and rendered 
odious by being induced to conmit some unnecessary act of 
cruelty. They  began, therefore, by making him issue a pro- 
clamation that his father's rule was at  an end; and it would seem 
that this princc, then about twenty-two years of age, agreed very 
willingly to this proposition, thinlril:g without doubt that there was 
no more harm in taking the place of his father ICamran than 
there had been in his dethroning Rlahmood Shah. Accordingly ' 
Djehanguir was proclaimed Sovereign Prince of Herat, and his 
first act was to pronounce the condemnation of Meuhvalee I.han. 
T h e  sentence was a terrible one : they first cut off his nose, his . 
ears, and his fingers, and from hour to hour scored him with sabre- 
wounds. T h e  agonies of this unfortunate man lasted two days, 
after which one of the officers of Djehanguir Mirza dragged him 
through the bazaars, and in a loud voice invited all those who 
were friends of the new sovereign to throw a stone at  Lhe 
wret,ch, while two hundred men, who had been assembled there 
previously by the serdm and the Veld,  also stoned the miserable 
sufferer. 
Directly Mohamed Hoosein and Moustapha Khan had attained 
their object by compromising Djehanguir with his father, and 
making him detested in the eyes of the Heratees, they improvised a 
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revolt by which the prince was overthrown and imprisoned, and 
the executive power placed in their own hands. Tllis was the cri- 
tical rnoment for these ambitious men, for they had penetrated the 
intentions of each other. The  Veld,  who did 11ot feel himself 
strong enough to attack the serdar openly, and dislodge him from 
the citadel, released l-Iadji Firooz from the prison in which he. 
was confined, and made the citizens aclmorcrledge him as their 
sovereign. Moustapha, I<han, thus forestalled, saw very well that 
he could not obtain ai~ything from the inhabitants if he stood 
&ne, fo; Haclji Firooz was their idol; they still remembered 
how much happiness they had enjoyed during his administration of 
&'airs, and his return to power filled them with joy. As a counter- 
p iae  to this, the serdar went to the Malimood at Bagh Shah, 
, whefe he lived p~etty nearly forgotten, and was ignorant of what 
was passing in the city, with the intention of setting him up as 
an opponcnt to IIaclji Firooz. This done, blood soon flowed in 
I-Ierat, and Moustapha Khan, defeated in the first conflict, was 
obliged to shut himself up with the old king in the citadel, fiom 
whence he cannonaded the city,, which, to avoid complete destruc- 
tion, surrendered at discretion, 
This second reign of I-Iadji Firooz Eddin lasted only eighteen 
days: the victor Moustapha Khan obliged him to return once 
iriore and seek refuge a t  Meshed, to which city he was folloived 
by the Vekil. The former was still alive in 18.15 ; I saw him in my 
woy through Meshed in that year, and received these details from 
his own lips. 
After the deposition of Djehanguir Mirza, and when he saw the 
power as he thought escape from him by the election of Firooz 
, Eddin, Moustapha Khan, thinking his chances of success were 
small, and calculating still less upon Shah Mahmood, sent an 
express to Kamran Mirza to beg him to hasten his return, pro- 
mising to stand firm for his party until he made his appearance. 
The prince hastened to adopt this suggestion, and arrived under the 
walls of EIerat the day after his uncle Hadji Firooz and the Vekil 
had retired from the city, but he found the gates closed ; for the 
victorious Moustapha, having now no other competitor, replied to. 
the summons to open them that he knew no other sovereign than 
. Shah Nahmoocl, would obey his orders only, and that those 
orders were that his son should not be allowed to enter the 
city. 
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Ramran invested the place immediately after he received 
this message, but he had scarcely opened his trenches when he 
was obliged to retire to Laush-Jowaine, a fortified castle and 
position to the south of Purrah, to avoid a battle with Shere dil 
Khan, Mohamedzye, whose forces nere much superior to his. 
This serdar had been sent against him by his brother Poor dil 
Khan, the sovereign of ICandahar, as much to avenge the death of 
Fethi Khan as to seize upon, Herat, and this conquest, added to 
the others which he had made to the eastward since the fall of 
Shah Mahmood, would have made them masters of {he whole 
of Afghanistan, as we shall see hereafter. 
Shere dil Khan, not having succeeded in obtaining possession of 
the place by simple summons as he had expected, commenced the 
siege, but he was soon forced to raise it, and finally to retreat 
towards ICanclahar, finding himself between two fires ; for an army 
from Khorassan, commanded by Mohamed I<han, Garai, whom 
MoustapLa Khan had called to his support, was in the neigh- 
bourhood. 
T h e  usurper, now being rid of Hadji Firooz, of Kamran, and of 
Shere dil Khan, satisfied the expectations of his ally Mohamed 
Khan, Garai, with a sum of money, and by paying his expenses 
during the campaign ; but not feeling sufficiently secure even 
after this, he thought that the best method of maintaining his 
position was to destroy all those who had opposed him. Blood 
again flowed on all sides, and revolt was the only resource that 
remained to the miserable Heratees by which they could deliver 
themselves from this tyrant. 
Syud Mir Sedilc Khan, chief of the Afghan branch of the 
Berduranees, a tribe from which.the majority of the citizens of 
Hera t  had sprung, invited the prince Kamran to approach the 
town as secretly as he could, declaring that when he arrived they 
would admit him. T h o ~ g h  Ihmran  had since his last flight been 
deserted by very nearly the whole of his army, he did not hesitate 
to accept this dangerous invitation to regain his power, and, 
reaching Herat about midnight, his march not having been dis- 
covered, the Syud admitted him into the place without the prince 
having been compelled to fire a single shot. The  remainder of the 
night was occupied in making the arrival of ICaniran known to the 
inhabitants, .and the citadel in which Moustapha Khan residcd 
was surrouildcd a t  sunrise by ten thousand armed men, who aroused 
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him by a well-sustained fire of artillery and vdleys of musketry. 
The serdar, -surprised by this sudden attack, lost a few men 
in the first instance, but after a few hours he c~mpletely or- 
pnised the defence, which during a month was most vigorously 
conducted, and he only made up his mind to surrender when the 
towers, shaken to their foundations by the explosion of mines, 
were on the point of falling, and large breaches opened a wide 
passage for the besieging army. In this extremity he sent the Serdar 
Dost Moh?med Khan, Popolzye, one of his party, to Icamran, to 
offer his submission : a t  the same time he invoked the clemency of 
the conqueror, and sent him a Koran, opened a t  the verse which 
recommends Mahornedans to bear no hatred, and forgive each 
other their faults ; but the certainly very far from a good 
Mussulman, and, as I have already remarked, a rare example of 
ferocity, fell upon the messenger and cudgelled him with a der- 
vish's stick which he happened to have in his hand. 
Moustapha Khan, appreciating clearly from this incident the 
kind of fate that awaited him, defended himself with desperation 
for ten days more-it was a lion encaged. . . . A t  last the assault 
was given; the place fell ; Moustapha was taken prisoner, and 
s~~ffered the most dreadful, of deaths. His body was burned with 
hot irons, his flesh torn with red-hot pincers by shreds ; covered 
with wounds and nearly flayed, he was bound to a large tree a t  
the entrance to the citadel, and on this spot the people con- 
gregated to spit in his face, and covered him with every kind of 
excrement. At  last they ripped open his belly, and he expired 
after enduring seven days of the most fearful agony. T h e  
tree to which he was bound was standing in 1845. Kamran 
Mirza punished his fathcr, Shah Mahnlood, for having assisted the 
serdar in this revolt, by depriving him of his wine during one 
whole month, which was to him a terrible infliction. As to his 
son Djehanguir Mirza, he gave him his liberty, but with it, 
as a small recompense for having assisted in dethroning his 
father, two thousand cuts with the bastinado on the soles of 
his feet, forgetting that, he had been guilty of the same crime 
himself. In  this family the son, grandson, and grandfather were 
all equally worthy of each other, and strove to distinguish them- 
selves by the most odious crimes. Such is the Afghan character : 
the people of Afghanistan honour that which is vile with us. 
From the death of Moustapha Khan, not one year went 'round 
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without Kamran's. seeing sonle ambitious character putting his so- 
vereignty in question. Alternately victor and vanquished, his reign 
was nothing more than a long drainit of intestine wars, conspiracies, 
and revolts, followed by the most atrocious executions. He cruelly 
put to death all who were opposed to him, even those whom he 
merely suspected : and numbers of these unfortunate beings were 
t~n;ornn under the feet of elephants, or to hungry tigers, ~v l~ ich  
he kept for this purpose. There was in his revenge a barbarous 
ferocity of wllich it would be difficult to form a conception ; and 
the most disgusting feature in it was, that he delighted to be himself 
the executioner of the sentences wliich he pronounced. In Europe 
the memory of Kamran would have been execrated for ages, but the 
Afghans see things in another point of view ; courage so called is 
in their eyes the greatest of all virtues : it stands in place of every 
other, and to take vengeance upon an enemy, to kill and massacre 
plenty of human beings, passes with them for courage. Directly a 
prince, a chief', or a person of lower grade is in the possession of ab- 
solute power, he ought to prove that he has it by the nuusacres he 
orders. They cannot comprehend why an enemy vanquished or dis- 
armed should be pardoned, and they regard this as an act of weak- 
ness and pusillanimity. I n  their estimation he who makes the most 
victims is the most powerful, the most honoured; and it is very 
doubtful whether there is a family in Herat ahich has not been 
deprived of some one of its members by Kamran. NO~V that he ' 
i s  dead, the people flock in crowls in pilgrimage to his tomb. 
lT7ith such sentiments i t  is not surpfising to see the history of tliis 
nation broadly traced in characters of blood. 
DEATH OF MAHIMOOD. 
C H A P T E R  XIII .  
Death of Shah Mahmood-Kamim is suspected of murdering his frtther-He 
indulges in every kind of excess - Death of Attah Khan - P a r  Mohamed Khan 
is made Vizier of Herat-Hostility of the  Persians against this principnlity- 
Intrigues of dbbtu Mirza- Yar Mohamed arrives at Meshed- He is put to the 
torture by the Persinn prince - Is clelivercd by the h thar  Bshi -  Measures of 
Yar  Mohamed-.Revolt of the Syud Mohamed Sedik-He is betrayed by 
Kamran and executed - The Shah is closely watched by Yar Mohnmed - His 
sons are disgraced - Project of Mohamecl Shah on I-Ierat -The Bflrukzyes con- 
sent to the restoration of Shah Shoojs-He plays the despot, and is over- 
thrown-Eyoob succeecls him- Mohrtmed .Azim Khan marches against the 
Sikhs- Runjeet Sing successful against the Afghans -The battle of Xoo- 
chero-The Afghans are beaten-Death of Azim Khan-The character of 
that serclw-His son Habib Ullah Khau succeeds him. 
I KAMRAN MIRZA was generally suspected of having abridged the 
days of his father, the Sl~ah Mahmood, who was found dead in his 
I 
hath in 1829 ; some assert that he was poisoned, and some 
I . that he wasstrangled, by the command of his son, who was tired of 
seeing him raised to power like a puppet every time an ambitious 
man revolted against himself. From the time of his father's 
decease Kamran took the title of King ; he then seemed to have 
F lost all energy, and retired within the walls of the citadel of 
I Herat, remaining almost a stranger to the affairs of govern- 
ment, the direction of which he gave up to his minister, the Serdar 
Attah Khan, Ali Kioouzye, who had given him many marks of 
his attachment, and in whom he had entire confidence ; after which, 
1 and following the example of his father, he commenceh a life of 
drunkenness, opium-eating, and every Eastern vice. 
This alteration in the conduct of the prince awakened the hopes 
of every party, and each wished to try its strength in several 
I 
disturbances, but the vigilance of Attah Khan suppressed them 
with so much energy that thcy withdrew into the shade, and made 
no hr ther  attempts during his lifetime. This able man, who 
had distinguished hilliself as much in war as in the civil admi- 
I 
nistration of his country, died in 1830, leaving three sons, serdars 
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like himself. I n  conformity with the custom of Af$anistan, where 
the office of prime minister is hereditary like the crown, it was 
expected that the eldest of these sons, the Serdar Dine Noharncd 
Khan, would succecd his father as vizier. Though young, 11c hid  
shown himself worthy of this distinct,ion by his bravery in the 
field and his military capacity, of which he 11acl given proof on 
several occasions; but, surrounded by intrigues, he refused to 
accept power, and abancloned his ~.ights to his cousin, the Serdar 
Y ar  Mohamecl Khan, who, having lost his father at a very tender 
age, hncI been brought up with him in. the house of Attah Khan. 
The minister had always evinced a great predilection for his 
nephew, and freqaent,ly expressed an opinion anticipatory of his 
future greatness; and Shah Kamran, influenced by a certain 
mollah, Mohamed Athar Bashi, the apothecary-in-chief, who 
flattered his passions, and administered his drugs to excite them, 
accepted Yar Mohamed Khan as his vizier. 
'rhis young serdar, who was distinguished for hi courage 
and cleverness, had made nun~erous partizans amongst the Ijcru- 
tees. His  father Abdullah Khan, Ali I<ioouzye, although of 
noble extraction, was not in the outset a very great person- 
age ; but he rose by merit, and became governor of Cashmeer 
a t  the period when Shah Mahmood first ascended the throne. 
Tha t  sovereign released him from prison, in which he had been 
confined by Shah Zeman, and placed him in this high position ; 
thus fortune favoured him, and his son's career was even more 
successful. 
T h e  dkbut of Yar Mohamed in admizlistrative affairs justified 
the selection which had been made in his person ; it is, however, to 
be presu~iied that he a t  once turned his views towards the assump- 
tion of supreme power, for all his acts tended constantly towards 
the accomplishment of his ambitious projects. As firm as he was 
vigilant, he always held his adversaries in check by depreciating 
them ; he successively removed those most dangerous to his interests 
in a manner that did not produce too much discontent, and 
endeavoured to smother the rivalry existing between the various 
tribes on whose support he could rely ; he proceeded, in short, like 
a clever and intelligent man, and the Shah Kamran, confiding in 
him, followed his advice in all respects. But Yar Mohamed had 
been minister scarcely a year when one of those events so frequent 
in Afghanistan arose to check for a moment his dawning fortunes. 
. -. 
CIIAP. SIII. VISITS MESHED. 
A t  the cominenccment of 1832 Feth Ali Shall, always pre- 
occupied with the idea of joining the province of Herat to Bersia, 
assembled 30,000 men a t  Meshed under the command of Abb;ls 
nilirzn, the heir allparent to the throne. For some yeilrs past 
ltussia had encroached considerably on the north of the Persian 
territory; England ha? done the same thing in the south, to 
the prejudice of the Indian .princes. Nevertheless, she 1;ad mot 
made a progress that would enable her to secure as much influence 
in Persia as the Tzar. She commenced, therefore, by fearing that 
the Shah of Persia, whom she had abandoned to the Muscovitcs, 
would undertake the conquest of Herat, and this much morc in 
accordance with the wishes of the Emperor Nicholas than his own. 
England was alarmed a t  this demonstration on the side of Inclia of 
which I-Ierat is the key, and brought forth all the springs of her 
clever policy to prevent it, or at least to paralyze the effects of it. 
She was, however, in the first instance, somewhat reassured by the 
reflcction that,, the Persian army being direc,ted by English officcrs, 
could only obtain s~ich success as they would pcrmit. The East 
India Company was also clever enough to induce Fetli Ali Shah to 
turn the expedition fiom its original object for a time, and reduce 
the petty chiefs of Khorllsscm, who had given only a nominal o h -  
diencc to Persia since the reign of Nadir Shah. 
On his arrival at  Meshccl the prince Abbas Mirza dcspatclierl 
one of his officers to the Shah Kamran to request him to send his 
'minister there in order that they might consult together, and 
endeavour to terminate their differences in an amicable manner. 
The character of the prince inspiring the vizier with every con- 
fidence, he accepted this invitation, and went to Meshed attended 
by five hundred Afghan horse; but instead of coming to an 
arrangcrr~ent as Y ar Mohamed hoped, libbas Mirza origin- 
ated fresh and serious difficulties, and Yar Mohamed was very 
soon obliged to confess to himself t,hat he had been led into a 
snare. With great secrecy, therefore, he immediately sent off his 
men by small detachments to Kootchan, then governed by Reza 
I<ooli Khan, who had not been subdued by Abbas Mirza, and 
recommended them as brave fellows who could powerfully 
assist the ally of his sovereign in the defence of his fort, which 
Yar Mohamecl considered one of the outworks of Herat. He 
then addressed a communication to the Persian prince containing 
most energetic protestations on his strange proceedings with regard 
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to himself; but it was all very fine for him to invoke the inviola- 
bility of an ambassador's person, or the rights of individuals ; no 
one listened to him, and a few clays after, the prince, fearing his 
energy and talents, gave an order that his movements should be 
carefully watched. After this Abbas Mjrza endeavoured to bring 
him to consent to an arrangement relative to Herat, but the vizier 
would not concede anything which he considered prejudicial to the 
interests of the Shah Iiamran. The princc even wi l t  so far as to ex- 
tract two of his teeth to cure his obstinacy, when by the intervention 
of some great personages this cruelty, unworthy of one of the Persian 
royal family, was abandoned. The  Athar Bashi, however, soon 
arrived to offer himself as an hostage in the place of Yar Uohamed, 
who returned to Herat ; but the vizier not having sent the prince 
the ransom which he had consented to pay to save his life, the 
Athar Bashi was placed in great danger : the death of Abbas 
Mirza, which took place towards the close of the year 1833, 
facilitated his release, xhich he succeeded in obtaining at  the cost 
of 10001. paid to those who had charge of him. I-Ie also promised 
to send them a similar sum when he reached H a a t ,  but this he of 
course took very good care not to do. 
The intrigues of the English at the court of Feth Ali Shah to 
prevent the expedition against Herat from being carried out, only 
partially succeeded ; the troops were occupied in reducing the 
small fortresses still unsubdued of Khorassan, and two years . 
elapsed between the period at  which they reached Meshed, and ' 
the time when Mohamed Mirza, the eldest son of the hereditary 
prince of Persia, encamped under the walls of Herat with a corps 
. 
cl'nrmh to effect a preliminary investment of the place. This 
was to be succeeded by a regular siege on the arrival of the rear- 
guard under the command of his father, but Mohamed Mirza hacl 
scarcely pitched his tcnts under the city walls when he heard of 
the death of Abbns Mirza, in consequence of which he raised 
his camp, and retreated on 3Iesl1ed. 
When Yar Mohamed escaped from the Persians he retook, and 
with a strong hand, the reins of government : nevcrtheless his vigi- 
lance could not prevent the revolt of the nornade po1)ulation in some 
of the districts situated in the north and east of the principality ; 
blit, an active general as 'well as a clever politician, he marched 
without delay 'against the rebels, and subdued them with as much 
promptitude as vigour. H e  subsequently led his troops southward, 
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and made Kamran's authority respected in all the Seistan. After 
this he returned to Herat, and continued to take a firm course in 
furtherance of his secret designs. 
Towards the close of the year 1834 an Indian Mussulman, who 
had been a sergeant in the East India Company's service, came to 
Herat, and offered his services to the Shah Kammn, which the 
- vizier accepted, and from this time the infantry, till then held 
in  little estimation there, was drilled, though very indifferently, 
on the European system. 
Taking advantage also of a few years' peace which ensued after 
the retreat of the Persians, Yar Mohamed repaired the fortifications 
of the city, which in consequence of the numerous assaults they had 
sustained were partly in ruins. EIe created villages, invited the 
populations from a distance to settle in them and cultivate the 
land lying untilled or unredaimed, and would have done a t  that 
time what he did at  a later pcriod, encouraged industry and com- 
merce, and cleared the roads of myriads of robbers who had 
'infested them, but such measures would then have injured his 
own interests. I t  is true that he governed, but Shah Kamran 
reigned, and he had the tact to make the odinm of the plunder- 
ing and discontent on the part of the people, fall upon the king, 
while he managed to secure to himself all the praise of what- 
ever was good. If from the moment of hie elevation to the post of 
vizier he was remarkable for those qualities which are with di5culty 
found united in an Afghan, he was nevertheless not exempt from the 
vices of his countrymen. During the entire reign of the Shah 
Kamran he was as avaricious, cruel, and implacable as it is possible 
for an Afghan to be ; but unfortunately this is frequently necessary 
with people of this nation, though in his extortions and sanguinary 
executions he was not always guided by any regard for the 
public weal : his ambition on such occasions was concealed 
under a veil of devotion which he affected to feel for his.prince 
and his country, and the serdars, who aere not his dupes, were 
continually on the alert to overthrow 'him, but without the least 
success. 
Amongst the numerous revolts which he had to repress, that 
which broke out a t  the commencement of 1837 gave him the most 
serious uneasiness. I t  was headed by the same Syud Mir Sedik 
Khan, Berduranee, who had surrendered the town of Herat to the 
Shah Kamran when he was dethroned by the Serdar Moustapha 
N 
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Khan ; but less fortunate on this occasion, Mir Sedik, having failed 
in his enterprise, was taken and executed. The unfortunate Syud 
had entered into this conspiracy with the full knowledge and con- 
sent of the king, who, beginning to perceive that his vizier was 
more powerful than himself, and even restricted his personal liberty, 
I 
was anxious to throw off the shackles which impeded the freedom 
of his actions. Rut he did not dare to strike openly, and it was 
actually the Shah himself who in a drunken fit revealed the plot 
to  Yar Mohamed, and thus caused the death of Mir Sedik Khan 
as well as that of many other chiefs who were completely devoted 
to him. 
After this occurrence the vizier removed from the court such 
of the king's advisers as mere attached to him, and by degrees 
replaced them by his own creatures. H e  preserved to the Shah all 
the external appearances of respect and obedience, but he found a 
, 
thousand ways of eluding his orders and his wishes when they mere not 
in accordance with his own views ; and in fact he did as he pleased. 
Shah Ihmran ,  warned by his wives, his sons, and other relatives, 
who detested the vizier, at length perceived clearly where all this 
mould end, but there was not one spark of that feverish ambition 
remaining in him which caused the death of Fethi Khan. The  
state of drunkenness in which he continually lived paralyzed all 
his energy, and he never seriously attcmpted to deliver himself 
from the tyranny which his minister imposed upon him. H e  readily 
gave his consent, it is true, to a secret league formed by a powerful 
party to overthrow Yar Rilohamed, a conspiracy a t  the head 'of 
which were his own sons; but he withheld h3s co-operation on ~ w o  
or three occasions at .  the very moment when his minister was to 
have been put an end to, and at length finished by discovering the 
plot to him himself. Yar Xohamed disposed of the chiefs who 
had formed these intrigues, and punished the sons of his sovereign 
by reducing to a very small sum the allowance which they received 
from the state. 
Such was the situation of affairs a t  Herat, when towards the close 
of the year 1837 Mohamed Shah, King of Persia, again laid 
siege to that capital, and took up the idea which his grandfather 
Feth Ali Shah had entertained, of adding this province to his do- 
minions ; and this desire was all the more intense, inasmuch as he 
considered that he was bound in honour to recommence asiege which 
the death of his father Abbas Mirza had alone induced him to 
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abandon before he had even fired a shot. The execution of this 
project was highly satisfactory to the Russian government, for it 
admitted the validity of the Shah's claims upon I-Ierat, and found 
independently of these many other legitimate and powerful motives 
for approving of the expedition undertaken by that monarch. 
Amongst them was the refusal of Shah Kamran to liquidate the 
arrears of tribute which he had pledged himself to pay, and the 
sums of money taken by his vizier from several Persian caravans 
travelling through his territory. T h e  English, who had done 
everything in their power to prevent the first expedition against 
Herat from being carried out, opposed the second in a still more 
decided manner; but as the consequences connected with this 
event were of so grave a nature that we cannot treat them sum- 
marily, we will enter at  a later period into the details of the 
varioils phases through which it passed. I n  the mean while L 
we ]nust retrace our steps a little to give some account of what 
happened in Kandahar, Kabul, and Cashmeer after Shah Mahmood 
and his son Kamran had been driven from Afghanistan proper. 
Once master of Kabul, the Serdar Mohamed Azim Khan, who, 
on the death of the vizier Fethi Ehan, became the oldest surviving 
son of Payendeh Khan, reunited the scattered remains of the 
Afghan army, and re-established security and order; but his 
brother the Nawab Djabbar Khan, by whom he was represented in 
the government of Cashmeer, had great difficulty in escaping the 
i snares set for him by Runjeet Sing, and in suppressing the revolts which arose from the intrigues of his clever and powerful neighbour. His other brother, Rahim dil Khan, had been obliged to fly from 
Shikapoor immediately after the death of Fethi Ehan to escape 
from the Beloochees, whom Shah Shooja, who had hurried from 
India, had induced to revolt against him. 
Poor dil Khan had remained master of Kandahar, but not 
thinking himself suficiently strong to maintain his power as 
sovereign, and having no hope of receiving any succour from 
Mohamed Azim Ehan, who had quite enough to do in Kabul, he 
sent his brother Kohendil Khan to Shikapoor, to propose certain 
terms to Shah Shooja, which, if accepted, would lead to his resto- 
ration to the throne of his ancestors. This prince insisted that 
the sons of Payendeh Khan assembled at Kandahar should swear 
on the Koran that they were sincere in their devotion to his person, 
and after having obtained this pledge he proceeded to thak city, 
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from whence he wrote to Moharned Azim Khan to claim his rights 
over Kabul and Peshawur. Mohamed Azim having given in 
writing, a similar declaration to that of his brothers, and sent it to 
the Shah, Shooja set off imlnediately to join him at Peshawur 
where he then was, and Poor dil Khan accampanied him with a 
strong escort. Mohamed -4zim Khan was in perfect good faith 
when he consented to the restoration of Shooja-ool-Moolk, for his 
position was not less embarrassing than that of Poor dil Khan, 
and he had very great difficulty in maintaining his authority over 
the northern provinces of the kingdom. Foreseeing well that the 
divisions whkh had crept in between his brothers would lead, ere 
long, to the loss of the sovereign power in his family, he thought 
that the only may of consolidating the influence of the Moha- 
meclzyes was to call in a S ~ t d d o z ~ e  prince, whom they would place 
like a puppet on the throne, and preserve for themselves all the , 
executive power. The restoration of Shah Shooja was therefore to 
be effected on this basis and understanding; but such a mode of 
proceeding was by no means satisfactory to that prince, whose 
imperious and absolute character had not been softencd in exile, 
and who wished to ascend the throne without making any condi- 
tions, or entering into any engagement, either with individue ,L 1 s or 
the people at luge.  Mohamed Azim Khan, thinking that he might 
bring the king to admit as sacred the right of his fa,mily to the 
first ofices in the state, re-established him on the throne, and this in 
spite of the knowledge that he had of his intractable character. 
But  Shooja, without taking any account of the ulterior conse- 
quences of his conduct, manifested almost from the outset liis 
arrogance without disguise ; he treated Mohamed Azim Khan 
and Poor dil Khan as rebels, took offence because one of their 
cousins used a palanquin, and ordered that for the future this honour 
should be reserved for the princes of the Suddozye family alone. 
Mohamed Azim and his brothers exhausted all the powers of 
argument that could be dictated by consideration and wisdom to 
induce Shah Shooja to listen to reason, but, finding him immovable 
in his absolute views, they would not permit him to proceed to 
Kabul ; the prince therefore left the camp, situated thirty-five 
miles from Peshawur, and retired within the walls of that, town, 
with a small body of Sikhs who had attached themselves to his 
person, to which were added a thousand Afghans of the discon- 
tented tribe of the Mohamedzyes. Mohamed Azim Khan, des- 
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perate at  having created fresh difficulties for himself by thus 
recalling Shah Shooja, immediately laid siege to Peshaw.ur with all 
his army. The prince could not hope to hold the place for any 
length of time ; nevertheless, he defended himself, hut was even- 
tually obliged to evacuate the town sooner than he had expected. 
His magazine took fire and destroyed all his munitions of war ; 
two hundred of his men were killed by the explosion; and an 
enormous breach was made in the city wall, which opened an easy 
passage for the troops of Mohamed Azim. 
Obliged to make a precipitate retreat, the Shah managed to 
.reach Shikapoor, whene the Emirs of Scinde consented to receive 
him. Sir Alexander Burnes states that they ceded the place to 
him and adds,--" A series of intrigues set on foot by his enemies 
expelled him even from' this retreat, and he fled by the circuitous 
route of the desert of Jaysalmere to Loodiana. The conduct of. 
Shah Shooja was ill-calculated to support his falling fortunes : he 
,forgot the dignity of a monarch in low intrigues with his subjects, 
in which he tarnished their honour as well as his own. The  
fitness of Shooja-ool-Moolk for the situat.ion of sovereign seems 
ever to have been doubtful. His manners and address are highly 
polished, but his judgment does not rise above mediocrity." 
I n  the year 1819 Mohamed Azim Khan gave way to the repre- 
sentations of-Eyoob Mirza, another son of Timoor Shah, who came 
to his camp, and promised him that, if the Khan would place him 
on the throne, he would appoint him his vizier, and give him all 
the power, having no other ambition than that of perpetuating 
the possession of the throne of the Afghans to the descendants of 
the great Shah Ahmed, and to see money strack in his o m  
name. I n  short," remarks the author of the work we have just 
quoted, " Eyoob said, ' Make me but king and permit money to 
be coined in my name, and the whole power and resources of 
the kingdom may rest with yourself; my ambition will be satisfied 
with bread and the title of king.' These conditions were accepted, 
nor did this puppet monarch ever violate or attempt to infringe 
the terms by which he had gained the name and trappings of 
royalty, but continued a tool in the hands of Azim Khan, 
who was nominally his vizier. So degraded was now the state of 
the Royal house of Kabul, that the very robe of honour with which 
the minister was installed into the viziership of the empire, was a 
portion of his own property, and had been sent privately to the 
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Shah, who conferred it on the vizier with all the pomp and 
display of royalty. Several of the young princes who aspired to 
the throne were delivered over to Eyoob and put to death." 
Eyoob kept therefore the promise which he had made to Azim 
Khan, even beyond what he had permitted himself to hope. T h e  
Afghans will have in their kings activity, courage, and energy of 
character, but Eyoob was distinguished only by nullity the most 
complete : he thought of nothing but himself, and yet he could not 
escape the fatality which seemed to pursue the sons of Timoor 
Shah. Some letters which he wrote to his brothers Shah Mah- 
mood and Shah Shooja having been intercepted, Mohamed Azim 
drove him out of Kabul, and put his brother Sultan Ali Mirza to 
death, as he appea~ed to have encouraged the king in breaking 
the pact which united him with the Mohamedzyes. 
This would seem to indicate that Eyooh, in giving up so readily 
the royal authority, obeyed from necessity rather than choice, 
and without doubt only waited for a favourable opportunity to 
obtain it ; but be that as it may, neither plan succeeded. A t  the 
same period at which Sultan Ali Mirza was put* to death at  Kabul 
by Azim IChan, another brother of that prince, Mohamed Murad 
Mirza, fell under the sword of Kohendil Khan at Eandahar, for a 
reason similar to that which had led to the fa11 of Eyoob. 
For several years past the affairs of government had weighed 
heavily upon Mohamed Azim Khan ; the order he established 
after having driven Shah Shooja from Peshawur had, after the 
dismissal of Shah Eyoob, again given place to agitation : the public 
mind was to be qnieted; the serdars mere to be satisfied or put 
down to procure tranquillity for the ltingdom, and that was not an 
easy thing to accomplish. Mohamed Azim Khan in his desire to 
smooth all these difficulties wished to proceed with some degree of 
regularity ; he commenced therefore by marching against the 
Sikhs, who, since they had occupied Attok, had taken possession of 
some of the Afghan territory which surrounded it, and began to 
be very unpleasant neighbours to the Dooranees. 
Tha t  remarkable man Runjeet Sing, profiting by the enfeebled 
state , to  which so many troubles had reduced the Afghans, !had 
taken from them in succession Attok, Mooltan, Derrehghazee 
Khan, Leya, and Cashmeer. Nawab Djabbar Khan, the governor 
of this last province, had been forced to evacuate it, and suffered 
great loss in effecting his retreat ; the Sikh troops had eves pursued 
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him to the right bank of the Indus, and at 
16 3 
one time menaced 
- 
Peshavur. Eight thousand of Runjeet's soldiers, under the com- 
mand of Boodh Sing, had also just made, from weak entrenchments 
hastily thrown up, an heroic defence against a population of fifty 
thousand Afghans. The Sikhs, up to this time enslaved, proved 
by these brave deeds of arms that their nationality had boldly 
developed itself; they felt the necessity of constituting themselves 
a separate and compact power ; and as this first and sudden impulse 
of the natural genius of this people might become fatal to their 
neighbou~, there was not a moment to lose in repulsing such 
formidable adversaries. Azim Khan therefore marched a body 
of troops towards the quarter that was threatened; but though 
they obtained marked and somewhat numerous advantages over 
Runjeet, they were not able to force him to recross the Indus, 
which on his invasion of the Afghan territory his cavalry had 
passed by swimming at a spot where there was no ford-a feat 
unheard of before in the annals of war in  that country. 
3!!oliamecl Azim Rhan had endeavoured to rouse the fanatical 
feelmgs of his soldiers by proclaiming a holy war, but, not having 
been able Co arrest the success of this modern Porus by that device, 
he was obliged to march in person against him. The Sikh and 
Afghan armies met a t  Noochero in 1822, the latter being divided 
into two corps by the Kabul river. The vizier Azim Rhan had 
conceived his plan of operations very badly : for he and the greater 
part of his brothers were on the southern side of the river with the 
second division, which it was impossible to move to the support of 
the first when it was attacked in person by the whole of Runjeet's 
forces. Nevertheless i t  sustained the fight valiantly : the infantry, 
posted on an eminence, and protected by several pieces of cannon, 
received the onset of the Sikhs without flinching, and repulsed four 
successive charges which they made with the whole of their cavalry ; 
i t  was only when a fifth was given that the Afghans were obliged 
to fall back, and with the loss of their guns-Runjeet conducted 
this charge in person, and brought up the whole of his reserves. 
Mohamed Azim Khan and his brothers were spectators of 
this sad disaster without the power, as it is said, of being able 
to remedy it ; a oircumstance which seems incomprehensible, 
for the runaways found no difficulty in crossing the river and 
rejoining them, as did likewise a corps of Sikhs who pursued them. 
How then did it happen that Azim Khan could not do the same ? 
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But supposing the Afghan general had committed this first error, i t  
was easy for him to repair it by attacking the Sikhs in their passage 
of the river, which he did not do ; the fact was, his heart failed him, 
and he took to flight. His apologists have endeavoured to justify a 
his retreat by saying that it was caused by the shouts that were 
heard in  the Sikh camp on the night preceding the battle, which 
led Azim Khan to believe they had received large reinforce- 
ments. But even if this version of the aflair was correct, the 
error, not to say stnpidity, of allowing the Sikhs to cross the .river 
without making any attempt to stop them, is not the less great ; 
besides, it may always be said that the Afghan general did not 
advance merely to retreat, but to fight, and that he might a t  least 
have saved his guns and his baggage which he abandoned. The 
Sikhs, taking advantage of the panic that seized their adversaries, 
marched on Peshawur, of which they took possession, and destroyed 
the citadel. 
T h e  right bank of the Indus remained'in the power of the Sikhs 
after the battle of Noochero, and Peshawur was an advanced post 
over which Runjeet reserved the right of suzerainty. H e  g a w  
the government to Sultan Mohamed Khan, one of the brothers of 
Azim Khan, enforcing a small tribute, hoping by this means to . 
increase the disunion amongst the sons of Payendeh Khan, and 
turn it to greater account. 
Mohamed Azim Khan, overwhelmed by all these reverses, and 
suffering from the effects of a wound which, from his habits of , 
drinking, had become very irritated, left the army, the temporary 
command of which he gave to his brother Dost Mohamed Khan, 
and took the road to Kabul, where he hoped to recover; but this 
hope was never realized, for he had not sufficient strength left to 
reach the city, and died a t  the village of Latu-bend about two 
days' journey from the capital. For some time past he had felt 
convinced his end was approaching, and hastened to collect all his 
wealth, which amounted to 2,700,0001.* Azim Khan left this 
enormous sum to his son Habib Ullah Khan, and a few hours 
before his death he made him swear to employ it and his life in 
revenging his father's defeat and the misfortunes of hi country. 
T h e  character of the vizier Mohamed Azim Khan has been 
estimated very differently by different persons according as they 
were partizans of the Suddozyes or the Mohamedzyes, but the 
* I learnt this from Kohendil Khan, hia sons, and his brother.-Ferrier. 
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of impartial individuals in Afghanistan are of opinion that 
he was a man of moderate abilities, and not equal to his mission ; 
that he was wanting in firmness ; that his military talents were of 
a mediocre character; and that his love of wine and ardent spirits 
was so great that he had the commalid of his faculties but for a 
very short time during the twenty-four hours. H e  was, however, 
gentle, conciliating, and showed great urbanity of disposition. 
CI-IAPTER XIV. 
Proceedings of Habib Ullah Khan -Divisions between the sons of Payendeh 
Khan- Hahib Ullab I a a n  at  war mith his uncles -Poor dil Khan interferes 
in Kabul - Union of Soltan Mohamed and Dost Mohamed Khans - Shere dil 
Khan and Poor dil Khan establish peace between their brothers - Dost' Mohamed - 
~ a i n  at  variance- His rivalry mith Sultan Nohamed-That prince at  
Peshamr - Sir A. Burnes'a opinion of him - Kantlahar -Pow dil Khan and 
Shere dil K h n  -Character of the latter-Sir A. Bumes's opinion of the 
Kand.ahar chiefs - Character of Dost Mohamed - Sir A. Burnes's opinion of him. 
I-IABIB ULLAH EEAX had sworn to his dying father that he would 
take no rest until he had exterminated the Sikhs, but his courage did 
not correspond with his promise; it is true he continued the war, 
, 
but without energy ; and it was only by the power of money that 
he was euabled to maintain for a short time his troops in obedience. 
Brutalized by his passion for drink, a vice which he inherited from 
his parent, he felt very little for the misfortunes of his country. 
His  mother endeavoured, but in vain, to stimulate his zeal, and 
lead him to appreciate more honourable sentiments; but he 
remained deaf to her solicitations, This apathy in their chief 
discouraged the inferior officers, who by degrees abandoned him, 
while the serdars and his uncles neglected the national defence 
and interests to quarrel for power amongst themselves. From this 
period the sons of Payendeh Khan were more disunited than even 
the Suddozyes, and rushed into a number of little wars which con- 
tinued during several years, until a few of them had succeeded in 
definitively establishing themselves in the Afghan principalities. 
Ballrh, Khulm, Koondooz, and Badalishane had shaken off the yolie 
since the fall of Shah Zeman, and governed themselves. As to 
Scinde, Shah Shooja was the last of the Afghan Icings who received 
trihute from that country, and after his disasters the Talpoora 
Emirs considered themselves as completely independent. 
Hahib Ullah had scarcely exercised his power six mouths when, 
his money being spent, all consideration for him was a t  an end ; in 
Kabul he had only a mere shadow of authority remaining, and that 
was soon disputed by his uncles. As to Sultan Mohamed Khan, 
who had been made governor of Peshawur by Runjeet, he was not 
satisfied with the small revenues of that province, which he was 
obliged to share with his two brothers, Pir Mohamed Khan and 
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Syud Mohamed Khan. Dost Mohamed Ehan had made a party 
for himself, and resided at  Ghuznee. 
The army of I-Iahib Ullah Khan, considerably weakened by 
desertion, was not in a condition to measure its strength with those 
of his uncles united. Aware of this, he sent his brother Akrem 
Khan to Kandahar to represent to their uncle Poor dil Khan the 
danger there would be to him if he permitted his brothers Sultan 
and Dost Mohamed Khan, who then had the reputation of being 
ambitious and restless characters, to acquire an influence in his 
neiglrbourhood superior to his own, for it might lead to their 
creating disturbances in the principality of Kanclahnr, and possibly 
end in their taking it from him if he was not upon his guard ; 
Alcrem Khan also sent him a few of their letters which had 
been intercepted, and in which such intentions had been clearly 
manifested. 
Poor dil Khan, alarmed a t  the danger which menaced him, 
sent his brother Shere dil Khan to Kabul a t  the head of a few 
thousand men, and this serdar met Dost Mohained Khan on the 
road, beat, and forced him to retire upon Jellalabad, and then 
proceeded to Kabul. There, however, instead of giving any . 
assistance to his nephew Habib Ullah Khan, he deposed him, 
plundered him of his riches under a threat of killing him, and united 
the remnants of his army with his own. The  vanquished chief by 
way of consolation now plunged into every kind of debauch, and 
eontinued to reside at  Kabul, where he still lives in a miserable 
plight, given up to excesses of the most filthy kind. Akrem Khan, 
his younger brother, died after his return to Kandahar ; he was a 
brave and resolute man, and no friend to ambitious characters: his 
death was supposed to have talcen place from the effects of poison. 
When Sultan Mohamed Khan and Dost Mohamed Khan saw 
the turn affairs had taken at  Kabul, they put a stop for a time to 
the fratricidal war they had carried on since the death of Azim 
Khan, and united their forces with a view of seizing that province. 
They then marched against their brother Shere dil Khan, who a t  
their approach retired within the walls of the Bala Hissar, not 
having sufficient troops to meek them in the field. Here he had 
great difficulty in maintaining himself during the winter of 1825. 
The  season was very severe ; the roads were covered with snow, and 
impassable ; and it was only in the spring, and after he had been 
five months besieged, that Poor dil Khan could bring him rein- 
forcements from Kandahar. Directly these arrived thky attacked 
198 RIVALRY' OF CHAP. XIV. .. 
Sultan Moha~ned and Dost Xohamed, and defeated them after 
a most sanguinary struggle. Nevertheless, these serdnrs did not 
consider their cause a hopeless one, and again prepared to try the 
fortune of war, when Poor dil Khan, by a generous resolution., 
stopped the further effusion of blood. He  went almost alone to 
the camp of his brothers, and pictured to them all the calamities 
which the quarrels and divisions of t,he sons of Payendeh Khan had 
brought upon their country. " Let us stand close," said he ; " and 
to prove to you to what extent our union is dear to me, I will return 
to Eandahar, and abandon Kabul to Sultan Mohamed Khan, 
our eldest brother ; but, before I retire, y0~1 must swear to me, as 
well as all our brothers now present in both camps, that nothing 
shall disunite us for the future." This generous proposition was 
accepted, and a good understanding reappeared for some time 
amongst the members of this heroic family." 
But Dost Mohamed Khan took the oath that Poor dil Khan had . 
exacted only because lie felt convinced that his brothers would never 
support him in his resistance, but he felt very angry that Sultan 
W h a m e d  Khan, who was already in possession of Peshawur, had . 
been preferred to h i m i s  sovereign of Kabul, in contempt. of the 
rights that he thought he had acquired by the courage he had 
everywhere displayed, and by his great popularity with the 
Afghans; and without doubt this chief was the hravest ancl the 
most talented politician amongst the brotllers of the vizier Fethi 
Khan, and had thus contributed more than any.of them to over- 
throw the Suddozye family. With him vexation and spite 
overruling every other consideration, he foreswore himself and 
prepared to carry arms against Sultan Mohamed Ehan ; however, 
there was, it is true, a deadly enmity between these two brothers, 
which had its origin in a love affair. One of the widows of the 
Serdar Azim Khan was a member of the royal family of the 
Suddozyes, and, according to the established custom in Afghan- 
istan, was obliged to marry one of the surviving brothers of the 
.deceased. Sultan Mohamed Khan, who greatly admired her, 
had, in the first instance, some chance of becoming her husband, 
and a few conferences had already taken place on this subject, 
when Dost Mohamed, who knew how to render his homage accept- 
able, made his appearance and married the beautiful widow. Sultan 
Mohamed Khan never forgave him this outrage, and swore to 
mash it out in his blood vhenever an occasion should present itself. 
* Al l  the sons of PayendehKhan were then in one camp or the other.-Ferrier. 
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During the space of two years did Sultan Mohamed and Dost 
Jfohamed carry on a merciless mar one against the other, bnt it 
terminated in 1826, when Dost Mohamed, victorious on all points, 
was enabled to establish definitively his authority a t  Kabul. 
Mollarned Khan, Beyat, a serdar of the Euzzilbashes, gave him his 
support in consequence of the blood relationship which united 
them. His  sister was the mother of Dost Molramed Khan ; and 
without the support of the Euzzilbash chief the Dost would haye 
had great difficulty in obtaining this triumph over his opponent, 
who was assisted by the Sikhs. 
Sultan Mohamed Khan, thus thrown back upon Peshawur, had 
also the annoyance of finding himself more and more brought 
under the power of Runjeet Sing. The Maharadja had, up to this 
time, been satisfied with receiving a small annual tribute from the 
Afghan chief, but, when he saw that Sultan Mohamed was beaten 
by the Dost, he demanded that one of his sons should be delivered 
up to him as a hostage, and reside a t  Lahore. I t  would have been 
easy for Sultan Mohamed to escape this difficulty by becoming 
reconciled to Dost Mohamed Khan, who was quite willing to receive 
his advances, and had even taken the initiative in this respect ; but 
Sultan Nohamed thought it preferable to persevere in the hatred 
he felt to his brother, and made his complete submission to the 
Sikhs-the sworn enemies of his country and of his religion. 
I was not able to reach Peshawur myself, and could not there- 
fore judge of the state of this province or collect any information 
respecting the manner in which it was governed by Sultan Mohamed 
Ehan, but I will supply such information by giving some passages 
from the work of Sir A. Burnes, who visited that city in 1832. 
" The  government of Peshawur has been held by a member of 
the Barukzye family since Futteh Ehan  placed Shah Mahmood on 
the throne of Kabul. Y eshawur owed allegiance and contributed 
to the support of the kingdom till the year 1818, when the vizier 
was put to death. Azim Khan, his successor, exacted tribute for 
it during his lifetime i n  the name of Eyoob Shah. Since that time 
it has formed a separate chiefship like Kabul and Eandahar, now 
subject, however, to the payment of a yearly tribute to the Sikhs. 
I t  is governed by the Serdar Sultan Mohamed Khan, who shares 
its revenues with two other brothers, Pir and Syud Mohanled 
Khan. A large portion of the country is alienated to different 
individuals, and the net revenue falls short of nine lacs of rupees 
per annum. The younger brothers enjoy three lacs, and-the chief 
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defrays from the remainder the entire expenses of the country, the 
tribute to the Sikhs, and likewise S U F ~ O ~ ~  the numerous families of 
two elder brothers, who fell in battle and to whom he succeeded. 
" T h e  power of the chief is confined to the plain of Peshawur, 
and the hills of Kohat, which form its southern boundary. That  
plain is well known as one of the richest portions of the Kabul 
dominions. I t  is of a circular shape, about thirty-five miles broad, 
highly peopled and cultivated, watered by nature and art. Within 
this limited space there are numerous villages which pay no taxes. 
T h e  Khuttuks, a tribe of Afghans in the cast, hold the country for 
twenty miles west of the Indus for the small sum of 12001. annually, 
which they render to the chief of Peshawur. The  villages on the 
west, and the Ehyber hills, do not pay anything ; and those north 
of the Kabul river, witn some few exceptions, enjoy a like immunity. 
The  only places of note in the chiefship are Peshawur and Husht- 
nuggur, which are described by Mr. Elphinstone. Peshawur has 
fallen into a state of decay with its change of rulers, and it is 
doubtful if it boasts of a population of one half the hundred 
thousand souls which occupied it in 1809. Hushtnuggur is the 
seat of one of the younger brothers ; Eohat is held by the other. 
T h e  military strength of Peshawur is unimportant. I ts  contingent 
of troops cannot be rated above 3000, two-thirds of whom may be 
cavalry. The  chief might rally round him a numerous body of 
irregulars, or, as they are called, ' ooloosee ; ' but they are badly 
anned, and not to be relied upon. Six pieces of artillery, and 
two hundred regular infantry, complete the power of the chief of 
Peshawur. Wi th  money the services of the Khyberees, and other 
hill tribes, may be purchased on an emergency ; but the chief has 
no treasury. I n  a religious war with the Sikhs, an infuriated 
population may be always raised, and has proved itself formidable 
on a late occasion, when the Syud Ahrned preached his crusade in 
this country ; yet the whole of these combined form a diminutive 
force, as compared with his neighbours on the east and west- 
the Sikhs, and his brother of Kabul. The political influence of 
Peshawur is as limited as its military power. The Sikhs have 
exacted a tribute from it since the death of the vizier's brother, 
Azim Khan, and retain a son of the chief as a hostage for its ful- 
filment. I t  now amounts to sixty horses, with son~e rice, which is 
pecu1ia.r to Peshawur; and it is annually enforced by an army 
which crosses the Indus, and lays waste their territories if not 
speedily paid. T h e  amount of the tribute depends on the caprice 
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. of Ru"jeet Sing, but the Sikhs will not make a conquest of 
this country. Without Mahommedan auxiliaries they could not 
retain it.* 
u The chiefs of Peshawur and Kabul, who are brothers, are a t  
enmity. The  power of Kabul is far more consolidated than that 
of Peshawur, but the latter'has an ally in his brother of Kandahar, 
who would resent any attack either on Peshawur or his own cou1ntry.t 
The chiefs of Peshawur and Kandahar have been some time past 
concerting an attack on Kabul ; but it is not improbable that the 
territories #of both may ere long be threatened, and perhaps taken, 
by the Khan of Kabul. In such an event, the chief of Peshawur 
woulik call in the aid of the Silrhs. This would probably be given, 
since Dost Mohamed of Kabul would never consent to the annual 
tribute now paid to Lahore by his brother of Peshawur. Serdar 
Sooltnn Mohamed Khan entertains hopes of being able to interest 
the British Government in his cause should it decliue. No chief 
,in the kingdom of Kabul entertains a higher respect for the 
British Government than Sooltan Moharned ~ h a b .  This has 
always been shorn by his attention to  Europeans who have entered 
his cour!try. If misfortunes fell upon him, he might be a useful or 
a dangerous partisan. H e  might espouse the cause of the King 
Shah Shooja-ool-Moollr ; though that monarch is no favourite with 
his family ; yet the inconsistency and inconstancy of the Afghan 
chiefs are yroverbial. I n  any dificulty the chief of Peshawur 
would be ably assisted by Fir  Mohamed, but his other brother is 
destitute of energy and enterprise. The whole of the Barukzye 
family $ entertain a dread of Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, and the Prince 
Kamran of Herat. The one, if aided by the British, would drive 
them from their usurped authority ; and the other, if assisted by the 
Persians, might perhaps fix himself on the throne of his ancestors. 
Sooltan Mohamed Khan bears a fair reputation, but his govern- 
ment is most oppressive and vexatious. His agents and underlings 
practise all manner of exactions ; goods are taxed far above their 
value ; and the currency is constantly altered and depreciated. 
An enormous tax is levied on the water-mills which grind the flour, 
* Burnee is not quite accurate here, being dead, Kohendil Rhan governed 
for Peahawur w a  actually invaded by Kandahar when I visited that city.- 
the Sikhs and governed for a number of Ferrior. 
gears by General Avitabile, who was the $ Burnea should have written Mo- 
terror of the Afghan8.-FB-rier. hamedsye, for Barukzye is the designa- 
t Poor dil Khan and Shere dil Khan tion of the entire triba.-Ferrier. 
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and i t  falls heaviest on the lower orders of the people. The chief 
is a man about thirty-fire ; he is ambitious, and at one time held 
the government of Kabul. H e  is well educated, and with good 
talents ; possesses an engaging manner, he reads and writes and 
transacts his business in person. He  has not the art  of settling 
disputes, and his court presents a scene of confusion which is 
hardly to be described or believed. The complainants intrude at  
all times and places, and state their grievances in the most free 
and republican manner, yet nothing is ever settled, and the popula- 
tion are heartily disaffected. Like Afghans, the chief of Peshawur 
and his relatives live from hand to mouth ; they are liberal of 
what they possess, and have no ~ e a l t h .  I have been informed that. 
they could not retain their government without this open-handed 
liberality. The chief of Peshawur has rallied round him some of 
the most celebrated of the Dooranee nation, who share his bounty. 
The  sons of Altram Khan, and the Moolrhtar o Doula, Shah 
Shooja's two ministers, a8 also one of the celebrated Mir Weis, are 
among the number ; the lat.kr is an officer of the chief of Peshawur. 
The only son of the Vizier Futteh Khan likewise resides with Sultan 
Mohamed Khan." * 
I t  has been stated that ~ a n d a h i r  had fallen into the hands 
of one of the Moharuedzyes, namely, the Serdar Poor dil Khan, 
immediately after the death of the Vizier Fethi Khan. This serdar 
had, like Sultan Mohamed Khan,. divided his 'principality into 
several districts which he had given to his half-brothers, Shere dil ' 
Khan, Kohendil Khan, RLthim dil Khan, and Mir clil Khan. 
Shere dil Khan, who had the reputation of being the bravest and 
the most enterprising of the surviving sons of Yayendeh Khan, had 
received from his brother. the command-in-chief of the army of 
Kandahar. Unfortunately this energetic man died while still 
young, in 1829 ; a few months after, his brother Poor dil Khan 
followed him to the tomb, and the power then reverted to their 
next eldest brother, Kohendil Khan. Such had been the paternal 
and enlightened administration of Poor dil Khan, that his successor, 
on whom the Randaharians had founded the same hopes, was by 
general acclamation placed at  the head of affairs. I t  would appear, 
however, by the following extract from Sir A. Burnes's work, that these 
hopes were not realized; for this is the opinion of that officer 
respecting the government of Kohendil Khan :- 
4 This serdar has left him, and has long resided at Kmdahar.-Ferrier. 
XIV. SIR A. BURXES ON TEE KANDAHAR CHIEFS. 193 
. - 16It has been already mentioned that Shere dil Khan * fled from 
Kabul to Kandahar, and fornled the present chiefship with the 
spoil of his nephew. H e  was a man of singular habits, in some 
respects resembling his brother Futteh Khan, but morose as well 
as cruel. They give an anecdote of his lopping off the finger of 
one of his boys, telling him a t  the same time, if he cried, that he 
could not be his child or a Barukzye. The young fellow bore it 
with great ptience. Shere dil Khan in his flight to Kandahar 
was accompanied by four brothers. H e  himself is since dead, as 
also one of his brothers. Kanclahar is now governed by Ko- 
hendil Khan, supported by his two surving brothers, Rahim dil 
and Mehr dil. The revenues amount to about eight lacs of 
rupees ; his force consists of 9000 horse and six pieces of artillery ; 
but as the city is situated in the heart of the nooranee country, 
and near. the native seat of the Barukzye family, he could perhaps 
increase his cavalry on an cmergency. 
"The government is not popular, nor would it appear from the 
acts of' oppression that it deserved to be so. The  chief is on bad 
terms with most of his neighbours. I n  common with all his family, 
he is inimical to Kaniran of Herat, and h a s  a t  different times 
attempted to seize that city. He is also a t  issue with the chief of 
Kabul. The  connesion between the Peshawur and Kandahar 
branches of the Rarultzyes is very close and secure ; but their 
united efforts will not, in all probability, injure their brother of 
Kabul. The Kandahar chief also seeks to form a settlement on 
the Indus; and has for several years past sent his troops to 
threaten Shikapoor in Scinde. The  Ameers of that country have 
been hitherto able to resist his attacks ; but, a s  there is an open 
and easy commtmication between Kandahar and the Indus by the 
Bolan pass, the chief is not likely to discontinue his endeavours in 
that quarter. In a disorganized state of Scinde he might easily 
possess himself of Shikapoor ; and such a state of events seems by 
no means improbable in the country of the Ameers. T h e  chief 
of Kandahar would gladly interest the ruler of the Punjab in  his 
cause ; but it is not probable that he will procure his assistance, 
as he himself looks upon Shikapoor with an eye of cupidity." 
* Gurnes apprars to .hnve thought tle facto ; but Poor clil Khan enjoyed by 
that Sbere dil Khan was the sovereign right the prerogatives of a sovereign, 
of I<nndahar; and this is notsurprising, which were never contested by his 
for Poor dil Khan gave up to him the brothers, and Shere dil Khan died 
entire direotion of affairs, and the without ever having positively reigned. 
A f g h m  considered him as their chief -Fen+er. 
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After having endeavoured to shorn the manner in which the 
principalities of Herat, Peshawur, and Ihndahar were constituted 
subsequcntly to the dismemberment of thc kingdom of the Suddozyes, 
i t  is desirable that we shouid throw a glance at  ICabul, the most 
wealthy and important of the Afghan provinces ; and let us in the first 
instance commence with its chief, Dost Mohamed Khan, who came 
forth victorious in 182 G from his conflict with Sultan Mohamed Khan. 
Dost Mohamed was the favourite byother of the Vizier Fethi 
Khan, and this predilection was not the 'effect of chance ; but in 
spite of the good qualities which were remarkable in the young and 
intrepid chieftain, he was certainly not exempt from the ordinary 
vices of the Afghans, though di~tinguished from them by superior 
intelligence and courage, which manifested itself in many heroic 
deeds when he was still a very young man. His manners were 
polished and attractive, and one felt irresistibly drawn towards 
him. The  preference evinced for him by Fethi Khan obtained 
him the hatred of his brothers ; nevertheless they affected to be 
anxious to pay their court to him to please the vizier, but when 
an  opportunity offered never failed secretly to play him some 
shabby trick. Dost Mohamed was not one to be made their dupe, 
but not wishing to irritate them he took no trouble to conceal 
his actions, and repaid them in kind a hundredfold for the evil 
he receifed ; this increased their hatred, which gave him very little 
concern, for, though brave soldiers, his brothers were far from 
possessing his capacity and resolution, and in the quarrels which 
ensued between them and him he was sure to have the upper hand. 
T h e  success which crowned all the projects of the Dost, and the 
tenacity with which he met these misunderstandings with his 
brothers, had procured him the sobriquet of Gurkek (the little 
wolf), a name by which he is distinguished amongst them at the 
present day. They were very ncarly all opposed to him when he 
vished to seize upon Icabul, and yet he triumphed over all their 
intrigues, and defeated them every time they came to blows. 
Directly his power was consolidated in the principality, he occupied 
himself in healing the wounds which so many intestine wars and 
revolts had inflicted on the country, and it soon felt the vivifying 
and paternal influences of his government. I t  is true that the 
small portion of the kingdom which had fallen to him did not 
allow of his raising a large army and subduing all the other 
provinces which had detached themselves from Kabul, like the 
Vizier Fethi Khan, but the finest prize in Afghanistan was still 
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within his grasp ; he had the good sense to be satisfiedwith it, and, 
instead of taking his revenge against his jealous and ambitious 
brothers, by dispossessing them of what they had, which he might 
easily have done, he preferred to leave them in quiet enjoyment of 
their conquests, and occupied himself in malting order, security, 
and abundance in his own territory succeed to the disasters of war 
and the conv~ilsive throes of revolution, Elis justice and equity 
were admitted by all, and he repressed violence without mercy from 
whatever side it arose. The rock upon which all the Afghan sove- 
re ign~ had made shipwreck up to this time was the insubordinat.ion 
of the serdars, who, having the power a ~ l d  influence over the warlike 
portion of the population, and possessing very productive fiefs which 
considerably lessened the revenues of the state, took advantage of 
these circumstances to agitate the public mind, and to change the 
sovereign as it suited their fancy; but the Dost soon niade it clear 
to them, and'at their cost, that it was as difficult as it was danger- 
ous for them to endeavour to throw off their allegiance to him. 
Without evincing any want of generosity, he obliged them to 
moderate their tyrannical conduct towards their dependants, and 
lend their support to the development of commerce and agri- 
culture, which he was anxious to improve amongst a people so 
idle, as well as to engender in their minds sentiments of a humane 
character. The great families submitted unwillingly in the first 
instance to this state of things ; but they thought that i t  was 
better to bend to a monarch who was generous, than to attempt 
revolts the issue of which must be at  the least uncertain, and 
which might again place tbem under the insecure and cruel 
despotism of the Suddozyes. But we have seen how Sir A. 
Burnes estimated the characters of the two brothers a t  Peshawur 
and Ihndahar, and it will not be out of place to give here the 
parallels which he has drawn between those chiefs and the state of 
their dependencies, and Dost Mohamed and the condition of Kabul. 
" In the year 1826 Kabul fell into the hands of Dost Mohamed 
Khan, the present chief, and a brother of the vizier Futteh Khan. 
Since then he has greatly extended and consolidated his power. 
H e  intrusts the town and dependencies of Ghuznee to a brother, 
and admits no one else to share his fortunes. The limits of the 
chiefship extend to Hindoo Koosh and Bamian. On the west i t  
is bounded by the hill country of the Hazarahs; to the south 
is Ghuznee, and to the east it stretches half way to Peshawur, 
terminating at the garden of Neemla. Much of the country is 
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mountainous ; i t  contains a large proportion of arable land which 
is most productive. I t  lies along the base of hills, and derives a 
richness from the soil washed from them. The  revenues of Kabul , . 
amount to eighteen lacs of rupees. Its military force is greater 
than any among the Afghans, since the chief retains a body of good 
horse, ~ v h ~  are  well mounted and acc,outred. He has also 2000 
infantry, with other auxiliaries, village troops, and a park of fourteen 
guns which are well served for a native state. This country is 
by nature strong and mountainous, though it has good roads 
through it. 
'' The  reputation of Dost Mohamed Khan is made known to a 
traveller long before he enters his country, and no one better merits 
the high character which he has obtained. H e  is unremitting in 
his attention to business, and attends daily at  the Court-house with 
the Kazee-o-Mollahs to decide every cause according to the law. 
T h e  Koran and its commentaries may not be the standard of legis- 
lative excellence ; but this sort of decision is exceedingly popular 
with the people, since it fixes a line, and relieves then1 from the,jus 
v n p m  azrt imynit.u-m of a despot. Trade has received the greatest 
encouragement from him, and he has derived his own reward, since 
the receipts of the Custom-house of the city have increased 
50,000 rupees, and now furnish him with a net revenue of two 
lacs per annum. One in forty, i.e. 24 per cent., is the only duty 
levied in his territory ; and the merchant may travel without guard 
or protection from one frollt,ier to another, an unheard of circum- 
stance in the time of the liings. The chief of Kabul, in his zeal for 
orthodox government, has deprived his subjects of the luxury of 
wine and spirits as being prohibited by his creed. Tlie enactment 
has driven the Jews and Armenians fi-om his comitry, since they I 
had  no other means to procure a subsistence. A good Mahom- 
medan ought not to regret the 10:s of such luxuries; but with this 
single exception I heard of no cowplaint against the rule of Dost 
Mohamed Khan. That chief, in common with many of the Afghan 
nation, was addicted in early lifc to wine and its concomitant vices. 
H i s  prohibition of them may be, therefore, capricious ; but he as 
well as his court hold out a bright example to the community. T h e  
justice of this chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes : 
the peasant rejoices a t  the absence of tyranny ; the citizen at  the 
safety of his home and the strict municipal regulations regarding 
weights and measures ; the merchant a t  the equit.y of the decisions 
and the protection of his property ; and the soldiers a t  the regular 
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manner in which their arrears are discharged. A man in power 
can have no higher praise. Dost Mohamed Khan has not attained 
his fortieth year ; his mother was a Persian, and he has been 
trained up with people of that nation, mhich has sharpened'his 
understanding, and given him advantages over all his brothers. . 
One is struck with the intelligence, knowledge, and curiosity which 
he displays, as well as his accomplishecl manners and address. 
H e  is doubtless the most powerful chief in Afghanistan, and may 
yet raise himself by his abilities to a much greater rank in his 
native country. 
c '  The differences which exist between Dost 3lohamed and his 
brothers lessen the influence of all parties, and would lay open the 
state to intrigue and faction if invaded. 'She family of Barulizye * 
have nothing to fear from any otller Afghan tribe, since they 
sur~~ass  all in numbers as much as in power.? The chiefs of 
Peshawur and Kandahar do not want the wish to injure their 
brother of Kabul, but they cannot accomplisl~ their purpose. Both 
of them have had a footing in Kabul, and l~o l r  with envy on the 
prosperity of Dost Mol~nmed Khm.  Both have emissaries at  his 
court,, who excite dist~rbance ; and both chesish hopes of rooting 
out one whom they consider it usurper. The  task will be found 
clifficult, for the chief of Kabul, besides the moderation and justice 
which secure him so many friends, enjoys an advantage in his 
Persian descent which will prove of material service to him in 
adversity. H e  holds the warlike clirn of Juwanshire in his interests, 
and tilltes every occasion to conciliate this tribe, which has so often 
turned the scale in favour of different pretendess to the throne. 
He  has acquired their language (the Turkish), and promoted their 
interests and wellbeing. 
" The Persians of ICabul amount to 12,000 families ; they reside 
in a separate quarter of the city, mhich keeps up an esprit tlc co lps  
among them; it also gives them a knowledge of their power 
which may prove s a l u t q  or prejudicial to the factions that divide 
the country according to circumstances. The state of fear which an 
enemy on both sides must inspire has had a bacl effect on Dost 
Mohamed Rhan's administration. FVith his o m  house as an 
* Mohnrned~ye.-Ferric),. consists of only four or five thousand 
t This is an arror into which B~wnes families. If it is the tribe of Barukzye 
has fallen; if it is the family o r  branch to  to  which he nlludes, it is probable that  . 
whichthesonsof PayendehIihanbelonqs i t  contains 45,000 or 55,000 familes.- 
that  he refers to, he should have men- Fe17.ier. 
tioned them aa Nohamedzyes, and that 
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object of care, hc is not likely to pursue conquests abroad, or 
retrieve the fallen state of Kabul. This alone deters him from 
taking Herat, the only province of the kingdom of Afghanistan 
nom lleld by a descendant of the royal family, and the Prince 
Ramran rules more from tolerance in his enemies than his own 
power. H e  receives no aid from his countrymen, since the whole of - 
the chiefs of Afghanistan are his enemies, and desire his destruc- 
tion, in revenge for the assassination of their brother Putteh Khan. 
Herat has, therefore, become a dependency of Persia. The town 
itself has of late been several times entered by the troops of that 
nation, and only spared by the ready tender of money on the part 
of its governor." I t  was threatened in September, 1633, by the 
Prince Royal in person, who made a pecuniary demand, and also 
required that the coinage of the city should be struck in the name 
of the Ring of Persia. I t  is probable that both these requests will 
be granted,t since Kamran would gladly hold his power on any 
terms. T h e  Persians do not appear to contemplate any permanent 
settlement in Rerat, since it would incur the expense of retaining 
a force that would diminish the tribute now gained from it. 
Ramran is said to be in possession of some of the crown jewels of 
Kabul, and derives a large revenue from Herat, which is situated 
in one of the most fertile countries of the world. By this wealth 
he is yet able to retain about his person some of the Afghan chiefs, 
and can raisc a body of 4000 or 5000 horse. He  has no political 
connexions in any quarter ; but still clings to the hope of being 
. 
able to re-establish the monarchy of his father. H e  has the 
. character of a cruel and tyrannical man, is destitute of friends, and 
odious to his countrymen. 
" The same causes which prevented Dost Mohamed from marching 
against Herat prevented him also from making some endeavo- 
to wrest Mooltan and Dera Ghazee Khan from the Sikhs. He last . 
year made a demonstration against Jellalabad, a district between 
Kabul and Peshawur, worth about seven lacs of rupees a year. 
H e  will probably annex it to his power, but until able to coerce 
or subdue either Peshawur or Kandahar, Dost Mohamed Khan 
cannot rise above a chief, or be aught than one among many in 
Afghanistan. I n  the present state of politics in that country he 
is nevertheless the most rising man in the Kabul dominions." 
* This is an error; the territory has t I have witnessed the contrary.- 
been entered, but the city not.-Ferrier.. Terriw. 
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C H A P T E R  XV. 
Shah Shooja takes up  arms against the Barukzyes - Dost Mohamed Khan marches 
to the relief of Kandhar-Shah Shooja receives a check - That sovereign is 
completely defeated- He retires to Keht  - Sultan 3lohnmed arrives at Kabul 
-ivIachinations of that serdar against Dost Moharued Khan - Resolution of 
the latter-The Dbst, now elected Emir, marches against. the Sikhs-Defeats 
them at Djamrood- Sir A. Burnes at Kabul -The English are hostile to 
Dost Mohamed-Sumner's account of the llussisna and the English in Asia 
- Mohamed Shah determines to invade HerclC -He is supported by the 
Russians. 
SUCH was the state of things when Burnes visited Kabul in 1832. 
The result of his opinion, as of my own, which is also that of the 
Afghans in  general, is that Rohendil Khan, the sovereign of 
' I h ~ d a h a r ,  had not the same superiority of mind as his brother, 
and was far from following in the same steps. The people were 
discontented with him, and he might have been reproached, 
as well a s  Sultan Mohamed Khan, who did not govern a t  
Peshamur a whit .better than he did, with sentiments of jealousy and 
hostility to  Dost Mohamed, whose enlightened and loyal g o ~ e ~ n -  
rnent they sought to  impede and ridicule in a manner little 
honourable to themselves. Ambition is an unfaithful mirror, which 
reflects things n~uch leas in their natural aspect than that in 
which mankind is pleased to colour characters and personal 
interests. With these perverted feelings, Kohendil Khan and 
Sultan Mohamed Ii han constantly pursued a. hostile line of con- 
duct towards their brother, who was desirous of being on the best 
terms with them; and they accused him, but without the least . 
reason, of wishing to seize their territories-there was danger 
for them it is true, but this danger was in another quarter. 
Sultan Mohamed Khan, already subdued by Runjeet Sing, was 
on the eve of being totally overthrown Ly the Maharadja, and, if 
Kohendil Khan did not succumb to him first, it was because he 
owed his preservation entirely to the generous support which he 
received from his brother Dost Mohamed Khan, as we shall now 
see. 
Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, although often beaten, had not re- 
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nounced his right to the throne. From the ~ e r i o d  at  which he was, 
for the first time, overthrown by Fethi Khan, he had made eight 
attempts to regain it by force of arms ; he failed-but his courage 
remained unshaken, and he had succeeded in interest.ing the 
Anglo-Indian goverument in his fate. They required a sovereign 
in  Afghanistan devoted to their views, but, afraid to assist him 
openly, the Governor-General supported his cause with some Sikh 
regiments, with which, through his intervention and promises of 
concession of territory on the part of Shah Shooja, Runjeet Sing 
agreed to furnish the Suddozye prince. This fact has been 
proved by the letters of Sir Claude Wade, s t  that time political 
agent a t  Loodiann, which letters were found amongst the baggage 
of Shah Shooja-001-Moolli after his defeat ; a good many anlongst 
them were addressed to some of the Afghan serdara. The British 
agent excited these chiefs to revolt, and assured them that his 
government would lrnom how to appreciate the support that they 
might give to their legitimate sovereign. 
I n  January, 1834, Shah Shooja quitted Loodiana; in the month 
of May he crossed the Indus, and, in the first instance, seized upon 
Sliiliapoor, belonging to  the Emirs of Scinde, but to which he 
laid claim. R e  then marched towards Kandahar a t  the head of 
an army of 22,000 Afghans and Hindostanees, the latter drilled, 
and manceuvring on the European system, and observing its 
discipline, some of them being deserters from the Company's 
service. 
Kohendil Khan, having assembled in haste what troops he could 
collect, marched to meet the Iring as far as the valley of Pisheen 
to close the passage, but he was defeated and obliged to make a 
rapid retreat on Kandahar, whence he despatched messenger 
after messenger to inform Dost Mohamed of the storm which 
had burst upon him. On the reception of this news the chief of 
Kabul made the following reply : " Whenever you are menaced 
let me know, and, as I am your enemy now, so I will be your 
friend then." After which, forgetting the just complaints which 
he had against this ungrateful brother, lie remembered only the 
ties of kindred and blood which united them, and hurried to his 
assistance with his army. But, before setting out, he despatched 
an officer to Sir Claude Wade to ascertain from him if it was true 
that the Shah was openly supported by his government? that if 
his reply was in the affirmative, he should think about i t ;  if, on . 
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the contrary, i t  was in the negative, he should fight. The political 
agent of the Company replied that the Indian government had 
taken no part in the expedition, but that Shah Shooja had its best 
wishes for his success. 
The "best wishes" of the English government. did not stop 
Dost Mohamed ; his march, which he had delayed in order that he 
might receive the reply of Sir Claude Wade, he now hastened ; and 
it was indeed high time that he should arrive a t  Kandahar, for Shah 
Shooja had taken up a position between the old and the.new city, 
and pressed the siege closely. The ground from which he opened 
his attack was intersected by numerous watercourses and covered 
with large gardens, enclosed with mud walls, in which the soldiers ' 
rnade many gaps to pass through; and these obstacles were far 
from favourable to the manccuvlw of cavalry, of which arm the 
greater part of both armies was composed ; nevertheless, conflicts 
took place daily on both sides in these labyrinths. The encounters 
mere the more murderous, inasmuch as the combatants, surrounded 
by walls, preferred being killed on the spot to yielding one inch 
of ground, and such closc fighting soon weakened both parties. 
Shah Shooja had great difficulty in repairing his losses, though the 
advantage on the whole was on his side, and on the 29th of June, 
1834, he made a general assault upon the place. His troops 
displayed great bravery ; four times repulsed, four times they 
returned to the aaault, but a t  last they were obliged to retreat, 
leaving the ditches of the town filled with their dead and mounded. 
The Dost's army arrived at  this juncture, and from that day Shah 
Shooja was under a double disadvantage, for he was obliged 
to divide his forces to repel the sorties of the besieged commanded 
by Kohenclil Khan, and the attack of the Dost in his rear. 
This war, or rather this butchery, lasted during fifty-four days, 
and the Afghans affirm that 16,000 men were lrilled before the 
place. 
After having lost a pitched battle against Dost Mohamed Khan, 
Shah Shooja fought only to clear a passage for himself and his troops, 
and make good his retreat to Shiliapoor; but hotly pursued by 
t)e Mohamedzyes, he was cut off from his communications, and 
thrown back upon the interior of the kingdom. Soon after he was 
b. abandoned by his soldiers, and had only fifty horsemen with him 
1 when be arrived a t  I-Ierat, and demanded a refuge and hospitality 
of the Shah Kanlran ; but his nephew, who never loved him, and 
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was afraid that he might intrigue with a view of supplanting him, 
refused him permission to enter the city. The defeated Shah 
was therefore obliged to retire upon Furrah, through the arid 
deserts of Beloochistan. What  he suffered in traversing its parched 
and burning sands, under the scorching rays of the sun, without 
food or water, wanting in short everything, is incredible, and the 
Mohamedzyes, who pursued him, were on the point of taking him 
prisoner a t  the moment he entered Kelat Nassir and Tas safe 
from further rnolcstation. The Emir of this town had freed himself 
from the Afghan dominion during his reign, but he received him 
hospitably, and furnished his guest with the means of gaining 
Loodiana in a manner suitable to his rank. Here he again 
resided, pensioned by the English, who reserved him for a new 
invasion in which he subsequently lost his life, and England met 
with the greatest disaster that she was ever called upon to register 
in the military annals of her Indian empire. n 
Mohamed Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohamed 
Khan, distinguished himself, in the campaign that had just - 
terminated, by a courage which might almost be termed fool- 
hardy, and military talents which even then gave indications of 
v h a t  his future career might be. 
This victory definitively confirmed the Mohamedzyes in the 
possession of eastern Afghanistan ; but, instead of profiting by it to 
strengthen their position, it became the signal for fresh dissensions 
amongst them, the result of which was the recall of Shah Shooja 
, 
a few years later, supported by an English army. While Dost 
Mohamed Khan was gone to assist his brother against this expa- 
triated sovereign, Sultan Mohamed Khan had been removed from . 
his government of Peshawur by Runjeet Sing ; forced, therefore, 
to retire to Jellalabad, he, with a view of remedying this re- 
verse, thought he might profit by the absence of Dost Mohamed 
Khan to seize Kabul. His  two brothers, Pir Mohamed Khan 
and Syud Mohamed Khan, joined him in this enterprise, which 
they had already commenced when they heard of the victory the 
Dost had gained a t  Kandahar and at  the same time his return 
to Kabul. They therefore remained some days undecided as to 
what line they should adopt; but the success of theil- plan being, 
to say the least, doubtful, and they not as yet committed to 
it, they gave up the project, petended to feel an ardent desire 
to be on the most friendly terms with their victorious brother, and 
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went boldly to meet the Dost to congratulate him on a success 
which, as it annihilated d l  their hopes, they cursed from the 
bottom of their hearts. Although informed of their faithless 
Dost Mohamed thought it would be better to leave 
them to think that he was ignorant of their schemes, imagining 
that in acting thus he might bring their dissensions to a close. 
H e  received his brothers, therefore, with courtesy and all the 
appearance of sincere friendship, and spared nothing to attach them 
to his cause. Moreover, directly he returned to ICabnl he deter- 
mined to revenge the affront which had just been put upon them by 
Runjeet, and proclaimed a holy war against the Sikhs ; neverthe- 
less, before undertaking it, he was desirous of exalting himself in 
the eyes of the Afghans, and received from a council, composed of 
the serdars of the principality, the title of Sovereign Prince. 
Mir Vaez, the grand Mollall of Kabul, proclaimed him Emir ool 
Moarnerime," and on this occasion repeated the same form of 
cerem~nial that had been used at  thc coronation of Ahmed Shah 
and his successors. When the festivities of his enthronement 
were over he sent 0000 horse against the Sikhs commanded by 
one of his brothers, but, as they obtained only a doubtful success, 
he left Kabul and placed himself at their head ; the Afghans were 
encouraged by his arrival, but the result was not more fortunate 
than before. This was owing to the intrigues of Sultan Mohamed 
Khan and his brothers, who were negotiating secretly with Runjeet 
Sing ; and the Emir Dost Mohamed, having convinced hi~nself 
of this fact, abandoned the war, which could only be disastrous 
to him, and returned to Kabul. There he occupied himself in rein- 
forcing his army, intending to enter a t  some f u t ~ r e  time upon an- 
other campaign, with greater chances of success, which were not to 
be hoped for so long as Sultan Mohamed Khan was ready to play 
the traitor. 
All the public functionaries of whose fidelity the Dost mas not 
perfectly sure were now dismissed; he made his sons governors 
of the various provinces and districts, and further intrigues failed 
in consequence of the wise measures which he adopted. Sultan 
Mohamed Khan and his two brothers, seeing that they were wholly 
powerless in Kabul, threw themselves completely into the hands of 
Runjeet Sing, who appointed the former governor of Rota, a 
* Commander of the Faithful.-limrier. 
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fortress in thc north of the Punjab, the inhabitants of which were 
for the most part iV1ohamedans. 
The Sikhs, finding that Dost Nohamed hesitatecl to renew the 
attack, mistook his discretion for fear, and Haree Sing, governor 
of the Maharadja at Peshawur, threatened some villages depend- 
ant on I<abul, and was guilty uf numerous exactions against. the 
Afghans of that country. The Emir, wearied with all these 
annoyances, declared war against Runijeet, and gave the command 
of his army to his sons Nohamed Efzel Khan and Mohamed 
9 k b a r  Khan, wit,h orders to advance immediately against the 
Sikhs. This time fortune declared in favour of the Afghans. They 
attacked their enemies at  Djamrood, near the entrance of .the 
Khyber Pass, to which they had advanced, and defeated them 
completely ; their general, I-Iaree Sing, being killed in this battle. 
T h e  Emir, who evinced great inoderation after his victo~y, respected 
the territory of his enemy, and claimed the intervention of Lord 
Aucltla~~d, Governor-General of the British possessions in India. 
H e  demanded that the Indus should for the future be the line of 
demarcation between the two states, and consented on this con- 
dition to abandon Cashmeer to the Sikhs for ever, though it was 
an  ,Afghan province, and the majority of the population were his 
countrymen. Lord Auckland rejected these reasonable poposi- 
tions; and, in his reply, left Dost Mohamed only a hope that 
Runjeet Sing wonld be requested by him to restore the govern- 
ment of Peshawur to his brother, Sz~ltun n/[U/mrned Khan ; adding, 
that he could not, consistently with the friendly relations existing 
between the Maharadja and the East India Company, force him to 
inalie a restitution, the legitimacy of which was, in his eyes, a 
questionable point. Burnes was sent to I h b u l  to make known 
this decision of his Excellency t,o Dost Moharned ; and the Emir 
naturally preferred leaving Pesha5qur to Runjeet, to seeing it 
again in the hands of his mortal enemy, Sultan Mohamed I k n .  
I t  was about this time that the army of Mohamed Shah, king of 
Persia, marched against Herat, and the Emir was far from 
desirous of forming a treaty with that sovereign, for all his 8ym- 
pathies were with the English, and he had done everything in his 
power to enter into a sincere alliance with the East India Corn- 
pany ; but Messieurs the Directors would listen to nothing ; they 
had admitted as a principle, that the consolidation and extension 
of Runjeet Sing's power, under their immediate protection, was 
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a counterpoise against every evil that could happen to them, and 
every advantage the Russians could gain arising from the Treaty 
of Turlcomantchai signed between the latter power and Persia in 
1827. Hence arose the tenacity with which the East India Com- 
pany supported the i~ivasioris of the Mahdradja and rejected the 
loyal concessions of the Emir Dost Mohamed, who from that 
moment had no other hope of safety than by allying himself with 
Russia and Persia. 
Let us not, hom-ever, anticipate, but come to that famous siege 
of Herat, which was nearly altering the status of every country in 
Ccntral Asia. Almost all those persons who have wntten on the 
changes which it occasioned during the last few years in Afghan- 
istan have allowed n party spirit more or less strong, with which, 
God be praised, the author has nothing to do, to influence their 
opinions. Merely a traveller in the country, my constant aim was 
to search for truth, and to speak it with impartiality ; having no 
political interest to defend, nor dignity or diplomatic pride to 
maintain, free from constraint, and having been able to lllix 
with a11 classes of the population, information came to me from 
all sides, and many fresh cilmmstances were revealed to me. I n  
adding them to those already linown, I have given a sketch of the 
whole, and endeavoured to make it as accurate as posslble with 
respect to the events that have recently talcen place in Central 
Asia. T o  attain this object with the greater certainty, I have 
selected finom amongst the narratives, which have hitherto appeared, 
those which seemed to me to contain the most exact detail of facts, 
borrowed from them whatever appeared to be true, and rejected all 
I that seemed open to the suspicion of a single doubt. 
1 The extracts are from the text of these authorities, which could 
not gain by a transformation of style, and the information that I 
have collected is added. I shall begin by giving the reader 
an idea of what were the respective positions of the English 
and the Russians in Asia, at  the time the siege of Hcrat was 
undertaken, but a reservation is necessary on my part. Though 
assenting to the mode in which the writers whose works I am 
about to make use of, and who have examined matters to the 
8 
core, have appreciated them, I do not intend to be responsible 
for any remarlrs that can \round the susceptibility of any 
nation which is the subject of them. My object is to makc known 
i facts without malice or prejudice, to give these facts impartially, 
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with simply their historical interest attached to them, and not to 
recriminate against any individual whatever. The  first quotation 
is taken from a work by Mr. George Sumner of Boston, who 
seems to me to have treated what relates to the English in a 
manner which is tolerably satiifactory. The following is his 
opinion :- 
I t  has been generally thought that the war made on the 
Afghans by the English was to be attributed to a fear of the 
encroachments of, and invasion by, Russia, but it has since been 
aclmowledged that this fear was only a chimera. Let us examine 
this question. First, to make the subject more clear, we mill 
speak of the position of England in the East : there we see an 
immense empire, with more than 100,000,000 of subjects, a large 
army, large revenues, and towns containing a million of inhabitants, 
entirely under the control and government of a company of 
merchants and capitalists, who, tranquilly seated behind their ' 
counters, give their instructions and orders to their agents, and in 
less than eighty years have succeeded in raising a power which - 
seems almost to equal that of Alexander or Tamerlane. 
" T h e  condition in  which they found the various states of India 
was no doubt exceedingly favourable to the increase of this empire ; 
but another cause, tending almost equally to that increase, was the 
vast field that it opened to talent of every description, and the 
facility that every able officer, however low his rank or position, 
there found of at.taining wealth and distinction, by cou&geously 
devoting himself to the interests of those whom he served. 
" I t  ought to be remarked, in speaking of the facility with which 
India was subjugated, that the plan of conquest adopted a t  the corn- . 
mencement by Clive, and since constantly folloved by the English, 
did not originate with them. I t  was conceived by the French 
General Dupleix, when that talented officer commanded a t  
Madras. His proposition to the French government was imme- 
diately rejected, and drew upon its author reproaches that the most 
recent biographers have not endeavoured to remove-indeed they 
have continued t.hem. It was to employ only a smal  number of 
European troops in the conquest of India, and to take advantage 
of the dissensions amongst the princes and rajahs of the country, 
to foment discord in their different states, and, finally, to assist 
any one of them who, after his success, showed a disposition to 
become a docile instrument in the hands of the nation that had 
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supported him. Divide et impera. By adopting this plan the East 
India Company has morltecl' by degrees to the north and north-west, 
invading, one after the other, princes, rajahs, and emirs, and even 
the Great Mogul himself had to accept their alliance and submit 
to their rule. The Company has occupied Delhi, the capital of 
the empire of Aurungzebe, crossed the Sutlej, rendered tributary 
the sovereign of Lahore, and has travelled thus far without knowing ' 
when or where it ought to stop, until it found itself face to face 
with anot.her power, of which the mind was as active and the 
resources as great, of which the interest and capability of advancing 
southwards were just as unlimited as those of England acting in the 
opposite direction-that power is Russia. 
" When the expedition of the Shah of Persia against Herat, in 
1835 and 1836, was determined upon, the northern limit of the 
states belonging to the English, and paying taxes to them, was 
the river Sutlej, which flows south-west, and joins the Indus a t  a 
distance about 200 miles north of Delhi. 
" Beyond, and in the delta formed by the Sutlej and the Indus, 
is the Punjab, the kingdom of the Sikhs, with their remarkable 
sovereign, Runjeet Sing of Lahore. R e  had hastened to treat with 
the British government in 1832 ; Burnes said of him that he 
might be regarded as one of the most faithful allies of the English, 
and the Maharadjah proved this by joining with them against the 
Afghans. 
" Crossing the kingdom of Runjeet, we come to the unhappy 
country of Afghanistan, which witnessed the recent disasters of the 
British army. To  the north of Ihbul,  the capital of that province; 
extends a portion of the Himalaya range of mountains, across 
which, in summer, there are a t  least two passes open to caravans, 
leading direct to the Khanats of Badakshane, Balkh, and Bokhara. 
With these Russia has formed great commercial interests, but the 
government of that country pretends that she has not yet any well- 
established political relations there. 
'' From Kandahar, another city in Afghanistan, the road is open 
towards Herat, on the Persian frontiers, and, passing through Persia, 
we reach the Caspian Sea and the southern boundary of Russia. 
Between Afghanistan and Russia then there is on onk side, besides 
the three IGanats that we have mentioned, a vast extent of deserts, 
and on tho other sidk is Persia, which, like Turkey, seems scarcely 
to have forgotten its past spleudour and ancient.renown. This 
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nation, enfeebled within and powerless without, has become more 
and more tottering, and seems ready to fall before the first enemy 
who shall attack her with vigour. 
Thus it is evident that the country of Afghanistan, of which 
Europe thought very little 6fty years ago, is without doubt destined 
to be the theatre of important events, on which the powers of 
Central Asia will be tested, and their destiny decided. 
a It was in Afghanistan, that Alexander the Great, on his 
march towards the Indus, stopped to rest his soldiers, who ate 
with delight the refreshing fruits of the villages in which we 
now find Ik~bul .  Through it also passed Ghengiz Khan and 
Tamerlane, when they undertook their expeditions to India. On 
this distant point is now fixed the atte~ltion of the two great 
countries, who look upon it as the pivot on which, in some degree, 
must turn their respective interests in India. Count Nesselrode, 
in a despatch of October 20th, 1838, recommended England to . 
respect Afghanistan. ' Great Britain and Russia,' said he, ' can have 
but one desire, that of maintaining peace in Central Asia, and 
supporting the independence of the peoples who are the legitimate 
possessors and the a~icient inh;~bitants.' 
" T h e  friend of England, Runjeet Sing, was not arrested in his, 
progress by this manifestation on the part of one of the greatest 
powers of Asia. He had.already committed depredations in Afghan- 
istan, reduced Peshawur to a state of vassalage, and prepared other 
more hostile movements towards the south-east. When the Shah 
of Persia, remembering that his dominions had in former times ex- 
tended to Delhi, determined to recover or reduce Herat (which ha.d 
been part of his legitimate possessions, and which is the capTtal of 
that province of Afghanistan situated farthest to the north-west), 
he was probably instigatedJo attempt this reassumption of his ancient 
rights by Count Simonich, then Russian minister at  Teheran ; a t  . 
least i t  was supposed so." 
T h e  position of the English in India, and the tendency of 
their future policy, are clearly set forth in this extract; but i t  
would not be of much interest if i t  were not followed by a 
sketch of the Russian policy in Central Asia. This question was 
considered in 1843, in a monthly review, by " A. Chodslco," 
who has proved himself as well informed as the philologist of 
Boston. After having rapidly traced the efforts which had been 
made by the cabinet of S t .  Yetersburgh to render its policy 
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dominant in Europe, and, above all, in Turkey, the writer turns 
his attention to Asia, and unfolds, with startling truth, the suc- 
cessive invasions of the Colossus of the North on that continent. 
The reviewer commences by citing the opinion of a contemporary 
historian : " Vainly," say Les~w, " were the dangers pointed out 
of permitting this intrusion of an enslaved and barbarous people 
into the system of European politics ; Russia has been elevated as 
much by the errors of others as by her own genius. The last treaties 
with Turkey, Persia, and the powers assembled at Vienna, have 
established her dominion on the right bank of the Danube, at  the 
extremity of the Gulf of Bothnia, and from the Vistula to Kam- 
tchatka. She commands the Black Sea, she suffers none but hcr 
own armed flag to float over the Caspian, and the shrine of the 
Kadjars is placed under her protection." After this quo tation 
1 
i the reviewer continues : " Subsequently to the year 1819 Russian 
agents left Tiflis, envoys to the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. Their 
instructions were to obtain the abrogation of the trade in slaves, 
and to announce their mission as the accomplishment of a great 
duty on the part of the head of the Russian empire. Russia, who 
had generally imposed slavery upon civilized nations, pretended 
to restore liberty to slaves, and she knew not how to proceed 
otherwise than by the sword : she threntened to conquer. The 
Autocrat expected the refusal that his envoys returned with, but 
he wished to give a colour to the war for which he was prcpar- 
ing, and his battalions were already marching from Tiflis upon 
Orenburg. Their reports also informed the Emperor Alexancler 
that his projects against Turkestan were premature; he could not 
ensure his object until he had deprived Yersia of the states she 
I possessed on the borders of the Caspian Sea, and that conquest I could not be attempted without further success against Turkey. But the patient constancy with which Russia carries on her schemes 
1 is well known ; aggression against Turkey would dissipate any sus- 
picions that might arise, while an invasion of Persia would only 
confirm them. The disposition of the Greeks to revolt was therefore 
encouraged, and Alexander showed himself again in the character 
of defender of an oppressed people. But he contented himself 
I with pleading their cause with the Sultan ; and several influential 
'I personages of his court having endeavoured to turn to their ad- 
vantage the discussions that arose in 1823 with the Forte, to  
provoke a rupture, the Emperor sent them into exile. 
P 
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" The  long looked for epoch for the achievcrnent of the project to. 
the accomplishment of which all his intrigues had been directed, 
arrived in 1524. In  the spring of that year he saw the ambassadors 
of the Khirghizes arrive a t  his court to render him homage 
as the supreme chief of the Tartars. In  virtue of this title he 
granted them a code of civil laws,-drawn up in the Russian language 
and in the language of their country ; this he bestowed upon them 
in consequei~ce of their having acknowledged themselves vassals of 
his empire ; the Emperor also promised to visit tlicm, and did in 
fact very soon after set out for Orenburg. 
" Such was the rash and inconsiderate contempt of tlie nations of 
the west for the people whom they called the barbarians of Asia, 
that this step on the part of Alexander occasioned no suspicion. 
The country of the Khirghizes att,racted no attention, though it wa.s 
the very same kingdom of Iiharism, forinerly so powerful, and 
which once entirely ruled Central Asia. 
" A brilliant reception awaited the Tzar at Orenburg. The 
khans of the nlost distant tribes came there to acknowledge their 
prince, and proclaim aloud his sovereignty. The Russian journals 
were filled with accounts of the homage which the numberless 
hordes scattered over Asia came to ofier to their new chief. 
Thcy had bestowed upon him, as formerly on their celebrated 
Temondjine, the Tartar surname which signifies T h e  Greutest- 
Djenghis. 
" T h e  Emperor soon quitted Orenburg to visit some of the 
Khirghiz hordes, and was satisfied that he should find in then1 all 
the submission. that lie could expect from their nomadic habits. 
" Alexander went again to Orenburg in 1825, and took the 
empress, then an invalid, with him, intending to leave her at  
Tangarsk, the climate of which place, the mildest in Russia, would, 
it was hoped, re-establish her health : but as, on the contrary, she 
grew worse, he would not quit her. I t  was then that he was 
attacked by the mysterious malady which had a1rea.d~ carried to 
the grave his father, the Emperor Paul, and which also terminated 
his own life, for he had drawn upon himself the same enemies. 
"Everything was in readiness for the Persian war, and the com- 
mencement of it was in the following year the first act of his suc- 
cessor; it might therefore from that moment be concluded that 
Nicholas was worthy to continue the policy of Alexander. The 
rupture of the treaty of Gulistan appeared to be the worl~ of 
I 
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Persia, and the conjecture might be read in the papers that she 
was emboldened to that step by the secret intervention and pro- 
mises of England. 
The treaty of Turl<omantchai, of which the preliminaries were 
signed November 3rd, 1827, was the res~dt of this clever comedy. 
Russia acquired two khanats which in a military point of view com- 
manded the Persian provinces, occupied the countries south-west 
of t,he Caspian Sea, and succeeded to the rights which Persia had 
preserved over that Turlromania which had been the ancient 
kingdom of Samarcand. These rights were of the same nature as 
t.hose recognised by the Khirghizes, and became much stronger, 
being thenceforth exercised by the acknowlcdged chief of the 
Tartar nation. 
" Nevertheless, whatever dangers were- revealed, the blindness of 
England continued and manifested itself by the impolitic battle of' 
Navarino, in which the Turkish navy was almost entirely de- 
stroyed. The result of it was the treaty of Adrianople, arid after- 
wards that of Uilltiar Skelessi, which confirmed to the Emperor 
Nicholas his preponderating influence in Turkey. 
" The  successor~of Alexander then appeared sure of the expected 
triumph of the policy so long followed in Asia. His numerous 
army was concentrated upon Orenburg, and orders were given 
for the opening of the campaign in the first fine weather of 1831, 
when the insurrection in Poland suddenly obliged him to march 
his troops to the Vistula. 
"The British ministry was the first that opened its eyes, as is 
proved by its intrigues to cause, though prematurely, the breaking 
out of the rebellion ; .and it sacrificed that unf?rtunate people to 
its own safity, by hurrying them into action to avoid being taken 
a t  a disadvantage itself. 
!. c c  Taking immediate measures for the protection of the Indian Empire, of which the chiefs, absorbed in commercial calculations, 
had too much neglected the political interests, the ministry ad- 
dressed to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, fresh instruc- 
tions ; and it was a t  this time that 'Captain Conolly and Lieute- 
nant Burnes were sent on their respective journeys. The first 
started from St. Petersburg to pass through the countries of the 
Khirghizes, Turlrestan, and Persia, while the second left Delhi to 
explore Afghanistan, Bokhara, and Persia. Burnes had already 
shown great capability in other expeditions, but the object of his ' 
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travels was not dissembled. I t  was evident that his purpose was 
to investigate the intrigues of the Russians, and the extent to 
which their efforts to lay the foundations of political power in 
Turkestan, under the n.ppearance of commercial intercourse, had 
succeeded. Burnes allowed it to be seen that he was convinced 
the project of marching an army across so much arid and unculti- 
vated steppe was impracticable ; but the passage of his narrative 
in which he insists with the greatest force upon this assertion 
suffices to prove that he had presented Lord Auckland with notes 
and information to the contrary. Here follows the passage : 
' When one has met with and felt such a horrible scarcity of 
water, and found pasture for the horses so difficult to obtain, oph- 
thalmia so prevalent, and so many other impediments, it will be 
understood that this desert can with difficulty be crossed even by 
a few squadrons of light cavalry. But who would think of crossing. 
i t ?  I f  the descendants of the Scytl~ians and the Parthians have 
the pretension to enter upon this conflict, they can do so without 
exciting much attention from Englishmen.' If the traveller 
thus deluded himself; one may be allowed to think that his Bri- . 
tish pride had strangely blinded him. What difficulty could 
there be in procuring water in a country from which the river 
had only been turned aside ? What obstacles could hinder tI:e 
raising of forage in  a country lately so fertile and of which the 
sterility" was so recent ?"t 
This sketch gives a very accurate idea of the object the Tzar 
had in extending his dominion towards the south ; it is atonishing 
therefore that the English Government should have been alarmed 
a t  the project formed by the Shah of Persia, under the advice of 
Russia, to sieze Herat. MTe will admit, like many other persons, 
and as several newsplpers have done, that the possibility of a 
Russian expedition to India is a chimera. if we had based our 
opinion, as there is everything to lead us to suppose these writers 
did, on the authority of Burnes ; but as the Goverllment at  CaI- 
cutta knew very well that the obstacles were not so serious as this 
* The district of Merv .here spoken the spring grass and water are to be 
of was ravaged by the  Tartars and fomd everywhere in the deserts of 
Usbeks in 1786. Ehivn a d  Bokhara. The facility with 
t The critic is perfectly correct in which a Russiw expedition could thus 
his remarks upon Hurnes, and, had he reach India has been shown in 'Caravan 
possessed more information, he might Jonrneys.'-lierrio.. 
have added, that in t he  winter and in 
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officer wished them to believe, the Governor-General in Council 
was right to take precautions ,against any invasion which could be 
from the north of Europe into central Asia. H e  ought 
indeed to have done this with more energy at the outset, and kith 
less delay, by which means he would have avoided many diploma- 
tic embarrassments, and many iniportant disasters, the wounds 
from which will not be healed for a long space of time, though, 
without doubt, England gained her object. Herat has remained 
independent, and Russia has retired within the limits st,ipdated in 
the treaty of Turkomantchai, while England has brought her 
frontier up to the west bank of the Indus, and passed that river at 
two points ; Pesfiawur i11 the north, and Shikapoor in the south, 
are two tztes-de-pont which cover the principal approaches t o  the 
river, and menace the Afghans. But let us not anticipate. 
Fll:ST DIPLOLIX'I'IC DISCUSSIONS 
CHAPTEIZ XVI. 
First diplomatic discussions relative to the siege of Herat --Mr. Ellis is succeeded 
by Mr. ?&'Neil - The Persians invade the principality of Herat - The minister 
of the Shnh plays n double game - Captnin Eldred Pottinger at Herat- 
Russian officem in the Persian camp - Samoun Khan - Colonel Elaremberg - 
Geueral Eorotiski -Colonel Semineau-Siege of Oorian - Recrimination against 
the latter officer - Russian und English agents in the Persian camp - Their 
hostility against Colonel Seluineau- Opentions at the siege of Gorian-Fall 
of the place - Shere Mohamed Khan - Yar Mohsmed's reply to his brother - 
Duration of the siege. 
IT has been already remarked that the idea of laying siege to 
Herat for the purpose of effectually putting a stop to the incur- 
sions of the I-Ieratees on the Persian territory, and forcing Kamran 
to pay tribute, originated with Mohamed Shah, but it should be said 
that immediately the subject was made known to the Russian Go- 
vernment it met with its eager s ~ ~ p p o r t  and encouragement; not 
because the views of Russia extended a t  that period so far as to 
undertake an invasion of British India, for she was not then in the 
least prepared for so great an enterprise, but because she ever 
obeys that spirit of forecast, evolteil by Peter the Great, which 
always leads her, whenever an opportunity presents itself, to extend 
her 'infl~ience in the direction of the Indus, as she did not long ago 
to the.  banks of the Bosphorus a t  Constantinople. At that time 
the Russians were contented ,with t,he possessions which they held 
in Asia, but they could not, as clever politicians, see without 
jealousy the successive invasions of England ; they therefore forced 
her to extend her frontiers out of all reason, exciting her fears 
by demonstrations of an ambitious character, hoping by that 
means to make her consume with greater rapidity the immense 
resources a t  her command, and to irritate the numerous peoples she 
has subjected, who serve her much more from a sentiment of fear 
than because they are habituated to, or love, her rule. 
T h e  projects of Mohamed Shah on Herat beg,zn to see the 
light about the cornmencement of 1835. Mr. Ellis, then British 
minister a t  the court of Teheran, at once informod his government 
of the fact by pointing out the active part which the Russian 
minister in Persia, General Sinwitch, had taken in connexion 
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with the resolution which had been formed by the Persian 
monarch. The British Ambassador danced atttendance in the 
diplomatic antechamber eighteen months to persuade Lord 
Palmerston, the Foreign Ninister of Her Majesty, of tlie com- 
$city manifested by Russia in this war, which was evidently 
undertaken with views hostile to England. I t  was in vain Mr. 
Ellis informed his Lordship that, after having offered his mediation 
to smooth the rnisunclerstanding eis t ing between the Shah of 
Persia and the sovereign Prince of Herat, the Persian Government 
had refused to allow Major Todd, the officer attached to his mis- 
sion, t,o be the hearer of his letter to Shah Icamran ; and that he 
was obliged to place it in the hands of the Persian authorities 
in order that it might reach its destination; in other words, to 
besubmitted to the supervision and control of Russian agents. 
The British minister further stated that Count Simonitch openly 
encouraged the war against Herat, that each day he hastened 
forward the preparations as well as the concentration of troops at 
Teheran, promising, in the name of his government, subsidies of all 
kinds and even the support of some Russian regiments. I t  was 
equally useless that, under the profound impression that he foresaw 
a very serious misfortune impending over his country, Mr. Ellis 
wrote to his superior thus :-"I have the complete conviction that 
the English Governmellt cannot permit the extension of the Persian 
Empire, in the direction of Afghanistan, without placing the interior 
tranquillity of British India in danger. This extension will bring 
Russian influence to the very tlxeshold of our Indian Empire ; and 
as Persia will not, or dare not, enter into a sincere alliance with 
England, our policy for the future should be to consider her not as  
a barrier which covers India, but as the first parallel from whence 
the assault will be given." 
Lord Pdinersto~~" was not much moved or affected by this infor- 
mation: his policy at  that time was not anti-Russian, and he 
persisted in seeing in the reports of his subordinate a t  Teheran, 
only, and perhaps unreasonably, timid anticipations which nothing 
could justify. Left without instructions, obliged very frequently to 
have recourse to his recollection as to what the English policy had 
* An article from the pen of Mons. able information on facts relating t o  
A. Thomas, in the 'Revue des Deux these negotiations.-Fwrier. 
Moncles,' has furnished me with valu-- 
been during his service in India, to enable himself to make a few 
feeble remonstrances to Mohamed Shah, and almost always cen- 
sured by his chief for the fears which be expressed, the unfort~mate 
Nr.  Ellis did not know what part he was to play a t  Teheran. 
The  minister of Russia, on the contrary, always advanced boldly 
in the warlike policy which he connselled, and had driven the Shah 
to carry on : supported by his government he d q e d  everything, and 
his most trifling wishes were accepted as orders by the Court of 
Teherau. If Lord Palmerston, pressed by Mr. Ellis, was hardy . 
enough to make a few weak remoiistrauces to the cabinet of St. 
Petersbnrg, Monsieur de Nesselrode denied facts as clear as the 
sun, and it was almost by menaces that he replied to the constant 
demands of the English minister that a good understanding should 
exist between the two governments upon the affairs of Persia. The 
noble Lord, deceived by Russian duplicity, considered it a crime in 
his minister at  Teheran to have seen too well and appreciated too 
clearly the state of t.llings there. The Prime Minister had been 
disturbed at a moment when the Russian alliance was without 
doubt necessary to him, as a balance, and he could not make up 
his mind to open his eyes to an event and give his attention to a 
subject which took him by surprise and deranged his plans. 
T h e  correspondence of the Foreign Office relative to this affair . 
is nothing more than a series of reproaches upon what Lord 
Palmerston then denominated chimerical ideas, which his subor- 
dinate had conceived respecting General Simonitch ; his Lordship 
requests Mr. Ellis to act in concert with that diplomatist, respecting 
whose intentions, so far as he is concerned, he is quite satisfied, and 
to make confidential representations to the Shah's Government on 
the embarrassment which his inconsiderate aggression against Shah 
Kamran must expose him to. In short, he has nothing to transmit 
to Mr. Ellis but timid counsel to assist him in meeting an evil, the 
cause of which his Lordship obstinately refuses to comprehend ; 
he will see nothing because he is determined to avoid a conflict 
with Russia, and he keeps on such good terms with that power as 
to embolden her to redouble her cxertions in encouraging the Shah 
to seize upon I-Ierat. However, this cautious policy could not save 
Lord Palmerston from the consequences of the entanglements 
which it created for him, and he finished by being completely the 
dupe of his own acts. He believes the word of the Cabinet of St. 
Petersburg, and yet he doubts more and more the accurac-y of the 
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reports of his own n~inister at  Teheran. The  far-sighted Mr. Ellis 
then has to endure all the ill-iiumour of Lord Palrnerston, and he 
is recalled without mercy for not having been able to stop events 
the development of which was owing to the too great confidence of 
his chief in the assertions of the Russian Government. 
The noble Lord still endeavoured to disguise to himself the check 
which his policy had inflicted upon English influence in Persia ; 
nevertheless he ~.ubsequently made choice of an energetic man, well 
known for his hostility to Russia, to fill the post of British minister 
at  the court of Teheran. Mr. M'Neil belonged to that schoul of 
diplomatists who are perfectly happy in the midst of agitation, and 
for whom European principles disappear before the necessities of the 
tortuous diplomacy of Asia. After having passed twenty-five years 
in India or Persia, he had returned to .England towards the end of 
the year 1534, and, not approving of the policy that had Been 
followed by his government in Persia since the accession of 
Mohamed Shah to the throne, he had, through the press, fought 
the question with all the obstinacy inherent in the English cha- 
racter, stating that there was no necessity for drawing the sword 
from the scabbard to baffle the Russian intrigues a t  Teheran, 
that it was only requisite for England to declare distinctly to the 
Shah her opposition to the war with Herat for that monarch to ab- 
stain from carrying on any further the preparations for the expe- 
dition. This view of the subject, one so simple, which Lord 
Palmerston ought to have adopted from the first, at  length broke 
i n  upon his Lordship's mind, but nevertheless he preserved it as a 
last resource in case he should find thz Shah intractable in every 
other way ; and as he was aware that Mr. MLNeil was active even 
to restlessness, resolute even to temerity, his instructions were 
similar to those which had been given to Mr. Ellis. The new 
Envoy was desired to discourage the ambitious projects of the 
Shah, and to offer his mediation in arranging the n~isunderstanding 
which had arisen between Persia and Herat;  in short, he mas to 
coritinue a spectator of Russian intrigues without being able to 
offer one energetic word in opposition to them. Mr. NcNeil was 
not more successful than his predecessor, and complained to his 
government with as much force as perspicuity, demanding that 
his instructions should be extended in order that he might have 
the power of acting with some hope of success. But Lord 
Palrnerston appeared to send him duplicates of all the replies that 
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he  11ad formerly given to Nr.  Ellis. I-Tis Lordship could not yet 
~ n a l x  up his mind to take the initiative in a vigorous opposition to 
Russia, and hc endeavoured to maintain a peace wliicl~ that power 
seemed little ansious to preserve. Lord Palmerston w a s  not very 
fortunate in his appreciation of diplomatic affairs, for, when he 
certified in his letters to the sincerity of the part played at Teheran 
by Couut Simonitch, that nobleman admitted his bad faith in his 
owu correspondence. The noble Lord waited witl imperturbable 
tranquillity till reparation should be made by the Persian Govern- 
ment for conduct with wl~ich he was offended, and this at the very 
moment when Mr. M'Neil received the assurance that the Shah 
declined to make any ; and as Lord Palmerston had purposely 
deferred sending his instructions, his envoy found himself opposed, 
with his hands tied, to the ever active manoxvres of Russia, and 
the  determination of the Shah to seize Herat. 
Tha t  which Messrs. Ellis and BI'Neil had foreseen at length 
occurred ; the Persians took the field in 1837, and in the month 
of October entered the province of Herat ; but it is necessary to 
add that the encrgetic representations which Mr. McNeil made to 
the Shah on his owrz 7-esponsibility had led to indecision and a slight 
sensation of fear in the council of his ministers, which the non- 
realization of the promises made eighteen months before by 
General Simonitch also powerfully contributed to develop. The  
Persians had waited, but in vain, up to this time for the material 
intervention promised by Russia, and the Russian diplomatist, who 
had been urged to give a guarantee in writing to the effect that 
it would be forthcoming, had just refused to do so. Mohamed 
Shall had conceived some just apprehensions upon this subject, 
qhich led him for a moment to t,hink of renouncing his project, 
for he was afraid that his quondam ally would abandon him in the 
height of the conflict which the war with Herat might cause 
between himself and England. But the cleverness of Count 
Simonitch surmounted this dificulty also, and the Shah took the 
field without an aft,erthought, determined to seize upon the for- 
tress which he wasgoing to attack ; but his prime minister, Hadji 
Nirza  Agassee, an  old and obstinate man, directing as he pleased 
the.opinions of the King, was far from sharing these sentiments. 
H e  readily consented that the Persian army should invest Herat, 
but. he had secretly decided in his own mind to allow the siege 
operations to languish until the Russians had fulfilled the verbal 
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stipulations which their diplomatist had made with him, and, as 
these engagements were never carried out, the city was not talcen. 
This resolution of the Vizier is the solution of the enigma which so 
many persons have attempted, but in vain, to discover. Twenty- 
five days at the utmost ought to have been sufficient to take Herat ; 
nevertheless i t  sustained a siege of more than nine months, to the 
great displeasure of Mohamed Shah, who, deceived by his minis- 
ters and generals, was ignorant that there were some amongst them 
who had been gained over to the English party and intended to 
retreat without having accomplished the projected conquest But 
the folly and incapacity of the Yersian officers in directing the 
operations of the siege, as well as the eccentric measures adopted 
by the prime minister, were more than sufficient to cause the failure 
of the enterprise without the addition of bad faith. 
The newspapers assured us a t  the time, and many persons still 
think so, that the Persian army was accompanied by many Russians, 
officers and men, when it marched against Herat, and that the 
place was defended by several English o5cers ; there is.exaggera- 
tion in these two assertions which I will clear away. 
I n  the treaty of 1813 between England and l'eisia it was stipu- 
lated that, if war broke out between the Persians and the Afghans, 
the English Government should remain neutral, but it might never- 
theless become a mediator if requested to do so by both parties. 
We have seen that Eng1and.u~ to this time had not failed on her.  
paart with respect to that clause ; but the eagerness with which the 
Russians had advised the Persians to undertake a siege that threat- 
ened the dearest interests of England, without doubt induced the 
Governor-General to pay very litde attention to it, and he sent 
Captain Eldred Pottinger to defend Herat. The Indian news- 
papers pretended that " this officer, travelling in the neighbourhood 
of that city, entered it by chance a t  the moment the siege com- 
menced, and that it was with his assistance and advice as well as 
the encourqcment yiueri by the Englisl~ Goae~nment, that the 
inhabitants were enabled to hold out for nine months." T h e  first 
part of this assertionis not accurate. Captain Pottinger, sent by his 
Governme,zt with a secret missiolz, arrived a t  Herat disgui'sed as a 
I-Iindoo physician, and was known there only to three merchants of 
Herat, who were devoted to English interests--Shah Kamran and 
his vizier did. not hear of his arrival until the army invested the 
place. This was the moment chosen by the English officer to 
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offer the support of his professional services, a s  well as subsidies 
of all kinds on the pnrt of his Government, to assist the Shah 
ILmran in making a stand ,against the Persians. This offer 
was accepted with joy, but such wasstill the discretion of the chiefs 
of Herat that the inhabitants were actually not aware that the 
pretended Hindoo physician was an English officer, until Mr. 
M'Neil arrived in their city in March, 183s. From that moment 
Captain Pottinger resumed his European uniform, and did not 
attempt to conceal himself any longer, H e  was the only Eng- 
lishman who remained in the place during the whole period of 
the siege; but it should be added that Major Todd and some 
few other officers, who were like hiniself attached to the Persian 
embassy, entered the city on several occasions with a flag of truce, 
and i t  is reasonable to suppose that the advice of these o5cers was 
calculated to strengthen the resolution of Yar  Moharned Khan in 
continuing the defence. 
, A s  to the Russian officers, there was not one in the Persian army, 
fbr the Sertip" Samsoun Khan, of Russian origin, could not be 
considered such ; he had resided in Persia for many years, and, 
having refused to take advanwe of the amnesties granted by 
the Emperor of Russia to his subjects who were deserters, Sam- 
soun Khan was much more of a Persian than a Russian, as all , 
those who lmem him could aver. Besides, his military knowledge 
was too mediocre to influence the operations of the Persians, for 
his rank in the Russian army had never been higher than that 
of a quartermaster sergeant of dragoons. A t  the time of the 
siege he commanded the Persian battalion of the Chaldean, 
Armenian, and Nestorian Christians, to which were attached seven 
or eight hundred Russian deserters, nearly all of whom aere 
common soldiers ; a very small number of these had been sergeants 
and corporals, and they had for the most part arrived in Persia 
long before there was any question of the siege of I-Ierat. [These 
deserters were, in 1839, in consequence of the representations of 
the British Government, reclaimed and given up to the Emperor of 
Russia, and that event led to a new conflict bctuwn Russia and 
Persia. T h e  Shah, on the ground of the duties of hospitality, re- 
fused to give up these Russian deserters, but the Emperor Nicholas 
just a t  that moment visited his Trans-Caucasian provinces, travelling 
* General of Brigade. 
indeed as far as Erivan ; and to this place 3"ohamed Shah sent his 
eldest son, Nasser Eddin Mirza, to compliment his Russian Majesty. 
Count Simonitch then declared to the Shah that,, if' he did not give 
upthe Russian deserters, the heir to the Persian throne should remain 
an hostage in Russia until he did so; there was therefore nothing 
to be done but to yield, and to this alternative the Shah consented.] 
Nor can i t  be said that Lieutenant-Colonel Blarernberg, of the 
Russian Engineers, was attarshed to the Yersian army, for he 
formedpart of the mission of Count Simonitch. I t  is true t,hat these 
two superior officers were actively mixed up in the affairs of Herat, 
but in a diplomatic sense ;-they never ostensibly directed the 
operations of the siege, and their position was simply t h t  of 
advisers. 
Two other European officers were in the service of the Shah : 
one of them, General Boroffski, a Pole and a Russian subject, had, 
through the protection given him by the English, advanced to this 
rank in the Persian army, but he had never served in any p a ~ t  of 
Europe, and had no military experience whatever ; he was reported 
brave, but courage alone is not sufficient to direct the operations 
of a siege. 
The other was General Semineau, a t  that time Colonel of Engi- 
neers, a Sardinia11 subject, and an old officer of the Empire, serving 
in the Shah's army as a Prenchman-his mother was French and 
born a t  St. Tropez, his father a t  Nice. The English accused 
General Semineau of serving the interests of Russia, because he 
performed his duty 3 they were, however, in an excellent position 
to know that, when the campaign against Herat commenced, this 
officer was on the very worst terms with Count Simonitch. I n  Pel.- 
sia, however, duty is a thing which always comes after personal 
interest, and there is nothing astonishing in the fact that the 
English had great doubts of the Colonel's conduct being clisin- 
terested. 
The Count Simonitch and Mr. M'Neil had remained a t  Teheran, 
but each of them detached an oficer of his legation to the royal 
camp. The Russian drgoman'Goutt, and the English Colonel 
Stoddart, taking example from their chiefs, carried on an active 
paper war. To  the first was attached an officer of cavalry of 
the same nation, by name Vikovitch, who had made himself a 
reputation for talent in Tartary, and been employed in several 
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missions with success. He spoke with fluency several languages 
and oriental dialects, arid his government destined him, as we shall 
see further on, to prepare t!le way for Russian influence in Afghan- 
istan. 
Amongst the Persian nobles, too numerous to mention, to whoin 
the Shah had coufided the various commands of his troops, there 
was not one who was capable of taking up the encamping ground 
fur an army, or directing scientifically the operations of the siege. 
1 3 s  Majesty n-s obliged to make Colonel Semineau take upon 
himself the duties of chief of the staff, and director of the artillery 
and engineers, which brought upon him from the first the jealousy 
and oppositiou of the Persian officers, who were besides urged to 
annoy him by the Russian and English agents, according as his 
acts happened to be adverse to the policy or proceedings of either. 
'The  Russian was the first who endeavoured to injnre him, iu the . 
opinion of the Sliah and his minister, stating that the Colonel paid 
and received visits to and from Colonel Stoddart, which was a great 
impropriety in the eyes of Count Simonitch, but subsequently, when 
h c t s  proved that Colonel Semilieau was a loyal and honest man, 
though on terms of good social feeling with men of all parties, and 
performed his duty before every other consideration, the attacks 
, 
came from the opposite side. Unfortunately the Persian Govern- 
ment lent but too willing an ear to this gossip, and such wenk- 
ness annihilated all the good that could result from the attive co- 
operation of this officer in ca r r~ ing  on the siege. 
T h e  Persian army advanced very slowly upon Herat, and turned 
aside to wage an irregular warfare against the Tu~~comans, Yamoods, 
and Goklans, before repairing to its ulterior destination ; neverthe- 
less, when it arrived under the walls of Gorian, a fortress garrisoned 
by the troops of Shah Kamran, and situated thirty-five mileswest 
of Herat, in the midclle of a large plain ten miles in width, it then 
numbered from 34,000 to 35,000 men, well provided with artillery 
and munitions of war. Colonel Semineau ordered the army to 
encamp a gunshot from the fortress on ground sheltered by a ridge 
of hills which covered it at this short distance. After having 
marked out the  encampment for each corps, he proceeded to make 
a .still closer reconnaissance of the town, and was received by a 
sharp fire of muslietry, but he continued his examination of 
the place, and, this duty having been accomplished, he retired 
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to a short distance from t l~e noise uf the camp, and tmced a 
sketcll of the plan of attack which he thought it desirable to 
While thus employed, other divieions of t.he army arrivcd 
in succession, and with them the Russian agent Goutt, who, 
seeking every opportunity of annoying the Colonel, was loud 
in his exclamations against the spot he had chosen for the camp. 
c L  I t  is treasonable," csclaimed the liussian, " placing us so close 
to the poignard of the Afghans; he wishes our throats cut ;  he 
is sold to the English," &c. kc. Great confusion and tumult 
followed, and maledictions without number were hurled at  the 
Colonel. The  mules remained still laden, and every one was on 
the point of carrying his baggage elsewhere, when the arrival of tlie 
Shah put a stop to these irregular proceedings. The Persian chiefs 
made their complaints in bitter terms, but the King well knew 
their ignorance, for his military studies, which had been directed 
by French and English officers, enabled him to form a correct 
judgment of the circumstances ; he went himself to the summit of 
the hills adjoiiling the camp to ascertain the eligibility of the posi- 
tion, and saw at a glance that the spot chosen by Semineau was a 
most favourable one, as the enemy's shot flew over the camp. The  
Shah therefore maintained the dispositions made by Sernineau, udlo, 
ignorant of what had talren place, went, tu communicate with the 
sovereign about half an hour after, and was received by him in his 
usually kind manner. The Colonel's plan of attack presented three 
points, on either of which it could be made with a fair hope of 
prompt success : but the one selected was on the reverse side of the 
ridgc of hills against which the troops were encamped, for from 
thence the ground sloped towards the place. cL  Well, then," said 
the Shah to Semineau, " it is you who shall direct the attack," and 
gave him written orders to the colonels of four battalions to place 
themselves immediately under the Colonel's command, and obey 
. him in everything. These four regiments were the Bahacler-harx 
or grenadiers, the Rhasseh or guards, the Demavend, so citlled from 
the district of that name, and I<araguzloo, of the tribe of that name. 
These troops were employed in making the gabions and fascines 
that werc necessary, and on the following night Senlineau brolce 
ground and commenced his trenches, but he had then to,avoid 
a danger which he did not in the least suspect. The Persian 
chiefs, who were ordered to conduct the other attacks, did not 
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advance methodically and in silence like the Colonel, but disco- 
vered their position to the besieged by a brisk cannonade, under. 
cover of which their troops advanced on the open plain, but the 
besieged Gorians ~eplied with a 'musketry fire so well kept LIP 
that many of the Persians were soon hors cle combat. The Persian 
guns being badly laid, the shot passed over the town at a consi- 
derable height, and, after having described their curve, fell into 
the middle of Semineau's division, who was not a little astonished ; 
nevertheless, after taking some precautions, he proceeded with his 
trenches. His plan consisted in dividing his corps into two bri- 
gades, to attack an angle of the bastion that it was intended to 
destroy ; and when the trenches had arrived at the point at  which 
the two brigades were to separate, they were to construct their re- 
spective batteries, st a good distance from one another. But the 
semi-Russian Sertip, Samsoun Khan, of the grenadier regiment, to 
whom the Colonel had given the command of the second brigade, 
obstinately determined to remain where he was and batter the angle 
-I in front, being a t  a distance equal to the point blank fire of one of 
his own pieces. 
His adviser on this occasion was a gunner, like himself a deserter 
from the Russian service, who had convinced him that a cannon- 
shot striking a mark a t  a short distance would not make a hole, 
' 
but fall to the ground after having struck the wall, and that, to 
obtain the most completely destructive effect, it was necessary that 
it should acquire greater power in a longer trajet. I mention these 
trifling circumstances, to a certain extent foreign to the subject- 
matter of this work, only with a view of showing how ignorant the 
Persian officers were in general, and Sarnsoun Khan in particular. 
Colonel Semineau, after having made reiterated representations 
to this officer, and threatened to retire if he persisted in this obsti- 
nacy, at length acceded to his wishes, leaving to him all the respon- 
sibility of his conduct. As to his own operations, he continued 
his trenches in order that he might be able to place his guns on 
the spot he had determined upon at the outset. 
Samsoun Khan had constructed the embrasures of his battery with 
old wooden boxes filled with earth, which were of course knoclred 
811 to pieces by the first fire, and ten of his men were killed at day- 
break ; his casualties soon amounted to forty-five or fifty, and his 
battery was laid completely ope11 This decided him in coming 
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round to Semineau's opinion, and to construct,a fresh battery in the 
proper place. 
If I have been diffuse upon these accessory details of the siege . 
of Herat, it is not that they are of any real importance, but that 
I wish to give an idea of the obstacles raised by Persians, English, 
and Russians, a t  every step, to impede Colonel Semineau, who 
alone was sincere in the prosecution of the war which had been 
so rashly undertaken. Samsoun Khan, as a Russian deserter, exer- 
cised some influence over the troops, and he was also considered 
one of the most ,experienced generals of Mohamed Shah. What  
has been stated above will give a correct idea of his capacity, and 
enable the reader to itnagine that of his Persian collea.gues, which 
was inferior to his, both on scientific grounds as well as courage. 
ColonelSemineau had not advanced so rapidly with his trenches, 
'or rather towa~ds a result, as the commanders of the other attacks, 
who had from the first established their batteries a t  too great a 
distance from the place ; but with a view to more satisfactory pro- 
ceedings, he arrived after several days' hard work within five-and- 
forty yards of the fortress, and this without losing a single man. 
His  batteries, constructed upon the ordinary rules of engineering, 
being ready, he gave notice to the king of the hour a t  which he  
intended to open his fire, and Mohamed Shah, anxious to see the 
effect, took up a position on the neighbouring heights to have a 
good view. Semineitu obtained the success which from his able 
dispositions he had reason to expect: the great tower at the 
angle gave way, and the ricochet fire would soon have destroyed 
the smaller towers, which were on the prolongation of this face 
and the upper part of the wall which connected them one with 
another. Mohamed Shah, who had served in the wars against 
Russia.and been present s t  different sieges, had never witnessed 
anything like this, and exclaimed, when he saw the result of the 
fire, " It is only to-day that I understand what may be done with 
artillery." The  Afghans, not less surprised than the Shah, and 
alarmed at the disastrous consequences which would follow if the 
town were taken by assault, hung out a flag of truce near the angle 
of the bastion, and, Semineau having given orders t.0 cease firing, 
they advanced to the top of the breach and declared that they 
surrendered at  discretion. Two hours after, the Serdar Shere 
Mohamed Khan, the brother of Yar Mohamed Khan, who com- 
manded in the town, came to the Shah and made his submission ; 
Q 
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the Persian troops occupied Goria11 the same day, and their army, 
which was now a t  liberty to advance to the siege of Hernt, arrived 
under the walls of that city in the beginning of November. The 
Serdar Shere Mohamed Khan wrote to his brother from the camp 
to inform him of the reason which had induced him to surrender 
Gorian, and advised him not to continue a conflict which the 
insufficiency of his means of defence would not permit him to 
prolong against the Persian army, for, said he, " there is an Euro- 
pean officer with it who can in forty-eight hours raze Herat to the 
ground." H e  also stated that in persisting in his resistance he 
would only lead to the ruin of his country and great misfortunes 
for himself; that it would therefore be much better for him to 
throw himself upon the generosity of Mohamed Shah and open to 
him the gates of the city. Yar Mohamed, indignant a t  this 
message, replied, '' It may be very well f~:~ou, who knew not how 
to die a t  your post in defence of the fortress which I confided to 
your caxe, to give such advice, but for myself, as long as there 
remains one cartridge to fire, a sabre in my hand, and one breath 
of life in my body, I will never bow my head before the Radjars : I 
mill not surrender Herat until the teeth which Abbas Mirza 
ordered to be pulled out of my head a t  Meshed are replaced. If 
till then the fortune of war goes against me, I shall know how to 
escape dishonour by dying in the breach." H e  kept his word, 
and his heroic defence during nine months is one of the finest 
military exploits which modern history furnishes in Asia. 
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THE fortified town of Herat, supposed to have been founded by 
Alexander the Great, is a quadrangle of 33 miles long on the north 
and south sides, and rather more on the'east and west. I ts  extent 
would be immense if all the suburbs were included, particularly 
those stretching to the west of the town beyond the Dervazeh Irak, 
or Gate of Iralc ; all these suburbs are partially covered with ruins, 
and numerous walled gardens about half a gunshot from the town. 
A thick.rampart, constructed of earth brought from the interior of 
the city, surrounds it and forms its defence. The height of this 
rampart is not everywhere equal, but the average may be about 
90 feet, and it is supported on the inside by counterforts of masonry. 
Earth has also been taken for a distance of 108 yards beyond the 
ditch, and used in the construction of this work, and being a pure 
clay it has become exceedingly solid. The rampart has the 
appearance of a long hill surrounding the city, and on the crest of 
i t  a thick wall has been built about 32 feet high, flar~ked with 
round towers, which, as well a s  the curtains that connect them 
with each other, are loopholed for musketry; it is only in the 
enormous and massive towers at  the angles that cannon can be 
mounted. 
Generally speaking, the ground fiom the edge of the ditch 
towards the country, in a radius of 250 yards, is of a marshy 
nature ; water is found a t  a depth of fiom 8 to 10 feet, especially 
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inclination of the on the southern side of the city, for the general 
ground is from north to south. Streams, which all run east and 
west, water the environs and supply the ditch ; and it flows out on 
the south side opposite the large tower which forms the angle of 
the place, called Iioordj Khakhister, or Tower of Cinders. Wheu 
the Persians first arrived before Herat the immediate neighbour- . 
hood was well wooded-an immense number of vines and vast - '  
plantations of poplar, willow, cypress, and above all fir, filled the 
Bagh Shah, or IZing's Garden, and bordered the avenue which 
extended about a mile thence up to the g i t e  of the city. 
A t  half a cannon-shot south of the town is a canal with steep 
banks, supplied with water by the Heri-rood, which is four miles 
distant from the city, and on this canal are a great number of mills ; 
it is fordable only a t  a few points, on which account a t  different 
distances little bridges have been built, each of a single arch. 
There  are five gates to the city of I-Ierat. T o  the north of it, 
near the Dervazeh Melelr, or Meshed, are two citadels-Ark Noon 
or the New Citadel, and Ark Keuheuneh or the Old Citadel-which 
nearly join each other. The  first commands the second, in which 
there is an enormous round tower, that then served as the palace 
of the Shah Kamran. 
Also on the north, parallel to the walls, and about 1250 yards from 
them, rises the long hill of Talleh-bingui, which 4orms a ridge on 
that side. Beyond this hill stands one of the most beautiful 
mosques ever built in Asia : it is surmounted by nine minarets, 
from the summits of which the interior of the town can be seen, 
and its distance from it is about the longest range of a tn-elve- 
pounder. Herat is not commanded by any of the liills in the 
environs; Talleh-bingui, which is used for a cemetery, is the 
highest. 
Mohamed Shah pitched his camp about a mile and a half south- 
west of the city, on the right bank of the great canal already men- 
tioned, and as soon as his troops arrived he conimanded them to 
invest the place on all sides. T o  do this was not difficult, for the 
Persians were ten times as numerous as the Afghans, who had 
only 4000 men to defend it. They had confined themselves to 
this small number in order to economise tlie provisions they had 
stored up a long time previously, having foreseen the attack they 
were now called upon to repel. 
T h e  first day that the Persians attacked the city the Afghans 
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opposed the occupatiogof the suburbs. with as much courage as obsti- 
nacy ; i t  was necessary to dislodge them from each house in succes- 
sion ; the smallest tuft of trees, the smallest piece of mall, were cover 
of which they availed themselves with great readiness, and from 
thence directed a most murderous fire on their aggressors. Artillery 
did no further service for the Serbaz or Persian infantry than batter 
the towers and covcred ways, from which a treble fire of musketry 
proceeded. The Afghans had s few pieces of heavy calibre which 
they had placed on the large towers, and the fire from these guns 
took t.he assailants in flank and occasioned them immense loss. 
However, their ardour was not abated, and such was the progress 
they made, that, in the evening, the Afghans, fearing their position 
would be turned and their communications cut off, at  last retreated 
and abandoned the suburbs to the Persians, who immediately 
surrounded the city and took up a position wherever an inequality 
in the ground presented itself to shelter 'them from the uninter- 
rupted fire which proceeded from the ramparts. 
Colonel Semineau then made a careful reconnaissance of the for- 
tifications, and traced a plan of attack, which he submitted on the 
following morning to the Shah. In this he indicated, as the best 
point on which to make a regular approach, the great tower a t  the 
angle of the city, called Koordj Khodja" Abdul Hamid, of which 
he had the opportunity of examining with a glass, from the 
minarets of Talleh-bingui, the front within the town. T h e  King 
thought the plan was an excellent one ; but such was his wretched 
vacillation, and so strong were the intrigues of the English party, 
that i t  was never acted upon, and the attack was indefinitely de- 
layed. 
The Shah was afraid of offending the different Persian com- 
manders, for, moved by presnmptuous vanity, they refused to be 
directed by an European, and promised, if allowed to act for them- 
selves, to take the city in eight days. This emulation amongst his 
lieutenants, which evinced itself by false oaths and hollow protesta- 
tions of devotion, the Shall thought. he ought not to discourage ; and 
as each asserted he w ~ s  braver and wiser than all the rest, he made 
each independent in his command, and ordered them to take up 
positions according to their own good pleasure on whatever p0int.s 
they considered most eligible: they were also to attack as they 
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pleased, without any regard to acting in concert, as each would 
then derive from his own deeds the honour that 'would attach to 
them. 
Sad indeed were the cocsequences of these incredible arrange- 
ments : everything in the trenches was done a t  random, excepting 
that i t  might be saia they agreed on one point only, namely, to * 
make the greatest possible noise ~ i t h o u t  arriving a t  any result. 
T h e  artillery played without judgment on the mhole circumference 
of the place, and wasted their shot in a point-blank fire against 'the 
I 
rampart, which all the cannon-balls in the world could not destroy. 
T h e  fi13t operation in each trench was an endeavour to bring down 
the tower and curtains on the crest of the rampart, before they 
thought of how they were to pass the ditch : to effect the latter pur- 
pose the Persian generals could devise no brighter scheme than 
letting off the water ; therefore they broke the darn and laid it dry, 
greatly to the convenience of the Afghans, who till then could not 
get in or out of the city excepting a t  the gates, which were masked. 
From that time they constantly harassed the Persians by surprises 
on all points, the great advantage of exit and entrance having been 
given them by their enemies. 
Although t,he operations were thus disjointed and subject to the 
caprice of a score and a half of commanders in the trenches, Hadji 
Mirza Agassee, an old Mollah, entirely ignorant of military science, 
. 
reserved to himself the chief direction of the siege ; his object, as 
before stated, was to prolong it till the diplomatic struggle in 
which he had, with Russia, engaged against England, should be 
decided. But as the Shhh had not at  that time been convinced by 
his arguments, and pressed his generals to take the town as quickly 
as possible, the prime minister gave them secret c,ounter-orders to 
do nothing ; they fought therefore without a purpose ; men were lost 
without necessity, and treason was the order of the day. 
Colonel Semineau alone was ignorant of these disloyal intrigues, 
and conducted his operatiops on the side assigned to him, the Gate 
of Kandahar, with his habitual resolution, but the prime minister 
found means to paralyze his best measures by giving. him as  
coadjutors Persian officers who did not execute his orders. On 
the other hand, Hadji Mirza Agassee committed a thousand extra- 
vagances, more like the lucubrations of a diseased brain than the 
rational conceptions of the commander of an army. The following 
facts will only give a slight idea of his eccentricities ; were they all 
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to be chronicled, they would fill volumes-a few only shall be men3. 
tioned. ,' 
Two or three of the commanders in the trenches, being sufficiently 
~owerful to have nothing to fear from the minister, and being even 
hostile to him, had not been favoured prith his views, and having - 
pushed their works with ardour were more prepared to attempt a n  
assault; but it was necessary that a diversion in their favour 
should be made by the troops in the other trenches. This diver- ' 
sion was ostensibly promised to them by Hadji Mirza Agassee, 
but he secretly forbade those who were to carry i t  out from doing 
so ; the gallant fellows therefore who made the assault found 
themselves betrayed, and, crushed by the Afghans, lost heart for 
any future attempt. 
At another time ammunition was wanting at  the moment of 
attack ; or the cartridges for the guns and musketry were blank. 
This happened several times in the trenches commanded by 
Prince Seifet Dooulet ; nevertheless he was not discouraged, and, 
after having made the necessary arrangements, applied to the 
prime minister for permission to make an attack that should reach 
the very heart of the city. His request was granted, but a condi- 
tion was attached to it, namely, that he must trust nothing to 
chance, but make a trial first. '(If you succeed," said he to the 
prince, '' do not advance too far, retire after a slight engagement ; 
be satisfied with knowing that you have the advantage, that should 
be suficient for you ; we shall see later what can be attempted - 
definitively." I n  vain the gallant prince represented that the 
Afghans were quite ignorant of the works in his trenches, that to 
make a simple trial would only serve to expose them, and enable 
them to construct other works that might completely neutralize the 
effect of his. T h e  minister remained ~mmoveable in his deter- 
mination, and this spirited oflicer was obliged to give up his 
cherished hopes of serving his sovereign and distinguishing himself. 
From that time the intriguers tempered his zeal by withholding 
the ammunition and projectiles that were requisite for the ope- 
rations he had to conduct; and Hadji Mirza Agassee, saying 
that he had scarcely enough himself to defend the king's camp 
if it should be attacked, coldly added, "You must do the best 
you can, it is your affair." Upon receiving this reply, Seifet 
Dooulet, and those chiefs who were similarly circumstanced, 
cut some thousands of balls out of the ruins of the marble 
232 CONSPIRACY IN HEHXT. CHAP. XTII. : 
tombs ou the Talleh-bingui, but after they had put their troops 
to dl that labour the powder requisite to discharge them a t  
the enemy was denied these energetic officers. The  king had 
masked all the gates of the town as soon as he arrived before it, 
but a few days after the Hadji said that they ougl~t to give 
the Afghans the power to move ont; and the reason he as- 
signed for this strnnge conduct was that the rebels should have 
an opportunity of escaping. " If I weye to be master of the town 
in ten days," he said, " there would be too many of them to punish." 
A t  the same time he by degrees formed a Persian party in the 
city, who conferred with him, proposing to admit during the 
night some of the king's troops, and deliver to him all the artillery 
of the Shah I iamran;  everything was agreed upon, and thk 
sound of the trumpet was to be the signal for the Fersians 
to enter the -city. The trumpet did sound, but the Persians 
never appeared ; and, in the& stead, the accomplices in this 
treason saw approaching the troops of Yar Mohanled Khan, who 
came down upon them and cut them to pieces. Hadji Mirza 
Agassee had himself revealed the whole plot to the Vizier of Shah 
Iiamran ! 
Again : Mohamed Shah had ordered that a 96-pounder should be 
cast upon.the spot,,which with some difficulty u7as done, but when it 
was mounted the minister discovered that it required too much 
ammunition, and he mas very indignant with the commander of the 
artillery. What  a fool you are !" he said to him ; " cannot you 
see that this piece was cast far more for the purpose of t,errifying 
than of destroying the Afghans? tell your men to fire over the 
town ; that will frighten the Shah Kamran, and every morning you 
can send a waggon and a few artillerymen round to the other side 
to pick up the balls that will haye fallen beyond it." 
Thus it will be  seen that the prime minister was in no hurry to 
take Herat, but neither was he disposed to abandon the siege, for 
as soon as the troops were installed he made each battalion clear a 
piece of ground and sow it, which plainly showed that he intended 
to remain till the next harvest. As long as Mohamed Shah was 
not prevailed upon by the Hadji to waive his original ideas of the 
siege of Herat, he showed himself far less benevolently inclined 
to the Afghans and their adherents than his minister was, and 
ordered that all who were taken prisoners should be put to death : 
he often commanded that these executions should take place under 
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his own eyes, and, when beholding the vast space of bloodstained 
ground, was once heard 'to say In Gulistan est," c L  This is a 
garden of roses." 
In another instance, when the treason of Mirza Naghee was de- 
tected, the same savage feeling was manifested. That officer was 
in a high position at court, and his guilt mas proved by an inter- 
cepted letter of his to the Shah IKamran, in which he informed the 
Afghan prince of what mas doing in the Persian camp, and recom- 
mended him also to warn Mr. M'Neil to hasten his arrival, if he 
wished t o  prevent the fall of the town. The Shah sent immediately 
for the criminal, and, perfectly regardless of the entreaties of the 
Hadji, ordered that he should lose his life under the bastinsdo, 
and that his body should be exposed on a gibbet before the ram- 
parts of the city. 
The prime minister was well aware that his sovereign would 
have more than enough to do to annihilate all the traitors in his 
camp, and for this simple reason-they were most of them his own 
friends ; from that moment he determined to induce the Shah to 
participate in his views, and finally succeeded in his object. But - 
both the one and the other stood so much in awe of General 
Simonitch that they concealed from him the little inclination they 
had to continue this war with the Afghans, and they prolonged it 
only to avoid incurring the indignation of that diplomatist. * 
Colonel Semineau was no longer an obstacle to the proceedings of 
the prime minister, for, shortly after the arrival of the army, he had 
by a series of intrigues forced him to abstain from taking further park 
in the active' operations. T h e  day after that on which the place was 
invested the Colonel advanced, with 200 recruits who had arrived 
in camp the evening before, to an Imaum Zadeh," situated a t  a 
I short distance from the Gate of Kandahar, and there took up his position; the ground about i t  was undulating and very much 
I broken, and for a considerable space cbvered with burial-grounds, 
gardens, and the ruins of houses and out-buildings. Once in pos- 
i session of the Imaum Zadeh, he entrenched it, and connected i t  by some small earthworks with an ab-ambar,? situated abont 11 yards 
ill front of his position. This brought him so near the gate of the 
1 .  town as to give rise to a hope that some lucky chance or clever 
coup de main might one day or other put the place in his hands, 
* Saint's tomb. t Reservoir OF water. 
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and, had he been at  $11 supported in his plans, that would have 
happened. 
T h e  first night he held this post was exceedingly dark, and 
favoured an  attack that 2000 Afghans moving silently out of. the 
town attempted against it. The Imaum Zadeh mas a t  the time but 
imperfectly protected by a slight earthwork scarcely finished, and 
the enemy crept up to it unperceived, until noticed by Colonel Semi- 
neau himself, who was returning from an inspection of his works. 
H e  had scarcely regained the tomb when a Herculean soldier who 
had followed him crawled up the breastwork with his sword raised I 
to cleave him to the ground, but before he could do so he fell by 
a ball from the Colonel's pistol. The Afghans, seeing they were 
discovered by this rash action of their comrade, at once rushed 
towards the work, and, as they gained the top, would certainly have 
remained masters of it if Semineau had lost his coolness for a mo- 
ment. His recruits, under fire for the first time, stood astounded 
a t  being thus assailed by at  least twice their numher, and but for 
the energetic conduct of their commander, which restored their 
courage, would have been massacred without dealing a blow even 
in self-defence. When they had repulsed their enemies with the 
bayonet, the Colonel placed them round the breastwork, conjuring 
them to stand, which they had every inclination not to do, an- 
" noyed as they were by a well-sustained fire from the walls, though 
the stupidity and clumsiness of the Afghans assisted them in no 
slight degree. The  besieged threw fire-balls from the town to guide 
their party, but these never reached the Iniaum Zadeh ; they fell 
short amongst the Afghans, and consequently rendered them visible 
to the Persians, by whose bullets they were cruelly decimated. They 
could not return the fire because they had only their sabres with 
them, and therefore fell by hundreds on the work ; and after four 
hours' hard fighting, seeing that it was impossible to overcome the 
resistance maintained by the little garrison, they retircd into the 
city. 
A Persian Sertip, Meuhbalee Khan, and a relation of the prime 
minister, who was posted 200 yards in rear of the Imaum Zadeh with 
300 men, with orders to support the Colonel, instead of executing 
the duty assigned to him, as soon as he heard the firing made all 
his preparatiofls to escaye in case the enemy should reach his posi- 
tion ; but the next morning, when he heard that the men whom he 
had abandoned had been victorious in the struggle, and still held 
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the post intrusted to them, he could not believe it, and gave as an 
excuse for his inaction that he did not consider himself in sufficient 
strength to advance to their assistance, that he believed they were 
all killed, and consequently that it was useless to try to help them. 
The truth was that this inaction fell in with the views of the 
prime minister as well as of this coward. 
A Persian proverb says, " I t  is not always those who sow the 
corn who reap the crop," and Meuhbalee .Khan remembered it : 
hastily wrapping a handkerchief round one hand, he hurried with 
his feigned wound into the presence of Mohamed Shah, and gave 
his sovereign a most flowery description of the courage he had 
displayed in the defence of the Imaum Zadeh, without even naming 
the brave Semineau, but the monarch, enlightened by more trutllful 
informers, presented the Colonel with a watch set in jewels, an 
acknowledgment of the royal appreciation of his services, which is 
in Persia considered as equivalent to receiving a decoration. Not- 
withstanding the flagrant falsehood in which this craven Meuhbalee 
Khan was thus detected, the Hadji insisted upon his remaining the 
colleague of Colonel Semineau in the intrenchments in front of the 
Kandahar Gate, to the great annoyance of that officer, who well 
knew the cowardice, ignorance, and treachery of the Sertip : in an 
evil moment, however, he yielded to the desire of the Hadji, and 
very unfortunately, for a few days after, in his absence, the Khan 
allowed the Afghans to take the works constructed with so much 
trouble and defended a t  such a cost of life, decamping with the 
men under his orders. 
From that moment Semineau, who till then had constantly 
struggled against the cowardice and treachery of others, ceased to 
take any part in the siege, and retired to his tent in disgust, a result 
which perfectly fell in with the schemes of Hadji Agassee. Never- 
theless, when he waited upon the Shah, this brave soldier hesitated 
not to tell him his opinion, and point out to him that he was 
betrayed. The weak-minded monarch bent his head and reflected ; 
but never profited by the information and advice given to him. 
His minister directed his conduct as he pleased, and knew how to 
remove from his mind the most unfavourable impressions regarding 
himself. 
The Afghans distinguished themselves daily by the most daring 
attaclts upon the besiegers : sometimes a handful of horsemen would 
issue from the town, charge a whole corps of Persian infantry, and 
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never retire without making many prisoners or comn~itting great 
slaughter; sometimes a detachment would fight till the death of 
the last man amongst them : theirs was always hand-to-hand 
work with the sabre, and was perfectly murderous. One day 
they surprised two battalions of Chaghaghis posted on the Talleh- 
bingui, killed 400 of their men, and carried off two guns. 
Their commander, the Sertip Hadji Khan, had very imprudently 
a t  nightfall of the previous day admitted within his lines 100 
Afghans, who besought him to gwnt them hospitality, assuring him 
that they had always been on the side of Mohamecl Shah, but that 
i t  had never been possible for then  to escape f ~ o m  the city till then. . 
T h e  too confiding Sertip allowed them to remain with his own men, 
and a t  midnight they sprung upon the piled alms of the soldiers 
sleeping beside them, and with the aid of 200 of their countrymen, 
who had followed them and crept up the hills to the works, made 
a frightful carnage, after which they retired with one prisoner, a 8 
captain of artillery, and the two guns that he comrnancled. ' 
The Persian army, harassed without intermission by sorties of 
this description, never had a moment's repose : it maintained itself 
with difficulty, for the provisions mere brought fi-om a great clis- 
tance, and often intercepted by parties of Afghans who scourecl 
the surrounding country. The  neiglibourhood of I-Ierat 11ad sup- 
plied the bazaars of the camp very well for three or four months, 
and these resources would have lasted three times as long if they 
had been properly managed ; but they were wasted and nlisused, 
and it was not long before the half-famished soldiers of Moha- 
med Shah were reduced to browse upon clover, and seek for wild 
roots to satisfy their hunger. By marauding, in which they were 
great adepts, they sometimes managed to procure a little corn or 
barley, of which they made coaree bread, and ate it ravenously 
half baked. 
The beleaguered city m s  in no better condition ; tbe Afghans 
felt the miseries of famine even in a worse degree than their 
enemies. They were iu want of the first nccessaries of life-salt 
was sold at  20s. an ounce ; the horses, camels, mules, asses, and 
even animals reckoned unclean by Mi~ssulmans, had been consunied, 
and the population was dreadfully reduced by hunger. The water 
in the canals which supplied the city having been turned off by the 
Persians, it was necessary to have recourse to that in the tanks, 
which was very brackish, and also insufficient, for most of them 
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being supplied from the outside of the town were soon dried up, 
and this added one more to the terrible sufferings of the inha- 
bitants. Yar Mohamed placed sentries .on all the cisterns that were 
supplied by springs, and the water that rose in thein was parsi- 
moniously dealt out to the people every tventy-four hours. The 
bazaars, public squares, and mosques were crowded with sufferers 
imploring the pity of the serdars as they went by, and begging 
for food; to prove their misery they laid out before them the 
corpses of their townsmen who had died of hunger, but the'chiefs, 
reduced to extremity themselves, could only encourage them by 
words and their own stern resignation. T o  all these horrors was 
at length superadded the failure of ammunition. Yar Mohamed 
Khan, it was true, ordered some to be made, but either the mate- 
rials were bad or the workmen ignorant, for the powder b~u-ned 
in the cannon and left the ball as it was put in. 
The original defenders of the city, who amounted a t  the begin- 
ning of'the siege to 4000, were reduced to half that number in the 
first month of the operations, owing as much to the defections 
produced by the intrigues of the Russians and Persians, as from 
their losses'in action; but, as the Afghans are nearly d l  sol- 
fliers by birth, Yar Mohamed filled up his ranks with tradesmen 
and workmen. Those who were. for defending the place to the 
last extremity, a t  the head of whom were the Vizier, his cousin the 
Serdar Dine Mohamed Khan, and Captain Pottinger, were im- 
moveable in their resolution ; but those who were for submitting, 
and who affected to act in the name of the Shah Kamran, were 
daily intriguing, and tried frequently to give the city up to the 
besiegers ; so that but a handful of brave Afghans were frequently 
obliged to repel the attacks from the enemy outside the walls, and 
those from their countrymen within as well; but this contest was of 
short duration, for the traitors, seeing the fruitlessness of their dis- 
loyalty, took refuge in the camp of i\iIoharneil Shah, with the excep- 
tion of their nominal chief Shah Kamran, who was imprisoned and 
closely watched in the citadel, where he could get drunk a t  his 
ease ; he ceased not to urge the surrender of the place, but, though 
Yar Mohamed treated him with external respect, it was long since 
he had paid the least regard to his commands. 
Amongst the Afghans who had joined the Persian army were 
Djelat Edrlin Mirza, a son, and the Serdar Chems Eddin Khan, 
a brother-in-law, of the Shah ILtmran ; the former was governor of 
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Subzawar, the latter of Furrah, fortified places south of EIerat. 
They had brought mith them 1000 Popolzyes and Noorzyes, who 
were a valuable reinforcement to the Persians ; also 2000 Hazarahs 
of Kalehnoon, who, by the clever policy of Assaf Dooulet, the 
matema1 uncle of Mohamed Shah, were attached to the Persian 
party. This welcome addition to his forces saved the king from 
the necessity of raising the siege so soon as f h m  the utterly 
destitute state of his army he must otherwise have done, and he 
aften~ards proved his gratitude to these chiefs by bestowing lucra- 
tive grants upon all, and continuing their rank in the Persian 
army when they followed him in his retreat. 
I t  has been stated that General Simonitch and Mr. M'Neil had 
remained a t  Teheran after the departure of the Shah for Herat, 
the latter greatly. distressed a t  an event which he had long before 
announced by anticipation to his owl1 government, but which he 4 
had constantly assured the Persians would never happen. " In  
the present state of his finances,'' he said, " the Shah will never 
get 10,000 men together to take into the field!' The facts had 
not justified his predictions, and he persisted against them so far as 
to doubt that Herat was attacked, even after the arrival of the 
army under its walls; but at last he was obliged to believe it. 
Learning that the siege had commenced, and that the place was 
on the point of being taken in spite of his intrigues amongst the 
Persian chiefs, and the useless efforts of his agent Colonel Stod- 
dart to induce the Shah to retire, he became so alarmed that 
he determined to visit the royal camp himself. He  had, it is 
true, no order from his government to authorize his blring this 
journey, but he provided himself with a very indirect m e  from the 
Governor-General of India, and arrived on the 8th of March, 
1838, under the walls of Herat. The coldness of his reception, 
and the displeasure evident in the king's countenance, would have 
daunted any less hardened diplomatist than himself; but in spite 
of the insufficiency of his instructions, he attacked the question of 
the retreat afresh with his usual tenacity, and used all the argu- 
ments that diplomacy or even threats could furnish to induce the 
Shah to retire, but without success. 
The following extracts are from the work of M. Alexandre 
Thomas, ' Simple i propos de l'lIistoire Diplomatique,' which has 
been my guide in all that concerns the negociations that took 
place between Russia, Persia, and Great Britain. This excellent 
work is exceeding1 y dry, .but 
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that has not mevented me from con- 
sulting i t ;  its l e i i th  has obliged me to mike a close abridgment 
of a portion ; and to the extracts, which I shall give nearly 
I have only added circumstances that had been for- 
ptten-for the asperity of his opinions I leave Mons. Thomas 
responsible. " Mr. M'Neil," says this author, " pressed and me- 
naced, but the Shah excused himself as he did to Mr. Ellis-( he 
is not a free agent, he is afraid of giving umbrage to the Russian 
Government by abandoning the place; if he had known he was 
running the risk of losing the friendship of the British Govern- 
, 
ment, he would not have gone so f a r ;  if Mr. MLNeil was in a 
position to inform him- that if he did not at once desist he would 
be attacked by the British, he mould desist at  once: he must abso- 
lutely be so spoken to, so treated by Great Britain, to support him 
against Russia.' 
" Mr. McNeil did his best and gained time : he went from the 
besiegers to the besieged, from the city to the camp, carrying, 
dictating, changing the concessions of both parties; but when he 
went into Herat he was always careful to take with him Major 
D'Arcy Todd of the artillery, in order that he might assist Captain 
Pottinger with his advice. However, by dint of perseverance and 
parley, the British Envoy had succeeded in settling the prelimi- 
naries of peace, when the Russian Ambassador reached the Per- 
sian camp ; a despatch also arrived from Lord Pdmerston dated 
February 12, 1836, enclosing an extract, from one from Lord 
Durham, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in which it was 
stated that ' Count Nesselrode said that he was convinced that our 
minister had been misinformed, and that Count Simonitch had 
never given any such advice to the Shah as that which had been 
attributed to him, namely, to seize Herat.' Lord Palmerston 
proceeded, therefore, to address fresh reproofs to his agent, though 
it appeared that his lordship was not entirely convinced by Lord 
Durham's assertion, for he demanded, timidly it is true, but 
still he demanded, from M. de Nesselrode the recall of C.ount 
Simonitch from Teheran, and also that of the Russian deserters 
employed in the army of the Persian sovereign ; however, this did 
not prevent him from writing to Mr. M'Neil that the general was 
offended a t  his bad opinion of him, recommended him to be less 
suspicious for the future, and to live on good terms with his 
colleague ; information which, instead of extinguishing, only added 
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fuel to the fire. Its first effect was to break off the prelimi- 
naries of peace to which the British envoy had brought bot,h 
parties to consent; and thc second was immediately to restore 
to Count Sinlonitch his influence in the councils of the Shah, 
while Mr. MLNeil lost all his. This letter from Lord Palmerston 
deprived him of all power of action, for it contained not a word 
about I-lerat-no notice whatever of Russia ; it seemed to reduce 
the pacitic conclusion of the whole affair to the secondary question 
of a good understanding between the two diplomatists. 
Mr. M'Neil hacl then nothing more to say ; his credit fell rapidly 
when i t  was seen that he was not supported ; annoyances and affronts , 
of all kinds were put upon the English ; Russia, who recalled her 
deserters, exacted the withdrawal of all the English officers in the 
service of the Shah ; and by one of those unhappy coincidences to 
which Lord Palmerston always exposes himself by his consideration 
for doubtful friends, and which only produce vexatious results, the 
British oacers were requested to withdraw from the camp before 
Herat, just when Mr. M'Neil had received the order to leave 
them a t  the disposition of the Shah as long as he was .not obliged . 
to quit the Persian territory himself * H e  was almost driven to 
the. last extremity-he ought to break all diplomatic relations with 
the Shah, and retire without having even o6cially opened any 
discussion touching upon Russian intrigues. He  did break them, 
and retired for a doubtful and almost insignificant afiont from 
the  Persian court. Notwithstanding the strict orders of Mo- 
hamed Shah that no one should have any communication with 
Herat, Mr. MLNeil continued to have secret correspondence with 
the besieged, and a courier with some desl~atches addressed to him 
was arrested by the Persian videttes; the Persian monarch had 
perhaps a right to be more indignant at  this than hc was, but he only 
sent the letters to the British envoy, and begged him not to expose 
himself to have others intercepted. Probably few sovereigns mould 
have shown more moderation on such an occasion, but Mr. McNeil 
considered himself affronted by this act, which he looked upon as an 
infringement of his rights, and insisted upon an apology from the 
prime minister; this was refused, and he adopted the refusal as 
the basis of his rupture with the Persian Government. Without 
taking into account the continued hostility of Russia, which for 
* Despatch, March 10, 1538. 
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three years had .menaced the barriers of British India, Mr. 
i\'lcNeil announces to his own Government his rupture with that 
of the Shah in the following terms :- 
" ' N d ~ e d ,  June 85, 1533. 
" ' After having exhausted all the means I could devise to 
induce the Persian Government to grant me reparation and satis- 
faction for the violence offered to the messenger, and finding that 
I could obtain nothing, I felt compelled, not only in consequence 
of the evident determination of the Persian Government not to 
grant what I .had demanded, but also because of its perseverance 
in a course of proceeding towards me in camp which I felt was 
lowering the character of the mission in the estimation both of 
Persians and Afghans, to quit the court, and I am now on my 
way to the Turkish frontier, where I shall hope to receive further 
instructions from your Lordship. What course the Persian 
Government will now pursue I know not : some public act of re- 
paration, which will prove to the people of Pe.rsia and of Central 
A s h  that we are not with impunity ta be insulted, is in my opinion 
iudispensably necessary-I will not say to restore us to our former 
position, but to enable us to retain one of any credit or respectability. 
Both the Persians and the Afghans in the Shah's camp saw with 
, amazement the Persian Government treating a British mission as  
a proscribed body, and punishing .persons who ventured to hold 
even a casual communication with it ; while some of the members 
of the Russian mission took to task, and threatened to get punished 
for that offence, persons who occasionally visited a t  my tent, 
taking some precautions to prevent their being discovered.' 
" I n  the month of Mayy, 11838, before he quitted the camp, the 
British envoy despatched Major Todd to Lord Buckland, Governor- 
. 
General of India, with despatches that informed him of the rupture 
which had taken place. After rapidly crossing Afghanistan the 
Major arrived in July at  Simla, where he .Found his Lordship, who 
was greatly impressed with the importance of the letters placed in 
his hands ; it has even been affirnled that- they were the cause of 
his determination to make war on Kabul the following year. 
(' On the eve of his departure from the camp Mr. M'Neil obtained 
permission.to go into the city once more to make a last attempt 'at 
a reconciliation between the Persians and the Afghans ; he passed 
the night in Herat, but, instead of fulfilling his promise, i t  was 
found that he had only beeu there to make presents to Shah 
R 
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Kamran and his adherents to induce them to renounce their 
project of surrendering the place. The next day he went to the 
Shah, and told him that the Heratees would not hear of peace, and 
that he must raise the siege. On the refusal of the Shah, the 
British ambassador struck his tents, and left for Tauriz, where he 
decided to wait for further instructions from his Government, to * 
which, on the 11th April, 1538, he wrote as follows : ' The question 
of Herat seems therefore to be the question of all Afghanistan, for 
i t  is no secret to any one that the British Government has been 
desirous to prevent its fall, and that Russia, on the contrary, has 
been solicitous to see it in the hands of Persia.' " s 
BIB. MII'NEIL'S LETTER. 
C H A P T E R  S V I I I .  
Mr. M'Neil's letter to the Muchteid of Ispahan -Lord Palmerston no longer con- 
tinues. his half-measures - The English occupy the island of Karrack - 
Captain Vikovitch at  Kandahar and Kabul-He returns to the Persian camp 
with the envoys of these two principalities - Treaty between Persia and 
Kandahw-Violent declaration of Lord Palmerston to the Persian government 
- General Simonitch arrives in the Persian camp -The Persians take courage 
-Hadji Mirzn's opposition to  Count Simonitch-Colonel Semineau's plan of 
attack adopted-Siege operations renewed-The assault-Treachery of the 
Persian chiefs - General Boroffski is killed and the Persians are repulsed - 
Colonel Semineau is wounded-He senda in his resignation, which is not 
accepted- Is promoted to the rank of General, and receives a Persian order - 
The English ultimatum arrives at  the Persian camp - Conduct of t h e  Heratees 
during the assault. 
MR. &!'NEIL had scarcely reached Meshed when he allowed free 
scope to his resentment against the Persians; and he carried 
matters to such extremes, that one is in  truth tempted to ask if his 
actions ought not to place him under the ban of civilised nations. 
On his accession to the throne Mohamed Shah had met with 
opposition from three of his uncles, and one, Seifet Dooulet, 
Governor of Ispahan, had been supported in a semi-revolt against 
him by Sjud Mohanled Bagher, the great Muchteid of that city, 
whose power over the masses was great;  indeed he could raise 
them with a word. The British envoy knew that after the fall of 
Seifet the chief of Islam had retained a feeling of resentment 
against Mohamed Shah, which he did not even take the pains 
to conceal; Mr. MGNeil wrote, therefore, a furious letter to the 
Suyd, in which he insinuated that he ought to preach a crusade 
a.gainst his sovereign, and left him to believe that he would in sd 
doing be supported by the British, who were, he said, attached 
to the Persian people, and were angry only with their unworthy 
monarch. IIappily the enlightened mind of Syud Mohamed 
Bagher saw this attempt in its proper light ; he sent Mr. M6Neil's 
letter to the Shah, and replied thus' to the Envoy himself: " T h e  
Persians have always been remarkable for their attachment to their 
kings, and to you, an European Envoy, less than to any one else 
does it appertain to raise a storm in a country where the English 
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have always been received according to the dictates of the laws of 
hospitality." Thus mas arrested the progress of an evil which 
might have proved immense. "Mr. MWeil," says Monsieur 
Thomas, " had not reached Tauriz when he received from Lord 
Palmerston a reply to one of his despatches, anterior to that in 
which he had announced his rupture with the Persian Government.. 
I t  was after having stretched his patience to the very utmost, and 
when there was not the least hope of gaining his point by wisdom 
and firmness, that the British Agent received from his Lordship 
the permission to act energetically in the name of Great Britain. 
" 'The Shah should have been told from the beginning,' said 
Lord Palmerston, ' that the British Government ~erceived in this 
expedition a hostility entirely incompatible mith the spirit of the 
alliance entered into between Persia and Great Britain.' 
" A t  the same time an English fleet sent by the Indian Gox-ern- 
. 
ment disembarked on the coast of Persia, and took possession of 
the Island of Harrack. As soon as Mr. M'Neil received this intel- 
ligence he sent Colonel Stoddart, as the bearer of an ultimatum, to 
the camp of Mohanled Shah, informing that sovereign that Great . 
Britain had determined to arrest his prc~jects of conquest in 
Afghanistan, and that, if he did not immediately raise the siege of . 
Herat, the taking of Ihrraclc by the English would be fcllowed by 
further and more significant acts of hostility on their part." 
England was not ignorant whence this injury proceeded, but she 
could hardly attack the source without creating a fresh compli- 
cation of interests, and English pride is not so hasty as to be unable 
to resign itself, wl~en desirable, to a cold-blooded policy. Not 
daring t o  go  direct to the Russian Court., whose incognito, though 
but loosely kept, slie respected, she dealt a sick blow, as if to 
warn and disconcert those who would be tempted to try to profit by 
their manmuvres. However that might be, Mr. MiNeil  armed 
with the last despatch that he had received, was perfectly at liberty 
to act or tllreaten as he pleased, but the power came too late, as the 
oppoltunity w a s  lost; the rupture with Mohamed Shah was 
complete, and in his reply the British Envoy could only infirm 
Lord Palmerston of the extent of the mischief. 
I t  has been stated that when the Persian army marched fron 
Teheran it was accompanied by a Russian officer named Vikovitch, 
who quitted it a t  Nishapoor, having had numerous andieuces of the 
Shah and his prime minister : very soon after he reached IIandahar, 
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where in twelve days he concluded a treaty offensive and defensive 
with Kohendil Khan, Sovereign Serdar of that principality. 
After this he went to Icabul, where he remained several months. 
Burnes, who had been some time in that city whcn the Russian 
officer arrived, was charged by his government with the ful- 
filment of a mission very similar to that of the Russian ; namely, 
to smooth the existing differences between the Emir of Kabul and 
the Maharadjah of the Punjab. 
Vikovitch was a t  first not well received by Dost Mohamed, whose 
tendencies were entirely English ; but thc Emir, having found only 
hesitation and injustice in the mediation he had requested of Lord 
Aucklancl for the settlement of the difficulties existing between 
himself and Runjeet Sing, he was in despair, and turned to the 
side of the Russians and the Persians. 
When the Russian diplomatist quittell I<abul he was accom- 
panied by an Afghan Syud named Yaya, whom the Emir sent to 
Mohamed Shah to follow up the negotiations commenced by Viko- 
vitch ; they remained several days at  Kandahar, and left with 
Mohamed Omar Khan, the second son of Kohendil Khan, who 
was charged by his father wit11 a mission to the Persian monarch 
analogous to that of the Syud of Kabul. These three personages 
arrived at the royal camp a t  Herat some time after Mr. M'Neil had 
quitted it, and the following is his appreciation of the results of the 
Russian officer's embassy. 
H e  writes to his government., " Before my messenger (Colonel 
Stoddart, bearer of the ultimatum) could reach the Shah of Persia, 
a treaty had been concluded between the Prince of Kandahar and 
his Persian Majesty, and the Russian minister had form ally gua- . 
ranteed the fulfilment of the engagements contracted by the two 
parties. A treaty of the same nature was in course of completion 
with Kabul also, and Captain Vikovitch, after having been received 
by the Shah in his camp, had set out a second time for that city 
and Kandahar, furnished with immense sums of money for the 
purpose of terminating arrangements so auspiciously commenced to 
establish Persian domination and Russian supremacy in all the 
Afghan states. The entire colmtry from the Russian frontier on 
the Araxes to the banks of t.he Indus had been secretly tampered 
with and raised by Muscovite agents, some openly accredited, 
others without any ostensible public duty, all engaged in forming a 
line of influence which not only counteracted the views arid interests 
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of Great Britain, hut disturbed and threatened her empire in the 
East." 
Lord Palmerston," observes Mons. Thomas, " replied to 
Mr. MCNeil on the 27th July, 1838, and wishing to nard off 
fresh perils, a s  well as the embarrassments pointed out by his 
agent, he at last gave up the reserve and temporising with which 
up to that period he had acted towards Persia; he discovered 
in the treaty of 151 4, not a reason for political inaction, as he had 
aftirmed at the commencement, but a perfect right of interventio~, 
which is what the terms of the treaty most positively deny : nothing 
can be more clear. 'If war,' it is said therein, 'should be 
declared between the Afghans and the Persians, the English 
Government would not interfere on either side, unless its pacific 
mediation should be solicited by both the contending parties.' 
His Lordship went further even than he had ever done before, and, 
not content with pointing out Russian influence as a permanent 
sturnblingblock in the way of Pewia, as a fatal snare which Persia 
should mistrust for her own sake and in her own interest, he loudly 
1)roclaimed that ' the suggestions of Russia were antagonistic to the . 
peace and prosperity of Great Britain.' 
" This was a great effort," says Mons. Thomas, an useless effort - 
after the extremities to which he had been reduced with Persia, 
aimless and without result, if it did not bear upon a point other 
than that on nhich it seemed to be directed." The following is an 
extract from Lord Palmerston's despatch to Mr. MLNeil, dated 
Foreign Office, July 27th, 1838 :-"I have to instruct you to 
state to the Shah of Persia, that, whereas the spirit and purport of 
the treaty between Persia and Great Britain is that Persia should 
be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that 
the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great 
Britain in defending British India, it appears, on the cont,rary, 
that the Shah is occupied in subverting those intelwning states 
between Persia and India which might prove additional barriers of 
defence for the British possessions, and that in these operations he 
has openly connected himself with an European power for purposes 
avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; 
that, under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter 
upon a course of proceeding wholly a t  variance with the spirit and 
intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel her- 
mlf a t  liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty,.such mea- 
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sures as a due regard.for her own interests and the security of her 8 
dominions may suggest." * 
'' Lord Palmerston," remarks Mons. Thomas, "had failed to 
preserve the Persian alliance at  a time when i t  might have been 
done by moderation and firmness only, and now that it was lost he 
adopted violence and menaces to regain it. I t  was the British 
Government, throwing aside the indecision caused by the fear of 
Russia, taking a t  last an extreme line, not against Russia, which 
it always treated with deference,-not against Persia, which re- 
mained its sturdy enemy under the protection of the Tzar,-but 
against the whole of the East, which it then wished to terrify 
with the power of Great Britain, and this after having displayed 
her weakness for four years. I t  now became necessary to raise 
Persia from the depths into which she had fallen by accepting the 
Russian alliance, and some great exploit was to be performed in 
tbe narr.e of England alone ; the weakness with which the Tzar's 
proceedings in Penia had been combated was bitterly repented of, 
and they must now be stopped in Afghanistan as by a thunderbolt: 
SO great was the fear of being outstripped by the indefatigable 
activity of Muscovite diplomacy, that i t  was thought preferable to 
destroy it at  the outset." W e  shall see to what this new system led, 
and will judge, of it by its fruits. 
General Simonitch made up his mind to leave Teheran when he 
saw that Mr. M'Neil had gone to the royal camp, and, in propor- 
tion as the reception of the British minister had been cold and 
reserved, was his Majesty's manner to the Russian gracious and 
expressive of his anxiety to please ;' for as Mr. M'Neil had, in 
consoquence of not being supported by his government, lost the 
influence that he had at one time succeeded in obtaining, and t 
had even come to a rupture with the Persian Court, General 
Simonitch had become more powerful than ever, and the Shah, 
against the advice of his first minister,-was devoted to him body 
and soul. This diplomatist was a Dalmatian, who, being in the 
French army in 1812 or 1813, was taken prisoner by the Russians, 
and after the fall of Napoleon entered their servjce. I t  is true he 
* Mohamed Shah had renounced annihilated ever since the day on which 
this conventiou long before the British the Cabinet of London had refused to  
Government; and when pressed by Mr. psy to that  of Teheran the subsidies 
Ellis and Mr. M'Neil to conform to  it, tha t  Great Britain had by the same 
he said that  in his eyes it had been treaty engaged to.furnish.-Forrim: 
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treated the Persian King with rough respect, which had a certah 
effect upon the weak but goodnatured monarch, who entertained 
a species of veneration for all those who had served under 
that Emperor; and after having been sharply rebuked by the 
Russian ambassador for all the deception that had been prac- 
tised from the commencement of the siege, the Shah ordered the 
chiefs of his army to act henceforth in col1formit.y with the instruc- 
tions of the Russian minister. I 
Hadji Mirza Agassee, thus thwarted in his scheme of retreating, 1 
exerted himself as much as possible to get these orders revoked, but 
in vain. He  then tried to paralyse their effect by manifest ill-will in 
furnishing the materials, ammunition, and stores requisite for the 
works necessitated by the new arrangements that were adopted. H e  
did not conceal the vexation he felt even to General Simonitcll, 
and explained his opinion t.o him very categorically. " Why should 
I take T3erat ? " he said to the dragoman ; '' why should I espoae-a . 
crowd of innocent people to perish for the fault of one individual 
only ?-of Yar Mohamed Khan, who takes all the revenues of the 
province for his ova profit, instead of paying me the tribute ; and who . 
authorized all the pillage that has been committed by the Afghans 
upon the Persian merchant.. . And then, it would be impossible for 
., 
me to keep Herat mith Persian soldiers, idle gluttons, who the 
moment they are masters of the place will think only of eating pillau, 
and amusing themselves with the women. The Afghans, whose bag- 
gage is light enough, for they have never anything to lose, will come 
back some day and cut their throats. Besides, you have not given 
me the material support that you promised ; on the contrary, you 
have taken away the Russian deserters: all this ought to induce 
the Shah to raise this unhappy siege, which ruins the country and 
creates difficulties with England." 
But General Simonitch was not to be impeded by this obsti- 
nate old man. He inlmediately sent for Colonel Semineau, whose 
straightforward conduct had won his esteem, and in some degree 
reproached him for the tardy manner in which the operations 
were conducted. T h e  Colonel exculpated himsclf by showing 
i t  was not his fault, as treachery and the general ill-feeling had 
obliged him to hold himself aloof after the first few days of the siege ; 
a t  the same time he submitted to him the plan of attack which he had 
presented to the Shah seven months before, but never received autho- 
rity to put into execution. The General then desired Lieutenant- 
i .' 
I .  
j 
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Colonel Blaremberg, the Russian officer of Engineers attached to 
the embassy, to inspect the works in the trenches, and as speedily 
as possible report his opinion of them. M. Blaremberg was soon 
convinced that they were conducted in a manner entirely contrary 
to the rules of common sense, and that the wisest course to take 
would be even then to adopt the plan of Colonel Semineau, arid 
this was the one subsequently carried out by General Simonitch. 
Fascines and gabions were immediately made in great numbers ; 
and as the .soldiers would do not.hing without being well paid, 
the Russian minister drew from his own treasury the funds . 
necessary to satisfy them, and they worked accordingly, but he 
alienated the chiefs from his cause because he never gratified 
their avarice. They had taken English gold as a soothing antidote 
to the excess of their zeal, and would not have been less happy 
to pocket that of the Russians as a stimulus to it ; but the General, 
thinking perhaps that he should not want their help, never he- 
stowed an obolus upon them, which led to a thousand intxigues 
011 their part to baffle the new plan of attack. The  following, 
taken from Colonel Semineau's notes, will give a rough idea of the 
disconnected character of the operations. 
For eight months," it is therein stated, "have we fought with- 
out result, and 4000 soldiers have been disabled, which in Persia 
very nearly means killed, for the slightest wound cannot be success- 
fiilly treated, excepting Lp astrologers, who take the title of doctor 
without having the slightest idea of the knowledge that belongs to 
it ; besides, they are particularly careful to keep out of the way 
- when the army is in the field. 
After the expiration of these eight months, during which we had 
olily experienced heavy losses, and without any corresponding 
result, his Persian Majesty, by the advice of General Simonitch, 
sought to enlighten himself by a council of war, a t  which he pre- 
sided in person. After many propositions more or less extravagant 
had been made, my turn .came, and I reverted to the plan that I 
had given in a t  the commencement of the siege. But this raised + 
terrible storm against me ; not a chief would confine himself to a 
uniform and well-considered line of operations. Each persisted in 
wanting to act separately with his own force, and claiming for him: 
self the honour of taking Herat or any other success he might 
obtain : they therefore with one voice rejected my project. How- 
ever, addressing myself to his Majesty, who seemed'on the point, of 
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yielding to his officers, I represented to him that it rould be folly 
to sacrifice the public interest for the sake of individuals; that 
each corps would take its turn in the trenches that I intended to 
open, according to the rules of war; and that in point of fact the 
city could only be taken in the name of Moharned Shah, who ought 
to have the honour of the victory, without that circumstance in the 
least detracting from the glory that would belong to the generals. 
This advice pleased the King ; and as nothing more was wanting to 
induce the council to hold the same opinion, the order was imme- 
diately given to commence the attack upon the angle of Khodja . 
Abdul Harnid under my direction in chief. But I had yet to 
encounter many a spiteful impediment in the construction of my 
trenches, and it was entirely owing to the determination of General 
Simonitch that I could partly surmount them. For example, one 
day, in the middle of a most difficult work, the Shah sent for me 
and commanded me to throw a bridge over a ravine twenty miles 
from the camp, which would have occupied several days, and 
during my absence my trenches must neccessarily have been a t  
a standstill. Happily Lieutenant-Colonel Blaremberg prevailed , 
upon the King to revoke this order. 
'' I opened my first trench at t,lle farthest ruins of the Meuhelle 
Arabha," and, having arrived within 437 yards of the edge of the 
town ditch, I constructed large and spacious cavaliers, using only 
gabions, palisades, and fascines, which I raised to the height of 326q 
feet;  this height was not sufficient to enfilade the sec,ond covered 
way, but one of our batteries had a plunging fire into the first and 
the ditch. From the cavaliers I had a good view of the prolongation 
of the curtains in the enceinte, as well as along those of the second 
covered way. I placed in battery eight 12-pounders on each cava- 
lier, and made the embrasures b portibe, and it was not till every- 
thing was complete that I worked from this point to reach the edge 
, 
of the ditch of the angle attacked. T h e  Afghans had made 
galleries with fougasses to defend the approaches, from which they 
hoped to obtain great results ; but as these underground works had 
been executed some time, it was not difficult to discover, by the 
colour of the grass withered above them, the direction they had 
given to their mines. A cupo7rike, which they had made in the 
. 
ditch, and in sight of my battery, enabled the enemy to communicate 
* Arab quarter. 
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with his mines. T h e y  I turned by counter-mines, at  which we 
secretly worked. When. our . c h k b &  mere charged and matches 
ready I sent tvo balls at  tlie ccapod&.e, which swept it away, and 
the people who were in it took refuge in their mines. A t  that 
moment I ordered ours to be sprung ; the explosion destroyed the 
Afghan works, and the miners were suffocated ; from that day they, 
abandoned all their works beyond the counterscarp, and of this 
circnmstance I took advantage to push my trenches without delay 
up to the ditch. B ~ l t  the Afghans, perceiving the object of the 
cavaliers, altered their determination, and early in the night estab- 
lished traverses to defend the covered ways on both sides of the 
angle of attack ; I was not uneasy at  that, because the space that 
I required opposite the batteries was free, and they in no way 
impeded me in forwarding my works, foot by foot, up to the crest 
of the rampart of the town. I would not breach it till I had suffi- 
ciently filled up the ditch at the point at which we were to pass 
i t ;  this I managed to do by three chambers outside the counter-' 
scarp, and, springing them all at  once, the earth was thrown 
into the ditch and filled it. W e  then opened from the two bat- 
teries in the cavaliers, each of .which was armed with eight pieces 
of heavy artillery, consisting of twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four 
pounders. The fire from these guns at forty-three yards from 
the edge of the ditch, and sixty-five yards?rom the large tower, 
took it obliquely, and after a cannonade of four hours, riot 
only was that vast and massive work razed to the ground, but 
also the-adjacent one on either side of the angle ; I wished to use 
some field-howitzers, but, being short, they blew out the cheeks of 
the embrasures. On the night of this day, the results of which had 
as much astonished the Persians as the Afghans, we filled the ditch 
with the fragments of the wall and bags of hay, and a t  daybreak 
we might have made the assault, but, knowing the daring of the 
enemy, and the inexperience of our own troops, I conceived it my 
duty to save bloodshed as much as possible, by conducting the 
approach in zigzags up to the crest of the breach, where I had 
intended to establish a nid de pie, to protect the infantry, who were 
to descend into the city. I aslied for the requisite quantity of tim- 
~ ber, fascines, and gabions to construct this, which could have been 
I 
I lone in three days, but a cabal at court had vowed to baffle me 
j as much as possible ; on this occasion they put the very stars in 
requisition against me, declaring that it was absolutely necessary 
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the assault should be made on the following day, the 24th of July, 
because a happy conjunction of them promised infallible success. 
I n  consequence four battalions were told off for the assault, and 
noon was the hour appointed for storming the place. I t  was well 
chosen, for the Afghans, overcome by the heat, habitually gave up 
,a few hours to repose in the middle of the day, and, till then, the 
Persians had done the same ; the former therefore were far from 
supposing that this woulcl be the moment selected for the attack,- 
it was indeed a complete surprise. But unfortunately, of the four 
battalions that ought to have marched, one only, the Raragudoo, 
and that reduced by its losses to 400 men, appeared at  the breach. 
Pressing had been the demands, the entreaties of these devoted 
men for ammunition, and yet seven rounds per man was all . 
the prime minister woulcl grant them ; and as he knew full  well 
that the other battalions, being his countrymen, Maliooees, would 
not stir a foot, he gave but four to each serbaz. The messengers 
I sent into the camp, one after another, to procure what 1 re- 
quired, always returned with a vague answer, and, in short, i t  
was impossible for mc to obtain anything. On the other hand, the 
Sertip Hadji Khan, who had behaved so ill some months before .- 
near the Imi~um Zadeh, and who had received orders to hold his .. 
brigade in reserve to support, if necessary, the storming party, went 
in quite a different direction, and attacked another part of the city, 
in the hope of having the credit of taking it. But this absurd 
diversion injured far more than it coi~tributed to the success of the . 
enterprise. T h e  400 serbaz who threw thenlselves into the breach 
quickly disposed of the guard in the covered ways ; they were half 
asleep, and a crowd of their comrades, who rushed to their assist- 
ance, were swept away by oar batteries, which then crossed their 
fire behind the point of attack. This brave band of Karaguzloos 
carried the Persian colours to the very crest of. the breach, and had 
the courage and constancy there to maintain themselves for hours, 
waiting for ammunition, in the mean time using their bayonets, 
bricks, and stones, to keep off the Afghans, who in very superior 
numbers fired on them in front and flank. The science of the 
engineer, and the devotion of the soldier, could avail nothing in 
such a position. The 4fghan serdar Dirie Mohamed Khan, who 
commanded the defence, fought like a hero. With his pistol he 
laid a t  his feet the brave Nabee Khan, chief of the Kara- 
guzloos, whose courage and loyalty merited a better fate, and 
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cut down the trumpeter who sounded the advance, and had just 
planted the flag on the'breach, but he could not force that haed- 
ful of Persians to retreat ; the death of their chief hiid only 
doubly excited them, and the majority of them preferred death on 
the field of honour to retreating one single step. I n  vain they 
called upon the other three battalions to help them; a secret order 
retained them where they stood. The gold of England arid the 
orders of the Hadji Mirza Agassee had tied them hand and foot. 
The soldiers looked on like the habitub of the pit of certain 
theatres : each gave his opinion, and with more or less noise or sym- 
pathy. ' They'll mount, they'll mount ;' or, ' They will never 
do it.' Such were the cries that accompanied these noble Kara- 
guzloos to the top of the breach. I had also demanded the aid of 
400 riflemen of the Garai tribe, well known for the correctntss:of 
their aim, in order to maintain a sharp and continuous fire from 
t,he foot of the entrenched cavaliers upon the faces of the angles of 
attack, but what svere my astonishment and indignation to see them 
remain passive spectators of the fight ! These sharpshooters were 
under the command of a great Persian nobleman, a relative of the 
Shah's, who ought to have been more interested than I was in the 
taking of Herat ; and when I approached him to express my feelings 
a t  the conduct of his men, he replied, in the most ironical man- 
ner, ' Give them powder and ball, of which they are perfectly desti- 
tute, and they will do anythiug you require.' 
" I then saw clearly that treachery on all sides would cause the 
failure of the assault, and there remained but one man in whom I 
had yet a hope left,-this was General Boroffslri. H e  had in the first 
instance been protected by the English, but his proud nature could 
not adapt itself to their demands, and General Simonitch had endea- 
voured, and with tolerable success, to attach him to the Russian cause, 
promising to interest the Emperor in his position, and to endeavour 
to procure his recognition of the General as the son of Prince R., of 
whom he was the natural child. Boroffski had no military acquire- 
ments, but he was brave, and the serba.z always followed him with 
the utmost confidence ; about two sections rallied round him, ,and 
hurried to the breach to support those who were already engaged, 
but he had scarcely reached the ditch when a ball struck him in the 
lower part of the body, and gave him the wound which sent him to 
his grave. My eyes followed Baroffski on his way to the assault, 
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and I saw him fall mortally woilnded ; I have always thought, from 
the direction the ball took, that it came from a Persian musket ; 
and I can state as much with regard to myself, for 1 was hit in the 
shoulder by a ball fi-om behind me as I faced the ramput. 
" T h e  unhappy serbaz, who were as much disappointed at this 
fresh misfortune, and as heartily enraged with their chiefs, as I was, 
addressed them in the most insulting tems,  but they were a t  last 
obliged, to their bitter regret, to abandon the breach they had so 
valiantly stormed and held for five mortal hours; they slowly 
obeyed the bugle that sounded the retreat, and, mutilated as 
they were, the shattered survivors of this heroic battalion retired 
with mournful steps to their encampment. After having visited the 
minister to report to him the result of the operations, and reproach 
. 
him with his disloyal conduct, I, like those brave men, shut myself 
up in my tent, and I determined to renounce the Persian service 
for ever, and even my arrears of pay. I told Hadji Mirza that I 
should resign, but the Shah, always kind and considerate to me; 
pressed me so much not to do so that I yielded to his persua- 
sions ; and as soon as he had obtained my promise to that effect, ' 
. 
he sent me the brevet of General and the red ribbon of the order 
of the Lion and the Sun." 
General Semineau, having been in entire ignorance of everything 
that passed, had acted with his accustomed loyalty of character, and 
especially regretted that he had been refused the three days to carry 
his works to the crest of the breach, for then treason itself could not 
have prevented him from taking this important place. Under cover 
of the nid de pie crowning the culminating point of the attack, he 
could have established one or two pieces of cannon in battery, the 
fire of which would have protected the troops in their descent into 
the  town ; this would not have been easy, because the interior side 
of the e'paulement was raised to the height of nineteen to twenty-two 
feet 2d pic, and supported by brickwork which served as a counter- 
fort. A t  the top of the kpaulement was a banquette on which two 
men would have difficulty in walking abreast, and the Persian sol- 
diers in following this must have been under the murderous fire of 
the besieged from the surrounding houses, before they could get to 
the ramre which led into the city: all therefore was not done 
when the breach was gained. General Semineau, who devoted 
himself soldy to his profession of engineer, and interfered not in 
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politics, was absolutely ignorant of the .reason for which he was so 
pitilessly refused the three days he so much required ; but on the 
24th of July, ISM, Colonel Stoddart was expected to arrive 
a t  the royal camp, with the ultimatum of Mr. M'Neil, by 
which the Shah was threatened with war with  nila and if he 
did not raise the siege. On the 22nd General Si~nonitch had 
received a despatch from M. de Nesselrode, which informed 
him that he had been dieavowed by him, that he was recalled 
from Teheran, and that he was besides charged to inform the 
Shah that his Majesty must no longer expect to be supported 
in his undertaking by the Russian Government. Count Simonitch 
thought less of the blow thus dealt to himself than of the failure of 
an enterprise that he had conducted with such ability, and. partly 
by persuasion, partly by threats, obtained the order for the 
assault on the day named. Colonel Stoddart could not arrive till 
night, the place might be taken by the Persians before the ultima- 
tum arrived, and, its fall being a fait accompli, negotiations might 
be continued on a different footing ; Russia could then more posi- 
tively resist the demands of England : but the treachery of the 
prime minister annihilated all the operations of General Semineau, 
to whom fortune was adverse in every way. T h e  city itself, in 
consequence of the intended flight of Yar Mohamed, was on the 
point of yielding. That chief could not imagine that the Persians 
would loose their hold after having advanced their works so 
near, and, when the fight was a t  the sharpest, he retired from the ,  
assault in all haste to make preparations for departure. I n  
the act of mounting his horse he sent to the troops to say they 
might surrender, but he was detained by Captain Pottinger, who 
,entreated him to grant an hour's delay, a t  the expiration .of 
which time he could leave the city if success attended not the 
efforts of his gallant soldiers on the breach, when the vizier acceded 
to his request. 
The  British officer, well acquainted with the details of Mr. 
M'Neil's policy and negotiation, was not ignorant of the reasons 
which led General Simonitch to hurry the assault ; and his pmc- 
tised eye soon perceived that, though made with vigour, it was not 
supported : he saw the irresolute battalions quite undecided a s  to 
what they ought to do, and could not mistake such characteristic 
signs. British policy had once more the upper hand, and Captain 
Pottinger had not prejudged the circumstances when he hoped for 
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the retreat of the assailants. In  this terrific struggle the Afghan ' 
women and all the children over ten years of age hastened to the 
breach to exert their feeble power in aid of their defenders, and 
showered down bricks and stones upon the Persians. The Afghans ' 
had determined to day all their women and children, and afterwards 
each other, if the Persians succeeded in into the place. 
Mohamed Shah remained two months inactive under the walls 
of Herat after this assault, and in September, 1838, he raised the 
siege and retired to his capital. Scarcely had he arrived there 
when the Russian Government, not very grateful for his docility, 
obliged him to pay a fourth part of the eqenses  of. the war stipu- 
lated in the treaty of Turkomantchai. 
When the Persians retired, Syud Yaya, the envoy of Kabul, and 
Mohamed Omar Khan, the envoy of Ihndahar ,  accompanied the 
Shah to Teheran, while Captain Vikovitch, who had presented 
them at the royal camp, followed them as far as ICussan, a fron- 
tier town of /Herat ; here he turned to the south, and, after 
having examined in a strategical point of viex the road which 
passes by Khaff, Birdjan, Duroo, and Furrah, he went to Kandahar. . , 
There he had several audiences of Kohendil Khan, to whom he paid 
56001. in consideration of an engagement entered into by that prince 
to recommence the siege of Herat, which the threats of Great 
Britain had forced Mohamed Shah to abandon. I n  consequence 
the Serdar Nohamed Sedik Khan, the eldest son of Kohendil 
Khan, a t  the head of three or fow thousand men, entered the territory 
of Herat and commenced hostilities Captain Vikovitch remained 
forty days at Kandahar, and when he left that city to return to 
Teheran great was his astonishment, on arriving at Furral~, to find 
the army of Mohamed Sedik Khan encamped there and perfectly 
unoccupied, except in the appropriation of the booty it had levied 
in the district by carrying fire and sword into every house. H e  
had detached a small advanced guard, but that had not proceeded 
beyond the small town of Subzawar. This fatal delay, of which 
Vikovitch felt the full import.ance, brought on an angry contest 
between that officer and the Afghan serdar. Vikovitch demanded 
the prompt execution of the convention between himself and 
Kohendil Khan, or, in case of further delay, the immediate restitu- 
tion of the 12,000 ducats; but Mohamed Sedilr Khan 'was highly 
indignant. " The money you gave uie," said he, " would not 
provide my army with horseshoes. I f  you wish me to advance, 
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give me as much again." Vikovitch, who knew well that to pay 
more was simply throwing the money away, decisively rejected this 
proposition, which at one time the serdar seemed inclined to 
.enforce, and not by words only. H e  even thought of plundering 
the Russian officer, and would perhaps have proceeded to personal 
violence, had he not been restrained by the fear that the Shah 
might make some retaliation upon Mohamed Omar Khan, then 'at 
his court on a mission to that sovereign. These facts were told 
me by the ruffian himself: 
Mohamed Sedik hesitated not to abandon the project of seizing 
Herat, and returned to his father to confer upon the plan for 
opposing the English invasion, then vaguely rumoured in Afghan- 
istan. .As to Captain Vikovitch, he was obliged to continue his 
journey without recovering the 12,000 ducats that were extorted 
from him by the Sertlars of Kandahar. After having visited the 
fortress of Laush Jowaine and the north of Lake Ruostem, he took 
the road by Toon and Tubbus towards Teheran, and very soon 
after, returned to Russia, where, as the reward of all his exertions, 
he found hinself in fatal disgrace. This crying injustice wounded 
him so deeply, that he put a period to his life with his own pistol 
in a hotel a t  St. Petersburg : it is stated that before he committed 
that deplorable act he destroyed the documents that he had col- 
lected on his various journeys in Asia. 
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The Persians abandon the  siege of Herat - The Serdars of Kandahar and Captain 
Vikovitch-Desolation of Herat - Yar Mohamed implores the assistance of the 
neighbouring priucipalities - Yar Mohamed sells tLe Reratees to the Turcomuns 
-The English prepare to invade Afghanistan - Misunderst.anding between Dost 
Mohamed and Runjoet Sing - Intervention of the English-Their want of 
good faith towards Dost Xohamed - Their partiality for Runjeet - Negotiation0 
between the English and the Dost - Battle of Djamrood -B~rnes at Kabul - 
H e  meets with Vilcovitch, who is coldly received by the Emk - The Dost 
makes frank explanations to the English - He is supported by Burnes at 
Cdcntta - Burnes is triumphant over Vikovitch - Note of Lord Pdmerston to 
&I. de Nesselrode - Reply of the Russian cabinet - The last attempt of the 
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IT is impossible to conceive the recltless devastation committed 
by the Persian soldiers in the principality of IXerat during the ten 
months of the siege of its capital : they made a perfect desert of 
that once rich and fertile country. The city, torn up by shot and 
shell, was nothing but a mass of shapeless ruins, and the houses, 
.caravanserais, and bazaars, were all pulled down to repair the 
breaches in the ramparts ; it was in fact a heap of cinders, ruin, 
and desolation. 
T o  crown their misfortunes, the wretched citizens, who had been 
nearly starved during the siege, were for a long time short of pro- 
visions after i t  was raised, and the famine was almost as bad as it 
had bee11 previously, for the ground had not been tilled, and every 
one had consumed the provisions he had laid by before the arrival 
of the Persians. All the villages, from seventy to ninety miles 
round, had been completely pillaged to supply the besieging army, 
and the population of the country stripped of every thing, as were the 
citizens who left the city before the siege, and now returned in 
crowds to T-Ierat, where there was not a grain of corn to support 
them. The  famine soon made frightful ravages, and produced 
every day horrible scenes worthy of cannibals-in fact, its condi- 
tion was fearful to contemplate. 
To  put an end to this misery, Yar Mohamed Khan appealed to 
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the chiefs of the small principalities round Herat, and, in the name 
pf Nahomet, implored their generosity, and entreated them to send 
corn to the desolat.ed city ; a t  the same time he remitted the duty 
on every description of grain. 
The merchants of Turkestan, Randahar, and the Eimak Rhanats 
quickly responded to this appeal, but much more with the view of 
realizing enormous profits than of relieving such bitter distress. 
The majority of the Heratees, not having a groat in their pockets 
to purchase bread for their families, in many instances sold them- 
selves to the Turkomans for ten battemens of corn: fathers sold 
their children for as small a sum, and the children thankfully sanc- 
tioned the bargain which saved them from the terrible pangs 
of hunger. 
Yar Mohamed entered largely into this traffic, not, as his unhappy 
people did, to save their lives, but to replenish his coffers, the con- 
tents of which had been considerably exhausted by the war. He 
sold to thc Uzbeks all the Heratees who were guilty of the most 
trifling rnisdemeanours; and when they saw this, and ceased 
to commit them, thereby destroying his source of gain, he sent 
agents into the bazaars to excite disorder, and by that means 
,secured a supply of slaves for his market The slightest alter- 
cation or a loud word amongst a harmless group of citizens, and 
his satellites were always at  hand to pounce upon these unfortunate 
beings; even those who were attracted to the spot by curiosity 
only were taken, and a couple of hours afterwards sold or exchanged 
by their relentless vizier for a camel, or a mule, or anything else 
that might better suit him. Twenty young men was the price that 
he usually gave for a Turltoman horse, a hundred tomauns i r ~  value. 
This trade continued for some considerable time, but the English 
a t  last succeeded in putting a stop to it, the inducement being a 
.subsidy which they paid to the court of I-Ierat. 
Western Afghanistan had scarcely escaped the Persian yoke, a t  
the cost of all these fearful calamities against which it had still to 
struggle, when the English, to repay Russia and the Shah for all 
their provocations, prepared a forn~idable expedition to *invade 
-Kandahar and Kabul. This important act was preceded by 
.negotiations sufficiently singular, of which I will endeavour to give 
a rough sketch. 
W e  have stated that Runjeet Sing, the ambitious Maharadjah of 
the Punjab, after having wrested from the Afghans their finest 
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provinces, prepared to his conquests still further into their 
territory, when his intention was seen through by Dost Mohamed, 
who, as  the English said (but the fact has not been ~roved) ,  sought 
the alliance of the Icing of Persia, and proposed to assist him in his 
expeciition against Herat, ,provided that the Shah would on the 
other hand protect him against the Sikhs, who were supported by 
the East India Company. The English also reproached the DOS~ 
with having written to the Emperor of Russia requesting his 
alliance. This letter was, it is said, sent to St. Petersburg by an I 
Afghan envoy, properly accredited ; but the assertion is denied by 
M. de Nesselrode, who declared in one of his despatches, beaing 
date October 20th, 1838, that this envoy was simply a commercial 
agent, having no instructions or authority to meddle with politics. 
The  adversaries of the Emir vent so far as to give a copy of his , 
letter, but Dost Mohamecl declared that it was a lying invention of 
the enemy ; and to those who are acquainted with the extent to which 
false doct~ments are made use of in Asia, and the advanbges which 
the English have themselves derived from them in subduing the 
princes and rajahs of India, one doul~ts the propriety of giving an 
opinion on the validity of the one which the Emir is reproached with 
having written. This doubt is d l  the more admissible, inasmuch as 
a t  the epoch at which this document was said to have been pre- 
pared he was the warmest partisan of the English in Afghanistan, 
and remained so after they had driven him from that country., 
The  following is the letter referred to, written in the early part of 
the year 1836 :- 
" There have been great differences and quarrels between myself 
and the royal house of the Suddozyes. The English Government 
is inclined to support Shoojah-001-Moolk. The whole of India is 
governed by them, and they are on friendly terms with Runjeet 
Sing, the lord of the Punjab, which lies in their neighbourhood. 
T h e  British Government exhibit no favourable opinions towards 
me. I (literally the creature of God), with all my power, have been 
always fighting with the Sikhs; your Imperial Government has 
made friendship with the Persians ; and if your Majesty will gra- 
ciously be pleased to arrange matters in 'the Afghan country, and 
assist this nation (which amounts to twenty lacs of families), you 
will place me under obligations. 
"I. hope your Imperial Majesty will do me the favour by allow- 
ing me to be received, lilre the Persians, under the protection 
1 
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of the government of Russia. Under your royal favour I can 
perform, along with my Afghans, various praiseworthy services. I t  
would be highly proper, whatever your Imperial Majesty may be 
pleased to do." 
Supposing that Dost Mohamed did write this letter, where was 
the criine in his doing so ? Had lie not a right to look for alliances 
against his enemies? Was there more justice therefore in the 
English supporting Runjeet Sing in his spoliation of the Afghans? 
But who was this Runjeet-who were the Sikhs? h nation of 
yesterday ; always in subjection, without ancestors ,or traditions, 
and governed for the first time by a chief of their own nation: and 
this chief, 'this Runjeet, who it cannot be denied possesses some 
very great qualities, how was he brought u p ?  From whom did he 
hold his power? Was it not from an  Afghan sovereign, the Shah 
Zeman, who made him governor of the Punjab? Has lie not 
thrown off his allegiance to that monarch's successors, and pro- 
claimed himself sovereign of that country ? Is then the origin of 
his power more legitimate than that of Dost Mohamed, who a t  least 
has in his favour the old traditions of his family to prove that his 
ancestors always had in his country a power almost equal to that of 
the Afghan sovereigns ? 
The English had, probably, thought of this more than once ; but 
reason is a poor argument in the eyes of those who for twenty years 
had been wishing to have in Kabul a sovereign who would be a 
docile and submissive instrument of theirs. They also sanctioned 
the spoliations committed upon the finest Afghan provinces. by 
Runjeet. H e  had seized Mooltan in 1810, Cashmeer in 1819, 
Peshawur in 1823, and that Runjeet affirmed, with the entire 
consent of Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, the dethroned Icing, who had 
placed himself under his protection, and was considered by him and 
the English as the legitimate sovereign of Afghanistan, qualified 
by that title to make whatever concessions of territory he pleased. 
But why should Shooja be the legitimate sovereign of Afghanistan 
more than any other of his twenty brothers?-than Zeman or Mah- 
mood, for instance, who had been kings before him, and had done 
nothing to disinherit their children or deprive them of their rights to 
the throne ? Shah Kamran and Shah Eyoob had always protested 
against the pretensions of Shooja to the throne. Why, then, should 
the English he so regardless of their remonstrances and opposition, 
and the opinions of the generality of the Afghans? This policy 
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concealed a n  ambitious project ; the Anglo-Indian Government :: 
was possessed with a passion for territorial extension, and in no 
way sensitive as to the justice of the cause of Dost Mohamed 
from the moment they found that he would not bend to their wishes ; 
and not being in a condition to depose him themselves, they 
weakened his power as much as possible by means of their ally 
Runjeet, who annually sent an army to ravage some part of the 
Afghan kingdom. 
Although the Government of Calcutta showed a marked predi- 
lection for that ruler, it did not fail still to maintain its relations 
with and show some consideration for Dost Mollanled, who had on 
his part been guilty of very great duplicity, if he had really written 
to the Emperor Nicholas the letter which they accused him of 
sending, for very nearly s t  the same time, viz. on the 31st May, 
1836, following, he addressed Lord Auckland, who had recently 
arrived in India, in the most humble terms, as follows :- 
'' It may be known to your Lordship that, relying on the prin- 
ciples of benevolence and philanthropy which distin,pish the British 
Government, I look upon myself and country as bound to it ; and 
the letters I have received from that quarter have all been replete 
with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the efTect that, in the 
time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. T h e  
late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and mis- 
guided Sikhs and their breach of treaty, are well known .to your 
Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest ikelf 
to your wisdom for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that 
i t  may serve as a rule for my guidance. 
" I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your 
own, and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. 
Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the 
administration of this country, I will-act accordingly." 
Lord Aucltland replied to this communication on the 22nd of 
August, 1836, with the greatest kindness, very highly praised his 
discreet policy, and promised his impartial intervention to effect a 
reconciliation between the Afghan prince and the Sikhs. 
During the time that this correspondence was passing, the Per- 
sian expedition against.Herat was prepared and openly encourqed 
by General Simonitch; but it was November, 1837, before the 
army of Mohamed Shah arrived under the wdls of that city. 
Early in the same year, however, Dost Mohamed, gown weary of 
" * 
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I; the provocations of the Sikhs, and finding that he derived no 
: benefit, but rather the contrary, from the intervention of Lord 
Auckland, determined upon avenging his own cause, and seized 
. upon the opportunity offered him in the month of May by the indis- 
. cretion of the Maharadjah (who recalled his troops from the Afghan 
'+. ,. 
frontier in order to celebrate, with the greater pomp, the marriage 
.* of his grandson Nahal Sing), to march 15,000 men into the province 
of Peshamur. They were commanded by the Dost's two sons, 
Mohamed Efzel Khan and Mohamed Alcbar Khan, who attacked 
the Sikhs a t  Djamrood on the 1st of May, 1837. The combat was 
obstinate and the carnage dreadful, but victory crowned the banner 
of the brothers a t  the heavy cost of 7000 men. 
The  Government of Calcutta, already sufficiently daFmed by the 
Persian expedition against Herat, became still more so on hearing 
of the defeat of their faithful ally Runjeet, and despatched with all 
speed Sir A. Burnes to Kabul, to encleavour to arrest the progress 
of the victorious Afghans. 
T h e  British Envoy arrived in that city in September, and was 
received with great honours by Dost Mohamed, who greatly 
esteemed him. The instructions of Lord Auckland were, that he 
was simply to enter into commercial relations and pacific interven- 
tion between the Emir and the Maharadjah ; he added also that he 
wasauthorized to do this in the interest of the Afgizan chief and 
to avert his ruin. It was sufficiently surprising that his Lordship 
should use such language respecting a prince who had hitherto 
so well known how to defend himself, who had set forth no 
demands but what were perfectly reasonable, and in accordance 
with which he would, if admitted, have laid down his arms. The  
task of Burnes was difficult ; but he was fortunate enough to obtain 
from the Emir a temporary suspension of hostilities, and it was 
while he was occupied in this negotiation that Captain Vikovitch 
arrived a t  Kabul, namely, in December, 1837. The English have 
asserted that he brought the reply of the Emperor Nicholas to the 
letter the Emir had written his Imperial Majesty in the commence- 
ment of 1836. 
Whatever might have been the real object of his presence there, 
Vikovitcli met with a cold reception, and Dost Mohamed made 
his arrival the pretext for paying a visit to Sir A. Burnes, and 
requesting his advice as to what he ought to do under the circum- 
stances. The Emir declared from the first that he had determined 
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not to adopt an  alliance or ~olit ical relations with any other 
foreign power than England, that he would receive no foreign 
agent so long a s  he had the hope of conciliating the sympathy of 
the Anglo-Indian Government, and that for all he cared he .was 
willing to dismiss the Russian officer, or arrest him on his journey ; 
indeed, to treat him as Burnes might wish. It must be admitted 
that this was very extraordinary language for a man to use who 
had been recently accused of having written to the Emperor of 
Russia in the most respectful and submissive terms. Nevertheless 
Vikovitch was allowed to enter Kabul, but only at the request of 
Burnes, who took copies of all the letters brought by the latter to 
the Emir, and the conduct of Dost Mohamed was in every way 
calculated to inspire the English Government with confidence. 
T h e  following letter from the Envoy to Lord Aucltland proves this 
to have been the case :- 
" January 15,1838.-Since I have been here I have learnt that 
a Persian agent, bearing presents for Dost Mohamed, has pene- 
trated the country as far as I<andahar,* and he has announced 
hinlself a s  the bearer of most seductive promises; but he was 
nevertheless obliged to leave Afghanistan almost immediately, 
because no one invited him to come on to Kabul. After him a 
Russian agent came, by name Vilrovitch ; he brought flattering 
compliments and offers of lasting engagements, but he was received 
with only the respect due to any stranger and the regular forms of 
hospitality. T h e  Emir has said that his interest was in the English 
alliance, and that he would not abandon that while he had a hope 
of obtaining it." 
T h e  reasons which Burnes gave to his Government seemed to 
him so conclusive, that he did not for a moment think that the 
authorities at  CaIcutts would reject the alliance of a chief so de- 
voted to the English as Dost Mohamed; and to smooth every 
species of difficulty, he exerted himself to establish 4 friendly un- 
derstanding between the Dost and the Sikhs. The Emir, a witness 
of his efforts, testified his gratitude for them ; but his confidence in 
the equity of the Directors of the East India Company towards 
him was not so great as that of the English officer. 
Knowing how strong was their predilection for Runjeet Sing, and 
* This agent arrived with Vikovitch in October, 1837, cud remained there 
when the latter went on to Kabul.-Fm'm. 
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having a vague suspicion that the Court would come to a partial 
determination, the Dzst neglected no means of persuading them of 
his entire devotion. " I n  return," said the Emir to Burnes, " I ask 
but little, but that little is just and reasonable. I ask the English 
to protect me from the spoliat.ions of the Sikhs and the resent- 
ment of the Persians, who will never forgive me for having made 
common cause with your countrymen; they must deo force the 
former to give me back Peshawur, which is the only point that 
protects my frontiel. on this side of the Indus, and oppose any 
attempt of the latter to reduce Herat and Kandahar to a state of 
vassalage : then I am theirs, body and soul. I shall never have 
recoulse to others till I have lost all hope in you, and even in acting 
thus it would be with regret to save only Afghanistan and my own 
honour, not from ill-will towards England. On the contrary; I 
should be happy to be advised and protected by her, and in  return 
should make every effort to second her views, political and com- 
mercial." 
This frank and explicit declaration of the Dost's could not 
leave Lord Auckland in any doubt of h i  loyalty or sincerity. It 
was quite sufficient to induce him to fall back upon the natural 
course of British policy in India, and to  maintain the Afghan in- 
dependence against every other state, instead of joining with the 
Sikhs to attack i t  on the one hand, while the Russians, in alli- 
ance with the Persians and the Serdars of Kandahar, ruined i t  on 
the other. 
T h e  arrival of Viltovitch a t  Kabul, and the copies of the letters 
presented by him to the Emir, produced a lively sensation a t  
Calcutta, and formed the subject of a note sent by Lord Clan- 
ricarde to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, which plainly allowed the 
determination of the British Government to act vigorously to be 
perceived. The following is an extract from that document :- 
" The undersigned is further instructed to state that t,he British 
Government possess a copy of a Treaty which has been concluded 
between Persia and the Afghan ruler of Kanclahar, the execution 
of which has been guaranteed by Count Sirnonich, and has given - 
to this Treaty, which tends to afford Russia, if she adopts the 
guarantee, a pretence to compel the Shah of Persia not only 
to make himself master of Herat, but to deliver over that city 
afterxards to the rulers pf Icandahar, to be held by them, to- 
gether with their other possessions, in the capacity, which those 
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rulers engage by the Treaty to aclmomledge, of tributaries to 
Persia. 
" T h e  guarantee, moreover, contains a promise to compel Persia 
to defend the rulers of Kmdahar against attack from any quarter 
whatever. I t  is true that in this stipulation no specific allusion is 
made to England ; but the intention of the parties may be inferred 
from the original draft of this treaty, of which also Her Majesty's 
Government have a copy, and which was less cautiously worded, 
and in which specific allusion was made to England as one of the 
powers against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the . 
rulers of Kandahar. 
" 'rhe undersigned is further instructed to state that a Russian 
agent of the name of Vicovitch, but sometimes calling himself 
Omar Beg, and said to be attached to the staff of the general 
commanding a t  Orenburg, was the bearer of letters from the 
Emperor and Count Simonich to the ruler of Kabul, copies of 
which are in the possession of the British Government, and that 
Count Simonich observed the most'* perfect silence 'towards the 
British minister a t  Teheran with respect to the mission of this 
agent ; a reserve which might seem unnecessary if this agent was 
merely to deliver the letters of which he was the bearer, and if his 
mission was to have no tendency prejudicial to the British interests. 
'' But the British Governnient have learned that Count Simonich 
announced to the Shah of Persia that this Russian agent would 
counsel the ruler of Kabul to seek assistance of the Persian 
Government to support him in his hostilities with the ruler of the 
Punjab ; and the further reports which the British Government' 
have received of the language held by this Russian agent a t  
Kandahar and at Kabul can lead to no other conclusion than 
that he  strenuously exerted himself to detach the rulers of those 
Afghan states from all connexion with England, and to iiiduce 
them to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and 
ultimately upon Russia. 
" I f  the British Government could ent,ertain a doubt of the 
correctness of the  foregoing information, that doubt would, in a 
great measure, be removed by the unfriendly language with respect 
to t.he British Government which Count Simonich held some time 
ago to the agent of Kabul a t  the court of Persia, and of which the 
British Government possess proof in the report made by that agent 
to the ruler of Kabul." 
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Lord Clanricarde concludes hy declaring " that Russia is free 
to pursue with respect to the matters in question whatever course 
may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the 
interests of Russia. But the British Government considers itself 
entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St  Petersburg whether the 
intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia and Great 
Britain are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nessel- 
rode and Mr. Rodofiniltin to the Earl of Durham, or from the 
acts of Count Simonich and M. Vikovitch in Asia.!' 
The Russian Government was not much disturbed by this note, 
nevertheless it did vouchsafe to give a few explanations, but in a 
most ironical manner. I t  denied facts as clear as- the sun, with an 
audacity so sustained and so calm that any minister less experi- 
enced than Lord Palmerston would have allowed himself to be 
,deceived by the language of Count Nesselrode. The following 
are some extracts from the despatch which that diplomatist 
addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, to be communicated to the 
Foreign Office, October 2Oth, 1838 :- 
" You state that on this .occasion H e r  Eritannic Majesty's 
Principal Secretary-of-State for Foreign AEairs did not conceal 
from, you, Monsieur Ye Comte, that public opinion in England 
ascribes to Russian influence a decisive part in  the events now 
passing in Persia, and attributes to our Cabinet' intentions, danger- 
ous to the security of the British possessions in Asia. 
" This consideration is so serious, it is ,calculated to have so 
pernicious an influence on all our relations with Great Britain, that 
we do not hesitate a single instant to meet the English Cabinet 
with a frank and spontaneous explanation. The policy, M. 
lYAmbassadeur, which the Emperor pursues in that quarter is 
guided by the same principles which direct i t  in Europe. Far  
from any idea of encroachment, that policy has only for its object 
the maintenance of the rights of Russia, and respect for those 
legitimately acquired by all other powers. 
The idea of assailing the security and tranquillity of the pos- 
sessions of Great Britain in India has consequently never pre- 
sented. itself, and will never present itself, to the mind of our 
august master. H e  desires only what is just and what is possible. 
6 G  I f  the British Government places in those principles the con- 
fidence which they are calculated to inspire, i t  will be easy for 
you, M. YAmbassadeur, to clear up the doubts which it has .con- 
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ceived as to the conduct which we have adopted in the midst of the 
recent events in Persia, and specifically with regard to the .espedi- 
t*ion of Mohanled Shah against Herat. 
If we adduce these facts, if w;! point out the restless activity 
of certain unaccredited and unrecognised individuals, i t  is cer- 
tainly not our wish to impute to the Government to which they 
belong the blame of which they are deserving. On the contrary, 
we consider the British Cabinet to be altogether a stranger to the 
tendency which we have just alluded to. Eut in like manner as 
we place a just reliance on the rectitude of the intentions of the 
English Government, so also are we entitled to expect that i t  
' 
will not raise a doubt as to our own. 
" These remarks, M. le Comte, which the Emperor commands 
you to communicate with the most perfed frankness to the English 
Ministry, will serve, I hope, to satisfy it, above all, as to the inten- 
tions of our Cabinet, and to place in its true light the conservative 
and disinterested policy of our august master. Our attitude, 
M. le Comte, will necessarily be regulated according to the 
definitive determination which the British Government shall think 
fit to adopt." 
After this display of principle M. de Nesselrode gives his 
explanations. H e  declares that the siege of Herat appears to him 
a thing just in itself, but defends himself from the charge of 
having instigated the Shah to undertake it. Nevertheless, he 
adds, that if Herat  were joined to Icandahar all contests would 
cease, and that country would then become accessible to every 
nation interested in  the commerce of Central Asia. 
T h e  Emperor could not have any reason to injure England, and 
-, 
the natural obstacles which separate the two empires render a 
collision between them impossible. M. Thomas continues his 
narrative, and states that '' According to Count Nesselrode it was 
England who had made the first attack, and he finished by no 
longer concealing that Russia well h e w ,  when necessary, how to 
manoeuvre up to the Indus. I t  was therefore fur England to 
refrain and be careful; as to the Russians, they had nothing to 
reproach themselves with ; they denied the existence of any 
grievances that could be brought against them ; they had wished 
to prevent the attack upon Herat ; Simonitch and Vikovitch were 
pacificators ; the latter had been charged simply to fix the extent 
of security that Afghanistan would grant to Russian merchants, 
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and not to establish a treaty, or any other political combina- 
tion, Russia having no other object than to secure a market for 
her manufactures in Central Asia. If by accident the agents had 
slightly deviated from their instructions, England could not com- 
plain. Where is the government that is always served as it wishes 
to be ? Had England herself the power to control those turbulent 
travellers who continually excited disturbances in Asia? 
I '  Further, Count Nesselrode announced the recall of General 
Simonitch, and that Colonel Duhamel, who was appointed to 
succeed him, was on his way to Teheran-terminating his despatch 
as follows :- 
" ' If we recall these facts-if we, notice the activity of certain 
individuals who put themselves forward without having been 
accredited, or even recognised, by their government-it is not 
because we wish to impute to the British Government itself the' 
blame which belongs to them; on the contrary, we consider the 
British Cabinet'as being entirely above such actions as we poiut 
out ; ,but as we. place confidence in the rectitude of her intentions, 
we consider that we have a right to expect she should not throw 
any doubt over ours. 
'f -' These remarlrs, which the Emperor commands your Excel- 
lency to communicate in full to the British Ckbinet, will, I hope, 
s&ve to satisfy it, and place in its proper light the conservative 
and disinterested policy of our august master. Our attitude must 
necessarily be regulated by the definitive determination that the 
British Government will think fit to adopt.' " 
But Lord Palmerston, who, to the last, strove to preserve the 
illusion that the Cabinet of St: Petersburg was sincere, wrote to 
Count Pozzo di Borgo in the following terms on December 20, 
1888 :- 
" I can assure your Excellency that her Majesty's Government 
have given to this important communication all the attention which 
i t  so justly demands ; and I have great pleasure in being able to 
state to your Excellency that this communication has in its general 
result been highly satisfactory to her Majesty's Government. The 
leading principle which invariably directs the British Government 
in the management of its relations with foreign powers is an  
anxious desire to preserve for the Bri t i~h nation the blessings of 
peace. But  as regards Russia this wish is peculiarly strong ; 
because an alliarice of long standing between Grest Britain an 
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Russia, commercial intercourse valuable to both countries, and 
common interests of the highest order, must necessarily lead her 
Majesty's Government to deprecate as a great misfortune any 
event which might tend to interrupt the good understanding 
which so happily subsists between the Cabinets of Petersburg and 
London." 
Couut Nesselrode, delighted to have succeeded in calming Lord 
Palmerston's fears, wished probably to make him feel that from 
the explanations he had given i t  did not follow that the Russian 
Cabinet was determined henceforth to concede to him on all points, 
for after having received his reply he addressed the following dry 
answer to his Lordship on January 29, 1839, a reply which reads 
far more like a threat than an approach towards the good under- 
standing upon which the Noble Lord seemed so self-satisfied :- 
" Those explanations," remarks Count Nesselrode, " have 
afforded to the two Cabinets the opportunity of receiving and of 
offering on either side assurances which bear the character of just 
reciprocity, and which are inseparable from one another. Our 
Cabinet, in taking note of that assurance, expects to receive the 
proof of its entire fulfilment." 
I s  it possible to show more ability, more subtlety, more acuteness, 
than Russia did in these negotiations, or rather deceptions, of four 
years' duration ? Noth$g in her conduct can seriously give offence 
to the English. They reproach her with treaties made by her 
agents ; she disavows them. They are offended a t  the siege of 
IIerat, which they attribute to her ; she immediately abandons the 
Shah to his own resources and withdraws from him the Russian 
deserters. She has extended her influence to the frontier of the 
British empire in India, without its costing her the smallest sacri- 
fice ; she fails, i t  is true, but she retires mitho-ut shame and without 
loss, and in her retreat she shot a Parthian arrow at her rival, who 
. .only triumphed for the moment, subsequently to .meet with the 
most dreadful catastrophe. 
Though Russia and. Persia had appeared to give way on all 
points, and Lord Palmerston had  shown himself satisfied with 
the explanations of M, de Nesselrode, the British nevertheless 
continued their preparations in India for the purpose of driving 
the Emir Dost Mohamed and Kohendil Khan from the prin- 
c,ipalities of Kabul and Kandahar. Five of the Company'i; 
ships of war also entered the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1838, 
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and the troops they had on board took possession of the island of 
Karrack, where they waited for flat-bottomed steamers to convey 
them into the heart of Persia by the river Karoon. When the siege 
of Herat was raised, this expedition was given up ; but the one to 
Afghanistan was carried on with vigour to depose a prince who 
had wished, a t  all risks, to become the ally of England, and whose 
and concessions she, in her blind policy, constantly 
rejected. 
Dost Mohamed was thought to possess considerable adminis- 
trative ability, and a courage not common even amonpt  the Af- 
ghans. These qualities did not constitute any recommendation in 
the eyes of the Directors of the East India Company; but the 
Emir, who by inclination and conviction felt that the power of 
retaining his position could only be derived from them, and that 
nothing but their concurrence could enable him to found and 
maintain a monarchy, allowed himself to be persuaded by Alex- 
ander 13urries to male one last attempt to secure the friend- 
ship of England, by intrusting him with a letter to Lord Auck- 
land :- 
" Let his Lordship," said he, "give me but two words of en- 
couragement; let him recognise me as Emir of Kabul, and I will 
forget the mortal feud between me and the Shah I<amran, my  
enemy by blood, and I will rush to his support with my best troops 
to defend him from the Shah of Persia, on the simple condition of 
receiving a subsidy for the troops,that I shall employ in the service 
of the Company." E-Ie even added, " that for the present he would 
not say another word about the restitution of Peshawur." 
There was st) much disinterestedness and so much good intention 
in these propositions, that Sir A. Burnes conceived himself justified 
in promising the Dost that he could induce his Government to 
accept them ; but what did that avail against a prior decision ? I t  
was in vain that he wrote to Calcutta, "There is but one way of 
making Afghanistan a barrier against the Russians, and that is to 
form a strict alliance with Dost Mohamed, to strengthen his autho- 
rity, which has been compromised by family quarrels, and let eveiry 
one be thoroughly convinced that the government of India will 
never allow any attempts to be made to injure or subvert it." 
But  the Cuurt of lhec tors  was far from entertaining the same 
opinion, and in its insatiable avidity had long meditated the re- 
establishment of Shah Shooja in the government of Afghanistan, in 
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order to have the finances of that country elltirely at  its own dis- 
posal. Lord Auckland laid the conflicting opinions of Eurnes and of 
the Court of Directors before the English Cabinet, who decided 
in favour of that of the British officer, as being the only rational 
and practicable one; but the contrary opinion, supported by Sir 
JTT. M'Naghten, Sir Claude Wade, and Sir John &!'Neil, which. 
favoured the secret views of the Directors, prevailed. Sir Claude 
Wade, the resident a t  Loodiana, who was the warmest parti- 
san of Shah Shooja, encouraged the warlike propensities of the 
East India Company by leading them into the error in which he had . 
himself been held many years by his protdge', namely, that the 
Barukzye tribe did not contain 60,000 families, as Burnes had stated, 
and that their numbers did not amount to more than 6000; also 
that their chiefs were generally hatcd by the serdars of the other 
Afghan tribes. Opinions so different held by two officers, both of 
whom enjoyed in a high degree the confidence of their Government, 
arose from. one common source, ignorance : like the greater part 
of those authors who have hitherto written on Afghanistan, they 
confused the tribes with their srtbdivisior~s or branches. Thus :- 
Ahmed Shah and his descendants (Shah Shooja, &c.) were of the 
tribe of Popolzye, and the branch or family of the Suddozyes. 
Hadji Djemal Khan and his posterity (Dost Mohamed, kc.) were 
of the tribe of Barukzye, and the branch or family of the Mohamecl- 
zyes; and it is probably of this latter-branch, which does consist 
of four or five thousand families, that Sir C. Wade intended to 
speak ; for in Afghanistan, when a descendant of Hailji Djemal is 
spoken of, he is not called a " Barukzye chief," but a " Mohamed- 
zye chief." I n  the same manner Ahmed Shah is not called Ahmed 
Shah Popolzye, but Ahmed Shah Suddozye. 
T h e  advice of Burnes was rejected and his acts completely dis- 
avowed. Lord Auckland also toolr upon himself to offer to the 
Emir of Kabul the most merciless ultimatum, first demanding, but 
in the most polite manner possible, that he should immediately 
dismiss Captain Vikovitch; and next, that he should renounce all 
his rights to the Afghan provinces conquered by the Sikhs, because 
the noble Lord had determined not to interfere in his favour, from 
a fear of displeasing his faithful ally, the Maharadjah of the Punjab. 
Burnes exerted all his powers of persuasion and argument, which 
marked the intense interest he toolr in the cause of the Emir, to 
induce him to accept these hard conditions. The  Dost, though 
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indignant a t  this unworthy treatment, had not actually 
definitive reply, affirmative or negative, when he received informa-' 
tion from his agents in India, which left him no doubt of the fact 
of the concentration of a British army at Ferozepore with the well- 
determined purpose of replacing Shah Shooja on the throne of 
Kabul. Simultaneously with this information the Dost received 
letters from Captain Vikovitch, written from Kandahar, in which 
the fairest promises were made to him. These letters decided him 
in his course of action, and he broke off his negotiations with 
Burnes, who, having failed in his mission, retired, leaving Dost 
Mohamed in a state of great consternation. 
Mons. Thomas then proceeds with his remarks :-"The Dost 
could not, he said, hold out a month against Englaud, and t.he 
thoughts of displeasing her filled him with terror. H e  was not 
ignorant that Runjeet was the friend of the English, and that it 
would not be wise to attack him. They could a t  any moment 
support Peshawur, if not with troops at least with simple remon- 
strances, which would have restrained the Maharadjah of Lahore ; 
but, on the contrary, they were now more than ever Runjeet's 
declared friends, and preferred him to the Afghans, who were 
ready to place themselves a t  their disposal. Certainly that was 
not'the. provocation of a very determined enemy. Burnes himself, 
when he left, did not think that the Afghans would ever throw 
themselves into the arms of the Rnssians, and unite with the Per- 
sians. T h e  fatal policy of England, however, constrained the Dost 
to do so, and left him no alternative but ruin or war. 
" After haviug been four years a t  peace-after having forced 
the Shah of Persia to retire from Herat-after having ascertained 
with certainty the devotion of Dost Mohamed-what could excite 
the Government of India to such a,violent determination ? '  Why 
make war on the Afghans ? I-Iad all Asia risen in arms ? H a d  
.the Persians taken Herat and Kandahar, the Russians Bokhara 
and Khiva? No ; but, as Burnes said, it was only because a 
Cossack captain, without state or suite, had galloped up to I<abul. 
Lord Palmerston, who had hesitated so long before he interfered 
officially in Persia, adopted in less tlian six months a vigorous 
intervention in Afghanistan. He  required a war with Icabul, 
because he had not known how to ask in proper time for explana- 
tions a t  St. Petersburg, which would certainly have been given him 
if he had procrastinated, temporised, and tergiversated less. Afraid 
T 
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of losing the alliance of Russia in Europe, because he had the 
misfortune to place faith in it, and the still greater one of preserving 
i t  as a balance of power-necessitated to defer to her, though the 
Foreign Office had been obliged during four years to pass over in 
silence the Muscovite intrigues, he had not warned the princes 
of the East that England considered herself affronted, but endea- 
voured to detach them from these intrigues out of regard for their 
interests. H e  never spoke in the name of his Government, and 
they had therefore never listened to him ; however, seeing India 
seriously threatened, he a t  length took a side, but which? Lord 
Falmerston let loose the demon of war all over the East;  he 
created perils without end for the British empire ; he raised up 
against i t  resentment and vengeance ; he mixed England up more 
and more with the internal quarrels of a country in which her do- 
minion could only be maintained by neutrality; he hurried her 
purposely into the  path of conquest, and struck wherever the 
Russian had set a foot or intended to set one, hoping these grand 
strokes of his genius would astonish and lead to reflection, without 
remembering that such flagrant injustice is never pardoned." 
CHAP. SY. 1 LORD AUCKLAND'S MANIFESTO. 
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C H A P T E R  XX. 
Lord Auckland sends Sir W. M'Naghten to Lahore-Treaty with the Sikhs - 
Manifesto of the Governor-General from Simla in justification of his policy - 
Reflections on this  document^ - The possession of Scinde adjourned -The 
Emirs are opporied to the advance of the British 2,rrny through their territory 
-&fir Roustem of K6yi.poor-A~erse to lending the fortress of Bukkur to the 
English, but at length accedes to their request -The result of this to himself 
and his family - Conduct of the British authorities in Scinde - Strength of 
the army when concentrated at Shikapoor - Extract from Mr. Sumner's work 
- Seizure of Rui~achee - English appliances to success in the invaaion of 
Afghanistan - Proceedings of Shah Shooja. 
AS soon as war had been determined upon, Lord Auckland sent 
the Secretary of the Government of India, Sir William MLNaghten, 1 
to negotiate a treaty with Runjeet Sing and Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, 
which he concluded without difficulty i the Shah agreeing to 
cede to the Maharadjah all the Afghan provinces he had con- 
quered, including even Peshawur, which Dost Mohamed had 
refused to. give up. This point settled, Lord Auckland published 
the following manifesto, in which he set forth his reasons for 
making war upon the Afghans :- 
" Simla, October lst, 1838. 
"The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India having, 
with the concurrence of the Supreme Gouncil, directed the assem- 
blage of a British force for service across the Indus, his Lordship 
deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons . 
which have led to this important measure. 
"It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the 
British Government in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sinde, 
the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, had 
for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facili- 
tate the ext,ension of commerce, and fo gain for the British nation 
in Central Asia that legitimat,e influence which an interchange of 
benefits would naturally produce. With a view to invite the aid 
of the de fncto rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for 
giving full effect to t.hose treaties, Captain Burlies was deputed, 
towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to nos t  Mohamed 
Khan, the chief of Kabul. The  original objects of that officer's 
T 2 .  
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mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain 
Burnes, however, was on his journey to Kabul, information was 
received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost Mohamed 
Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack 011 those of our 
ancient ally, the Maharajah Runjeet Sing." I t  was naturally to be. 
apprehended that his Highness the Maharajah would not be slow 
to avenge this aggression, and it was to be feared that, the flames 
of mar being once kindled in the very regions into which we were 
endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial 
purposes of the British Government mould be altogether frustrated. 
I n  order to avert a result so calamitous, the Govei-nor-General 
resolved on authorizing Captain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mo- 
hamed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just 
and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, his Lordship would 
exert his good offices with his Highness, for the Maharajah, with 
the c1laracterist.i~ confidence which he has uniformly placed in the 
faith and friendship of the British nation, a t  once assented to the 
proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that in the mean 
time hostilities on his part should be suspended.t 
" I t  subsequently came to the Icnowledge of the Governor- 
General that a Persian army was besieging Herat ; that intrigues 
were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan for the purpose of 
extencling Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and 
even beyond, the Indus ; and that the Court of Persia had not 
only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her 
Majesty's mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence 
of being engaged in designs wholly a t  variance with the principles 
and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.$ 
" After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless nego- 
tiation a t  Kabul, it appeared that Dost Mohamed Khan, chiefly in 
consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assist- 
ance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, 
in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, 5 such as the Governor- 
General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the 
* What then of the spoliation of the on both prrties, and which Englnnd 
A f g h  provinces by Runjeet.-Fernier. had been the first to break by refusing 
f I have no doubt tha t  the English, to  pay the subsidy she had promised 
foreseeing that the Punjnb would ere to  Persia.-Fewim. 
long be theirs, supported Runjeet in his 5 The restitution of Peshawur, the  
apo1iations.-Feeni6t*. bulwark of his country, extorted b y  
1. An alliance which wns obligato]-y Runjeet.-Fewier, 
7 
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friendship of the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, be the channel of sub- 
mitting to the consideration of his Highness ; that he avowed 
schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security 
and peace of the frontiers of India ; and that he openly threatened, 
in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which 
he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support 
r to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and inju- 
rious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, 
he was well apprized, and, by his utter disregard of the views and 
interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to 
leave Kabul without having effected any of the objects of his mis- 
sion. I t  was now evident that no further interference could be 
exercised by the British Government to bring about a good under- 
standing between the Sihk ruler and Dost Moharned Khan ; and 
the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that, so 
long as Kabul remained under his government, we could never 
hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, 
or that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved 
inviolate. 
" The  Goaernor-General deems it in this place necessary to 
revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. 
The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian 
army for many months.* The  attack upon it was a most unjusti- 
fiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwith- 
standing the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British 
envoy at the court of Persia, and after every just and becoming 
offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged. 
have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice 
of their cause ; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the 
hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful 
defence until succours shall reach them from British India. In the 
mean time the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of 
the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more 
and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has recently 
ascertained, by an official despatch from Mr. M'Neil, her Majesty's 
envoy, that his Excellency has been compelled, by a refusal of his . 
just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted 
towards him by the Persian Government, to q ~ ~ i t  the court of the 
* At the date of this manifesto the Shah had abandoned the siege and retired,- 
Ferrier. 
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Shah, and to make a public declaration of a cessation of all inter- 
course between the two governments. The necessity under which 
Great Britain is placed of regarding the present advance of the 
Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards her- 
self, has also been officially communicated to the Shah under the 
expres  order of her Majesty's Government. 
"The chiefs of Kandahar (brothers of Dost Mohamed Khan 
of Kabul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with 
the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests 
of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in 
the operations against Herat. In the crisis of the affairs consequent 
upon the retirement of our envoy from Kabul, the Governor-Gene- 
ral felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting 
the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our 
own territories. His attention was naturally drawn a t  this conjunc- 
ture to the position and claims of Shah Shooja-001-Moollr, a monarch' 
who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united 
'esistance to external enmity which were at  that time judged 
necessary by the British Government, and who, on his empire being 
usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in 
the British do~ninions. 
" I t  had been clearly ascertained, from th,e informalion hrnished 
by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the 
Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill 
fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British 
Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of 
national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings 
injurious to our interests and security, the British Government 
acknowledged and respected their authority ; but a different policy 
appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those 
chiefs, and to  be indispensable to our o m  safety. The welfare 
of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our 
western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggressions 
and establishing tranquillity, in the pla.ce of chiefs ranging them- 
selves in  subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote 
schemes of conquest and aggrandizement. After serious and 
mature deliberation the Governor-General was satisfied that a 
pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and 
justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shooja-ool- 
Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved 
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to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best 
authorities. Having arrived a t  this determination, the Governor- 
General was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less 
from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, than from his 
undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that his 
Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the con- 
templated operations. 
" Mr. M'Naghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the 
court of his Highness, and the result of his mission has been the 
conclusion of a tripartite treaty by the British. Government, the 
Maharajah, ancl Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, whereby his ~ i ~ h n e s s  i  
guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to 
co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his 
ancestors. The  friends and enemies of any one of the contracting 
parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of d l .  
" Farious points have been adjusted which had been the subjects 
of discussiod between the British Government and his Highness 
the Maharaja, the identity of whose interests with those of the 
Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the 
surrounding states. A guaranteed independence will, upon favour- 
able conditions, be tendered to the Emirs of Scinde; and the 
integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be 
fully respected ; while by the measures completed, or in progress, 
i t  may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security 
of commerce will be promoted, the name and just influence of the 
British Government will gain their proper footing aniong the 
nations of Central Asia, that tranquillity will be established upon 
the most important frontier of India, and that a lasting barrier 
will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment. 
" His Majesty Shah Shooja-001-Moolk will enter Afghanistan 
surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against . 
foreign interference ancl factious opposition by a British army. 
T h e  Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah mill be 
replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and 
when once-he shall be secured in power, and the independence and 
integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be 
withdrawn. The Governor-General has been led to these measures 
by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the 
security of the possessions of the British crown ; but he rejoices 
that, in the discharge of his duty, he will be enabled to assist in 
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restoring the union and ~rosperity of the Afghan people. Through- 
out the approaching operations British influence will be sedulously 
employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile 
differences, to secure oblivion for injuries, and to put an end to 
the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and 
happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs 
whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the 
British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable 
treatment on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from 
opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the 
most suitable to the general advantage of their country." 
Thc explanations that have preceded this manifesto do justice to 
its inaccuracies, its reserve and want of frankness. I shall not 
therefore comment upon it, but have reproduced it here to give 
an idea of the manner in which the Anglo-Indian government pro- 
ceeds in Asia. 
The  invasion of Afghanistan mas only a prelude to that of 
Scinde, but there existed friendly treaties with the Talpoora Emirs, 
sovereigns of that country, and the Indian Government could not 
then attempt to seize their territory without creating for themselves 
too much enlbarrassment at once ; the taking definitive possession 
of i t  was therefore postponed, but forcing the Emirs to consent to 
the passage of the British troops through their country was a 
pelude thereto. A t  one moment war was on the point of break- 
ing out between the East India Company and the Emirs of lhat 
part of Scinde which is watered by the Lower Indus, for they 
energetically opposed the passage of an English ariny ; but Mir 
Roustem of Khyrpoor, their aged chief, prevented them from 
going to that extremity, arid succeeded in conciliating all parties. 
When the British forces entered Scinde this venerable chieftain 
acceded to d l  the sacrifices imposed upon him. V h e n  asked by the 
English to Zed them during their ope~ations in &hnnistan the for- 
tress of Guldcar, situated on an island at the mouth of the Indus, the 
demand appeared to him too humiliating. '' It is," he said, " at 
once the bulwark and the heart of my country, and my honour 
forbids that I should trust that in the hands of strangers." Never- 
theless he allowed himself to be persuaded. His  whole family 
threw themselves on their knees before him to induce him not to 
grant this extraordinary request, but he preferred exposing himself 
to their lively and incessant reproaches, to displeasing his friends 
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the English, in whose word he believed. H e  lent them the fort.ress 
of Bukkar-it has never been out of their hands since, and to recom- 
pense his generous conduct towards them they despoiled him five 
years afterwards of the rest of his territory, and possessed themselves 
also of that of his brothers and nephews. The officers of Genera1 
Napier invaded even the harems of these unfortunate princes, and 
carried off the treasures, jewels, and even the clothes of their women. 
The Government of lndia had ordered that the Expeditionary 
Army of Afghanistan should consist of 27,000 men, who were to 
be ready to take the field in the month of November, 1538. But 
when it was known at Calcutta that the Persians had raised the 
siege of Herat it was reduced to an effective force of 21,500, and 
this force was assembled on the eastern bank of the Indus, January 
16, 1839, under the compand of Lieut.-Gkneral Sir John Keane. . 
Here Shah Shooja hastened to join him, and a week afterwards 
the Emir Roustem placed the troops in possession of the island 
fortress of Bulrkar ; they subsequently crossed the river on a pon- 
toon bridge, and were concentrated at  Shikapoor in the earliest 
days of March. 
" This concentration," says Sumner, " was preceded by one of 
those acts of violence too often found in the pages of British 
history, and which tarnish the glory of the brilliant actions 
recorded in it. 
" Near the town of Kurrachee, which is situated about fifty miles 
north-east of the second mouth of the Indus, on the Scindian side, 
is a small fortress belonging to a state with which England was at  
peace, and which was attached to her by treaties of friendship aud 
commerce. I t  was thought that it would be useful to hold this 
place ; and a British vessel of war and steamboats having arrived 
before the fort, February 2, 1839, with two sepoy regiments and 
a detachment of European artillery, a messenger was sent on shore 
to inform the officer in command that its position rendered the 
po8session of it indispensable to insure the safety of the vessels of 
the Company intrusted with the transport of the munitions of war 
and rnate5ieZ of their army. The message required the officer to 
deliver up the place in a quarter of an hour, if he did not wish 
rigorous measures to be taken against him. 
The Scindian officer having refused to yield to the summons, 
the troops disembarked, and under cover of the fire of the ships, 
moored broadside to the shore, tool. possession of the fort and 
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town of Kurrachee, and it now forms part of the British dominions 
in the East Indies." 
The English had neglected nothing that could tend to secure a 
successful issue to this undertaking ; they had exerted all their arts 
of seduction and corruption to induce the serdars of Afghanistan 
to attach themselves to their party, and a few of the most in- 
fluential had responded to their appeal. Amongst these were 
Iskander Khan, Popolzye ; Mohamed Attah Khan, Popolzye ; and 
Walee Mohamed Khan, Isakzye ; who left their tribes on the first 
rumour of the mar, and joined Shah Shooja a t  Loodiana, where, 
with their concurrence, he formed the nucleus of a government. 
AS soon as that was constituted, they sent numerous emissaries to 
their own country, with a view of parading to the Afghans the 
power and generosity of the English, and to persuade them that 
not only would all resistance be useless, but that it would be more 
beneficial to themselves to receive them, as they would effect the 
restoration of their own royal family. A crowd of serdars, who 
were jealous of those of the Barukzye tribe, whom the Mohamedzye 
chiefs greatly favoured, allowed themselves to be easily persuaded 
by these emissaries, and joined without delay the British camp. 
A small number only, having no greater sympakh'y with the &lo- 
hamedzyes, nevertheless feared the consequences of a return of 
fortune in favour of that branch, and retired to their homes to wait 
till the course of events should be more decided before they took 
a n  open part. 
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CHAPTER XXI .  
Introductory note td'chapter - Character of the Afghans -Their physical deve- 
lopment - Mental qualities -Indifferent Mussulmans - Their turbulent nature 
-Spirit of .independence - Love of marauding - Their cupidity extreme - 
Insensible to  good faith-The law a dead letter in their eyes - The citizen 
and the nomade - Hospitality -Prandial habits of Par Mohamed -The cha- 
racter of their food - Kooroot - Node of sating - Ignorance of the Afghans - 
Their superstitiom -Education - Costume - Dirty habits - Religious feeling 
-Administration of the laws -The lex tationis - Punishments - Dieaaes - 
Remedies - Public buildings - Roads - Private houses - The zoology df 
Afghanistan -Domestic animals - Natnre of the soil -Productions of it - 
Aridity of the country - I'dinerals - Geographical position - Climate - D%. 
culties of rapid communication - Population. 
AT the conclusion of General Ferrier's manuscript are some pages 
devoted to a description of the Afghan nation, their habits, customs, 
education, laws, and religion, and much other general information 
respecting Afghanistan, its productions, climate, &c. The author 
left i t  to the translator to decide in which of the two volumes this 
information could be placed to the best advantage, namely, ' Cara- 
van Journeys,' or the present work. The translator has, therefore, 
though it certainly does interrupt the continuous character of the 
history, introduced a portion of that Addendum here ; for the reader 
will thus have an insight into the character of the Afghan people 
before he enters upon that period of their history which is so closely 
interwoven with our own, and -be, therefore, better able to form an 
opinion of it and that sad military catastrophe which is still and 
must ever remain so deeply interesting to every Englishman. 
T h e  Afghans are tall, robust, active, and well formed; their 
olive and sometimes sallow complexions and strongly-marked hard 
features give their countenances a savage expression ; the lids of 
their black eyes, which are full of fire, are tinged with antimony, 
for this, in their opinion, gives force and adds beauty and a dazzling 
brilliancy to them ; their black beard is worn'short, and their hair, 
of the same colour, is shaved off from the front to the top of the 
head, the remainder at  the sides being allowed to fdl in large curls 
over the shoulders. Their step is full of resolution, their bearing 
proud, but rough. 
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They are brave even to rashness, excited by the smallest trifle, 
enterprising without the least regard to prudence, energctic and 
born for war. They possess all the qualities essential to carry it 
on successfully, but are  utterly ignorant how to take advantage of 
and turn them to account ; their courage is impulsive, and displays 
itself most readily in the attack ; if that fails they are easily dis- 
heartened, and show no perseverance, for, as they are soon elated, 
so are they as easily discouraged. They are sober, abstemious, 
and apparently of an open disposition-great gossips, and curious 
to excess. Their anger is not betrayed by any sudden burst of 
passion ; on the contrary, all that is brutal and savage in their 
nature is manifested with the most perfect callmess, but i t  is the 
volcano slumbering beneath the ashes. 
Courage is with them the first of virtues, and usurps the place 
of a11 the others ; they are cruel, perfidious, coarse,, without pity, 
badly brought up, exceedingly inclined to theft and pillage. In  the 
latter they differ from their neighbours the Persians, who are,, how- , 
ever, as great scoundrels as themselves, for they endeavour by every. 
means in their power to conceal their knavery under the appear- 
ance of law or rhetoric, while the Afghans do the very reverse- 
they a t  once place the knife on your throat, and say, " Give, or I 
take." Force is their only argument, and it justifies everything ; 
an individual who is merely plundered considers himself extremely 
fortunate, as, generally speaking, they act inversely to the cnt- 
throats of Europe, who demand "your purse or your life ;" the 
Afghans take life first and then the purse. In  religion they are 
more tolerant and well disposed towards those who profess a dif- 
ferent faith than any other sect of Mussulmans. Like the people of 
most Eastern nations, they are also addicted to a crime which it is 
not necessary to name ; but this remark applies rather to the rich 
than to the people in general. An injury is never forgotten, a'nd 
vengeance is a passion which they love ; even at the cost of their 
lives they will satisfy i t  should an opportunity present itself, and 
this in the most cruel manner. 
There is no nation in the world more turbulent and less under 
subjection ; the difficulties in rendering them submissive to a code 
of just laws would be almost insurmountable. T o  make them 
observe the rules of good breeding, or even common civility, would 
perhaps be still more difficult ; the people are as gross and coarse 
as savages. The chiefs and upper classes are more civilized; but 
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their politeness is ,always tinctured by a rudeness of manner very 
offensive to Europeans. No matter what the condition or rank 
of an Afghan may be, he considers that he has a right to seat 
himself in the presence of his superiors ; to this privilege he attaches 
the greatest importance, and enters into conversstion with them 
perfectly a t  hi ease and without the least hesitation, giving his 
opinion on every subject; in short, forcing himself and his views 
upon them as he thinks fit, eating with them uninvited, and all 
this as if they were upon a footing of the most perfect equality. 
These habits do not wound the pride of the rich and powerful , 
Afghans ; on the contrary, they encourage this independent spirit, 
and admit their right to make their requests and volunteer their 
opinions in this way. These are prerogatives which in their eyes 
constitute liberty. 
The Afghans do not attach the same importance to some words 
as Europeans do ; " country " and '' honour " are to them as 
empty sounds, and they sell them to the highest bidder without 
scruple. This is so true, that they will almost always submit to and 
obey a conqueror ; and if they have been pretty nearly independent 
since the time of Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, i t  has been owing quite 
as much to the weakness of the neighbouriig states as because there 
was no one who thought it worth his while to purchase them. I t  
cannot be denied that the conquest of Persia, under Mir Mahmood 
in 172 1, is a very remarkable page in their history ; but if we take 
into consideration the feeble state in which that unfortunate country 
was at  the time, we shall be the less astonished ; a similar invasion, 
and composed of the same elements, would now have every chance 
of success, though the means of defence on the part of Persia are 
much more considerable than they were then. After all, the Af- 
ghans were not long in losing their conquest and their liberty, and 
being in their turn subdued by those whom they had vanquished 
and humiliated. 
I n  mentioning this circumstance, Heaven forbid i t  should be sup- 
posed that I desire to undervalue the courage of a people who 
have given so many proofs of i t ;  but I wish to establish the fact 
that the Afghans are as incapable of a continuous course of action 
as of ideas ; they do everything on the spur of the moment, from a 
love of disorder, or for no reason at all: it matters little to them 
who gives them laws ; they obey the first comer directly they find it 
is to their advantage to do so, and allow him to play the tyrant and 
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govern them if he pays them well and does not interfere with their 
passion for rapine and devastation. Pillage, fibhting, and dis- 9 
turbances are  at  times necessary to their very existence, and are 
followed by long days of repose and idleness, during which they 
live on the fruits of their depredations. 
Their cupidity and avarice are extreme; there is no tie they 
would not break, no duty they would not desert, to gratify their . 
avidity for wealth. This surpasses all that can be imagined; it is 
insatiable, and to satisfy i t  they are capable of committing the 
greatest crimes. For it they will sacrifice all-their native and . 
independent pride; even prostitute the honour of their wives and 
daughters, whom they frequently put to death after they have 1 
received the price of their dishonour. Gold in Afghanistan is, 
more than anywhere else, the god of the human race ; it stifles the 
still small cry of every man's conscience;if, indeed, it can be ad- 
mitted that an Afghan has a conscience a t  all: i t  ia impossible to 
rely on their promises, their friendship, or their fidelity. 
They enter into engagements, and bind themselves by the most 
solemn oaths to respect them, and, in order to give then1 a sacred 
character, transcribe them on a Koran, to which they affix their ' 
seal, but nevertheless perjure themselves with an impudence 
perfectly inconceivable. Towns and villages by hundreds have 
surrendered on the faith of such obligations, stipulating that the 
lives of the inhabitants should be spared, and get the examples are 
rare, that, once in the victors' power, they have not been exter- 
minated. It is extraordinary that, knowing their own bad faith, 
they allow themselves to fall into these snares. The majority of 
the wars which they wage against one another generally terminate 
by one or more of these massacres. Murder is a game, and they 
evince a feeling of vanity when they commit one, and glory in the 
perfidy and cruelty which they show in their acts of devastation ; 
when they can cite an example of a town which they have depo- 
pulated and razed to the ground, they imagine they have given 
the grandest idea of their power and valour : they are, in short, 
real Huns, and Attilas are never wanting amongst them. 
They submit to .the laws only after they have tried'every means 
to evade them ; they consider it perfectly lawful in those who are 
stronger or more powerful than themselves to plunder them, and 
consequently they have no scruple in despoiling those who are . 
weaker. Accustomed from their childhood to see human blood 
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spilt, to hear murder not only excused but gloried 
soon familiar with the ?dea of death, which they confront with the 
greatest coolness. It is rare to see them make war for the simple 
purpose of defending their nationality, for this sentiment does not 
' 
exist, and can be considered applicable only to the tribe, its 
district, or encampment. Their ideas are of a totally different 
character ; the hope of enriching himself by booty, of bathing him- 
self in blood-these are what from his earliest youth an  Afghan 
proposes to indulge in, and these are the principles in which he is 
brought up. They hate all governments which introduce law and 
order into a country, or enter into treaties of peace with their 
neighbours ; to do so is in their eyes an attack upon their rights, 
which deprives them of pillage, and consequently the best part of 
their revenues. 
If an Afghan is put tb death by his sovereign for marauding, his 
countrymen look upon him as a victim ; but they establish between 
him who exposes his life in combat and the obscure domestic thief 
who does not an immense difference ; the first is in their estima- 
tion a brave man, whereas the other is treated with contempt, 
banished from the tribe, and sometimes put to death. At first 
sight an Afghan pleases, and this in spite of his rough and savage 
physiognomy and exterior : the fact is, that, when he has a n  object 
in view, and he has something to gain, he knows how to play, and 
with great suppleness, the part which policy dictates ; but if he loses 
the hope of obtaining anything out of you, it is easy to see-into 
the details of his character, and he will stand without scruple 
unmasked, and in all the aridity of his evil nature. 
Excitement, the clash of arms, and the tumult of the combat are 
to him life ; repose is for an Afghan only a; transitory state of 
being, during which he leads a monotonous existence ; the sweets 
of domestic life, mental quietude, the endearments of his family, 
have no charms for him, and a life without commotion and agita- 
tion loses all its poetry. H e  is only really a man when he is 
fighting and plundering; then his eye is full of fire, his hand 
grasps convulsively the hilt of his sabre, and he presses his sinewy 
legs against his horse's sides until the animal can scarcely draw 
his breath : man and horse are one, each understands the ardour 
of the other, and it is difficult to distinguish which of the two is 
then the most vicious. As there is nothing in the world of which 
an  -4fghan makes so light as life, he hastens to live, but in his own 
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way, a slave to his passions, for who Icnows whether he will not fall 
to-morrow by his neighbour's sword, as others have fallen to-day 
by his ? 
Thcre is no shade of difference betreen the character of the 
citizen or the nomade; a town life does not soften their habits; 
they live there as they live in a tent, always armed to the teeth, 
and ready for the onslaught, devoid of a right-minded feeling, and 
always animated by the most ferocious instincts. Though they 
are full of duplicity, one is nevertheless frequently liable to be 
taken in by their apparent frankness ; but a traveller is not long 
the victim of their clumsy cheating, which can succeed only amongst 
themselves, for their minds are ratber'heavy than acute. Strangers,, 
and particularly Europeans, easily see through them ; their kind 
attentions, or an appearance of politeness to an individual, are 
rarely the'  result of a natural and sincere feeling on their part, 
for they are sure to have an interested object in  view ; and if 
they are so liberal as to present you with an egg, i t  is because ' 
they expect to have an ox in return : if they are of any service to 
you, and they ask for nothing in exchange, you will find that the 
gift, or whatever the service may be, has cost them nothing, 
whether trouble or money. They are hospitable to travellers, but 
only because this is an ancient custom, which has the force of law, 
and is nut a virtue which springs from the heart; those who are 
not in good circumstances consider it a burden which they would 
willingly cast aside, were it not that they fear public opinion ; in all 
cases they take every means in their power to evade it ; the rich 
practise it only from ostentation, and always parsimoniously. 
Idleness being the dominant vice of this people, they rarely 
ever work ; and when the amount of plunder is insufficient for 
their requirements, they are always thinking of some expedient by 
which they can procure money; their greatest anxiety, however, 
is to ascertain how they can get their daily bread without having 
to pay for it. This is their one only thought all their lives ; after 
having provided for their wives and children the barest pittance, 
they will go from door to door in the hope of getting a dihner : 
hangers-on are indeed so numerous that the chiefs, and even the 
sovereign himself, are obliged to enter into the most minute 
details of their houselceeping, and give instructions to their servants 
as to the  character and quantity of the food they are to place 
before their voracious visitors. If with some bread they give a 
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t little soup, they have the reputation of being exceedingly hospit- 
able ; but if to these they add a ration of rice or meat, no praise, 
however expressed, would be sufficiently strong to marlt the estima- 
tion in which their generosity is held. The common people are 
not alone in this love of putting their hands into other people's 
plates, the highest personages do not object to refresh themselves 
at  their neighbour's expense ; and I have more than once seen 
the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan, and other chiefs, after having 
finished their own repast, present the remains to some of their 
guests, many of them generals, governors of towns, &c., who 
pounced upon and cleared them off in the twinkling of an eye, 
seizing the bones with as much dacrity as would have done 
the most famished poodle. I t  is rare indeed that an Afghan's 
appetite fails him, at  any rate i t  is a fact that never came within 
my knowledge; and when they have the good fortune to meet with 
a table well furnished, and an easy host, they put all reserve aside, 
and, as they themselves express i t  (ltharabi singuin), make an  
enormous feed. 
This habit of living at  the espense of other people forces the 
Afghans to practise sobriety and frugality. They live on fruit 
nearly half the year, rice forming the best and most appetising part 
of their food ; but notwithstanding the low price a t  which i t  is sold, 
it is only persons in easy circumstances who can afford to cat it 
every day. They season it in their pilaus, like the Turks and Per- 
sians ; like them idso they take their meals sitting on the ground, 
with their heels tucked under them, and convey their food to their 
mouths with their fingers. Meat is not much lilted unless it is 
swimming in grease ; then it is delicious. They throw away the 
lean, as they say it produces diarrhcea. The principal food of 
the villagers and nomades is Aooroot, a kind of pudding made of 
boiled Indian corn, bruised between two stones, or simply bread, 
on which they pour rancid grease, mixed with a substance which 
in the East is known under the name of kechk." The flesh of the 
sheep or goat is what the Afghans prefer ; but, as with the rice, 
the rich only can afford to purchase i t :  the ox, the camel, and 
the horse, that age or infirmities have rendered unfit for further 
service, is the animal food of the people. 
They will not eat meat unless it is hula1 (lawful), that is, the 
- -- 
* The aettlement in whey.-Fwrier. 
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animal must have its face turned towards Mecca, and its throat cut 
in a particular part of the neck, the following sacrificial words being 
pronounced during the operation, in accordance with their law and 
rule of faith-Bismillizh dt.nzan ~u l~ i rn  (In the name of the most 
merciful God). In eating, they mix one dish with another, knead 
then] together with their fingers, and then stuff it into their mouths. 
The highest personages not only permit the lowest to eat with 
them out of the same plate, but the dirtiest and the most disgusting : 
* it is sufficient that they are Mussulnians for them not to feel the 
least annoyance, and yet they will be scr~~pulously careful not to eat 
with a person who is not of their religion, no matter how clean he 
may be. They make two meals, one at  noon, the other a t  nine 
o'clock at  night ; they frequently smoke the tcldim, a kind of 
water-pipe, but very inferior to the niiryhile of the Turks, or the 
Kulioon of the Persians. 
It would be difficult to conceive the ignorance of the Afghans, 
which does not, however, prevent them from being excessively pre- 
sumptuous ; they are brutes, not, .however, unintelligent, but they 
like to be within a circle of ideas of the narrowest kind. They 
have neither the genius of creation nor the faculty of imitation, and 
are satisfied with the bigoted and confined views which have been 
handed down to them by their ancestors. They refuse to take the 
least trouble to learn anything which would open their minds and 
add to their well-being, convinced that science is a useless burden, 
which only fatigues and enervates those who pursue it, without 
making them a t  all happier. "Are not these Europeans fools," 
say they, "to give themselves so much concern in acquiring all 
these things here below, while they arc preparing for themselves 
the most dreadful punishments which they must sufTer for ever in 
another world, for refusing to believe the unity of God' and the 
power of our revered prophet Nahomet, on whom be praise ? " 
Their wise men are the mollahs and astronomers ; the last, 
especially, are in great reputation amongst them, for they cannot, 
will not, undertake anything without consulting the stars and the 
auguries. They believe also in magic, and hang a number of 
amulets about themselves and their horses. 
The Persian language is met with all over Afghanistan ; the 
great families speak it, and their correspoildence is carried on in 
* They cannot in the least imagine in what may we comprehend the Trinity.- 
Femkr. 
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that tongue : the people are acquainted with 
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it, but they prefer 
the Pushtoo, the 'language of their nation, which is 
a mixture of ancient Persian, Arabic, and Eindostanee. They 
have a few works in this language, but they read Persian authors 
by preference, and have through them formed imperfect ideas of 
geography, astronomy, medicine, and history ; but these works, 
full of fictions and deficiencies, have not materially assisted in 
developing their faculties. 
The Afghanswear their clothes long. They consist of two large * 
robes, very ample, and are either of cotton or a cloth made of 
camel's hair, called burelt: this is the dress of the people. T h e  
only difference in the garments of the rich is in the material, which 
is silk, cloth, or cachemire. I n  summer they are made without any 
lining, but in the winter they are wadded with cotton or lined with 
fir. The under garment is confined by a piece of muslin, or long 
cloth, which is wound round the body ; the outside one and some- 
times a third robe is used as a cloalc, and a person would be con- 
sidered wanting in politeness if in visiting a superior he did not 
put it on. The shirt is very full, and the sleeves, which reach below 
the hands, particularly so. The former is open at  the side from the 
neck to the waist, and falls over the trowsers : these, which are 
excesswely large, open at  the foot, and are drawn in a t  the waist 
with a string. The head is covered by an enormous blue or white 
turban, and the feet with slippers without quarters. The  upper 
classes are, for the most part, simply dreesed, and consider luxury in 
this respect as enervating ; but some young chiefs have their robes 
ornamented with gold lace or embroidered with gold thread. This is 
done in the harems by the women, who excel in this kind of work, 
particularly in Kandahar. T h e  Afghans are not careful of their 
clothes, and soil them the very first day they are put on, for they 
squat on the ground without talcing the least thought whether the 
spot on which they sit is clean or clirty. They never cha.nge their 
garments, not even the shirt, until they are completely worn out; 
and as they very rarely wash themselves, they are constantly covered 
with vermin, great and small. 
The  Afghans are Muss~~ln~ans of the sect of Soonee, with the 
exception of the tribe of Beritchees, who belong to that of Shiah. 
T h e  Parsivans and Eirnaks, who are subject to the Afghans, equally 
profess the faith of Islam, but besides the two sects just mentioned 
some of them are of a third, called Ali-illahee, who worship Ali as 
u 2 
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God. The Afghans did not embrace Islamism till very late, and 
after their conquerors the Moguls : this assertion is in contradiction 
to their own, but is nevertheless true. They are religious more 
from habit than conviction, though they are not on that account 
guilty of hypocrisy. While the English occupied their country 
they relaxed considerably the practice of their worship, and the 
influence of the mollahs was much reduced ; but when the Anglo- 
Indians withdrew from Afghanistan, they recovered it with a 
powerful hand, and from that moment have endeavoured to excite 
, 
a spirit of fanaticism in the people, and inspire them with a 
hatred of Europeans. 
I t  is probable that the Afghans are not more persuaded than 
formerly of the infallibility of Islam, but, as the mollahs are sup- 
ported by -their chiefs, they have resumed their previous habits: 
They make the live prayers every day, observe the fast of Ramazan, 
and everything is comprised in the most rigorous observance of 
external forms. Let the English -return, and they would again 
relapse inbo indifference on this subject. 
Just.ice is administered amongst the Afghans according to the 
commands of the Eoran, though in some cases they use their 
traditional lams, which have, they say, descended to them from the 
remotest antiquity. The Kai i  is the head of the religious tribunal ; 
the sovereign, and, under him, the Ealehbeghi and the Daroga, 
administer the ordinary law. The Afghans of Herat and Kabul 
may congratulate themselves on the equity and justice with which 
they are governed, but it is not the same in Eandahar, where the 
laws are construed to the benefit of the judges in an unjust and 
violent manner : they are always anxious to find the accused guilty, 
and, as the sovereign inflicts heavy fines, this system much augmerits 
h IS ' revenues. 
The 1e2 tnlionis is rigorously observed amongst the Afghans, and 
the murderer is put to death by the nearest relation of his victim. 
I t  sometimes happens that the person on whom t.his duty devolves 
is a child, when the punishment remains in abeyance till he is 
strong enough to hold the dagger which is placed in his hands, and 
with which he performs the office of executioner. H e  possesses the 
right to grant the murderer his life, but there is no instance of this 
ever having been exercised, excepting for a compensation, which 
the criminal is obliged to xnalce in a, sum of money or in land ; 
sometimes he gives one of his daughters in marriage to the son or 
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the brother of the murdered man, without the father being obliged 
to give her any dower. 
Thieves are treated with great leniency : for the first theft the 
offender is obliged to restore the stolen property to its owner, and 
receives from him a paternal admonition ; the second is txeated in 
a similar manner, but with the addition of a fine ; the third is 
followed by the bastinado; and a further repetition of the offence by 
torture 01. death. I n  a country where the population is so fond of 
laying hands upon other people's property, i t  is not surprising to find 
the judges exercise so much forbearance, for the generality of them 
might with more propriety be placed a t  the bar than on the seat of 
justice. I t  must be added that torture, or any other punishment, 
may be remitted, with the consent of the injured party ; and as 
he has ever before him the probability that he will one day need 
pardon himself, it is seldom that he is too severe. 
The punishments inflicted for political crimes, and others which 
in France would be brought before our courts of assize, are fine, 
bastinado, cutting off the nose, ears, or hand ; opening the body of 
the criminal, and then h a ~ g i n g  him up till death releases him fi-om 
his suff'erings; cutting the throat, stabbing, impaling, strangling, 
skinning alive, scalping, quartering, hanging (generally with the 
head downwards), crucifying, stoning, boiling in ,z caldron, and a 
thousand other barbarities of the kind. No extenuating circum- 
stances are admitted ; no difference is made between a crime which 
is the result of passion and premeditated guilt, between man- 
slaughter and murder: from a. sentence there is no appeal, and the 
punisliment is pitiless. 
The  Afghans are afflicted with dreadful diseases, which, from 
their ignorance of medicine, they cannot ,mitigate ; these maladies 
are owing to their bilious habit, the badness of their food, their 
extreme dirt, and the little care they talie to prevent their develop- 
ment. The nomacles are generally of a siclrly complexion; this 
is to be attributed to the pernicious quality of the water, which is 
almost. a11 allraline. The diseases to which they are most subject 
are fevers, cutaneous and nervous disorders, and especially blind- 
ness. The last they attrib;te to the waters of the rice-fields, which 
they drink ; but if this has any effect upon the eye, it is no doubt 
less injurious to that organ than the incredible treatment it often 
receives at  the hands of t.heir empirics: in fact, there is no country 
in the world in which diseases of the eye and loss of sight are more. 
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frequent than in Afghanistan. When the Afghans are bled they 
generally avoid drinking for twenty - four hours after ; but if 
they do not do so, they keep the arm elevated as much as 
possible during absorption, in order that, as they say, the water ' 
may not fill up and mix with the remainder of the blood in the 
vein. They pretend also that, according to the quarter in which 
the wind sets, or this or that conjunction of the stars, they ought 
not to be bled in the same vein. They are very careful not to eat 
sweet food after sour, dressed after raw, or vice versci. Rancid 
, 
grease three or four years old is in their eyes more easy of diges- 
tion and more beneficial than fresh ; the latter, which they obtain 
from the enormous tails of their sheep, they use only as aperient 
medicine, and, when melted, swallow four or six pounds of it a t  a 
time. 
For  the cure of wounds and abscesses they have but one receipt, 
but that they say is infallible-it is, to apply a piece of an old 
watersl~in, resoftened by soaking, which they place on the part 
.affected, either to heal or to draw it. There is, however, a schism 
amongst their doctors as to the treatment of wounds, some of them 
affirming that i t  is dangerous to wash them, and that the blood, or 
the matter, ought to be left to coagulate on the surface to reform 
the flesh. 
T h e  dressing of a broken bone they rernove every three or four 
days; it consists of flour heaten up with the yolks of eggs, which 
they consider a specific for setting a dislocated or fractured limb. 
For fever they recommend cold baths, and, if possible, of iced 
water; they administer mercury internally, but in such quan- 
tities as generally to bring the most serious consequences upon 
the patient. 
Every European is a doctor in the eyes of the Afghans, and 
they have a blind confidence in them : even when in perfect health 
they will ask for a medicine of some kind, and, be it what i t  may, 
will swallow it on the spot. " I am not ill," an Afghan will say, 
"but I may become so." They have no idea that there is any 
difference between one medicine and another ; in their opinion they 
all ought to produce the same results. 
T o  carry a Koran in procession, or to place i t  under their heads 
when they go to sleep ; to repeat one thousand times the name of 
God or the Prophet Mahornet, are infallible means of curing any 
malady whatever. As they have a great dread of the Evil Eye, 
PUBLIC BUILDLXGS-ROADS. 
they cover themselves and their domestic animals with amulets. 
Some of the charlatans whom they look upon as doctors procure 
different European medicines from India, of the properties of 
which they are utterly ignorant, and give them without discri- 
mination as to their nature or dose, whatever may be the disease 
they are prescribing for ; in this manner they will kill fifty pat.ients 
before they cure. one. They win the confidence of these unfortu- 
nates by assuring them they have seen their disease in a dream, 
and that they are thoroughly acquainted with it and the remedy 
that will cure them. The wretched patients trust these liars 
implicitly ; and instead of depending on the efforts of nature, which 
in many cases would triumph over the malady, they allow them- 
selves to be lrilled with a resignation worthy of a better fate. 
The munificence of the Persian, Tartar, and Indian monarchs 
has enriched Afghanistan with many fine buildings and worlrs of 
public utility-mosques, caravanserais, reservoirs of water, &,c., 
but they have long since been in ruins. The Afghans know not 
how to build, and destroy everything ; one may travel whole 
months in their country without finding any other shelter than the. 
tent of the nomade. At  every step may be seen traces of edifices 
that must have been magnificent, but none have ever been 
repaired. Here or there the ground is strewed with rubbish; 
farther in the distance an aqueduct has fallen down, or a river, 
owing to the dilapidation of the dykes, has overflowed, and 
the waters, which, well-directed, would have been of immense 
advantage to the agl-iculturist, remain perfectly useless; but the 
people whose interests are most concerned are quite indifferent to 
the subject. 
The  roads, if the name can be given to paths made only by the 
continual passage of carrLvans, are traced a t  random over the 
country, and frequently turn miles out of the way to avoid some 
slight obstacle that might have been removed a t  very little cost of 
money or time ; and often, simply owing to the want of a bridge, 
or even a ferry-boat, all trafic is interrupted for weeks. 
The first families who establish themselves in a fertile spot for 
the purpose of cultiva.ting it find their way to it by taking as 
direct a course as they can, but entirely by conjecture ; their 
footsteps guide the next traveller, and the next, and there is soon 
a path. Wlien the snow begins to melt, thirty or forty camels 
tied one after the other are led over it to trample it well, and the 
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traces of their large feet never disappear. Such is the organi- 
sation of the ponts et chaussbes, or roadmaking, in central Asia. 
The same system seems to have been followed for ages in the 
construction of their houses ; sun-dried bricks are the material 
ordinarily used, the rich have them burnt ; up to the present. 
period but little use has been made of hewn stone. The great ' 
scarcity of wood in this country has obliged the Afghans to build' 
vaulted roofs, and, like the Persians, they excel in this art ; .' 
nothing can be bolder or more graceful than the form of some of 
their cupolas. 
They roughcast the wall with mud and chopped straw mixed ; 
as there is little rain, this suffices to consolidate them, and, being 
neatly snloothed mith a trowel, the effect is not unpleasant to 
the eje. The  rich use plaster ; and the Kandaharians especially 
decorate their rooms with great taste and talent. Their houses 
are generally low, rarely consisting of more than one floor, but 
they occupy a great space of ground; tbe inside is concealed 
from the gaze of.the passer by, by a high wall which encircles 
the whole, and in which there is very rarely more than one 
entrance. A11 Afghan house is usually divided into several parts, 
each having its own rooms, kitchen, court, reservoir, garden, &c. 
They perfectly understand the distribution of the apartments, 
with regard to preserving them from the intense heat of the 
sun ; but they are quite ignorant of .any precautions against 
the cold, which is, however, never severe at E-Ierat or Kandahar. 
Even a royal residence in these countries looks mean externally 
compared with an European house, and one is surprised to find 
in the interior every Asiatic comfort combined with much that is 
luxurious. 
911 over the East they make an exceedingly hard cement, 
which they use as mortar, and to form the lining of baths and 
reservoirs : it is made by some persons with equal parts of wood- 
ashes, thoroughly sifted, and powdered lime ; and by some -with 
two parts of lime to one of ashes ; but in either case these materials 
are me11 mixed. Water is then poured upon them and they are 
well kneaded, after which the mass is beaten for six days by bwo men 
with large sticks, and uninterruptedly, except at night: when it 
becomes a little solid on one side, it is turned over and beaten on 
the other, care being taken to moisten it  occasiontllly lest i t  should 
become too dry. When thus well mixed, it is folded and turned 
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1 and beaten again and again till the sixth day, when it is ready for 
use. In building, this cement is laid between the bricks, which 
are tightly pressed upon each other ; for lining it is laid upon the 
surface that is to be covered, and spread with a flat and polished 
flint, for it must not be touched with the hand, as i t  would burn. 
Three layers are put on successively, and the third is washed over 
with oil, but of what kind is inimaterial ; when it is dry nothing 
can equal the beauty and solidity of this cement, which is called 
saroodj. There is another description called sa~oocl j  maglu-eli, but 
it is not so much used : this is composed of one third of hot lime, 
one of sifted sand, and one of pounded brick. 
The domestic animals of Afghanistan are the camel, the ox- 
with-a-hump, the hoke, the ass, and a few fine mules, goats 
and sheep, pigeons and fowls. T h e  camels are of two sorts ; 
those from Turltestau and the country of the Hazarahs are exceed- 
ingly large and strong, but not very active. Those from the 
Seistan are slenderly formed and wiry, but, though small, are 
as hardy an animal as can be found, and iucredibly swift; they 
will travel five-and-twenty leagues in a day without feeling fatigue, 
and are never affected by the great heat of the sun; these are  
generally used for riding, and those of Turkestan as beasts of . 
burden. 
The ox is used in the plough, in the transport of goods, and, as 
a last resource, for food. The  horses of Iiandahas and Kabul are 
not particularly good, but at  Herat, and amongst the Hazarahs, 
there are splendid animals, probably the finest and most capable of 
enduring fatigue in Central Asia. The Afghans take many of 
them to Shilrapoor, where they are bought by the English for 
remounts for their cavalry, and particularly for the artillery. 
Amongst the wild animals of Afghanistan are the royal tiger, 
the panther, bear, hyena, wolf, wild boar, jackal, fox, polecat, and 
various kinds of rats ; myriads of scorpions and reptiles swarm in 
the plains and mountains. Deer, the wild goat, and wild ass are 
seen in numbers of which it is difficult to form an idea; the 
gazelle is found only on the south bank of the Helmund. Hares, 
partridges, pheasants, bustards, indeed every variety of game 
and waterfowl are in abundance. 
The soil of Afghanistan resembles that of the rest of the great 
table-land of Central Asia. Within the principality of Kabul and 
the northern part of that of Herat w e  high mountains covered with 
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forests, having between them vast argillaceous plains well supplied' 
with water, covered with fields, and susceptible of every species of 
cultivation; the portion south of Herat and Kandahar also consists of . 
immense plains, but generally arid, running from East to West, and 
bordered by a chain of sterile mountains. The  soil of these plains 
is sandy, and absorbs so much water as to create a great scarcity : 
of that necessary of life within their limits, and t,he inhabitants are ' 
obliged to obtain by long and toilsome labour that which nature - 
has denied them a t  the surface. They dig a deep hole at  the foot 
of a mountain where they expect to find water, and, having suc- 
ceeded, lead it to their villages by a subterranean canal connecting 
a series of wells. Experience is generally their only guide in 
performing these works, for very few of them understand anything 
of the ar t  of taking levels; nevertheless, they rarely make a 
mistake. 
Before a population resolve to undertake such a work, they . 
must have found it impossible to select a spot near a natural .. 
stream which they could turn to purposes of cultivation. I t  
r eq~~i res  much time and trouble to make these wells, or kariz, 
as they are called; and if the country nnhappily becomes the 
theatre of war, the first operation of the invading army is to 
destroy them, and deprive the people they come to attack of their 
supply of water. I t  is to this unhappy mania of dest,ructiveness, 
especially in this particular form, that the depopulation of Afghan- 
istan is principally to be ascribed : immense tracts of country have 
in consequence been abandoned and become arid ; they belong to 
no one-the land is valueless and cannot be sold ; water only has 
a value, whether in a well or from a river led by conduits to the 
spot that i t  is required to fertilize. I t  is always part of a bargzin 
that, whenever land can be irrigated by this water, the water shall 
belong to the purchaser. 
Notwithstanding the bad quality of the soil in Kandahar, 
vegetable productions are extremely good and cheap. The  
Afghan plough is simply a piece of wood sharpened and hardened 
in the fire. T h e  Afghans cultivate wheat, barley, maize, tobacco, 
cotton, and rice, sesamum, and palma-christi. T h e  rice from 
Jellalabad is esteemed the best; and from the sesamum and 
palma-christi oil is expressed. Asafetida is exported, but of the 
other crops they raise only enough for their consumption. They 
rear also a few silkworms. 
! 
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All the fruits of Europe, excepting the gooseberry and straw- 
berry, are found in Afghanistan, but the absence of these is amply 
by the water-melon and the pomegranate. I n  Kan- 
dah.har the latter are superior to those grown in any other part of 
Asia. 
In the mountains of Afghanistan are found vast quantities of 
iron, lead, and sulphur ; quicksilver abounds; also asbestos, which 
is called singui pemhe. Gold and silver are washed down in many 
of the little streams; the mountains, therefore, contain much of 
the precious metals-but all this mineral wealth is useless, for 
the Afghans wilzl not take the trouble to turn it to account. 
Afghanistan lies between 32" and 36" of north latitude, and 60' 
and 680 of east longitude, and within this confined space the 
climate varies amazingly according to the locality-the heat or 
the cold is felt in different spots in the same latitude with very 
different degrees of intensity, according to the configuration of the 
country. By the side of plains, on which the sun darts his burning 
rays, are table-lands at  a very high elevation, and gigantic moun- 
tains where summer and winter seem to stand side by side. A t  
Herat, in the July of 1845, the Centigrade thermometer never 
stood higher than 37" in the shade, and that rarely; it more fre- 
quently ranged between 3%" and 34". From the commencement 
of May to the middle of September the wind blows constantly from 
t.he N.W. over this province, and often with such violence as to 
prostrate houses, uproot trees, and cause much devastation. T h e  
winter is tolerably mild; on the plain the snow melts as it falls, 
and does not lie long even on the summits of the mountains. 
Three years out of four it does not freeze hard enough for the 
inhabitants to store up any ice for the summer; in general the 
temperature is moderate, and the climate one of the most agreeable 
in Asia. 
The province of Ihndahar  is everywhere subject to intense heat. 
I n  the fortress of Girishk, on the banks of the Helmund, in the 
month of August, the Centigrade thermometer stood at 48' or 49O 
in the shade. This principality is bounded on the S. by the deserts 
of moving sand of the Seistan, and is on this side open to violent 
winds, surcharged with exceedingly fine sand, which is very in- 
jurious to animal life. 
For nine months the sun shines with the greatest possible splen- 
dour on Afghanistan, and the nights are even more beautiful than 
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the days; travellers can journey in perfect safety by the brilliant 
starlight only. T h e  atmosphere is, during the night, much charged' 
with electricity, and the least friction will draw sparks from almost 
any object whatever, mith a slight noise like the breaking of an 
osier twig. 
The  N.W. wind of the spriig and summer is as violent in Ran- ' 
dahar as in Herat., but the minter is still milder; the mountains 
which bound i t  on the north attract much rain, but snow is rarely -. 
seen there, and then only in small quantities. 
I n  Kabul the climate is very temperate in the summer, and it 
is delightful to reside there in tllat season ; but during half the 
autumn, the winter, and half the spring, the ground is covered 
with snow three feet deep. The frost is constant and intense, and 
the roads are impassable f o ~  five months in the year. 
Tha t  which has contributed more than the turbulence of the 
serdars and the rivalry of the tribes to break up the Afghan king- -- 
dom, and lieep the three principalities separate, is the difficulty . 
that has been always experienced by the Suddozye monarchs of 
marching from Kabul with sufficient promptitude upon any part 
that might be in  a state of revolt. The extent of the Paropa- 
misus, which is occupied by indepeildent tribes, and is at  any time . 
difficult to pass through, always obliged them to make a long 
circuit with their armies to reach Herat,. This occasioned a loss 
of time which the insurgents turned to their advantage by. strength- 
ening their position. It is difficult to determine the boundasies of 
the three Afghan principalities from. each other in those parts 
where there is neither river nor mountain to fix them definitely : 
in such case the frontier of each is defined by an imaginary line 
which shall just include the ground on which a tribe subject to its 
power has planted its tents. 
T h e  population of Afghanistan is not in proportion to the 
extent of its territory, and the conditions which govern this 
question contribute powerfully to arrest its development, and even 
cause a sensible diminution of its numbers. The inhabitants 
withdraw more and more from the agitation and instabi1it.y that 
reign there ; a fourth part of its fighting men have either been 
killed or taken service in Persia or in India in consequence of 
the intestine or foreign wars with which Afghanistau has been 
afflicted. 
There are two causes which make it very difficult to estimate' 
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the population of Afghanistan : first, the itinerant character of the 
nomadic portion of it, for the passion for change of place is 
pushed to the greatest extreme-a remark which sometimes applies 
even to the inhabitants of towns; secondly, the mountanious 
country of the Paropainisus is very iniperfectly known, and this 
is specially inhabited by nomade tribes, of which it is impossible, 
even approximately, to ascertain the number. 
The population of Afghanistan is divided into two very distinct 
parts : first, the Afghans, properly so called ; secondly, the Tajilcs, 
the descendants of the ancient conquerors of the country, and who 
may be s~~bdivided into two classes-the Parsivans," or inhabitants 
of the towns, and the Ei~naks or nomades. T h e  Afghans are a t  
the present time the dominant race, and. the Tajiks are subject to 
them both in Hemt and Kandahar; nevertheless Yar Moharned 
Khan has in the former city shown them great consideration, and 
permitted them to obtain an influence which may a t  some future 
time become fatal to the Afghans. A t  Kabul their superior 
numbers, their warlike instincts, and the fortified position which 
they occupy in that city, have obtained for them the same p i -  
vileges as the Afghans ; they share with them the appointments 
of the public service, and in the political troubles which often arise 
the party to which they give their support is very frequently tri- 
umphant. 
The  ICuzzilbashes or Persians established in Kabul by Nadir 
Shah, and numbering 12,000 families, hold to the Tajiks, to whom 
they assindate in religion, both races being of the same sect, that 
is to say, Shiahs. 
The following may be considered, but approximately only, as 
the amount of the population in Afghanistan. 
In  the province ofllerat 300,000 Afghans, and 600,000 Parsivans or Eimaks. 
,, ICanclahar 600,000 ,, 300,000 ,, Belooches. 
,, Kabul 1,600,000 ,, 800,000 ,, and Kuzzilbashes. 
-- -- 
Totd  2,500,000 1,700,000 
General Total, 4,200,000 inhabitants. 
The meaning of which is, "speaking Persian."-Fe~rier. 
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CHAPTER XXII.  
Government of the Afghan provinces -Power of the Emirs - Influence of t h e  
priests - Turbulence of the serdars - Ideas of government - Conduct of 
public affairs - Stability of power unlikely to last - Mode of obtaining it 
- Character of the serdars - The producing classes - They cannot leave 
Kandahar - Clannish feelings - Mercenary qualities of the serdars - Fidelity 
of the  troops never certain - The result of their numerous wars - The 
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sovereign and the serdars - Superiority of the Moharuedzyes -The power of 
the Barulzzyes-Probabilities of their retaining it- English marriages in  
Afghanistan -The Afghan army -Manner in which it is composed - The 
contmgents easily assembled - Ignorant of military discipline, and insensible 
to its advantages - War a necessity - Cavalry numerous - Mode of fighting 
-Rights of individuals unknown - Construction of their towns-Tribes of 
the south-Strength of the Afghan army in each priucipnlity -Par Mohamed's 
troops- Money - Prices of provisions - Wine-Weights and measures -The 
Parsivans - Mechmical arts - Eurupean manufactures -Taxation. 
THE government of the Afghan provinces has somewhat of a 
monarchical character about it, nevertheless it is rather a military, 
aristocratic, and despotic republic, the dictator of which is esta- 
blished for life. The sovereign is absolute, and makes any and 
every change which may appear to him necessary or proper in the 
government or the administration ; he can dispose of the lives and 
property of his subjects, and is kept within certain limits in 
these respects only by the calculstions which prudence dictates. 
Religion is the counterpoise to his authority ; this gives the clergy 
great influence, one that he might try in vain to subject to his will , 
and pleasure ; and vainer still would be the attempt to infringc 
and invade the rights and privileges of the serdars or chiefs of 
tribes, who would never consent to resign a certain influence in 
the affairs of government. I t  may be said that in Afghanistan 
there are as many sovereigns as serdars, for each of them governs 
after his own fashion ; they are jealous, turbulent, and anlbi- 
tious, and the sovereign can restrain and keep them in some 
order only by taking advantage of their rivalry and feuds and 
opposing one to the other. There is no unity, nothing is 
permanent, everything depends on the pleasure or caprice of a 
number of despots, always at  variance with each other, making 
their tribes espouse their personal quarrels ; a constant feeling of 
irascibility is the result, which finally leads to sanguinary civil 
i CHAP. 5911. CONDUCT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. 303 
yarn, and throws the country into a state of anarchy and perpetual 
confusion. 
I n  Europe civilization has regulated everything ; the majority 
of her citizens are devoted to ~cience, the arts, industry, and 
commerce, which enrich and conduce to the well-being of the 
and ameliorate the habits and conditiou of the people : 
when war bursts forth only a very small portion of the population 
arm for the defence of the country, and this supplies all the wants 
of the army, which ' i s  an  element of order and security-the 
government, in short, is the guardian and watches over the 
 interest,^ of the nation for the general good. But in Afghanistan 
the ideas and object of the government and the governed are 
wholly different ; there each man thinks only of destruction and 
disorganization ; it is who shall labour least, or who shall enrich 
himself the most, and by the most culpable means. T h e  deposi- 
taries of power, instead of leacling those under them in the right 
path, instead of giving them, by their own conduct, a good 
example, and ameliorating the condition of the people, load 
them with exactions and enrich themselves a t  their cost. 
This system of spoliation and embezzlement is practised by 
functionaries of every class, and has a sad effect upon the minds 
of the masses, who follow the example of their superiors : seeing 
that the great., instead of occupying themselves with their welfare, 
only think of enjoying themselves at their espense, they become 
egotistical and avaricious in their turn, and prefer idleness to 
an industry, which serves only to benefit their oppressors, and 
draws upon themselves additional persecution. T o  seize without 
ceremony upon the property of other people is an example which 
the Afghans receive daily from their chiefs, and it appears to 
them a practice both convenient and just ; the effect of this is 
a permanent state of disquietude and trouble. They are, as I 
have already remarked, the moat turbulent nation in Asia, and 
the most difficult to govern : they always welcome, and with 
enthusiasm, the arrival of a new sovereign, but a reign too long, 
or a peace too prolonged with their neighbours, is to them insup- 
portable ; and when no opportunity presents itself of getting rid 
of their over-excitement on their foes without, they make war 
upon one another. 
If courage is to them the first of Firtues, it may be said also 
that agitation is for them a first necessity; thus scenes of 
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violence arise which produce a change of government, and with i t  
a change of sovereigns, with incorlceivable rapidity. He  who 
possesses a little money and can scatter it amongst the crowd will 
soon have a sufficient number of partizans to assist in raising him 
to power; and though this power is hereditary in Afghanistan, 
the regular succession to the throne is by no means liked and 
is the most uncertain thing possible. The legitimate heir is 
always obliged to submit the question of sovereignty to an election - 
and the chances of war ; the result is rarely doubtfill, and has 
always favoured the candidate who paid the soldiers best that 
adhered to his fortunes ; hence it is that one sees so many obscure 
adventurers, enriched by mzzias, suddenly elevated to the supreme 
authority. These have, for the most part, been little better than 
avaricious and sanguinary tyrants, who are overthrown almost as 
soon as they are set up. In Afghanistan everything that succeeds 
is legitimate, and in this way success favours the greatest rascal ; 
his crimes or his virtues are of little importance to the people ; if 
he pays well he  is'their idol ; but let his purse get empty, let a 
reverse of fortune overtake him, he a t  once becomes an object of 
contempt and aversion, and is obliged either to expatriate 
himself or retire into a greater obscurity than that from which 
he sprung. 
Afghanistan is of all countries in the world that in which a 
man's position is the most uncertain ; a serdar to-day wealthy and 
powerful will to-morrow be despoiled of everything he is possessed 
of, and be reduced to serve, and in a subordinate rank, those who, 
till then, had obeyed his smallest wish. T h e  members of his 
family will be dispersed and reduced to the greatest privations, and 
hence it. is that in this country are Eeen so many nobles in rags. 
There are hundreds of khans who take service as private soldiers, 
and even servants of the lowest grade ; but no matter what may 
be the misery, degradation, or adversity to which they are reduced, 
they are always wonderfully vain of their birth, and their aristo- 
cratic pride is sure to pierce through their plebeian garb. 
T h e  sovereigns of Afghanistan bestow every kind of title with a 
prodigal hand, and that of khan so much so, and upon such 
perfect nobodies, that it has completely lost the consideration 
properly due to it. The chance which every energetic man 
has of rising to power, even the highest, and the faci1it.y with 
which he attains it, has established between the people, the 
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serdars, and the sovereign, a species of familiarity which is seen 
in no other country. Jndividuals of the lowest birth and class, 
clad in rags and covered with vermin, take whatever complaints, 
they may have in person to the king ; they approach and seat 
themselves before him without ceremony, enter at  once and with- 
out preamble into . their story, and with that easy nonchalant 
air which is so characteristic of Afghan human nature. T h e  
sovereign sees, receives, and discusses every petition even on 
the most insignificant subjects, and his minister, when he has 
one, generally speaking, merely gives effect to the decisions of his 
master. 
As the Afghan chiefs are never sure of holding for a length- 
ened period any great appointment in the state, their first thought 
is always how they can fill their own coffers and ru i i~  the country; 
however great and politic, and of future advantage, any measure 
may appear, they will always sacrifice i t  to the most trifling 
present benefit, no matter how small. Another mode of enriching 
themselves is putting up the public offices for sale to the highest 
bidder, and the purchasers then consider that they are justified .' 
in committing every kind of fraud to reimburse themselves the 
sums they have paid. Individual liberty exists nowhere in the 
East so perfect as in Afghanistan ; every Afghan can go where 
he thinks fit; he can leave the kingdom with his family if he 
wishes, neither authority nor passport is required to enable him 
to do so, no one has a right to interfere with or restrain him ; 
the sovereign certainly would not, for an Afghan is a very unpro- 
ductive article, which consumes much and produces nothing: but 
this is not the case either with the Paraivam or the Hindoos, 
settled in the country, who form the industrial and producing class. 
They, especially those in Iiandahar, are retained in the principality 
against their wishes, and are severely punished when they attempt 
to leave it. I t  cannot be said that there is, as we understand i t  
in Enrope, ally national spirit amongst the Afghans ; they fight 
much more for their own interests than for their independence; 
there is, nevertheless, something which resembles it, though not 
commonly felt: this is a sentiment of affection for, or a jealous 
pride in ,  his own tribe, which makes a man detest the neighbouring 
one, though of the same race : i t  may be affirmed, therefore, tha.t 
every tribe of Afghans has its own clannish feeling, and i t  is that 
which protects the nation ; interest alone effects a passing unity 
X 
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of purpose, and when that is satisfied the rivalries of different 
castes and clans re-assume their sway. 
The  serdars are a t  one and the same time the strength and the 
cune of the monarch ; prompt to take arms and defend him when 
a good understal?ding exists between them, they are as  ready 
- to revolt against him when they find, or think, they have the 
smallest interest in doing so ; in anything, however, to which they 
are disinclined, they mould not obey even the sovereign of their 
choice but with reluctance ; moreover, they are always impatient 
to see him replaced by another, from whom they hope to obtain 
p e a t e r  advantages. Each subdivision of a tribe is, according to 
its numerical force and extent of territory, commanded by one or 
more serdars.. These chiefs, though of a different countrx and 
religion, may be compared to the dukes and barons of the middle - 
ages in France-the more powerful to the knighk bannerets, and 
those having authority over only a few families to the esquires-who 
in time of war enrol themselves and their men under the orders 
of the chief that inspires them with the greatest confidence, and 
can pay them the best. They have also the characteristic which 
mas common to the old Italian condottieri, namely, that they will 
sell their services to the highest bidder. I n  war, as in peace, they 
are ready to pass from the ranks of the Emir of ICabul into the 
service of the Vizier of Eerat,  the chief of Kandahar, the English, 
the Persians, Sikhs, Tartars, or Belooches, and vice vers$, without 
the slightest scruple ; it is indifferent to them whether their friend . , 
of to-day is their enemy to-morrow, or whether they have even to 
take arms against their relations or not ; the love of money enables 
them to overlook a11 these considerations. The  soldiers imitate 
on a small scale that which their chiefs do on a large one, that is 
to say, they will desert one party and attach tliemselres to another, 
without feeling any compunction or incurring the least disgrace ; 
the question is simply one of speculation, an admitted custom, 
and there is no shame in conforming to  it. 
The  consequence of this is that a sovereign is never sure of his 
troops, and, if any one else will give them higher pay or treat 
them better than he can, they will pass over to his camp. The 
authority of the chiefs of tribes is much more effectual over their 
subordinates, whom they sometimes rule with a rod of iron ; these 
consider the chief as their father, and are accustomed to obey and 
respect him from their infancy ; he is of the same clan as them- 
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selves, he has received his power and authority through a long line 
of ancestors; but these reasons nevertheless cannot always save 
him from ruin ; it requires very little to excite discontent ; then he 
is attacked, followed, and driven forth, aud his right to govern, 
such as it is, passes to a brother, an uncle, or some collateral 
branch, to any one, in short, so that the feudal rights remain in 
the family. 
The wars that have reddened the soil of Afghanistan for the last 
seventy years have so completely decimated the old families that 
many of them have become extinct, and several tribes have re- 
mained without a head. On some occasions, when the sovereign 
has tried to give them a chief of his choice, instead of one of their 
own, some dreadful and bloody conflict has ensued, which has 
always ended in the triumph of the chief elected by the tribe. 
This resistance is natural enough. To accept a leader who was 
imposed upon them would be to abdicate their rights, to deliver 
themselves up to the tender mercies of the prince ; whereas, he 
who holds the command by right of election defends his position 
and privileges with greater tenacity, no matter who may be the 
individual who attacks him. 
The visits of the serdars a t  the court of the sovereign are rare, 
for they are generally apprehensive of falling into some trap 
which is often laid for them, and they dislike the prolonged stay 
they are obliged to make when once they are there. They prefer 
residing amongst their tribe, in their fortified villages, generally 
occupying some eminence, where in case of attack they can the 
more readily and continuously resist the efforts of their enemies. 
The most powerful amongst them are caressed by the sovereign, 
who attaches them to his interests much more by the concessions 
he makes than by the fear which he inspires ; ordinarily, and with 
a view to preserve a nominal authority over them, he remits the 
whole of the taxes, and imposes in their stead the obligation to 
furnish a contingent of troops in the event, of war being declared 
against him by his neighbours. This wretched system gives too - 
much power to the serdars; the sovereign is a t  their mercy, and 
it is the ambition of these men that gives birth to the numerous 
civil wars in Afghanistan, for they are constantly ill revolt. 
I t  has been shown in the course of their history to what an 
extent they carried their excesses under the dynasty of the Sud- 
dozyes ; if they have o t  as often deposed and recalled the 
x 2 
hIohnnledzyes, it is because that family is as it were an exception 
to the Afghans in general, and those who compose it are men of 
superior intelligence and energy of character. They have also an 
ascendancy over the other chiefs, and know how to control them 
by the divisions which they so adroitly excite and maintain amongst 
them, and by settling or encamping the tribe of the Bnrulizyes, 
to which the Mohamedzyes belong, in the plains and valleys that, 
lying south of Kandahar, reach as far as Ghumee. This central 
position enables them to move their forces rapidly to any particular 
spot, and suppress all revolts with alacrity and vigour, and being 
numerically stronger they control the other tribes. Many of theie 
they have broken up into sections or dispersed, in order to make i t  
almost impossible that they should render mutual assistance to 
each other, and they thus hold them in check with greater facility. 
T h e  clan of which the sovereign is a member always enjoys the 
greatest privileges and advantages over the rest, and this is one of 
the reasons why each tribe is continually agitating and endeavour- 
ing to raise its chief to power. 
T h e  princcs actually reigning in Afghanistan have up to this 
time repressed with as much good fortune as severity the revolts 
that have taken place in their states ; but thougli this has enabled 
them to hold the reins of government for many years, we must 
not imagine that the Mohamedzyes have stifled the spirit ,of 
rebellion, which is as much a necessity in the Afghan character as 
the effect of a vicious social organization ; the Barulrzyes may be 
overthrown to-morrow, they live on from day to day in a precarious 
position, and their fate is dependent on the caprices of fortune and 
the yood pleasure of their enemies. Burnes has affirmed that Dost 
Mohamed is held in veneration by the Afghans, and that he is the 
first sovereign who made them understand the sweets of peace, 
and introduced abundance and security amongst them ; but how 
did they treat him when the hour arrived for them to show their 
gratitude? this chief was abandoned for Shah Shooja, for whom 
they had still less consideration. T h e  English took possession of 
Kabul without meeting with any serious resistance on their march ; 
and in ,spite of what has been said, and what might still be said, 
I affirm and assert that they were then received with acclamations 
and protestations of friendship and devotion without the least 
solicitation on their part, and this from chiefs who subsequently 
declared them to be their enemies. Then, as now, the serdurs 
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were men of bad faith : they expected and hoped for gold ; as long 
as they were given any they accepted it and said nothing ; t,heir 
consciences were dead within them, even the bigoted feeling of 
fanaticism was hushed in their breasts ; the husband sold the 
honour of his wife, the father that of hi daughter, the brother that 
of his sister, and one saw a circumstance till then unheard of, a 
number of Englishmen, Christians, become the legitimate husbands 
of Afghan women who profeszed the faith of Islam. , Money had 
. 
made these Savage Afghans as tame and submissive as sheep, but 
directly the order .was given by the East India Company to reduce 
the subsidies which had been paid to them, turbulence and 
fanaticism returned a t  once ; the salaries and donations which they 
received after this reduction were even then much higher than 
those they obtained from their own sovereigns, but in this, as in all 
other circumstances, their avarice, their unstable, restless, and 
ficlrle character, brought about the insurrection which re-established 
the power of the Emir Dost Mohamed in Kabul and that of 
Rohendil Khan in Kandahar. Their return was celebrated with 
every circumstance of pomp by their subjects, and yet how often 
since that period have they not revolted against these chiefs ! They 
will, as they have already done before, turn their backs on them 
on the first occasion ; and if these princes have the good fortune 
to terminate their troubled lives in power, it'is d l  that in common 
reason they can expect. It will be impossible either for them, 
or Yar Mohamed Khan of Herat to establish a dynasty, the 
foundations of which shall be sufficiently solid to enable them 
to transmit i t  with any degree of certainty to their legitimate 
heirs ; t.he sovereignty in this country exists only on considerations 
purelyindividua1,-it is frequently brought to a close with the life 
of the possessor, and becomes afterwards the appanage of some 
bold adventurer or soldier of fortune. 
T h e  Afghan army might in case of necesssity consist of the 
whole male population, for every .man is born a soldier, and 
attaches himself to some chief as soon as he can hold a musket. 
As the troops have no regular pay, and during their period of 
service generally speaking live on plunder, i t  is difficult to say 
which is the most disastrous to the people, its own army or that of ' 
a foreign enemy, for both one and the other abandon themselves 
to all kinds of excesses, devastate the country, and leave behind 
'the most fearful traces of their pawage ; ordinarily speaking, 
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the strength of the army of each ~ r i n c i p a l i t ~  is dependent on the 
probabilities that exist of maintaining it in the district to which 
i t  is going. 
A t  the first news of war the s e r d m  hasten with their several 
contingents to the camp of the sovereign, each bringing with him 
the number of men in proportion to the nature and importance of 
his command. These contingents united form the army, properly 
so called ; but in addition to it is another class of combatants, 
which, though not the best, are often the most numerous ; such, for 
instance, as the inhabitants of towns, who are not attached to any 
chief, individuals who make war on their own account and at  their 
own expense, solely for the pleasure of making it, and in the hope 
of obtaining large booty. I t  sometimes happens that these 
irregulars unite in parties, or d l  together, and elect a chief, or 
c.l~iefs, under whose command they place themselves; but more 
often they are broken up into small detachments of Friends or 
acquaintances coming from the same locality, associated together, 
and iutending to share in the profits of the enterprise ; they march 
after their own fashion, and without order, regulating their pro- 
ceedings according to the movements of the army, or leaving it 
when it suits their views and convenience. These elements united, 
or sometimes disunited, form an Afghan army, if one can give 
such a name to a collection of men, animals, and followers 
marching pell-mell, and in the greatest confusion. I t  requires 
only a few days for the serdars to assemble their contingents, for 
every man of the tribe is always ready to mount his horse, and 
each of them carries his provisions with him in a kind of havresnc, 
which is slung behind the saddle. The Afghans, such parasites 
and sponges when at home, are exceedingly frugal and temperate 
when they are on a journey ; their powers of abstinence and en- 
durance are great, and they can live almost upon anything and 
for a long time ; the chiefs, and those whose means enable them 
to do so, are accompanied by so many servants for their personal 
requirements, or to look after the baggage, that during the whole 
of the operations they generally exceed in number those of the 
fighting men. All these form a mixed and noisy rabble, undis- 
ciplined and impracticable, badly equipped, aud taking no pre- 
cautions necessary to their own security, whether on the march or 
in camp, even when in presence of the enemy. Nevertheless, 
though in this miserable and confused state, the army moves with 
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great rapidity and over immense distances : the inhabitants of the . 
villages 07 at their approach, for they destroy and pillage every- 
thing that lies on their road. Sometimes a dearth of provisions , 
is felt in the camp, when the majority of the volunteers quit the 
srmy and return to their homes ; the aerdars, who carry with them 
only food enough for their personal wants, are also obliged to 
disband successive portions of their contingents to obtain sup- 
plies, so that it often happens that only a fourth, and even a 
less number, are all that remain with their colours. When 
war takes place between the Afghans themselves, it generally 
ends in a combat in which a very small force is engaged on either 
side. 
In  the field, the Afghans never think of ascertaining what 
is going on in their front on the line of march ; they form neither 
advanced nor rear guards, but move straight on without the 
least uneasiness or apprehension until they meet the enemy ; it 
matters little to them whether o i  not their communications are 
left open ; the spot on which they find their subsistence is for them 
the line of operations ; they pitch their camp by hap-hazard, with- 
out system or order, a t  the first place they come to, but Ijy pre- 
ference near villages, which they can plunder, and where they are 
also sure to find water. As this is in some parts very scarce, and 
to be found only at  certain points well known to all, it often 
occurs that the vtrious contingents marching in several columns, 
finding the springs or wells near which they intended to encamp 
exhausted, retire upon the adjoiuing ones, but the ground is often 
occupied, and a bloody conflict is the result, when the strongest 
party remains in possession of the springs, and the other has to 
continue its search elsewhere. I n  thg camp each contingent forms 
an irregular circle, the baggage and the chief's tent being in the 
centre. The mass of the Afghan army is corrlposed of cavalry, 
and the national character, and the nature of the climate and 
soil, are the principal reasons that lead them to prefer this arm 
to infantry, which, excepting in the mountains north of Kabul, 
is held in little estimation amongst them : there the country is 
difficult and the climate temperate, but in the other parts of 
Afghanistan the people do not fancy traversing on foot miles and 
miles of desert plains, under a burning sun, and where water is 
scarce. With a little forethought and arrangement these obstacles 
would readily and promptly be overcome, but this is not the 
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country in which people care to overcome difficulties : anything 
that is easy of execution and can be effected in a brief space of 
, time is much more to their taste. 
The love of war iu  felt much more amongst Afghans than all 
other Eastern nations; nevertheless, in no one instance has so 
little desire been shown to augment the means of resistance and 
aggression. W a r  to them is a trade, for it would be impossible 
to give the name of science to the thousand absurd proceedings 
which they employ, and which prove that their chiefs are completely 
ignorant of the first elements of the art. The reason of their success 
against the other Asiatic hordes up to this day has been their d u n  
in the attack, their courage, but not any clever dispositions or 
a knowledge of milibry operations ; t.heir neighbours the Sikhs, 
previously subject to them, defeated the Afghans and seized some 
of '  the most valuable provinces in their territory, directly they 
had obtained even a partial Itnowledge of European tactics. I t  
cannot be denied that the Afghans are excellent skirmishers and 
experienced foragers, for they possess the necessary qualifications 
in a much greater degree than Europeans. They are perfectly 
independent in their manmuvres, each detachment fighting after 
its own devices, unrestrained by any subordination and discipline, 
those who comrnand them not being any wiser than themselves. 
Their instinct tells them what movement will ensure their safety 
under defeat, or will tend to their advantage invictory. European 
soldiers wou~ld certainly effect as much as they could under the 
same circumstances ; but then they are subject to regular discipline, 
directed by one impulse, the majority of them confiding in the 
talents of their chiefs, so that their courage is limited within 
proper bounds, out of which they cannot step without compromis- 
ing their discipline, or sometimes endangering the lives of their 
comrades. 
For the theatre' of combat between their armies the Afghans 
always select large plains, in order that their numerous cavalry, 
on which they place a blind reliance, may be able to deploy 
freely; if they could charge regularly and in line it would be 
perhaps the finest cavalry in the world. The sword is their 
favourite arm, and when they say of any one "chemchiri adam 
est!' (that man is a swordsman) they have paid him the most 
flattering compliment. They have no idea of the advantages of 
position, or estimating in a military sense the features of the 
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ground ; in their eyes the shortest road is the best ; they never 
seek to turn a position or to make a diversion ; they always attack 
in line parallel to t l~at of the enemy and on all points at  once, 
taking, in the words of the proverb, '' the bull by the horns." 
Before they encounter their adversary, however, they endeavour 
to weaken him by ruining the country in his front, so that he 
cannot maintain himself; they burn the villages, expel the inha- 
bitants, destroy the aqueducts ; and after he has wandered for days 
in  the desert they have made, panting with thirst and extenuated 
by hunger, they pounce upon their enemy like a tiger and make a 
horrible massacre. Strategy and tactics are unknown to them, 
and not even by compulsion could they be initiated in these power- 
ful agents in obtaining victory. They will have independence of 
action, opportunities of displaying their address and their physical 
strength ; t,hey place the triumph of individual courage far above 
that of science, and reject every idea of combination and unity in 
their movements. But this impulsive ardour, this daring bravery, 
of which they were so proud, slackened when they had to meet the 
British, whose artillery cleverly served, and infantry squares solid 
as walls, made fearful hwoc in their squadrons. The  artillery 
especially, that terrible a m  in the hands of Europeans, inspires 
them with no less. aversion than it did formerly Montluc or the 
Chevalier Bayard, the first of whom looked upon it as an invention 
of the devil, and the second said it was a shame that a brave man 
should be exposed to die by such a miserable device. ' 
Against cannon the Afghans feel that they'.cannot trust to the 
prowess which they value so highly. Their valour is incontestable, 
but t,heir presumptiou is greater ; they never cease to boas4 and 
are constantly repeating that, if other nations were, like them- 
selves, armed only with the sword, they could give laws to the 
world. When they attack they utter loud cries, and the most ' 
courageous place themselves in front ; the rest form a second or 
third line, more or less distant from the first, according to the 
degree of ardour they may possess. These are ready to rush 
forward and plunder if their comrades in advance are victorious, 
or to run away if they are beaten. The chiefs are far more 
intent upon signalizing their personal courage than upon directing 
their troops, who are not under any control when they have 
been a short time in action. The Afghans never disband until 
they have failed in three charges successively, but after that i t  
becomes impossible to rally them, because they believe that talleh, 
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fate, is q a i n s t  them, and that they would offend God by longer 
opposing his decrees. 
But if they gain the day, woe indeed to the conquered! for an 
Afghan ceases not from slaughter till his arm is wearied with 
striking; till then there is no quarter from him, and a hundred 
times better is i t  to die on the Eeld than survive to be his slave, 
certain of the hardest possible toil and the most inhuman treat- 
ment : a large ransom is the only chance of liberty. In  time of 
war the Afghans carry on their communications by signal fires on 
the mountains, the information they are to afford being intimated 
by their numbers and position, and the length of time they burn. 
They have no idea of the rights of individuals, uor any regard 
for public opinion, or fear of reprisals. T o  express any humane 
or generous sentiments after a victory is in their eyes the greatest 
weakness ; and if they have lost the ideas they first formed of the 
power of the British, it is not because they evacuated the country, 
but because they did not, before they left it, convert it into a vast 
desert, deluged with the blood of the inhabitants. 
I n  the Afghans enthusiasm and impulse are not the result of 
noble sentiments, and but rarely of fanaticism ; they are excited 
by the hope of pillage, or even, like the tiger, for the plain and 
simple purpose of satisfying their ferocious instincts. Nothing is 
morgnatural, in their eyes, than to seize upon a neighbouring state, 
even upon that of an ally, without having received the slightest 
provocation; force, the last argument of a nation who respects 
itself, is with them the first and only one, and justifies all their 
actions. 
Though they are eutirely ignorant of the art of attack and de- 
fence of towns and fortresses, the Afghans are remarltable for the 
obstinacy of their resistance and the correctness of their aim when 
they are behind walls. When they are the assailants they always 
attack, suddenly, by escalade, surprise, or stratagem, but very 
seldom succeed. It is by long blockade or treachery, or more 
often by lying and false oaths, that they possess themselves of a 
fortified place. 
T h e  majority of their towns are square, but more or less perfect 
in their form, enclosed by one very thick and high wall of earth, 
embattled and loopholed, and having a banquette within, on which 
two men, a t  most, can walk side by side : a t  intervals are placed 
small hollow towers ; those a t  the angles being larger, solid, a d  
constructed for artillery. The ditch which surrounds the enceinte 
is flooded in time of war whenever water can be obtained. The 
gates are strengthened with large nails and bands of iron, and to 
give them greater security there is a portcullis with loopholes 
above it to defend the approach. A great proportion of the 
villages in Kandahar and Herat are, like the towns, enclosed with 
mud walls of about 1 2  or 15 feet in height, and 4 in thickness 
at the base, but narrower a t  the top; they are seldom protected by 
a ditch, and in some'instsnces there are no turrets except a t  the 
angles. These defences would be inefficient against artillery well 
served, but they are all that is required to sustain the mode of 
attack customary in the country ; however, the climate being so 
very hot and rain so very infrequent, the walls are of considerable 
solidity, and are difficult to destroy with artillery only,-the mine 
is indispensable for effecting a practicable breach. 
These remarks apply to the towns and villages situated in the 
plains of Kabul, but not to those in the mountains, which are con- 
structed in positions defended by nature. 
The inaptitude of this nation for discipline and military organi- 
sation arises from their spirit of impatience under the slightest 
idea of restraint; and to this feeling their religion contributes, for 
they are taught to believe that, having proclaimed Djehad, Holy 
War, the numerous battalions of the Infidels are powerless against 
a handful of the Ghazees, or soldiers of the Faith. The climate 
and nature of the soil have also a great i~lfluence on the warlike 
habits of the Afghans. The tribes of the south are l e ~ s  quarrel- 
some and less able to support the fatigues of warfare than those 
of the north ; and those who inhabit the southern bank. of the 
I-Ielmund are considered by all the others as an effeminate race. 
There is more than one instance of this pernicious influence of 
climate upon the human character, and not t h e  least remarkable 
one is, that the Roman . legions gradually lost their manly 
courage as they carried their conquests eastward. 
The arms of the Afghans are the firelock, the carbine, the 
swivel-gun, or a pair of bad pistols ; sometimes a bow, or a lance 
with a bamboo handle. The fire-arms are coarse and heavy, the 
hammers of the locks being very defective; most of the barrels 
. 
are Turkish, and rifled. They also carry a shield, a foot and a 
half in diameter, covered with copper, or the hide of either the 
elephant or the horse, which is very hard. 
The whole Afghan army consists of the three division's of 
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Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat ; of these, the troops called Defteris,* 
present the following effective force :- 
KAEUL 15,000 Afghan Horse. 
6,000 Prrrsivan or I<nxzilbash Eorse. 
6,000 Afghan Xountilineers, 1nTanh.y. 
4,000 l'arsivr~ns, Haznmhs, or Usheks, lnfant~g.  
-
Total 31,000 
Mohamed Akbar Khan, son of the .Emir, Dost Mohamed, per- 
ceived the great advantages which order and discipline gave to 
the British army, and, as  soon as he had in some degree established 
his power, he attempted to train the Afghan cavalry to move in 
squadrons-but all his efforts failed against the power of habit. 
H e  mas more successful with two battalions of Parsivans, who were 
not so intractable as the Afghans uncler the discipline that he 
introduced. These battalions, as it is said, manceuvred badly 
enough; they were drilled by an Englishman of the name of 
Kervel, who, having been wounded and made prisoner at  the time 
of the disasters i n  Kabul in 1841, became a Mussulman, and 
entered the service of Dost Blohamed. 
In RANDAHAR there me 13,000 Afghan Horse. 
3,000 Afghan Inrantry. 
3,000 Belooch Infantry. 
-
Total 18,000 
I n  1833 Iiohendil Khan, sovereign of this principality, obtained 
the assistance of a few Europeans to instruct and organize his 
army, and after five years of continued exertion they succeeded 
in bringing into some slight degree of discipline, such as it was, 
about 2000 Afghan infantry. I n  1838, when Mohamed Sedik 
Khan advanced to Subzawar with the intention of taking Herat, 
these battalions met the enemy for the first time, but after one 
volley was given their natural instinct of self-dependence was at 
once in the ascendant ; every man left the ranks, forgetting all 
he had learnt, and fought independently, the orders of the officers 
being drowned in tumult and confusion. 
Kabul and Kandahar have also a few pieces of artillery, served 
by Afghans, who learned, to a certain extent, how to serve them 
during the occupation of Afghanistan by the British. 
* 
* Which receive pay.-Ferrier. 
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In  I-IERAT the army consists of 8,000 Af~lian Eorse. 
4,000 Hazarah EIorse. 
10,000 Parsivan Infantry,. 
-
Total 22,000 
Of the three Afghan princes the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan 
is the one who has placed the most confidence in his infantry, and 
he persists in keeping up this arm; notwithstanding the little favour 
with which it is viewed by the people, he has succeeded in forming 
eight battalions of 1000 men each. H e  accomplished this with the 
assistance of a Hindoo Mussulman, who had been a sergeant in the 
East India Company's service ; this man arrived at  Herat in 1829, 
and was killed in the last campaign which the Vizier undertook 
against the Hazarahs in 1847. In the organization and drill 
of these battalions there was much room for improvement, but 
they have done pretty good service. The Vizier, finding the 
Afghans ill adapted for making disciplined soldiers, recruited 
these corps from the Parsivans exclusively, and this released him 
from the esactions of the serdars of his principality, whom he 
managed with so much tact that he made it impossible for them 
to injure or even to disobey him. But if this plan had its advan- 
tages it had also its evils, for by i t  Yar Mohamed com~nitted the 
same fault that Marius did when he received slaves and freedmen - 
into the Roman army, and he prepared the way for much future 
embarrassment in Herat. The Parsivans are the conquered race, 
and their number is double that of the Afghans ; by putting arms 
in their hands, which they know how to use, Yar Mohamed Khan 
has restored to them their prestige and power. Any other chief 
but him would have already paid dearly for this imprudence, but 
his policy has been so clever that he attached to himself by the 
ties of gratitude a race that till then had never borne, but with 
impatience, the yoke of their cruel oppressors. I t  is probable that 
so long as he lives these battalions of Parsivan infantry will always 
be faithful to him, and give him their staunch support; but his 
vigilance is unequalled, and he always foresees, and with rare 
talent provides against, eventualities that might be fatal to him. 
The ordnance of the Vizier is conlposed of sixteen pieces of 
artillery, 6, 8, and 12-pounders, which are served by the infantry, 
who make but poor artillerymen. 
I n  the three Afghan principalities the chiefs are too numerous 
in proportion to the number of the troops they command, and that 
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is particularly the case in Herat. The  Vizier is aware of this, but 
could not avoid recompensing the brave soldiers who SO valiantly 
. 
! 
fought the army of Mohamed Shah, and afterwards supported him 
against Shah Kamran. Hence the superabundance of office*, even 
then but poorly rewarded, and having no permanent command. 
The pay of the contingents is given to the serdars by the sove- 
reign and is never fixed: i t  varies according to the influence these 
chiefs possess, and the number of men they can bring into the 
field. The tau due to the state is deducted from the pay when 
the serdar receives it, but it is rarely they distribute the whole to 
their soldiers-more than half remains. in their own hands, and 
they indemnify the men by small grants of land, right of pasturage, 
to work at  a trade, et cetem, and no notice is taken. 
Each Afghan is obliged to furnish his arms and horse at his own 
expense, for which reason they always take great. care of them. . 
T h e  princes of Afghanistan have not coined gold pieces ; those 
which are current in that co~mtry are t.he ducat of Russia and the 
tellah of Bokhara. The gold tomaun and the silver Icran of 
Persia are also in circulation, but a t  a depreciation of a tenth of 
their value, whereas that of the ducat and tellah is augmented in 
the same proportion. Small silver coins called djindelc are 
struck a t  Herat, in value about fourpence; and a t  Kandahar 
rupees, also of silver, and. of the value of a shilling. A t  Kabul the 
rupee is worth two shillings. 
There a re  two fictitious light coins current in the three principal , 
cities, called chahee and abbases; two chahees make one abbasee, and 
two abbasees a djindek or fourpence ; there are three Herat djindelts 
in  the ICandahar rupee, and two rupees of Randahar to one of 
Kabul. Fractions of the chahee and abbssee are represented by  a 
copper coin called pod or paiseh : its value is never fixed, and 
varies according to the abundance or scarcity that exists in the 
market a t  the time. This value is determined every three months 
by the sovereign .on the report made to him by the chief a.gent of 
police and the five principal merchants, who previous to the audi- 
ence consult their fellow merchants of the locality on the subject. 
There are from three to five pouls in a chahee according to circum- 
stances, but this copper coin has no currency except in the towns, 
where it is compulsory to receive it. The  country-people will not 
take it, or sell their provisions to the caravans and travellers, unless 
they obtain in exchange a piece of coarse cotton cloth manufactured 
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in the country, called kerbas, with which they make their clothes. 
They will not even receive silver money ; and if the purchaser 
has no cloth he must present them with some article that will be 
useful to them ; in the way of food there are only two things which 
they inquire for, viz. tea and sugar. 
In a country where the inhabitants are so idle and poor, every 
article naturally sells at  a very low price ; a man may live for two 
pence a day. The  following is the current value of the under- 
mentioned articles of first necessity in Afghanistan in the year 1845. 
I t  is strictly forbidden to make or drink wine a t  Kabul and 
Kandahar ; at Ilerat the contrary is the case, where Yar Mohamed 
has monopolized the right to make it, and this has brought him in 
a considerable profit by farming that right a t  a very high price to 
,' 
others. As to the consumption of it, he is one of the greatest wine- 
bibbers in that city or the principality. 
Everything, whether solid or liquid, is sold by weight in 
Afghanistan; the one which is generally used is the men or 
.batternen of Herat, which, as 1 have just stated, is of the weight of 
seven pounds. This is divided into 40 sirs, the sir into 20 mis- 
cabs, and the miscale into 24 nookoods. 
Cloth and manufactured articles are measured by the guez, 
which is 3 ft. 35 in. I t  is divided into 16 gui~eh  or knots, and 
one of these is subdivided into 4 nokteh or points. Though 
this is the only measure sanctioned by the government, it is 
rare that an Afghan will purchase cloth in the bazaar unless i t  
is measnred from the hand to the elbow, and more especially by 
his own, that is to say, from the elbow to the very extremity of the 
middle finger. 
The  Afghans who take any part in commercial affairs are very 
few in number ; they are principally the Babees, who live to the 
I south of Kandahar ; the rest nev,er occupy themselves in this way 
s. d .  
Bread .. the mcn oi Herat * 0 1$ 
Mutton 8 , 0 4d; 
Butter and fat I >  I 1 
Milk of various kinds ,, 0 1 
Fruit I I 0 1 
Rice 11 0 26 
* The ?nen of Herat is soven pounds of 'Afghanistan ; but  the sir is! less, aud 
Enghh-that  of Persia is only six, and meighs only sixteen nookoods.-Ferrier. 
divided in the same manner as the nlrn 
8 ,  d .  
Salt . . .. the men 0 O& 
Tobacco 1 0  
Wheat .. .. 200 lbs. 2 1 
Barley > I  1 8  
Indian corn * ,, 1 0  
Wine .. . . a battemen 0 5 
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or in any branch of industry ; they have in fact the greatest 
repugnance to every kind of occupation, and are only qualified 
either to make war or to plunder. 
Those who inhabit the towns are habitually in the employ of 
their wealthy countrymen, a n d .  the nomades or country people 
who have pasture or arable land never farm this themselves. 
Directly an Afghan receives a concession of land from his chief, 
he places it and a few oxen in the charge of a Parsivan, who 
tills, sows, and reaps it for him, and when the crops are housed 
he has a third of the produce for his trouble ; if they have flocks, 
the Parsivan is in like manner the shepherd ; and if the Afghan 
is overtaken by poverty, he procures as best he can a horse and 
arms, and sets o:t to plunder his neighbours. T h e  Parsivans in . 
the towns as well as in the villages are, as we have already stated, 
the industrial class ; all commercial affairs are in their hands, a11 
manufactures ; in a word, it is their activity and intelligence that 
support the country and those who govern it. The Afghans are 
incapable of imitating them ; they know only how to fight, and - 
live from hand to mouth, rarely making a competency when they 
. , have no public appointment ; but once invested wit,h the least 
power, they enrich themselves by every species of exaction. 
T o  the Parsivans must be added some few Hindoos, as forming 
part  of the commercial and industrious class, who are a t h c t e d  to 
the Afghan towns by the hope of gain ; they are here what the 
Jews are elsewhere, always ready to enter into commercial transac- 
tions, and evincing like the Israelites the same intelligence and 
activity in all their operations, displaying the same poverty-stricken 
appearance, and affecting great simplicity in their dress. Every- 
thing about them denotes the greatest humility, which does not 
however protect them from the contempt of the Afghans. Never- 
theless, that does not give them much concern, and they console 
themselves if i t  does by filling their strong box with Russian ducats 
or Bolrhara tellahs, and some of them are immensely rich. They 
are considered extremely honest in all business transactions, exact 
in fulfilling their engagements, and devoted to those to whom they 
have once attached tfiemselves. The very few Afghan merchants 
that are met with are, generally speaking, Sycds or descendants 
of the Prophet, who will not profane their holy origin by serving 
any master. These are especially employed in the somewhat 
unsaintly occupation of horse-dealing with t,he I-Iazarahs and 
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~urkomans.  They take these horses to Shilrapoor, and return 
from that town with English goods to Afghanistan. Their title of 
Syud smooths all the difficulties of their journeys, for they are 
venerated by the tribes, even those most addicted to pillage. It 
would be hazardous for Parsivans and Hindoos to undertake similar 
expedtiions and embark in an import and export trade, for they 
would be stripped before they had traversed half the road between 
Randahar and ,the Indus, they employ therefore these Syuds as 
their agents. . 
The mechanical arts of indispensable utility are but imperfectly 
known in Afghanistan : they manufacture inferior sabres, glass, 
delf, coarse cloths of goats' hair, called kourh, and others of camels' 
hair, called barek, of which they make their robes and cloc&a, and 
esport a pretty large quantity to Turkestan and Persia The 
kerbas, or coarse cotton 'cloth, is their principal article of manu- 
facture, and with it they make their shirk and trousers. At 
Herat, and there only, they raise and weave a little silk of a light 
texture, and dye it of a red colour : the women's chemises are made 
of this. A thick cloth, manufactured from the long coarse hair of 
the, camel and goat, is used by the nomades for their tents. 
Masonry, and carpenters' or joiners' work are pretty generally 
understood in this country; they also work tolerably well in 
leather ; and sheep-skins, with the wool on, are beautifully dressed 
a t  Kabul. This is done with considerable art, and the cloaks 
made with these skins, which are very handsome, have a great 
reputation all over Central Asia. I t  appears that their superior ' 
quality is to be attributed to the fact of their being prepared with 
t,he rind of the pomegranate, a fruit which grows with peculiar 
luxuriance near that city : workmen, who have established them- 
selves at  Kandahar, and a t  Herat, have not been able to obtain 
the same results with the pomegranates grown in those provinces 
as they did with the fruit of their native city. 
The Afghans purchase in Persia, Turkestan, and more especially 
in India, a number of articles of European manufacture, which 
they cannot do without, and which are not produced even in small 
quantities in their own country. Amongst these the following may 
be mentioned-metals, silk goods, cloth, muslins, woollen and 
cotton goods, particularly the latter, which they purchase in very 
large quantities, the lower and middle classes wearing scarcely 
anything else. Fowling-pieces and watches would find a ready 
Y 
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sale in Afghanistan ; t.hose that I saw there were generally speaking I 
of French manufacture,,anrl more in demand than the same articles 
of English makc. Delf, cutlery, spectacles, rich and heavy silk 
goods, woollen or cotton, for turbans and sashes for the waist, 
paper, and sugar might be imported with advantage. 
Afghanistan, Turkestan, and Persia are excellent markets for 
England and Russia, who have nearly monopolized the trade 
of those countries ; if France had a commercial treaty with 
Persia, she might hope to introduce several millions of francs of 
merchandize into Central Asia annually. The  Emir Dost Mo- 
hamed and Yar  Mohamed have endeavoured by every means in 
their power to encourage their subjects in manufacturing some of 
the articles which they require from European countries, and thus 
avoid the high prices a t  which they are obliged to purchase them, 
but on such subjects to speak to an Afghan or a deaf man is abso- 
lutely the same thing; the Parsivans responded more readily to this 
appeal, but they were very soon disgusted with the knowledge they 
acquired, for it. was only a source of misery to them : under one 
pretence or another the mealthy and powerful classes made them 
work for their benefit and without sufficient remunerstion. The 
best gunmalzer in Kandahar was incarcerat,ed in the fortress of 
Girishk by the Serdar Mohamed Sedilr Ehan, on the absurd 
pretext that he was born at  a village within his jurisdiction ; the 
khan gave this unfortunate artizan scarcely bread enough to eat, 
and the man eventually expired under the harsh treatment he 
received for llaving attempted to make a visit to his wife and 
children, who were living only ten hours' journey from Girishk. 
Foreign merchanclize arrives in Afghanistan by five different 
routes: the first is that from the west, which tmverses Persia by 
Teheran, and Meshed to I-lerat; the second is from Turkestan - 
on the north, by Bolthara, Mei-v; Moorghab to Herat ; the third, 
also from Turkestan, by Bolihara, Iiarcliy, Ballth, and Khuln~, to 
Kabul ; the fourth is the eastern one, from the Punjab by Lahore 
and Peshawur to Kabul ; and the fifth is that of the south from 
India by the Indus, Shikapoor, and Bolan, to I<andahar. 
T h e  revenue in Afghanistan varies according to the abundance 
of water which irrigates a locality, or the race of persons by whom 
i t  is inhabited. An Afghan, who thinks that any debt he owes 
his country is repaid by the fact of his arm being at her service, 
always finds some way of avoiding the payment of a portion of the 
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tax he owes his sovereign : but the Eimaks and Parsivans, \yho 
are regarded a.s a conquered people, think themselves fortunate if 
the collector takes only double of what they should legally pay ; 
altliough Mtissulmans (the greater part i t  is true are of the sect of 
Shiahs) they are obliged to pay the Icharadj, or capitation tax, 
called also ser khani.h, or house tax, from which- the Afghans 
are exempt. 
The following is a statement of the tax, not as it is collected, 
hut as it is fixed in the principalities of Herat and Kandahar. 
Though the Afghans are exempt from the humiliating tribute 
of the ser lrhankh, they pay under another name a contribution of 
two shillings for each tent or house. 
The Eimalts, or the nomade Beloochees, pay the contribution of 
the ser khan'eh, which amounts to forty-four djindeks, or fourteen 
shillings and eightpence for each family : orphans and widows are 
free of this impost. 
The  ser khansh is not paid under this name by the Par-' bwans 
and Hindoos living in towns, who are exempt by placing them- 
selves under the protection of some Afghan chief; but the sove- 
reign repays himself by the tax levied on their shops. 
A t  Herat Afghans and Parsivans, &c., pay an annual tax for 
the horses or other animals which they keep. For a camel and a 
mare, sixteen djindeks (five shillings and fourpence) ; for a cow, 
three djindeks and a half (one shilling) ; for an ewe or a she-goat, 
twenty abassees (or two pence) ; a he-goat or a sheep is free of tax. 
For all animals without distinction, whether male or female, a tenth 
of their value is paid when they are sold in the public market. 
In Icandahar the tax upon animals is only paid upon sheep a t  
sixpence a head ; the tax of n~eiclaw* is levied on all the other 
aliimals at  the rate of five per cent. 
I n  Kandahitr and in Herat it is only on cultivated land that 
taxes are levied; the sovereign takes as much of the crop as 
there was seed sown, and also eight djindeks (two shillings and 
eight pencej on the produce of ten battemens of' seed sown. 
Fruit gardens are taxed by the ten$, or cord, a t  ten shillings 
; this measure comprises a space sixty paces long on 
every side. Kitchen ga,rdens pay twelve shillings and sixpence 
per cord, When an Afghan proprietor or farmer lets his land to 
- -- 
* The duty upon sales.-Ferrier. 
Y 2 
a Parsivan, and furnishes seed, and oxen to work it, the former . 
claims four-fifths of the produce, and leaves one-fifth for his tenant. 
But when the Parsivan takes the land only, hc takes three-fifths, 
and gives two-fifths to the landlord. 
Having merely passed through the principality of Kabul, it was 
impossible for me to know positively how the taxes are levied there, 
but  the information I obtained by careful inquiry justifies me in 
supposing that it is nearly in the same manner as i n  Kandahar. 
I n  the eyes of an European these taxes appear trifling, but i t  
must be remembered that the smallest payment seems onerous to 
an Afghan; they work so little, and are therefore so poor, that 
they feel the want of the least thing that is taken from them, and 
every time they pay a tax they exclaim against what they call 
violence and tyranny. They might perhaps become reconciled to 
the impost if, after they had paid it, they were left in peace and 
. idleness to enjoy the fruits of their speculations or their rniscleeds, 
but they are subject to the exactions of subordinate agents, and 
that provokes them, though they pay less than the Parsivans and 
others. T h e  inhabitants of the country pay also another indirect 
tax, which, in proportion to their resources, is rather heavy, but i t  
does not seem oppressive to them, because it is engrafted on the 
manners of the nation: it is the hospitality they are bound to 
exercise towards travellers, of whom a great number are servants 
of the government. 
When the travellers are men of rank they have a long train 
of attendants, all of whonl the villages are obliged to feed, and 
also their horses; i t  is true they sometimes avoid extortion by 
concealing themselves if they have timely notice, but. they cannot 
often elude the vigilance of the head of the village, who almost 
always extracts something from them; this is violence and not 
hospitality a s  they like to practise it. 
A sa general rule, if an Afghan is obliged to work one month 
in  twelve h e  considers himself most unfortunate. The  re- 
pression of crime and levying a tax he designates as ztrlm, 
tyranny. T o  live in  perfect licence and never to be asked for 
anything is what he would call the proofs of a paternal govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, the heaviest demands are not made upon 
him ; the Parsivans, who are attached to the soil, obtain for their 
labour in cultivating it, only just so much as is necessary for the 
maintenance of themselves and their families. There is no 
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security for them unless they put themselves under the protection 
of an Afghan, and this protection costs them dear. Those who 
live in the towns are less oppressed than those in the countiy, but 
as they are the working part of the population, they are subject to 
a host of taxes direct and indirect which they have mucb difficulty 
in meeting the payment of, even when they are always in work. 
Tradesmen pay five pounds twelve shillings per annum, for 
pel;mission to open their shops. Those who expose their goods in 
front of their houses, such as attar, bakal, halva-j%rouchlm pay 
upon each shelf a sum fixed by the tax-gatherer, which varies 
according to the presumed profits of the merchant. Artificers 
like Aiefch-dooz, zine-dooz, zerguer, or Rliayat,t are obliged when 
they sell an article, and before they deliver it to the purchaser, to 
submit it to one of the inspectors, who perambulate the bazars, to 
receive the mark of the dagh,$ for which they pay a duty equal to 
one third of the value of the article sold. Workmen, that is, 
benna, nahal-bed, or nadjar§ are obliged to give to the government 
gratis, two days' work out of seven. I n  fact, every profession, 
every species of trade or commerce, is subject to taxation. A t  
Herat in particular, the meat-markets, soap-manufact,ories, copper- 
ware, and ironmongery trade, carpentry, the repairing of old fumi- 
ture and even shoes, and the carriage of water, are all monopolies. 
A t  Kabul, previously to 1839, the Parsivans were much better 
treated ; they did not pay more than two per cent. on their floc%s, 
and four per cent. on the harvest, like the Afghans ; but since the 
power of the Emir, Dost Mohamed Khan, has been hampered by 
the conduct of his sons, avaricious demands have greatly increased 
in that principality. 
In Kandahar extortion is yet more ra~npant than in Kabul. or 
Herat. T h e  people live in utter misery, and within the last ten years 
more than 100,000 of Kohendil Khan's subjects have emigrated. 
All merchandise entering Afghanistan pays duty as under :- 
At Hernt 5 per cent., but  with other exactions it may be calculated at  9 per ceut 
At Kmdahar 2f ,, I I  1 ,  , > 10 ,, 
AtKabul  2 4 , ,  >) P I  ) I  4 ,, 
Goods are exported from the three principalities fiee of 
customs duties, but they are subject, to the ba4,II viz. :- 
* Druggist. Grocer. Spice shop. I Stamp. 
t Shoemaker. Saddler. Goldsmith. 5 A mason. Blacksmith. Carpenter. 
Tailor. 1) Tar on transport.-Terrier. 
r. d. . 
.. A camel load, whether entering or leaving the country, p ,2~ . s . .  12 2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  A horse or mrde load 8 10 
. . . .  An ms load . . . . . .  . < . .  . .  .."i 
Every horse scnt to India for sale pays I I. 4s. 4d. to the chief of 
1Candaha.r when he leaves his territory. 
The  revenues of Afghanistan are :- 
In Herat XL'jd.000 and E24,000 in corn. 
In  Xaudahr 15,000 ,, Y?,000 ,, 
In Kabul 140,000 ,, 60,000 ,, 
Whoever looks only at  the amount of this revenue will never 
be able to form a correct opinion of its importance ; he must also 
understand the price of labour, of materials, of cereal and other 
products, of the requirements of the people, et cetera, he will then 
have an idea of the real value of' sums which appear so small. 
Under the system fdlowecl by the Afghan chiefs, these revennes 
covered all their expenses, and left them a very pretty profit. 
T h e  English, instead of following the same system, paying the 
officials regularly and on the same footing, and thus have 
satisfied every one, thought it necessary to increase the expenses 
which such a revenue was not able to meet; tllis was one of 
the principal reasons, that led to their disasters in that country, 
because every one had enjoyed the augmentation, and revolted 
when the t ime came for retrenchment. 
W e  have said that the minerals in the mountainous parts of 
Kabul and Kandahar are not worked. Yar Mohamed, of Herat, . 
saw better than either of his neighbours, the advantages which he 
possessed in this source of wealth, and has for some years past 
worked an  iron and a lead mine near his capital. The results, 
however, have been but moderate as to profit, owing to the 
ignorancc of the workmen, who are unacquainted with metallur- 
gical operations ;the silver is not properly extracted from the lead ; 
the iron can .be broken, and is as brittle as glass even when hot. 
T h e  Vizier is most anxious to increase his revenue by these mines ; 
he would like to establish cotton and woollen factories, also 
spinning machinery for cotton, silli, and wool ; to erect cannon 
foundries and small-arm manufactories, but in the Afghan style. 
Yar Mohamed would like to have all this without spending any 
money, and with the assistance of one man, who must be ac- 
, 
quainted with every department, and who would find by enchant- 
ment, in a country devoid of everything, all the machinery and 
tools requisite to carry out such projects. 
CHAP. XYIII. BRITISH LEAVE SHZKhPOOR. 
CHAPTER YXIII. 
English army leaves Shikapoor - March through the  Bolan pass -Kohendil 
Khan advances to meet i t  - Defection of the Afghan chiefs - Kohendil 
retires into Persio- Kandahur cnpitulntes - Assault and fall of Ghuznee - 
Dost Mohamed endeavours to negotiate, but  without success -The Emir 1ea1.e~ 
Kabul -The English enter the city - Restorat.ion of Shah Shooja-First 
disagreement .between him and the British - The latter interfere in t h e  
administration of the kingdom - Results of this-The priests are hostile t o  
the  invaders - Avaricious views of the English disappoiuted -Revenues of 
Afghanistan moderate in amount - Means employed to raise them - Shah 
Shooja demands the fulfilruent of the treaty - Refusal of the English - Hatred 
against them augmented - Religious proselytism - English connesio~ls with 
Afghan women -Revolts in the kingdom - The Dost at Bokhara-. Perseou- 
tions to which he is subject -Combat a t  IEarchy - Mohamed Shah threatens 
the  Usbek Emir- The Dost is  released - His perilous position near the Oxus 
-He tiles to Cher Sebz and Khulm- Returns to the province of Kabul - Con- 
flicts between the Dost and the  English-Deserted by his conutrymen - Sur- 
renders to the English-He is sent to India. 
WE must now return to the EIistory which was interrupted at  the 
close of the 20th chapter, the last incident mentioned being 
the concentration of a British force at  Shilrapoor. This army 
left that place early in March, and after passing Dadur, entered 
the mountains though which the road winds as far as Bolan, 
s distance of fifty-two miles, and thence leads to the great table- 
land of Central Asia, more than 5000 feet above the level of the 
sea. Notwithstanding the advantages which this defile afforded 
the Afgllans scarcely defended it. The English advanced without 
serious opposition, though two hundred men well posted might have 
annihilated them, distressed as they were by a painful march 
amidst the natural obstacles with which the pass is thickly beset at 
every step. A t  Dadur, oil this side the mountains, the thermometer 
stood a t  102' of Fahrenheit, while violent snowstorms fell heavily 
on the way-worn soldiers as they advanced dong the Bolan Pass. 
On the 24th of March, after eight days of a most harassing march 
from Shikapoor, the army having cleared the mountains, moved on 
towards Iimdahar. Kohendil Khan had ceased to intrigue against 
Dost Mohamed, and became on friendly terms with him, as he 
always did when threatened by serious danger. H e  had deter- 
mined upon shutting himself up in his capital till his brother of 
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Iiabul should arrive with reinforcenlents to his assistance, but the ' 
llost having been detained by a movement which the Sikhs had 
made in favour of the English on this side of Peshawur, Kohendil 
Iihan decided upon assembling all his contingents and marching to 
meet the enemy. However, he had scarcely reached the valley of 
Pisheen when the ranks of his army were thinned by numerous 
desertions. The Serdar I-Iadji Khan, Raukeree, was the first to 
pass over to Shah Shooja with five hundred picked horsemen ; this 
was the signal for the disorganisation of the Iiandaharian army, and 
Kohendil Iihan, and his brothers, despairing of then defending 
themselves and their families with success, determined upon flight. 
'J.'hey gained the Helmund, followed its course to lake Roustem, and 
entered Persia, where the Shah received them most kindly ; he 
bestowed upon them as a fief the little town of Sher-babek, situated 
between the provinces of Fan and Kerman, and gave them the reve- 
nues of the whole of that, district, amounting to 12,000 tomauns 
annually. The flight of the Prince of Kandahar was followed by 
the immediate subniission of the Serdars ZIadji Dost Mohamed 
Iihan, Isalrzye, Habib Ullah Khan, Surkanee, Perstalab Khan, 
Noorzye, Ramazan Khan, Ghildjzye, Akhter Khan Alizye, Ser 
Firaz Khan Isakzye, &c. k c . ,  who brought with them a detach- 
ment of horse to Shah Shooja, and his cause might from that hour 
be looked upon as  triumphant in Afghanistan. 
The British Army thus took possession of Kandahar without 
opposition, and the King and General Sir John Keane made 
their public entry into that city on the 20th of April. ShahShooja, 
a s  if conscious that his claim to the throne was not very legitimate, 
was crowned in the mosque of Ahmed Shah on the 8th of May, 
1839, hoping by that ceremony to render his claim more important 
i n  the eyes of the Afgl:ans. After naming his son Timoor nlirza 
governor of the city, the King and the Army marched on the 27th 
of, June, in the direction of Ghuznee. 
"This  town," says Mr. Sumner, " is about one hundred and sixty 
miles from ICandahar, and sixty-eight from Kabul : although ten 
days ought to have Been sufficient to reach Ghuznee it was not till 
the 2 1st of July that Sir John Keane arrived before that fortress. 
T h e  march of the troops had been much impeded by the difficulties 
of the road, the great number of camels, and the crowd of camp 
followers, more numerous even than the soldiers, but no resistance 
wort,hy of remark opposed the progress of the army. 
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" I t  had been supposed that the town of Ghuznee was not fortified, 
it is, however, surrounded by a wall and a ditch. To  attack it with 
the few light field-guns that the Anglo-Indian army had with i t  was 
impossible, but one of the gates was destroyed with gunpowder in 
the course of the second night, and on the 23rd of July a fierce 
combat took place i11 the streets of the town, in which the English lost 
two hundred-men. The Afghan garrison, numbering 2500, fought 
with unexpected energy,-it is stated that almost all the dead 
were pierced by the bayonet, and very few received gun-shot 
wounds. Nevertheless, the Afghans were vanquished, and Gholam 
Haidar Khan, one of the sons of Dost Mohamed, who commanded, 
was taken prisoner; Shnh Shooja wished to put him to death, and 
the English had the greatest difficulty in making him renounce his 
inten tion." 
Notwithstanding the defection which had so seriously ~ e a k e n e d  
the army of Kabul, Dost Mohamed would not abandon his kingdom 
without trying the fortune of war, and he marched a t  the head of 
the few followers who remained faithful to him, about 6000 men, 
with his artillery, to meet the British Army ; but having at  the 
second halt heard of the fall of Ghumee, he sent his brother the 
Nawab Djnbbnr Khan, as ambassador to Sir William McNaghten, 
the British Commissioner, to negotiate with Shah Shooja. The  
Afghans reproached the Nawab with being too warm a partizan of 
the English, with whom he had for some time kept up a continuous 
intercourse ; but as he was of a conciliatory disposition and generally 
appealed to as peace-maker in the quarrels between his brotl~ers, as 
well as those between the serdars of the different tribes, this partiality 
was overlooked. The Dost could not have made a better choice of a 
negotiator with his adversaries, to whom he proposed that he should 
accept a post under Shah Shooja, analogous to that which his brother 
Fethi Khan had held under the Shnh Mahmood, that is to say 
Prime Minister. He also demanded the restoration of his third son 
Haidar Khan and his wives, who had been made prisoners a t  Ghuz- 
nee, and consented to submit on these two conditions ; but they 
were rejected. The Nawab met with an icy reception in the 
English camp, almost insulting, and returned full of hatred for 
those who, but a few days before, held the first place in his esteem. 
The Emir retraced his steps when he heard the result of his last 
conciliatory offer, and gave up the idea of making head against 
the invading army with so small a force as his own, the greater 
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part of which were demoralized,-moreover, he could only expect 
fresh defections. H e  macle, therefore, but a short stay in Kabrrl, 
and abandoning that city retired beyond the Hindoo Koosh 
into the dominions of the Emir of Bolchnra, accompanied by his 
family and three lmidred and fifty devoted adherents. ,4s soon 
as  he mas gone, Abdullah Khan, Etcheltzye, Aziz Khan, Ghildjzye, 
Emin Ullah Khan, Logheree, and Khan Shireen Khan, Kuzzil- 
bash, who might still have created fresh difficulties for the English, 
and caused them coasiderable loss in their attack upon Kabul, now 
openly espoused the party of the invaders and made their submission. 
The  Anglo-Indian army entered that city without opposition on 
the 7th of August, 1839, and proclaimed the definitive re-establish- 
ment in power of Shah Shooja-001-Moollr. The  General-in-Chief 
had hoped to take Dost Mohamed prisoner, but finding that 
he had escaped he sent Colonel Outram nith one hundred and 
fifty British cavalry, and seven hundred Afghan horse, commanded 
by Hadji Khan, Raukeree, in pursuit. On the 21st of August 
they had nearly attained their object, for they were but fourteen 
miles from the fugitive Emir, but having received secret intelligence 
of this by a messenger from FIadji Khan, he made a forced march, 
and escaped the danger that threatened him. Before he could re& 
IShulm he had to repulse several attacks of the I-Iazarah Deh 
Zinguis, who had already felt the power of English influence, and 
his lit& escort was reduced to half its number by the time he 
arrived a t  Ballth. His first intention had been to gain Persia, but 
the Emir Nasser Ullah Khan Bahadoor having despatched a mes- 
senger to offer him shelter in his domiuions, he delayed his journey 
to Teheran, and went direct to the court of the Usbek Emir. 
Shah Shooja, replaced on the throne of his fathers, was soon 
surrounded by the greater part of the Afghan serdars, and with the 
exception of some partial outbreaks of little importance, haxl reason 
to consider himself firmly seated on the musnud. This result was 
due to the conciliatory conduct that he a t  first manifested, and 
his good understanding with the English; but he only acted 
thus from an apprehension that Dost Mohamed might be near 
at hand, for as soon as he knew that that chief had arrived at  
Bolthara, he wished to exercise the sovereign authority to the 
exclusion of his protectors. They, on the contrary, had determined 
to leave him nothing but the semblance of it-and Sir T;V. 
McXaghten directed everything. H e  gave all his orders through 
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the Shah, who every morning repeated, a t  his durbar, the lesson he 
had received 011 the previous evening from the British Commissioner. 
The serdars were too clear-sighted not to perceive this, and they 
expressed their disgust in strong terms at all times, and in all 
places. The English, though affronted at this freedom of speech, 
dared not openly repress it, lest their own interference in the 
Government should become too manifest, but they revenged them- 
stlves by noting the chiefs that were rebellious in their eyes, and in 
this way created a great deal of discontent. 
Notwithstanding the smothered displeasure that prevailed, the 
English fancied themselves firmly established in the country, and 
sent back part of their army to India. They determined also at  
once, and without the least consideration for the Afghans, to 
introduce those administrative reforms which they had established 
in their Indian possessions, where all had been done progres- 
sively and without wounding the prejudices of a population, far 
more timid and more easy to manage than the Afghans. I t  is true 
that in  Afghanistan they put native officers at  the head of the 
different departments, but they were there like puppets, having no 
liberty of action and only following blindly the directions of a 
British officer, who was associated with them. I n  doing this, Sir W. 
M'Naghten appeared to be guided by the remernbmnce of what , 
Mir Mahlnood the Ghilcljzye had done when he established his 
government in Persia ; but Sii. William forgot, or overlooked, the 
point that the in placing with his ofiicials others more enlightened 
than themselves, selected the former from among the Persians, a 
servile people alvays accustomed to bend to a conqueror, while the 
English officers on the contrary thrust their own will upon the Afghan 
functionaries, which was a very different condition of aflairs. The 
plan failed and brought into general contempt with their country- 
men those natives who accepted office under such circumstances. 
This system gradually disturbed the good understanding existing 
between Shah Shooja and the English ; they wishcd to be masters, 
but wanted the courage to act openly, and yet they would not 
leave the Icing to his own ideas of Government : they were 
apparently neutral, and still had the presumption to m u  themselves 
up in everything. This bastard system alienated from them both 
the people and the court ; the Shah testified his great displeasure at 
it, and a t  last connteracted evcry measure that originated with the 
English. For example, Sir Alexander Burnes, who had bcen 
appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the of Kabul, had establishec! 
a new and reduced tariff for the lnerchandize imported into Afghan- 
istan, but Shah Shooja seeing that this was done simply with a view 
of encouraging the interests of British commerce, secretly authorised 
his agents to levy higher duties than those which had becn deter- 
mined on. The  injured merchants complained to the English, by 
whom they were referred to the Minister of the Shah, and this officer 
gave them the bastinado for appealing for justice to strangers before 
they had applied to the Royal Government. At  length an almost 
open rupture took place between Mollah Chekkar, the Shah's Prime 
Minister, and Sir W. MLNaghten. A party had bcen formed by 
the Vizier with the hope of withdrawing the Shah fi-om the influence 
of the British, and this party cared not ill the least to conceal or 
dissimulate its intentions. Sir W. M'Naghten and Sir A. Burnes 
were made aware of its existence, but they despised the information 
they received on all sides, and when their partisans endeavoured to 
make them see the extremities to which impunity would encourage 
the Afghans, they answered in the famous words of the Duc de 
Guise, "they dare not." The result proved that these gentlemen 
were no nearer right than was the Duc de Guise. 
T h e  Afghans, little initiated in the intricacies of politics, and not 
as yet completely experienced in the duplicity of the government of 
Calcutta, remembered the article in the treaty that Lord Auckland 
had concluded with their king, which stipulated that as soon as 
Shah Shooja was$rmly established on his throne, the Anglo-Indian 
army should repass the Indus. This word "jrmly"  gave him, it is 
true, a great latitude, but it was not thus that the Afghans had 
interpreted it ; and they were impatient for the hour that should rid 
them of their protectors. 
The uneasiness at length became general, and confidence existed 
amongst the English only. The Afghans anticipated a catastrophe, 
and the agitation, at first confined to the towns, soon spread into the 
country. The  Mollahs would no longer recite the " Khoutbe" (or 
prayer for the King) in the Mosques, alleging that they could only 
do so for an independent sovereign, and that Shah Shooja was not 
independent. On the other hand, the maintenance of the British . 
army had nearly exhausted the provinces, all the necessaries of life 
had quadrupled in price, and a cry of distress was raised every- 
where. I n  vain did the Vizier publish an order placing the sale of 
provisions on the old footing and forbid monopoly ; no one paid any 
attention to his injunctions. The Shah therefore found himself 
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obliged to arrest the monopolists, whose corn was re-sold a t  the 
tariff price, and by public auction. The English were ill-judged 
enough to interfere in their favor, which increased the irritation 
amongst the people, and they were accused of wishing to create a 
famine. I t  was in vain that they distributed food gratis to the 
necessitous, the populace valued not this concession as proceeding 
from charity ; that virtue is practised in a different manner by the 
Afghans, and the English lost more than they gained by granting 
benefits 'to one class only, and with an appearance of such 
method and calculation so totally foreign to Afghan habits. T h e  
deplorable. mania which the English have for scatterin0 gold by ? handfuls in Asiatic countries, without any reason for doip~g so other 
than to gratify an useless pride, and for valuing things only because 
they are expensive, created for them in this instance one of the 
most formidable difficulties they have ever had to encounter. T h e  
officers were prodigal in their personal expenditure, and that depre- 
ciated the value of money ; the British Commissjoner had obliged 
the King to give his officers, civil and ~nilitary, as much pay for 
a month as they had hitherto received for a year ; and that without 
having previously ascertained that the revenues of the country 
would admit of his so doing. I t  is true the English had calculated 
on an excess of receipts consequent upon the regularity of their 
administration, and an amount of revenue founded upon the informa- 
tion given by Shah Shooja when he was a t  Loocliana. But in that 
as  on many other occasions they were wrong in not remembering 
the maxim of Machiavelli, " that it is dangerous and i~nprudent 
to undertake an expedition upon the representations and hopes 
of exiles." The English also paid for every species of labour, 
tenfold what the Afghans had ever received before, so that all the 
workmen were glad to be employed on the fortifications, or other- 
wise occupied by the English, and hands were therefore soon 
wanting to till the ground. Shah Shooja, even, could not obtain 
the men that he required, because he could not pay them on this 
footing, and he was therefore obliged to overwork the labourers 
who were engaged in the repairs of his own palac,e, and to pay , 
them the ordinary wages of the country. But here the English 
meddled again, and signified to the Vizier, that if those who corn- 
plained were not satisfied, and paid according to the English tariff, 
they should pay them themselves, and place-the sum to the Shah's 
account. This new and insulting injunction irritated the Shah to 
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the last degree, and from that momcnt he seemed to be indifferent 
whether or not he mas on good terms with his protectors ; he even 
earnestly required of them the promised evacuation of his do- 
minions. But Sir W. M6Naghten ref~lsed to comply with this 
demand, objecting, that he could not be" firmly " seated on his 
throne while Dost Mohamed remained a t  liberty, and ,that the 
English could not leave him without support as long as there was 
n chance of the return of that chief. Shah Shooja, forced rather 
than convinced, resigned himself to their tutelage ; but his reite- 
rated complaints created in his subjects the most hostile feelings 
against the English, and their exasperation broke through all 
bounds when the people saw that the invaders considered the' 
Afghans incapable of serving them, and found themselves super- 
seded by Hazarahs and Yarsivans who 11p to that time had 
been looked upon as a conquered people. Perhaps the English 
were not wrong in having a better opinion of these descendants 
of the Persian colonists, but such a step shodd only have been 
taken with the greatest prudence, gradually, and after they had 
become perfectly established in the country. Another el-ror 
was their constant habit of threatening to send some of the 
restless chiefs to India, and not carrying out the menace. This 
might possibly have prevented the development of the revolt in 
which they were overwhelmed at a later period. The Afghans 
have little or none of that fceling which we understand by the 
word patriotism, for they are quite indifferent as to which or how 
many of their tribes may be subdued, provided their own is in the 
enjoyment of personal freedom ; but this indifference as to who 
governs them, is accompanied in each indiviclual by a deep 
attachment to his own tribe. T h e  repeated threats, therefore, of 
separation from them created serious alarm, and these fears heing 
worked upon by the partisans of Dost Mohamed, inspired a still 
greater distrust and hatred of the English : who never looked with 
the least anxiety a t  these various indications of approaching 
trouble, but slept on in perfect tranquillity. 
While they were reforming the administration, their missionaries 
attempted to meddle in religion also, and distributed everywhere 
the Bible translated into Persiau-a proselytism that uras more 
injurious than profitable to them. Previously to the time a t  which 
the English entered Afghanistan, the inhabitants might have been 
considered as the least fanatical of any people professing Jslamism 
--but as a set-off, they are the most covetous upon earth, and the 
result was that the women soon gave themselves up to the English 
for money, even with tbe knowledge of their husbands ; fathers 
and brothers sold their daughters and sisters, and it was a novel 
spectacle to see Christians become the legitimate husbands of Ma- 
homedan wives, for many officers were legally married to Afghaa 
women. The Mollahs did not omit to rouse the anger of the 
faithful, against this tendency to encroach upon their religion, and 
they excited on all sides a fanaticism which manifested itself in the 
provinces by assassination and partial revolt. Colonel Herring was 
murdered a t  Ghuznee, and it was only with great difficulty that 
Colonel Orchard and Major Mac Gregor quelled a seditious move- 
ment excited by a certain Syud Kassem. The Ibrtress of Kelat-i- 
Gliildjzye also rose against the authority of Shah Shooja, or ratlier 
the English, and the circumstance that led to this was one of' 
the unnecessary acts of rigour, of which they are so often guilty 
in Asia. 
Lieutenant Lynch, one of the political agents in Afghanistan, 
. made a military reconnaissauce on the side of Icelat-i-Ghildjzye 
and summoned the inhabitants to open the gates of their fort to him. 
The commandant was one of those men who were tired of the ascend- 
ancy so arrogantly maintained over their sovereign by hie foreign 
dly, and replied that he should do as Lieutenant Lynch demancled 
as soon as he showed him an order from Shah Shooja, or his son 
Timoor Mirza, and that in the mean time he would visit him the 
nest morning as a friend. Lieutenant Lynch was not satisfied with 
this answer, and without further negotiation demolished his fortress 
with his artillery, and the chief and many of the garrison lost their 
lives. The  survivors, who were of the Ghildjzye tribe, bent for a 
time to the storm, but as soon as the opportunity presented itself, 
they took their revenge by massacring all the English that fell 
into their hands. A detachment under Major Clibborne was cut up 
in the south, and that officer lost his life. The Serdar Alcter Khan, 
Alizye, who had raised a small body of troops of 1& tribe in the 
district of Zemindavar, held the English in check in that quarter, 
and Yar Moha~ned Khan secretly sent him reinforcements, for 
though the English paid him large sums of money the discontented 
Afghans always found help and shelter in his dominions. 
In  the midst of these serious difficulties the British mere surprised 
by fresh troubles, the Emir Dost Mohamed re-appeared in arms 
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on the northern fi-ontier, and there was not a moment to be lost in 
preparing to meet the storm. 
The Emir of Bokhara had received the fugitive Prince and his 
family in a suitable manner when he arrived in his capital, and 
allotted a daily sum for their maintenance, but from that conduct 
five or sis days after, it became evident that his offer of an asylum 
mas intended to dram them into a snare, for their allowance was 
stopped and the Dost was left to his own resources. This indiffer- 
ence to misfortune, so foreign to the Mussulman ideas of hospitality, 
was followed by aggravated insults. 
The  greater number of Dost Mohamed's sons accompanied him - 
to Bolrhara, and the youngest, Sultan Djan, who was remarkable 
for his personal beauty and graceful and distinguished manners, 
attracted the attention of the Emir Nasser Ullah. This monster 
was addicted to the most horrible of Eastern propensities, and one 
day sent an  officer to the Dost's house to bring Sultan Djan to t,he 
palace. His  father, however, well acquainted with the Uzbek 
Emir's character, refused to let him go, and immediately ordered the 
lad, accompanied by his second son Alrbar Khan and one.hundred 
Afghan horse, to leave Bokhara. They did so, but were soon pur- 
sued, and after a desperate encounter near Larchy, in which the 
Afghans lost two-thirds of their party, the remainder were obliged 
to lay down their arms. The two brothers were then brought back 
prisoners to Bokhara, and it is unnecessary to say what was the 
fate of the youngest a t  the hands of Nasser Ullah. 
T h e  position of the Emir Dost Mohamed had now become most 
distressing ; he had every day to repulse some new demand from 
his tyrant ; his life even was in danger, for Nasser Ullah Khan, 
besides his hereditary hatred to the Afghans, wished to make 
himself popular in the eyes of the English by showing hostility 
to the Emir of Kabul, as they might some day enter his own 
dominions. His  messengers were frequently crossing those of 
Shah Shooja, and the two monarchs had concerted together one 
of those vile plots by mecans of which Asiatics so frequently 
endeavour to effect their objects, when the Shah of Persia wrote to 
Nasser Ullah Khan and informed him that he should hold him 
responsible for any evil that might befall the Dost, whom he declared 
he had taken under his own special protection. The Shah also 
enjoined him to set that chief and his family at  liberty, in order 
that he might make tt pilgrimage to Mecca, as he had expressed his 
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intention of doing, and conchded by signifying to the Emir of 
Bokhara his royal determination of making war upon him if he 
did not coinply with his injunctions. 
Nasser Ullah, afraid openly to manifest his indignation against 
the Shah of Persia, allowed the Dost to leave Bokhara; but 
he was even then actually planning the death of this unfortunate 
chief, and taking measures to make i t  appear the result of acci- 
dent. Before the. departure of the Dost he sent a man to the 
banks of the Oxus who, in concert with the ferryman, was ordered 
to upset the boat, and take care that the Emir should never 
reach the.shore alive. 
Happily, an indiscreet remark of the wretch intrusted with this 
detestable commission made the Dost, when he reached the banks 
of the river, suspicious of some lurking danger; and a caravan 
fi-om the south travelling to Samarcand coming up at the time, he 
succeeded in escaping with it, disguised and in a litter, and thus 
eluded the vigilance of the authorities of Bokhara. His wives 
had left that city after him, and, having sent a messenger to 
desire them to alter their route, they rejoined him seven miles from 
. . Samarcand, which place he did not think it prudent to enter. Here, 
however, he took off the female attire in which he had escaped, 
mounted a horse, and proceeded to ask hospitality of the Khan of 
Cher Sebz, who generously granted it, but for a brief space only, for, 
though this Khan detested the Emir of Bokhara, he headed  his 
power. Alarmed therefore a t  his threats, and command to put 
Dost Mohamed and his sons to death, on pain of being deprived 
of his Khanat, he secretly sent away his guest, furnishing him 
with the means of reaching Khulm. Mir Walee, the chief of this 
province, was by no means easy at  the approach of the English, who 
had already reached Bamian, and he had made warlike preparations 
to receive them. The moment of the Dost's arrival could not 
have been more propitious, for the partisans of the Emir had suc- 
ceeded in agitating Kohistan, of which the population refused to 
obey the orders, emanating in appearance from Shah Shooja, but 
really from the English. Discontent was general in the other 
Afghan provinces, and if the orders of the latter were still acted 
upon it was feebly and with repugnance on the part of the offi- 
cials, though they were active enough when they saw a chance of 
committing some extortion that might prove a benefit to themselves. \ 
Sir W. McNaghten knew not what to do, nor whom to trust-for 
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those Afghans who did not betray him were indifferent to the 
disaffection that existed and the progress of revolt: he gave 
ordew, and revoked them almost as soon as given; and a t  last 
determined on rigorous measures, hoping thereby to eradicate the 
evil. I n  doing this he made several arrests of very doubtful 
legality, and missed the real culprits, who were most of them 
about the person of Shah Shooja 
Hadji Khan, Kaukeree, the first of the Afghan chiefs who 
joined the ~ n i l i s h ,  was arrested and sent to India, for showing too 
much independence, and being suspected of having pursued the 
Dost too leisurely in  order to give him time to escape. Two other 
Ghiidjzye serdars, Abcl el Rahman Khan and Mahme, who had - 
taken refuge with the Sikhs, were, contrary to all the laws of 
hospitality, given up to the English, and also sent to India. I n  
Kandahar severity was pushed to its utmost limits ; Akrem Khan; 
Noorzye, convicted of having taken up arms against the invade~s 
of his country, was arrested, and blown from a gun. I-Iadji Dost 
Mohamed Khan, Izakzye, died almost at  the same time in the 
prison of ICaudahar, and the people, ever suspicious, believed, though 
i t  was never proved, that he had been poisoned. Such was the 
position of affairs when the Walee of Khulm and Dost Mohamed 
took the field. On the 30th of August, Mir Efzel Khan, eldest 
son of the Emir and commander of the advanced guard of Usbek 
Afghans, attacked the British post at Badjguiah, but did not 
succeed, and he fell back upon the main body of the =my. Dost 
Mohamed waited a few days'longer, and on the 18th of September 
accepted the offer of battle given him by Colonel Denny, and he 
likewise was unsuccessful; after which the Usbeks retired alto- 
gether. This check, however, did not daunt the Emir, who withdrew 
into Kohistan, where the majority of the chiefs declared for him, and 
their men, added to those who joined him a t  IChulm, still presented 
a n  effective force of 6000 troops ; other reinforcements from various 
districts also came and ranged themselves under his standard, but 
Sir W. M'Naghten cooled their ardour for the cause of their ancient 
chief by lavishly distributing gold amongst the hostile tribes. 'The 
Dost and his companions, who well knew the power of this touch- 
- stone of honesty over the mind of an Afghan, were alarmed a t  the 
result of such prodigality, and it was almost with hesita- 
tion that on November 2nd, ld39, he engaged General Sale and 
Prince Fethi Djing, second son of Shah Shooja, at  Fervaneh Derreh, 
CXAP. XSIII. SURRENDER OF THE DOST. 333 
The Dost's soldiers performed prodigies of vdour, and the 2nd 
Regiment of Bengal Regular Cavalry wavered and fled before 
a charge of eighty Afghans, led by the Emir himself, who broke 
them at the onset, and then engaged the infantry, upon whom he 
inflicted considerable loss, especially in officers. The advantage 
of the day remained with the Dost, and the Anglo-Indian army 
would have been completely beaten had they renewed the combat 
on the morrow, but success being doubtful they determined to 
conquer with gold ; their agents entered the camp of the Emir, 
and manceuvred so well and so quickly, that he only escaped death at  
the hands of his own mutinous troops by a rapid flight, in which he 
was accompanied by a few brave men who remained faithful to him. 
Dost Mohamed now retired to the mountains, and wandered 
amongst them for some time ; his partisans, who were gradually 
detached from his falling fortunes by English bribes, and being 
also little inclined to face the hard winter in the hills, returned to 
their homes. Their noble chief was a t  length utterly abandoned, 
and had much to suffer from privation and the rigour of the season ; 
but this was not all,-he found himself hunted by parties of 
Afghans, who hoped to receive a large recompence for betraying 
him to his enemies, and this led to the resolution which he finally 
took of placing himself in their hands. 
On the 4th of November, 1840, he went almost done under the 
walls of Kabul, and, taking advantage of an accidental meeting 
with Sir W. M'Naghten to make his submission, he gave up his 
sword to the envoy, declaring at  the same time who he was. 
T h e  E ~ ~ g l i s h  diplomatist immediately returned it, which mark of 
respect gratified the Emir exceedingly, and they rode into Kabul 
together. Dost Mohamed was honourably treated while he remained 
in his own capital, and was afterwards sent to India with his 
wives, where he was pensioned, and carefully guarded by the 
political agents of the East India Company; his sons, whom he 
had left in Afqhanistan, soon joined him in his exile, with the 
exception of Akbar Khan. 
T;Ve have seen that this chief was taken prisoner by the Bokha- 
I +ns after having sustained a bloody combat with them at Karchy. 
On his return to Bokhara he was imprisoned by order of Nasser 
U]l& Khan, and was consequently prevented from leaving it 
with his father. But a short time after the flight of the latter 
the surveillance to which he was subjected was relaxed, and 
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having succeeded in making his escape he reached Cher Sebz : but 
the Khan of that place, a h i d  to grant him an asylum for the same 
reasons that prevented him from sheltering his father, gave him 
an escort of two horsemen as far as Khulm, where the Walee 
received the fugitive, and set-era1 of his dependents who joined 
him there. 
Notwithstanding the strict match that was kept over him, Dost 
Mohamed was treated vith great consideration and respect by 
Lord Aucltland, who, wishing to give him a clear idea of the 
British power in India, took him over all the arsenals, magazines, 
dockyards, &c., at  Calcutta. The Emir was completely amazed - 
at a 1  he saw, and expressed the conviction that afterwards he 
often repeated to his sons when they wished him to make mar 
with the English, that they were " invincible, and would some . 
day be the masters of the world." After several months' residence 
at Calcutta the Dost fell ill from the effects of the climate of 
Bengal, when he sought and obtained permission to join his family 
a t  Loodiana.--Subsequently he was allowed to settle in the moun- 
tains, the air of which was more favourable to his health. 
CHAP. XXIV. DEMANDS OF SHAH SHOOJA. 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
Shah Shooja demands the evacuation of hie country by the English-Their 
refusal - Forgery of letters -The invnders impose a vizier on Sbnh Shooja- 
Unjustifiable acts of this functionary - Complnints of the Afghan chiefs to 
Shah Shooja- The Ring conspires with them against the English - Abdullah 
Khan at  the head of the conspirators -Carelessness of the English - Subsidies 
to chiefs reduced-Revolt of the Ghildjzyes-General Sale marches against 
them- Is obliged to retire into Jellalabad-Feeling of security in the English 
-Insurrection in the provinces - Revolt at ICabul - Attack on Sir A. Eurnes's 
house - Assassination of that officer -The English are driven from the city 
-Bad defensive position taken by  them -Commissariat stores pillaged 
- Death of Abdullah Khan - Zeman Khan proclaimed King -Continual 
fighting - Weakness of General Elphinstone - Conduct of the 44th Regiment 
-Suspension of arms - Akbar Khan returns to Kabul - Indecision of the 
English - Events in the provinces- Plan of retreat abandoned -Embanass- 
ment of Sir W. M'Nqhten - Suspicions of the Afghans - Meeting between the 
resident and Akbar Khan - Assassination of the former --Major Pottiiger - 
Treaty with Akbar Khan - The English retreat - Akbar Khan unmasked - 
The English deliver up hostages to  him - English army annihilated - Akbar 
Khan besieges Jelldabad-Transactions between Shah Shooja and Zernan 
Khan -The King is assnssinnted - Character of that sovereign. 
AFTER the submission of the Emir, Shah Shooja, thinking the 
English had no further plausible motive for refusing to evacuate 
Afghanistan, inasmuch as the tranquillity of the country could not 
be disturbed by any pretender to the throne, demanded for the 
second time the fulfilment of the treaty; but, on various pre- 
tences, they again rejected this demand, and continued t,o carry 
out those injudicious reforms which had already alienated so many 
from their party. I t  might have been supposed that they were 
striving to destroy their own influence by adopting measures so 
false and ill adapted to the objects they had in view; every day 
tliey in some manner wounded the self-love and disappointed the 
avarice of the Afghans, and expected them to change abruptly the 
habits, customs, and ideas that had existed amongst them for' ages 
past-indeed, they endeavoured to make them do so. 
I n  a country so recently conquered, and on which a new 
sovereign had been forced, the opposition must, of necessity, be. 
FORGERY OF LETTEES. 
obstinate ; the wisest policy would, therefore, have been to attach 
the people to them by kindness, to throw, if possible, a veil over 
the past, and, above all, to be indulgent to minor oBences. The 
British did just the reverse in Afghanistan. 
After his flight to Bokhara, Dost Mohamed continued to cor- 
respond with the Afghan serdars that surrounded Shah Shooja, and 
he kept all their letters ; these were found in a little bag on t.he 
field f t e r  the battle' of Pervaneh and given to the English, who 
talked of this discovery, and threatened to make use of them against 
the chiefs whom they compromised and who were far from docile 
under their rule. But this indiscreet conduct brought about a result 
very different from what they intended, for the serdars who were 
hostile to them, and who were afraid of being sent to join Hadji 
Khan, Kaukeree, in India, held aloof, and, to prevent any surprise 
on the part of their conquerors, surrounded themselves with their 
follotveis, always appearing in public attended by an escort ready to 
fight ; this warlike attitude was almost a challenge to their adver- 
saries, who scarcely dared to accept it. T h e  English, moreover, 
drew upon themselves the resentment of those who up to that 
time had been devoted to their cause, by recompensing the indi- 
viduals that delivered this packet of pretended letters, the con- 
tents of which were, in truth, the fabrications of some artful and 
avaricious intriguers-a fact that was proved in the sequel. 
Shah Shooja profited by the errors of the English to alienate the 
minds of the Afghans from them, and to strengthen his own party ; 
his vizier, Mollah Chekker, was the soul of all his intrigues, and 
cared so little to spare the protectors of his sovereign, that in 
several instances they were able to prove his hostile intentions, and 
eventually demanded his dismissal. 
T h e  king resisted to the utmost of his power, but was at last 
obliged to accept a vizier of their choice ; and the Nizam ed Dooulet, 
the new minister, who consulted his master simply as a matter of 
form, entirely followed the instructions he  received from the 
English. This miserable wretch, finding himself supported by them, 
committed spoliations and exactions of every kind, and was guilty 
of many acts of tyranny; those whom he plundered sometimes 
found the means of bringing their complaints before the king ; but 
Shah Shooja informed them that he could do nothing, being him- 
self a slave. Sir W. MLNaghten was far from approving of the 
I 
vizier's conduct; but having himself made him minister, he could 
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not immediately degrade him. To  these causes of discontent and 
anxiety was soon added a still greater one. 
The Directors of the East India Company, who have a habit of 
judging of the value of a conquest only by the revenue it produces, 
were more disappointed than can be described a't the deficit which 
the expedition of Afghanistan had occasioned in their treasury. 
They, therefore, ordered a rigid economy to be practised in the 
Shah's army, and these instructions were carried out by the British 
officers with more or less intelligence. Chiefs, whom it mould 
have bee11 wise in the government to conciliate, found themselves 
deprived of their subsidies ; those of others were considerably 
reduced, and, at the  same time that the pecuniary interests of the 
Afghans were attacked, several Hazarah and I<uzzilbash chiefs 
received fresh proofs of favour, which irritated the Afghans to the 
highest degree. 
Towards the end of September 'the serdars met in Kabul and 
laid their grievances before Shah Shooja, who could only reply that 
his power as a king was a fiction, that it was impossible for him to 
do them justice, and added-" I t  is your own fault that I have 
fallen thus low; you have abandoned me to the good pleasure 
of the English ; had there been one man of spirit amongst you, he 
woulcl soon have delivered me from this shameful state of depen- d 
dence." These words were not uttered in vain. Amongst the 
serdars present at the durbar was Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye 
(branch of the Barulrzyes), a chief of energy and resolution, who 
stood forward and offered to be that man. I n  the afternoon 
of the same day he met the Shah in secret conference in the 
garden of his palace, and there a revolt, which was to be post- 
poned till a favourable ~pportunit~y should render success certain, 
was planned. However, i t  was resolved that the death of Sir 
A. Burnes should take place immediately ; for the king, who well 
knew the infinite trouble that officer had taken to support Dost 
Mohamed, detested him, and was very anxious to prevent his 
being made the Resident at his court, if Sir W. BPNaghten, 
whose departure had been talked of for some time, should be 
removed. 
On leaving the Shah, Abdullall Khan called together a t  his own 
house the serdars Mohamed Attah Khan, Sikander Khan, Mir 
Efzel Khan, Abdul Samut Ehan, and Abdul Selarn Khan, all of 
, 
the royal tribe of Popolzye ; also Seidal Khan, Aliltioozye, Emin 
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Ullah Khan, Logheree, and Mohamed Hoosein B a n ,  Erz Beghi,* 
and communicated to them the intentions of Shah Shooja : to which 
they agreed to conform in every particular, and swore to over- 
throw the British power in Afghanistan. This oath was written 
on the leaves of a.Koran, and the seal of each of the serdars pre- 
sent was affixed to it. The secret was ill kept, and soon came to the 
knowledge of Sir TJT. MLNaghten, who was not in the least alarmed 
by it, being fully impressed with the idea that it was impossible 
the chiefs should undertake any serious measures. H e  would not 
even allow the Koran to be seized for the purpose of learning the 
names of the conspirators, lest that act should be construed into 
evidence of timidity on his part: an appearance of perfect iudif- 
ference was, in his opinion, the best mode of proving to the discon- 
tented that the British were not afraid of them ; but Burnes took 
quite an  opposite view of the case. Thus the two officers, invested 
with special power, were never agreed upon the most judicious 
plan to be adopted for the general interests, and this want of good 
understanding between the Resident and the political Envoy was, 
perhaps, of all the causes that contributed to the British fall in 
Afghanistan, the one that hastened it the most. It is impossible 
. 
to doubt that, if three or four of the conspirators had been arrested 
and sent to India, i t  would have been sufficient to put a stop to 
these intrigues ; but instead of adopting this vigorous course, Sir 
TV. M'Naghten gave them ample time to bring them to maturity, 
and  exasperated the serdars by the most ill-timed measures of 
economy. Though he did not see that the storm was so close 
a t  hand, he  was fully aware of the difficulties that were to be 
surmounted, and modified in a degree the reduction in the 
pay of the Afghan soldiers ordered by Lord Auckland ; but from 
the moment he received notice of his nomination to the post 
of Governor of Bombay, he made no further objection to the 
instructions that the Directors had given, and unhesitatingly 
reduced all the subsidies which had been pointed out as super- 
fluous. 
The Ghildjzye serdars, who occupied the defiles of the Khyber 
* Thisserdar was the brother of that day has influence in Afghanistau. The 
wife of Dost Yohirued who had been chiefs of Kabul and Kaudahar are both 
previously married to Mohamed h i m  equally anxious to attach him to their 
Khan. By this ~narriage shc hail a son cause.-Pen-icr, 
called Sultan Djnn Khan, who to thia 
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mountains between Kabul and Jellalabad, and held them open or 
shut at their pleasure, were informed at the commencement of 
October, 1541, that they must submit to a reduction of 40,000 
rupees = 40001., when they at  once hastened to Kabul to ascer- 
tain the motive for this alteration. They made their represen- 
tations in the first instance to Sir W. MLNaghten, and he referred 
them to Shah Shooja, by whom they were haughtily dismissed, 
which greatly wounded their self-love and disappointed their cupi- 
dity ; but a few amongst them he secretly received, initiated them 
into the conspiracy against his protectors, and assured them that 
for the future their interests would be cared for. 
Sir Alexander Burnes, without actually foreseeing the conse- 
quences that would result from these retrenchments, nevertheless 
opposed them with all his power, though he did not succeed in pre- 
venting them; the consequence was, that when the Ghildjzye 
serdars returned to their homes, they raised their countrymen and 
cut off the communications in the mountains. 
On the other hand, the conspirators a t  Kabul had sent emis- 
saries to all the Afghan provinces to prepare the tribes for revolt ; 
already discontented, they alarmed them still more by persuading 
them that their chiefs were to be banished to India, that Shah 
Shooja was a mere puppet who would soon be upset, and that the 
British yoke, so heavy only in a protective character, would be far 
more so when it became absolute. The nomades responded imme- 
diately to this appeal, rushed to arms, and the communications 
between Kabul and Kandahar were closed without delay, as those 
had already been between Kabul and Jellalabad. General Sale 
was sent with a brigade to reopen the latter and force the passage 
of the Hindoo Koosh ; this small force quitted Kabul on the 11th of 
October, entered the mountains the same day, and was very far from 
expecting to meet with the terrible resistance it found there. Once 
. in this infernal region, however, the Indo-British troops could not 
retrace their steps, and during eighteen days they were, if the 
expression may be used, choked in these defiles, where every step of 
their way was disputed foot by foot. On the first day General Sale 
was wounded and obliged to abandon his command, and a fourth 
part of his brigade was exterminated. From the 12th of October the 
troops could advance only three miles and a half a-day, and arrived 
exhausted on the 2nd November at  Gundamuck, on the other side 
of the gorge of the Khoord Kabul ; here they rested a few days, 
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and then left for Jellalabad, still harassed by the tribes in revolt, 
and after having reached that town took refuge within its walls 
with only three days' provisions. Never were troops in such a 
precarious position ; but a most happy incident came to their assist- 
ance, for caravans brought them supplies for three months from 
Peshawur, which enabled them resolutely to oppose an energetic 
resistance to the insurrection in which the rest of the army perished. 
The news of these conflicts of the mountaineers with General 
Sale's brigade arrived at Kabul on the 1st of November, and was 
the signal for a serious disturbance which broke out in that city. 
The unconquered tribes of Afghanistan waited only for the signal 
to be given them by the Khyberees to rise simultaneously and 
commence a war for their faith-a religious war, the most bloody 
of all wars. They watched attentively the Indo-British troops, 
who were imprudently dispersed in the several garrisons of Kabul, 
Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghildjzye, Charikar, Kandahar, Jellalabad, and 
other places ; they knew that these detachments could easily be 
cut off, and also that it was impossible that reinforcements should 
reach them from India until the month of April, the mountain 
passes being obstructed by the snow. Of the thirty-two political 
agents scattered over the country, not one perceived the least 
symptom of the excited state of the public mind ; the unfortunate 
Burnes himself, blinded by his excessive confidence in the natives, 
was the first to report to the Indian Government that the Afghan 
chiefs were sincerely attached to Shah Shooja, and that the British 
army might be withdrawn from their garrisons. Sir W. M'Naghten 
wrote more confidently in the same strain : all had fallen into a 
fatal slumber, from which they were aroused only by surrounding 
massacre. The British Commissioner had, in the first instance, 
attempted to parley with the Ghildjzyes and induce them to return 
to their duty, offering as one of the most persuasive arguments 
100,000 rupees = 10,0001. ; but they rejected every species of 
temptation, and continued to make war upon the invaders, their 
attacks being generally made at night. 
As soon as the signal of revolt had been given in the country, 
Abdullah Khan, the head of the conspiracy in Kibul, took no 
further trouble to conceal his intentions, and said openly that he 
would kill Burnes before eight days were over. This officer, 
though warned, paid no attention to these threats, considering 
them as simple boasting, but, seeing that the serdar's insolence 
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increased daily, he at last became very uneasy, and obtained 
information which left no doubt as to the serious position 
they were i n ;  moreover, he saw that the conduct of Abdullah 
- Khan was connected with the revolt in the hills. This enlightened 
him as to the snare which had been woven round them, and he 
exclaimed, "There is nothing for it now but to quit this country." 
The next day, November 2, 1841, early in the morning, he sent 
one of his servants t6 the house of Abdullah Khan to request that 
chief to come to him, but the serdar, suspecting that Burnes 
intended to seize him and send him to India, conceived that the 
moment had arrived to execute the project of open revolt, for which 
he was so well prepared ; his first act was therefore to kill Burnes's 
messenger,. and, without loss of time, he proceeded to his residence, 
accompanied by Seidal Khan, Sikander Khan, Mohamed Attah 
Khan, Abdul Selam Khan, Emin Ullah Khan, &c. &c., and their 
followers and servants, in all nearly one hundred and thirty persons, 
the nucleus of the insurrection. 
On the way there they killed the British officers and soldiers 
whom they met in. the streets ; the delay this occasioned enabled 
Bumes, who had been informed of these massacres, to barricade 
the large outer gate of 'his house, and the insurgents were 
therefore a long time before they could force a passage. H e  
had thought of retiring to the cantonments situated three miles 
from the city, but while putting on an Afghan dress to effect 
his retreat undiscovered, he changed his mind, and said, "No, 
I cannot play the coward, and, for the life of one man, com- 
promise the honour of the British name. Were I to escape thus, 
the Afghans would believe that I was frightened ; no, a hundred 
times worse than death, the prestige of my authority would be 
lost." With these words he put on his uniform again and remained 
a t  his post, but sent messenger after messenger to Sir W. 
M6Naghten, requesting that a battalion of infantry and two pieces 
of artillery might be sent to him without delay, for with these he 
considered he should be able to put down the insurgents. And he 
was right, for had the British troops appeared in the streets of Kabul 
10,000 Euzzilbashes, ~ ~ z a r a h s ,  and Parsivans, would have rallied 
round Burnes and supported him ; but seeing that the English 
did not take the initiative, they feared to commit themselves 
in the eyes of the Afghans, who might have made them pay 
dearly for their interference, and thus remained passive spectators of 
the struggle. To  crown his misfortune, the artillery sent for by the 
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beleaguered officer never arrived, and the mob, emboldened 
by the simply defensive attitude assumed by his countrymen, 
hesitated no longer; the inhabitants rose in all parts of the 
city, and to them were soon joined the suburban population. 
From that moment the impulse given to the revolt \\-as im- 
placable and irresistible, and the nation rose as oue man against 
their foreign invaders. But to continue my narrative ; the 
shopkeepers and workmen, as well as the dregs of the people, 
now surrounded the residence of Burnes, to take it by assault, and 
showed themselves exceedingly vindictive in this conflict, a circum- 
stance which might have arisen from his having been governor 
of the city, and frequently obliged to punish them with severity. 
The mob showed great perseverance in their endeavours to break 
their way into the house, but the besieged, twenty-three in num- 
ber, consisting of a few officers and servants, and ten sepoys, by 
applying their ears to the ground, learnt from the hollow sound of 
the blows that were struck against the walls, on which side to 
expect the attack, and when a hole was made, they shot the first man 
who presented himself at the opening ; this damped the courage of 
the others, who retired to recornmewe operations a t  some other 
spot. The defence was thus prolonged from eight in the morning 
till two in the afternoon, and the Afghans having lost many men 
in their attempts to force an entrance, at  last had recourse to other 
means ; combustibles were piled against the great gate, and when 
i t  was entirely consumed they rushed in a mass through the passage 
and gained the interior of the house. T h e  inmates had by this 
time exhausted d l  their ammunition, and Burnes received a point 
blank shot from a pistol ; the ball struck him in the right eye, and 
he died instantly: his body was then hacked to pieces with 
repeated sabre cuts, and, horribly mutilated, thrown into the iarden 
of his own house. 
Three-and-twenty persons perished with Burnes, amongst whom 
were his brother Lieut. Charles Burnes and Lieut. Broadfoot; 
Captain Johnson, in charge of the Treasury, escaped by a miracle. 
Captain Trevor, with his family, and a few other officers, were also 
fortunate enough to reach the cantonments. His  house and that 
of Burnes were burned to the ground, and the military chest, 
magazines, and commissariat stores of provisions pillaged.* 
* These details of the death of sole survivor of the magsacre in ~nrnes 's  
Burnes weye given me by hfohamed house. He received six-and-twenty 
Hoosein Khan, Kachee, ~ h o  was the wounds.-Pcrricr. 
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On hearing of the outbreak Sir W. McNaghten detached t~vo  
regiments under Brigadier Shelton, and some irregulars under 
Captain Nicholl, to occupy the citadel -of the Bala Hissar, in 
which was the residence of Shah Shooja. This movement was the 
only measure the envoy adopted, totally regardless of the state of 
the city and the earnest demands of Burnes, whose repeated mes- 
sages announced his critical position. I t  was the weater error, b because provisions were short in barracks, and the principal maga- 
zine was in Kabul; the Resident considered the small party in 
charge of it as sufficient for its defence, but the indecision of the 
officer in command led to its evacuation. Another depct, gallantly 
defended, was carried by assault, and it was with great difficulty 
and'loss of life that they subsequently retook two small redoubts 
tolerably well provisioned, which enabled them to subsist some 
time longer. 
These disasters, the result of want of foresight, were the cause 
of all the calamit,ies which overtook the British army. Greater 
success would, without doubt, have followed if bolder measures had 
. been adopted, .but General Elphinstone, borne down by age and 
infirmity, had long lost the qualifications necessary for so responsible 
a command; he appeared to have fallen into a state of lethargy, 
and remained complacently satisfied with his defensive attitude, 
while it was absolutely necessary to proceed by the most opposite 
means. The staff of the General-in-Chief did not prove itself more 
competent than their commander, and Sir W. M'Naghten, taking 
hjmself to task rather late for the numerous faults he had com- 
mitted, and which had placed some thousands of his countrymen in 
peril, strbve to repair his error by the energy and vigour with which 
he conducted the defence. But his efforts were vain, all seemed 
pardysed around him; his orders, like his requests, were eluded, or 
timidly and inefficiently executed, and this occasioned fresh disasters, 
instead of procuring the slightest amelioration of their position. 
On the 4th of November Zeman Khan, Mohamedzye," who 
possessed immense wealth and had attached the people to his 
party by his largesses, succeeded, with the help of his uncle Nawab 
Djabbar Khan, and his cousin Chems Eddin I<han,t both influ- 
ential personages, in inducing the Afghans to proclaim him king, 
* Son of Nawab Assad Ullah Rhan, t Son of Emiu Rhan, half-broth& 
one of the'deceasecl brothem of Dost of Dost Mohamed Khan.-Terrier. 
Mohuned.-Frrier. 
350 WEARXESS OF GENERAL ELPHIXSTOXE. C ~ A P .  SSIQ. 
and he  surrounded himself with all the pomp of royalty. This 
chief, at the head of his partizans, daily exchanged a few shots 
with the English, who mere shut up in their cantonments; but 
though he captured and murdered a few officers and soldiers who 
imprudently risked their lives outside the camp, the Mohamedzye 
chief experienced only reverses in his repeated attaclrs. In  one 
of these Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye, the originator and promoter 
of the conspiracy, received a ball in the forehead and died within 
two days. 
After each defeat Zeman Khan retired into the city without 
being disturbed, for the English never followed him, which they, 
could have done without difficulty ; and as they had committed the 
serious fault of establishing their magazines of provisions a t  a 
considerable distance from the cantonments, they should at the 
outset have displayed a little more energy in endeavouring to dis- 
lodge the Afghans from the houses in which they. were regaling 
themselves upon them. At the sight of one battalion and two 
or three pieces of cannon, they would have fled: they admit i t  
now, and it was the step they most dreaded the enemy would take. 
Many times did the officers suggest it, but General Elphinstone 
would not give his consent, and the army saw itself reduced to 
procure provisions with gold and presents from the insurgents 
-the conduct of the general was indeed incomprehensible. After 
Shah Shoojs had concerted with Abdullah Khan the revolt 
against the English, he fell into a far more dependent con- 
'dition than that from which the latter had intended to withdraw 
him. T h e  Etchekzye serdar and other conspirators had shown 
themselves exceedingly overbearing towards him, sharp discus- 
sions took place, and there was very nearly a rupture; never- 
theless Shah Shooja was not sufliciently clearsighted to discover 
that they only looked upon him as a tool to be set aside as soon as 
the annihilation of his protectors was accomplished, and the rising 
of the Khyberees induced the king to throw himself into the arms 
of the national party, and conspire actively himself. H e  first 
-permitted the unhappy Burnes to 'be murdered, though he could 
have saved him with the greatest ease, for he occupied the citadel 
with a devoted garrison of a thousand men ; but it seems that he 
lost confidence in his accomplices while that act was being per- 
petrated, the cause of which was probably secret information that 
he received from the Serdar &lohnmed Attah Khan. He then 
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thought it prudent to close the gates of the B d a  Hissar before the 
mob could reach it, and, in his blindness, believed that when 
order mas restored the Afghans would ,hail him again as their 
king without the concurrence of the British being necessary ; he 
therefore abstained from helping them, hoping by this means to 
secure the support of his own subjects. He  even thought it very 
wrong when some of the English troops, shut up in the fortress with 
him, fired upon the townspeople, and turned their artillery upon the 
city ; but it was quite a different matter when the insurgents cut down 
the trees in his garden under the guns of t.he place, or when the 
partizans of Zeman Khan came within range: then the Shah 
entreated that the sharpest and best sustained fire possible might 
be 'kept up. Several British officers, to whom the treachery of 
Shah Shooja was now evident, proposed that the army should occupy 
the citadel in which he still reslded, as they woilld then have the 
town in their power, and could, by threatening its destruction, 
obtain supplies and provisions. This plan was warmly supported 
by Sir ?V. M'Naghten, but rejected by General Elphinstone, 
who gave as his reason that the discouragement amongst the troops 
rendered the execution of i t  impossible ; indeed he acte? in direct 
opposition to this sound advice by ordering a regiment, that had 
been sent to the Bala Hissar when the rebellion broke out, to return 
to camp. After this, though thus reinforced, the General lost all 
confidence in himself for any useful purpose ; he had despaired of 
success from the commencement, and waited to the last with the 
inertness and cold apathy that are the result of a fixed opinion, the 
annihilation of the doomed army under his command : the troops 
themselves, cast down by the.example of their chief, lost all energy. 
T h e  British soldier has proved in all times that in bravery he is 
second to none in Europe ; but this is under certain conditions: 
he must have full rations, his arrack, his beer, and a thousand 
other stimulants, the privation of which induces discouragement 
and indecision. 
There is no doubt such was the condition of the force a t  Kabul, 
and to this must be attributed the feeble and pusillanimous conduct 
of H.M.'s 44th and the 37th N.I. when attacked by the insurgents 
in a small ,entrenched camp on an eminence which protected the 
citadel ; they scarcely made any resistance, the efforts of Brigadier 
Shelton to animate them were useless, and cavalry and infantry gave 
way and fled in great disorder to the cantonments, hotly pursued 
by the Afghans, who would perhaps have forced their enemy's 
position that day, but for the intervention of the insurgent Serdar 
Osman Khan, Isakzye, who made a special treaty with Sir TV. 
MLNaghten, in virtue of which a few days of compi~rative tran- 
quillity were secured to the Anglo-Indian troops. After this check 
the 54th regiment of N. I., which occupied the Bala Hissar, was 
withdram, and Shah Shooja abandoned to his own resources. 
I t  has been mentioned that Mohamed Akbar Khan, a son of 
Dost Mohamed, had retired to Khulm after his flight from Bolt- 
ham. Not  having been able to procure from Blir TValee the 
assistance he required to maintain the old soldiers of his father who 
had joined him in his exile, he resolved to go to Persia, where his 
uncles, the serdars of Kandahar, had been well received by Mo- 
hamed Shah, hoping that that monarch would not do less for him than 
for them ; indeed he was on his road there, and near Balkh, when, 
hearing of the insui~ection in Kabul, he changed his course, and 
arrived on the 25th of November in that city,* where he found every- 
thing in the greatest confusion, and his cousin Zeman Khan declared 
king. Though smarting under this vexation, Akhar was obliged to 
recognise the election, but only with the secret determination to 
reverse it on the first opportunity, and such was the diversity of 
opinions and interests a t  this time amongst the Afghans, that he 
had little difficulty in creating for himself, and in a few days, 
a powerful party, which soon overcame that of all the other 
chiefs. 
Many British officers, alive to the mournful turn that the military 
operations had taken, and foreseeing the result which the weakness 
and incapacity of General Elphinstone must produce, were of opinion 
that negotiations, based upon the evacuation of the country, ought 
to be opened with all the influential chiefs in Kabul, without regard 
to the superiority that some chose to arrogate to themselves over the 
rest. For several clays Sir TV. M'Naghten repelled this advice, 
which he received from all sides; but the disastrous intelligence 
that was brought in from outlying garrisons inclined him to enter- 
* The newspapers nnd some other vernment, but  the assertion is utterly . 
publications that  have touched upon incorrect. He arrived with twelve 
this revolt hnve stated, on what au- badly equipped Afghan cav,alry, and 
thority I know not, that  Akbar Khan never received assistance from the , 
returned to Rabul accompanied by one Russian~, who carefully abstained from 
thousand Tartar  horsemen who had any materid intervention in  favour of 
been sent to him b y  the Russian Go- the conq11cred.-Fernier, 
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tain pacific measures more favourably, for the English had losses 
to deplore in every direction. T h e  troops at  Ghuznee, com- 
manded by Colonel Palmer, had been ordered to Kabul, but 
could not leave, and, subsequently, being obliged to abandon the 
town, they retired into the citadel : however, they were pretty well 
provisioned. The brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel WLaren, which 
Sir FV. M'Naghten recalled from Kandahar to the assistance of the 
division in Kabul, had been arrested in its march by the great depth 
of snow which had fallen and the insurrection that developed itself 
everywhere with a ferocity and excitement difficult to imagine. 
This column had pushed forward as far as Ghuznee ; but there i t  
was forced to return, and after having thrown a garrison into Ke- 
lat-CGhildjzye, with a year's provisions, it made its way back to 
Kandahar. On the other hand Captain Woodburn, who left 
Ghuznee with one hundred and thirty men, was .harassed on the 
road by the insurgents, and took refuge in some ruins, surrounded 
by a broken wall. Here, besieged by four or five thousand Afghans, 
he made a sortie in two divisions, one led by himself the other 
by a native officer, and, throwing himself into the rnelde, he fell 
gallantly with all his men ; the second division endeavoured to return, 
but only five Sepoys escaped to tell the tale. Another Engljsh 
officer, Captain Ferris, was besieged with two hundred and fifty 
men in a miserable fort, which he defended many days against 
three or four thousand Afghans, and having only twenty-five cart 
ridges a manleft, also resolved to try and cut his way through the 
enemy. This was no easy matter, for he had with him his wife and 
her sister, but the ladies were tied behind two native horsemen and 
placed in the centre of the square, and after a frightful conflict 
the little party reached another fort, whence, with the help of 
guides, they made their way to Peshawur. 
The first idea of Sir W. MbNaghten, on hearing of these dis- 
asters, was to force his way through the Khyber Pass and join 
General Sale in Jellalabad, which he had fortified ; but wiser 
counsels prevailed, and this impracticable project was given' up. 
It was impracticable quite as much from the nature of the ground 
as from the ill feeling of the tribes, who were in arms all along 
the pass, and the deep snow presented aggravated difficulties of 
every kind, which Sale's brigade, if it had been ordered to meet 
them, must have encountered also. The plans for the retreat 
thei.efore were for the moment abandoned by Sir Wm. MGNaghten, 
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and uot without regret. Subsequently, and in conformity with the. 
almost universal opinion, he sent Captains Lawrence and Trevor, 
and 3, few other officers, to make overtures of peace to the Afghans, 
by whom the propositions were favourably received ; this induced 
Sir W. M'Naghten to place himself in direct communication with 
the chiefs, particularly with Mohamed Akbar Khan, with whom 
the English Commissioner proposed to conclude a treaty, consisting 
of twenty articles. These were all accepted by him and them, and 
in several conferences that followed, many of the serdars, who were 
desirous that tranquillity should be reestablished in the country, 
insisted that the terms of the evacuation should be definitively and 
promptly decreed. Sir W. M'Naghten, seeing that Mohamed 
Akbar Khan appeared the most powerFul amongst them, and the 
most inclined to negotiate,   referred treating with him, although 
he well knew that this chief every day joined the insurgents who. 
fired on the soldiers in the cantonment. But Akbar, having 
assured him that he acted thus only to pacify the other serdars 
his rivals, who sought to degrade him in the eyes of his countrg- 
men by representing him as a traitor to the national cause, he 
succeeded in gaining the confidence of the Commissioner, and 
an  almost friendly understanding was established between them. 
W a s  Mohamed Akbar in good faith when he promised entire 
devotion to the English, and when he promised even to de- 
liver up t.he murderers of Burnes ? This is doubtful, for i t  is 
very improbable, he should have forgotten that the ruin of 
his house had been brought about by those to whom he had 
offered to devote himself. And then .his father, the head of his 
family, the. Emir Dost Mohamed, was he not still a prisoner in 
India?  I t  is impossible to deny that the position of Akbar Khan 
was most embarrassing, for, obliged to conciliate the invaders 
of his country to preserve a hope of delivering his father, he could 
only do so a t  the risk of exciting the suspicions of his countrymen, 
who were but too well 'inclined to mistrust him. Zeman Khan, his 
cousin, knew that the return of Dost Mohamed would bring down 
the crazy scaifolding on which his own dawning royalty fdepended, 
and therefore he neglected no means of alienating the Afghans horn 
Mohamed Akbar Khan ; he would, perhaps, have completely suc- 
ceeded if the latter had not, to save his life, adopted an energetic 
line of conduct, the loyalty of which has been diversely appreciated 
by those who have considered the subject. Many chiefs had openly 
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quarrelled with the son of the Emir, and on the 22nd of December 
they reproached him with having treated with the English unknowri 
to them, and sacrificed' them to his own ambition: H e  defended 
himself with energy from these accusations, but he could not con- 
vince his antagonists, and they would certainly have cut him to 
pieces on the .spot if he had not sworn upon the Koran that on 
the morrow he would bring the British Commissioner into Kabul 
either as a hostage or a corpse. 
The Afghans who took part in the melancholy episodes which 
concluded the British occupation of Kabul, are generally,convinced 
that in one of his interviews with Mohamed Akbar ~ h & ,  Sir W. 
N'Naghten had solemnly promised to restore his father to him 
within the space of a month ; but the period had nearly expired, and 
the Emir was still a prisoner in India. This fact greatly exasperated 
Akbar Khan, and made him more exacting in the terms of the eva- 
cuation ; several conferences had ended without a successful result, 
and the negotiations had already become embittered, when on the 
night of the 23rdto 24th of December, Captain Skinner who wasin 
the Afghan camp, arrived in that of the English, the bearer of fresh 
conditions from Akbar Khan, who demanded another interview with 
Sir W. MGNaghten, for the purpose of concluding a definitive treaty. 
This was acceded to, and the envoy arrived at the appointed rendez- 
vous on Christmas:Day, 1841, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, 
Trevor, and M'Kenzie ; the meeting took place near a bridge, in 
the neighbourhood of which sixteen Afghan horsemen had been pre- 
viously posted in ambush. Akbar Khan received the Commissioner 
with violent reproaches a t  his having so long delayed setting his 
father at liberty and evacuating Kabul ; he also declared that the 
arms, ammunition, and hostages had never been given up to him, 
while on his side he held in readiness and at Sir W. M'Naghtenys 
disposal the cattle necessary to transport the baggage of the army. 
" In  exchange for my promptitude," he said, I find only delay 
and duplicity; General Sale, instead of evacuating Jellahbad 
as agreed between us, has provisioned and fortified himself 
with more energy than ever." The  British Commissioner in 
vain protested his good and loyal intentions ; Mohamed Akhar 
would listen to nothi~ig :Sir W. M'Naghten had, he said, delayed 
up to that day. to fulfil his promises, and he should therefore con- 
sider him and his suite aa prisoners, till all the conditions pre- 
viously determined upon were executed. H e  then seized Sir William 
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by the arm to take him into Kabul, but the envoy resisted and ex- 
claimed, "Better die than follow you." Alrbar Khan instantly put 
his pistol to his breast and fired,-it flashed in the pan ; the second 
laid the Resident dead at  his feet. The  pistols which the chief 
used had been presented to him only a few days before by Sir W. 
McNaghten himself. Captain Trevor, who was at  a little distance, 
having seen the first hostile movement of the assassin, instantly dis- 
mounted to go to the assistance of his chief, but was killed on the 
spot by an Afghan bullet. As to Captains Lawrence and McKenzie 
they were seized, stripped, and tied on horseback behind two 
chiefs, who had infinite difficulty in saving them from- their in- 
furiated followers; they were subsequently imprisoned in a fort, 
but after some days recovered their liberty. The  head of Sir W. 
iMLNaghten was carried through the bazaars on the point of a 
spear, with the green spectacles on that he was in the habit of 
wearing ; it was subsequeutly fixed on the roof of the Round Point 
of the bazaar, called the Tchar-sook, as well as his corpse, and that 
of Captain Trevor: the bodies were left there three days, and 
afterwards thrown into a dry well. 
- 
After the death of Sir W. McNaghten, the direction of affairs 
was placed in the hands of Major Pottinger, who had defended 
Herat the preceding year. On leaving that city he came to Kabul 
and was appointed governor of Charikar and Istalif, two small towns 
situated in the mountains, one-and-twenty miles north of Kabul, 
and about three from each other. The garrisons which held them 
were after a gallant defence overpowered about the same time that 
the revolt broke out in the capital, but Major Pottinger, though 
wounded by a ball in the thigh, was enabled, almost by a mi- 
racle, to escape and reach the house of Burnes, which had been 
sacked and pillaged shortly before. .Of this event he was i p o -  
rant, but on his arrival there the traces of the disaster were 
still fresh ; he found himself alone in the smoking ruins and in 
the midst of the insurgents, from whom his lucky star and ex- 
cellent horse saved him once more, and he arrived, completely 
exhausted, in the British cantonment. Major Pottinger had but 
very imperfectly recovered from his wound, when the heavy 
task of directing the political affairs of Kabul fell upon his 
shoulders. Sad as had been the result of the confidence which Sir 
William M'Naghten placed in Mohamed Akbar, such was the 
desperate position of things, that Major Pottinger could see no 
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better course than to renew the negotiations with that serdar ; 
but the other Afghan chiefs who wished to prevent the con- 
centration of authority i n ,  the hands of the son of the Emir, 
insisted on taking part in the treaty, that was to drive the 
English out of their country. They all ratified it, and the articles 
were nearly a repetition of those which had been imposed on Sir 
W. MLNaghten, namely, the evacuation of Jellalabad by Sale's 
brigade, and the liberation of Dost Mohalned ; but this time it 
was agreed that the Epglish should keep their arms, and be accom- 
panied across the Khyber by an Afghan escort, commanded by 
Akbar Khan himself, who was to protect them as far as Peshawur. 
Wounded, however, as had been his self-love, and foiled in his 
ambitious views in not having been permitted to treat singly with 
the invaders, he did not care to assemble the escort immediately. 
The Indo-British had lost up to this period twenty-eight ofiicers killed 
in action or assassinated ; 10,000 bodies of men and animalsinfected 
the air and aggravated the sufferings of the 5000 unhappy sur- 
vivors, that now formed the army, and who were worn out by the 
resistance they had maintained for two months against 40,000 
insurgents. The cold had become intensely severe ; fuel, provisions, 
-, 
and ammunition failed, and the troops being completely discouraged 
Major Pottinger did not think i t  advisable to wait any longer for 
the promised escort, and decided upon making a desperate rush 
through the midst of the enemy; accordingly, on the 5th of 
January, 1842, he gave the order for departure. 
On Thu$sday the 6th, after having sust.ained a siege of sixty- 
seven days, and endured the most cruel privations, General 
Elphinstone and the army he commanded quitted, under a humi- 
liating capitulation, the intrenched camp of Kabul, and moved 
off on a road a foot deep in snow. The force had, however, 
scarcely cleared the cantonment, when the rear guard was attacked 
by the Afghans ; an officer of the 5th regiment of native cavalry 
named Hardyman, and some of his men, were killed in this 
affair, and the army marched only five miles that day. The  sky 
was clear, but the cold intense, and when they arrived on the en- 
camping ground the soldiers had to clear away the snow, before 
they could rest their weary limbs on the frozen earth; to this 
was added the want of provisiona, and before morning dawned 
several hundred men and women had died from cold and hunger. , 
On the 7th the division marched upon Barikhar, and the 
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Afshan escort which Akbar Khan had promised should protect the 
retreat appeared i n  larger numbers and hostile ; the rear guard 
was harassed that day by several bloody engagements, and the 
enemy carried off three mountain guns. From this moment 
the English, who had indeed placed but little confidence in the 
promises of t.he Afghans, felt convinced they should never reach 
Jellalabad but by fighting every inch of the way, and, encamping 
at the entrance of the defile, they there passed a more terrible 
night than the first. Those who survived till day-break, found 
the ground covered with corpses ; the bewildered Sepoys burnt 
their clothes to warm themselves, and the British soldiers sinking 
under cold and hunger had scarcely stresgth to carry their arms : 
the most frightful disorder reigned throughout the frozen and 
famished multitude, and those who had saved anything valuable 
were here obliged to abandon it. 
O n  the morning of the 8th, the division could not advance one 
single step. The heights around swarmed with their enemies, 
who having suspended their fire during the night, recommenced 
their deadly work a t  sunrise. I n  this extremity the.English were 
obliged to enter into a psrley with Mohamed Akbar Khan, who 
was seen encamped on an eminence near, and who, while affectilig 
a great sympathy for them, was not so ignorant of the misfor- 
tunes that befell them as he wished to make them believe. H e  
blamed Major Pottinger for his precipitation in quitting Kabul, 
without waiting for the escort which was to protect the army, 
adding that he alone amongst the Afghan .chiefs had the power 
to prevent the attacks made upon it, and he offered to control 
the insurgents, provided the English consented to give hostages 
that they would not go beyond Tezeen, until Sale's brigade 
had evacuated Jellalabad. I t  is evident that the serdar feared 
the junction of the two divisions in a place that was for- 
tified and provisioned, and in which they could pass the winter 
in safety, and wait for the spring to resume the offensive. To  
assure himself therefore that the engagement would be faith- 
fully kept, he demanded a t  first six hostages, but was subsequently 
satisfied with Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and 
McKenzie. A s  soon as they were placed in his hands, the troops 
moved forward towards the famous defile of Khoord Kabul, but 
attacked on all sides, notwithstanding the treaty just concluded, 
this day brought with i t  the climax of their misfortunes; scenes 
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of carnage and pitiless cruelty were renewed a t  every step, and 
the column, crushed by the rolling fire of its invisible foes, a t  
length abandoned the guns to the Afghans. Reduced to twenty 
cartridges per man, they were obliged to charge with the bayonet 
enemies sheltered by rocks and well provided with ammunition, 
while women and children pierced with cold were seen wan- 
dering distracted and at random through the fire, amongst the 
disorganised troops. Mohamed Akbar Khan had no command 
over his men, for they had proclaimed the Djehad or Holy War ,  
had become Ghazees or soldiers of the Faith, and their fanaticism 
knew no bounds ; the feeling of revenge, that of doing a good 
work in the eyes of God, and above all the hope of booty, rendered 
them utterly deaf to entreaty or command ; destitute of pity, and 
reckless of order or discipline, they gorged themselves with blood 
and plunder. 
On the 9th Akbar Khan acknowledged that he was perfectly 
powerless to restrain these Ghazees, who renewed the scenes of the 
previous day with increased fury, and the storm which had raged 
over the wretched troops for three consecutive days ended in one of 
the most terrible military catastrophes on record. The remnant of 
the Indo-British army, exhausted by forced marches, by cold, by 
want of food and fuel, and agonizing sufferings of every description, 
had no longer the strength t o  defend itself, and was massacred- 
annihilated, by overwhelming numbers of merciless enemies. Three 
natives only and one single European, Dr. Brydon, reached Jellala- 
bad out of a body of five thousand men and a much greater number 
of camp-followers, who lost their lives in this butchery. Akbar Khan 
seemed to deplore the conduct of his soldiers and his own want of 
command over them, and in the height of this bloody tragedy 
offered shelter to the English ladies, promising to protect them a t  
the peril of his own life ; the offer was accepted by several, 
amongst whom were Lady Sale, Lady N'Naghten, RIrs. Anderson, 
Mrs. Reid, and Mrs. Mainwaring, and they were perfectly well 
treated by him. 
Akbar Khan having in his camp the hostages that were deli- 
vered to him, also General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, Captain 
Johnson, and a few other officers, remained two days on this fatal 
ground, waiting for the evacuation of Jellalabad by General Sale, 
to whom he had sent a copy of the treaty concluded between 
himself and Major Eldred Pottinger. But that General formally 
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refused to abandon the place without an order from the Governor- 
General of India in Council ; and fortunate was i t  for him that he 
came to this determination, for the Afghans had laid a plan for 
exterminating his corps to the very last man. 
After the disaster in the Khoord Kabul, Mohamed Akbar , 
Khan marched his prisoners to Tezeen and Jugdulluk, and then 
to Thigri, a fortified town situated in the rich valley of Lug-. 
man, where, after much hesitation, he determined not to forward 
them to Jellalabad, but sent them to Buddiabad, a large fortress 
recently built a t  the upper end of the valley. On the 11th they 
were moved to Zindeh and placed in charge of the chief, Mohamed 
Shah Khan. T h e  death of General Elphinstone from natural 
causes occurred on the 23rd of April following, and Akbar Khan 
sent the corpse under escort to Jellalabad ; but the Ghazees met 
it on the road, attacked and dispersed the guard, tore the body from 
the coffin, and stripped and stoned it. 
The massacres in the Khoord Kabul greatly increased the power 
and influence of Mohamed Akbar and his party became daily more 
numerous ; the Ghazees on all sides responded to his appeal, and 
the irregular cavalry of the country in the service of the English 
deserted to join his standard. His army then amounted to seven 
or eight thousand men, and with these he laid siege to Jellalabad, 
being fully convinced that General Sale would never evacuate it in ' 
virtue of the treaty. This brave officer had entrenched himself in 
the place with the two battalions under his command, and for more 
than two months had been living on half rations, determined to 
hold out to the last man. Jellalabad (Glory inhabited) is situated 
west of Feshawur, a t  the opening of the Kliyber Pass. In the 
summer it contains but 2000 inhabitants, but in the winter nearly 
20,000, for the severity of that season in these mountains obliges. 
the inhabitants to take refuge in the t o m s  ; General Sale arrived 
a t  the period of this au,mentation, and was necessitated, for the 
security of his brigade, to take steps to prevent this increase in 
the  population. All Akbar Khan's efforts to dislodge the gallant 
General proved ineffectual, and instead of succeeding, as he hoped, 
he was very nearly losing his life here  either by mischance or 
treachery. T h e  rifle of the Isakzye chief, Mohamed Osman Khan, 
the first of the insurgent serdars who made a treaty with Sir Wm. 
M'Naghten, went off accidentally-such, a t  least, was the statement 
of that chief-and the ball lodged in Akbar Khan's arm, who pre- 
F. 
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tended that the injury was premeditated, and that Osman Khan 
had been bribed by the English to assassinate him : he, therefore, 
put him to death. 
While Akbar Khan was thus harassing General Sale a t  Jellala- 
bad, Zeman Khan, the newly elected king of the Afghans, occu- 
pied the town of Kabul and besieged Shah Shooja, who from the 
citadel kept up a cannonade upon the city ; several thousand lives 
were sacrificed in this struggle, for each day brought with it its own 
combat. The  cause of Zeman Khan, however, prospered no t ;  he 
became anxious and disappointed a t  this useless waste of his fortune, 
on which he depended for success, and by which alone he had 
secured partisans; he, therefore, deemed it prudent to accept the 
propositions made to him by the Shah, laid down the royalty with 
which the nation had invested him, and consented to become the 
prime minister of the Suddozye prince. I n  acting thus he thought 
he should be able to prevent the re-establishment of Dost Mohamed 
if he should return, and also to reduce Akbar Khan to ohe- 
dience, being well determined, however, to take the first favourable 
opportunity of overthrowing Shah Shooja and seizing the crown 
once more ; but the events which followed completely neutralized 
his deep-laid schemes. T h e  Shah, on the other hand, was not 
more sincere than his vizier, and promised him what' he never 
intended to perform ; he made these concessions to his adver- 
saries for no other purpose than to extricate himself from his 
present embarrassing position, intending to get rid of them all if 
ever he should find himself firmly established in power. T o  
complete this apparent reconciliation, he named Akbar Khan, 
Serdm serdarbne,* and sent his a.ppointment to him at Jellalabad ; 
but that chief would not accept it or sanction the treaty con- 
cluded with his cousin, unless Shah Shooja agreed to support him 
in besieging that town. I t  was hardly possible that any proposal 
should have better coincided with the Shah's own views, for he 
ardently longed for some opportunity of leaving Kabul till he could 
return in force, supported by the English, whose assistance he saw, 
when too late, was indispensable to him. The conditions offered by 
Akbar Khan were by no means favourable to the intrigues of Zeman 
Khan, and the vizier, therefore, advised the king not to accept them, 
or at  any rate if he did to leave him, during his absence, in com- 
* General .of the Generals.-Terrier. 
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rnand at Kabul ; but the king, who perceived the drift of his advice,' 
simply sent him orders to accompany him to Jellalabad, and to 
prove that he was in earnest in this decision, he appointed the 
son of the Serdar Emin Ullah Khan governor of Kabul while he 
was away. Zeman Khan, uneasy at the Shah's persisting in his 
determination, resolved to ascertain the cause, and found that 
he had been deceived by his sovereign, whom he had himself 
intended to betray : he, therefore, to nip the evil in the bud, 
determined upon his destruction. 
Shah Shooja, in pursuance of his intentions, left the citadel to 
join his small army, encamped.about a mile and a half from the 
Bala Hissar, with the declared object of leading it against the 
English, but in reality to use it as an escort on his way to place 
himself under their protection; he had, however, scarcely started 
when the Serdar Shooja ed Dooulet, a son of Zeman Khan, accom- 
panied by four servants, overtook him, and fired point blank into 
his palanquin. T h e  unfortunate monarch was wounded by several 
balls, and still breathed when the assassins took him out of the 
litter .and threw his body into a stream that mas near the road, 
finishing their atrocious crime with their swords. This event took 
place in February, 1842. 
The character of Shah Shooja has generally been too severely 
criticized. Even his adversaries, the Mohamedzyes, who now govern 
Afghanistan, admit that he was a very remarkable man, and the 
only one of Shah Timoor's sons who was capable of reigning. H e  
had both ability and courage, and redeemed .more than one vice 
by the qualities which the Afghans delight to see in their princes. 
H e  was after the manner of that country a good administrator, and 
understood how to conduct a war as well as an Afghan can ; he only 
wanted a little better luck ; such is the opinion of all Afghans. 
Several times beaten and driven out of the country, he never con- 
sidered himself vanquished, and took the field twelve times in his 
endeavours to regain the crown. It is impossible to look upon 
this perseverance as mere obstinacy ; it denotes great energy of 
character, and if he always failed it was because he never would 
permit the smallest entrenchment upon his absolute rights. When 
we Europeans form an opinion of the acts of the barbarous nations 
of Asia we always do so according to our own standard of morals, 
and political passions, without making the least allowance for the 
difference that exists between our habits and feelings, and theirs. 
CHAP. XXIB. HIS CHARACTER. 363 
There is no question that Shall Shooja, like every other Afghan, 
was cruel and also despotic, but let us review the position in which 
he was placed, and it will appear that having to govern a race 
for whom force is the only law, it would have been difficult 
for him to act othemise than as he did. The Moharnedzyes, 
whose influence in the government was so great, were always 
conspiring against him during his first reign. After the death of 
Ahmed Shah, the descendants of that great prince had always been 
subject to the caprices engendered by the ambition of the serdars 
who left them only the shadow of regal power. Shah Shooja 
resisted their intrigues with greater tenacity than his predecessors 
had done, and was therefore more especially the object of their 
machinations ; he would have been foolish indeed to allow himself t@ 
be beaten without making an effort to foil them, and coercion was the 
only means by which he could succeed in concentrating the power 
in his own hands: he believed he should secure this object if he 
did so, and therein was his error. Had  he reflected that the 
tribes, attached to their chiefs by so many ties, would give him but 
a feeble and uncertain support, he would certainly have abstained 
from using force for the purpose of attaining it ; but weakness on 
his part, would have been worse; for then he must have succumbed 
at once. His conduct during his second reign is a proof of that 
independence of character which was ever his nlisfortune : indig- 
nant under the yoke imposed upon him by the English, all 
the vices of his Afghan nature broke forth; he betrayed his 
benefactors, resisted his liberators, and died by the hands of 
assassins-for an Afghan he could have no more glorious close to 
such a career. 
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CHAPTER XXV. 
Fethi Djing Mirza succeeds Shah Shooja-Combat between that prince andZeman 
Khan- The former is beaten - Akbar Khan returns to  Kabul and forcea 
Fethi Djing to retire to the citadel-The former becomes his Vizier and 
r ecog~zes  him as King - Akbar plunders Fethi Djing- Flight of the Prince 
- Akbar remains master of Kabul -The English in spite of the insurrection 
maintain themselves a t  Kandahar-Foresight of Major Rawlinson-Occnr- 
rences in the neighbourhood of that city - Persian account of them - Akter 
Khan, Alizye, besten by the English - Plan of the Afghans to seize Kandahar- 
They are defeated- Second expedition of the English to Kabul - Akbar Khan 
is repulsed at Butkhak - Opinions of the press on this second axpedition - 
What h true and what  is false -Yistakes of the journalist in military mattera 
- The English evacuate Afghanistan - They place Shapoor Mirzaon the throne 
of Kab111- The English give Dost Mohamed his liberty - Akbar Khan returns 
to  Kabul and seizes the sovereign power - Restoration of Dost Mohamed at 
Rabul - Seif der Djing is from Kandahar by Kohendil Khan. 
SHAE SHOOJA left several sons,. of whom four took part in the 
political events that occurred in Afghanistam during the English 
occupation ; these were Timoor Mirza, Fethi Djing Mirza, Seif der 
Djing Mirza, and Shapoor Mirza. 
Although the Shah had appointed a Governor of Kabul pre- 
viously to his violent death, he had also for further security placed 
his second son Fethi Djing in the Bala Hissar. When this prince 
heard of his father's a ~ m i n a t i o n  he shut himself up in the citadel 
wiLh one thousand men of Arab origin who were devoted to him, 
and sent money to his partizan Emin Ullah Khan, Logheree, 
who occupied the suburbs with three thousand men, to distribute 
among the people in his name, and induce them to rise against 
Zekan Khan : this he did, and a bloody combat was maintained 
for two days and two nights, after which Emin UlIah Khan was 
obliged to retire to the Bala Hissar. 
Mohanled Akbar had scarcely recovered from his wound when he 
heard of these events, which determined him immediately to retire 
from the siege of Jellalabad (an undertaking that had hitherto 
proved to him only a source of disappointment), and return in haste 
to Kabul, which he reached twenty days after the death of Shah 
Shooja. Whether i t  was because he did not consider himself in 
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su5cient force, or that he thought the moment unpropitious, the 
serdar did not assume the sovereign power, but resolved in the 
first instance to beguile his enemies into destroying each other, and 
for that purpose allied himself with Zeman, Khan, and prevailed 
on him to assist in seizing the person of the Prince Fethi Djing. 
With their united forces they made four unsuccessful attacks upon 
the Bala Hissar, but at last succeeded in blowing up one of the 
towers of the enceinte, when they rushed in and either killed or 
made prisoners all who were within its walls. 
Zeman Khan wished to put' Fethi Djing to death, but to this 
proposal Mohamed Akbar refused to consent, and not only took 
that prince under his special protection, but made the liveliest 
protestations of devotion to his cause, declaring that he would 
never recognize any other Afghan as his sovereign. The  object J. 
of this apparent generosity was simply to crush more decidedly 
the power of Zeman Khan, who, divining his intention, for- 
tified himself in the suburbs of the town, but in vain, for Mo- 
hamed Akbar attacked and drove him back at  every point, 
and he owed his safety to his formal renunciation of his claims 
to royalty and the post of vizier. After this success Akbar - . 
Khan marcied the daughter of the Serdar Ernin Ullah Khan, an  
alliance which greatly strengthened his party; he was also ap- 
pointed vizier by Fethi Djing, and maintained in the general 
command of the army. But these concessions did not affect his 
original project, and he prepared to bring about the downfall 
of this prince, who, warned of his danger, once more retired to 
the citadel, from which, however, he was forced to retire after a 
siege of forty-eight hours. Akbar immediately seized the treasuxe 
that Shah Shooja had left his son, but suspecting that Fethi Djing 
had secreted a part of it, he ordered his guards not to lose sight of 
him for a moment, nor to allow him to sleep until he had given 
up all the diamonds which he acknowledged were in his possess'ion. 
For three days and nights had the unhappy Fethi Djing Mirza 
been thus tormented, when Khan Shireen Khan, a Kuzzilbash 
serdar, who was secretly of his party, and supported the English, 
found an opportunity of conveying to him two hundred ducats 
with which he bribed his janitors to facilitate his escape. His 
prison was one of the large towers in an angle of the citadel, and 
happily for him a window in it overlooked the town ; from this 
he was lowered by a rope a t  night, and took refuge in the quarter 
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inhabited by the Kuzzilbashes of Djevanchir, a gun-shot from 
the place, where-Khan Shireen Khan secreted him in his own 
house. 
When his escape became known, Akbar Khan sent in pur- 
suit of him in all directions; the strictest search was instituted 
for. about twelve days, but without success, and when all hope of 
discovering him was lost, and the search given up, Fethi Djing 
left his retreat, and under the escort of one hundred Kuzzilbash 
horsemen, reached Jellalabad. It was not known till some time 
after that Khan Shireen Khan had assisted the prince in his 
escape, and though Mohamed Akbar's resentment was great, he 
concealed it, as it was necessary for him t.o keep on terms with this 
serdar. Are not all these intrigues and counter-intrigues the best 
evidence of the instability,of the Afghan character, and of the 
. 
turbulence, constant craving for change, and uncontrollable love 
of bloodshed innate in it ? 
T h e  flight of Fethi Djing Mirzs was the last episode connected 
with the occupation of Kabul by the British. More fortunate 
or better prepared a t  Kandahar, they succeeded in holding that 
city ; a result which was due to the firmness of General Nott, 
and, aboZe all, to the indefatigable activity of Major Rawlin- 
son, who administered the affairs of that Residency with great 
ability." 
T h e  war in this province was the more difficult to conduct be- 
cause the.principality had never been entirely subdued. The Serdar 
Akter Khan, Alizye, who had retired to the district of Zemindavar, 
kept up an  unceasing conflict against the English, and though con- 
stantly beaten, he, in the most undaunted manner, as constantly 
* Major Rawlinson is one of those 
rare characters who are equally capable 
of everything - honournble, firm, en- 
lightened, and conciliatory-he is mi- 
versally beloved. The remembrance 
of his government, which even in 1845 
the author found fresh in the memory 
of the Kandaharians, and could well 
appreciate, tells fnr more in favour of 
the learned and celebrated decipherer 
of the Cuneiform inscriptions than any- 
thing that can be said in commendation 
of that officer's talents. The manner 
in which he defended Kandahar against 
the insurgents will give the  reader only 
a poor idea of the merit and courage of 
this brilliant officer. He may justly be 
classed amongst the great men that 
have been distinguished in the service 
of the East India Company, and it ia 
impossible not to feel astonishment, 
that after such a splendid defence of 
the post entrlisted to his care, his 
talents and fidelity should remain so 
ill-remunerated by his government. 
But, however that may be, such men 
are always elevated above their fellow 
men, and whether they are or are not 
the objects of Government patronage, 
the esteem and admiration of the world 
are theira. - Ferrier. 
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returned to the charge. When the insurrection broke out in  
Kabul the number of his adherents was considerably augmented, 
and the serdars Seidal Khan, Mohamed Attah Khan, Saloo Khan, 
Mir Efzel Khan, and others, with large contingents, then joined 
him. 
Seif der -Djing, the third son of Shah Shooja, who lived a t  Kan- 
dahar, fled from the city to join the insurgents; both father and 
son thus repaying their benefactors the English, to whom they 
owed everything, with the blackest ingratitude. 
Immediately the news of the rising a t  Kabul reached Major 
Rawlinson, he. secretly despatched messengers in every direction 
to call in the scattered troops under the guns of the place. 
H e  likewise ordered the removal of all the provisions from the 
different magazines to the citadel, in which he resided, and 
these wise dispositions were completed before the report of the 
revolt was known in the city. There were at this time in ICan- 
dahar and the suburbs, 4000 Afghan horse, in the pay of the state ; 
these troops were the cause of the greatest uneasiness to Major 
Raalinson, and, in consequence, he sent for Mirza Mohamed 
Khan, Popolzye, the Vizier of Timoor Mirza,* and desired him 
to say whether he was or was not true to the British cause? To  
this question he. replied in the affirmative, when hlajor Rawlin- 
son desired him to give instant proof of his devotion by leaving 
Eandahar with his cavalry, and attacking the Serdar Mohamed 
Attah Khan, who was advancing on the city from Kabul a t  the 
head of the greater part of the insurgent horse. Mirza Mohamed, 
having first received a large sum of money, a t  once set out 
with his division, but, instead of fighting, joined his force to that 
of the rebel chief. On hearing of this piece of treachery, the 
Resident adopted a measure most imperatively necessary to pre- 
serve the corps under General Nott from certain destruction, and 
ordered the greater part of the inhabitants who were of Afghan 
origin to leave the city in the shortest possible space of time, 
permitting only a few to remain besides the Parsees and Hindoos. 
A t  Eandahar the English had nine incomplete battalions, two 
batteries of artillery, and 9 few hundred Indian cavalry, but the 
atter were outside the town and held the country under the com- 
* The eldeet son of Shah Shooja and nally so, for  the English had more 
Governor of Kandahar; but only nomi- power here than at Kabul.-Ferrisr. 
mand of Mr. Pattinson. During my residence a t  Kandahar, 1 
read a Persian account of the mournful event which led t,o the 
death of that officer and one of his comrades named Golding. 
The  simplicity of the document tempted me to translate it in the 
most literal manner, and I give the Persian text in order that 
those readers who are able may judge of the correctness of my 
translation. 
Dou fooudj Djanbaz ez merdum 
Afghan-farsi-Kabonli der Kandshar 
boudend. Douta saheb meuseb in- 
glich serkerde emin dou fooudj 
djanbaz boud. Yeki ismech, Golding 
boud yeki Wilson. Pattinson saheb 
serlcerdi Kull, der tchader Goldiug 
saheb boud. Biroun dervaze Herat 
t c h d e r  zede boudend. Emon cheb 
k6 mi khastend subp iah  beurevend 
der Guirichlc, fooudj Golding saheb 
ril&t.end bala tchader. Er dou saheb 
Khabidk. Boudend der tchader. Dest 
bi: chemchir bala inha rilrhtend, 
Golding saheb kachtend, Pattinson 
saheb ez tchader biroun amed. Yozdeh 
zakhrn chemchir dncht. Pelt noouker 
ouchisr dacht ; asp hazer mi kouned, 
ve khodech poucht saheb savar 
micheved. Emon cheb onra avonrd 
dsr Kandahar. B8 on snheb d ive r ,  
Ire' TVilson saheb bached, khaberclar 
micheved ; Khodechra be' tchader 
saheb misresoned-mi bined lshoun 
busior r i b t e s t  ve' saheban em nis- 
tend-mustereb biroun mi ayed ; mi 
bined yek fooudj djanbaz &mmh 
reftend. Mi ayed miyan fooudj kho- 
dech, migonyet : her guia'n chouma 
em hemek beharam estid, mera beu 
kuched, vB Irhod-tu beorevid ouha 
der djavab mi gouyend : Ehouda nb 
ltouned ! ma nemek be  haram nistim 
- migouyed herguiah nemek b6 
haram nistid ba men bi ayid, E.6 
beurevim Choun be'raderan mara 
higuirim. I n  savar ez emin fooudj 
aspha lrhodra zin mikouned, b8 kadr 
sed savar emera on mi revend, dou 
sed pindja savar ez rassal8h. Hindi, 
alidja mejor Rawlinson, be Homalr 
ou mi furusted, ve gafeul mi rizend 
bala emon fooudj gurikht8. Fursed 
tutyeng indsktk n$ boud, dest bB 
chemchir gnti mi cheved, aliclja Wil- 
Two squadrons of Afghan horse, 
Djanbaz, composed of Yarsivans of 
Kabul, were a t  Kandahar with two 
English officers, Messrs. Golding and 
Wilson. Mr. Pattinson, who had 
the chief command, was in the 
tent of Mr. Golding, and the 
squadrons mere encamped outside the 
Herat gate. On the night preceding 
the day on which they were to march 
to Girishk the troopers of Mr. Gold- 
ing's squadron ru~ihed into the tent 
in which these officers were asleep, 
fell upon them sword in hand and 
killed Mr. Golding. Mr. Pattinson, 
who was mounded in eleven places, 
having subsequently left the tent, 
found his servant an intelligent, and 
faithful man, with his horse ready ; 
this man assisted him to mount, and 
getting up behind him, he brought him 
in to Kandahar the same night. Tho 
news r e d i n g  Mr. Wilson he imme- 
diately rode to the tent of these gentle- 
men, but found only the proof of the 
marderons onslaught in their blood 
on the ground. He withdrew from 
the tent deeply moved, and finding 
that their squadron of djnnbaz had de- 
serted, he at  once returned to his own 
men and said, "If you are traitors 
kill me and be off ;" but the troopers 
replied, " God preserve us from being 
any such thing." " Well then," said 
their officer, " if you are not traitors 
follow me and let us take'revenge for 
the blood of our comrades which has 
,heen shed." The men, about one 
hundred in number, immediately 
saddled their horses, and I~efore leav- 
ing the ground two hundred and 
fifty Indian cavalry, which had 
been sent to his assistance hy Major 
Rawlinson, joined Mr. Wilson, when 
they a t  once set off in pursuit of the 
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son saheb chir del ewe1 savar bond, 
mi ressed. Seta ez serkerdbh-bu- 
zurk-ra ba chemchir mi zened, kuchtb 
chudk ez asp mi indazed eulm mi 
dbd,  ser .yelu-ra mi hourend :- 
Kalender Khan ismech boud emin 
fessad-ra ou Kerdeboud Bagui savar, 
chikest khourdk, rouh b'e guriz mi 
guzarend, aigaih ichan mi revend ta 
busior ez ichan Kaltl ICerde vb euldjb 
busior mi averend, bermigerdend ser 
bourid k Kalender Khan-ra avour- 
dend der Kandahar ; eukm Kerdend 
IrB sB oh rouz der bazar avizou Ker? 
dend. Djartchi Djar k6chid der ba- 
zarha ke' sezye k6si Ire' nemek be 
barami mi kounend. 
deserters. I t  was no affair for fire- 
arms, they came upon the rebels sword 
in hand ; the very exalted Nr. Wilson, 
the lion-hearted, was the first to close 
with them, and killed three of the 
principal chiefs with his own hand, 
striking them off their horses. He 
then ordered the head of one of them, 
Kalender Khan, who had excited the 
men to mutiny, to be cut off, and fol- 
lowed the rebel squadron, which had 
fled in disorder. Be pursued them 
until a great number were killed, and 
they retumed to Kandabar laden with 
their spoils, bringing back with them 
the head of Kalender Khan ; this n7as 
by order placed on a hook in the 
bazaar to remain there three days, 
and a crier stood near, who continmlly 
announced to the passers by, " This 
is the punishment of traitors." 
Treachery was indeed the order of the day with the Afghans ; 
and fanaticism, till then almost unknown to that people, was added 
to it. Aroused by the mollahs, it excited every mind, for these 
sanguinary ministers of Allah unceasingly repeated to the people 
in their sermons and on all other occasions, the verse of the 
Koran which says that to kill an infidel is an act pleasing to God, 
and that every Ghazee .wil l ,  after his death, go to the Garden of 
Paradise, and live in the midst of houris always young and 
beautiful. I s  it astonishing that such teaching should instigate 
this barbarous people to indulge in the most deplorable excesses? 
One example, from amongst a.thousand, will give an idea of the 
state of public feeling at  this time. An officer of the English 
commissariat was making some purchases in the bazaar, when one 
of these fanatics came up to him, and stabbed him in the abdomen 
with his knife. H e  was immediately arrested, bound, and brought 
before Major Rawlinson, who asked him why he had committed 
so vile an act ? " H e  is mad," exclaimed a certain Mirzs Jan, 
a servant of the English, who wished to save his life. "No, 
no," replied the Afghan, eagerly, " I have all my senses about 
me;" and, having heaped upon the Resident every opprobrious 
epithet he could think of, added, " far from repenting of what 
I have done, if I had my knife now, and my hands were freo, 
I would do as much for you." The villain was subsequently 
blown from a gun. 
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But to return to my narrative. The Prince Seif der Djing, 
Akter Khan, Mohamed Attah Khan, and other insurgent chiefs, 
after having united their forces, advanced to within a short distance 
of Kandahar on the 9th of January, 1842, just in time to give a 
small body of six hundred men, commanded by General Nott, the 
opportunity of beating them. They, however, were not demoralized 
by this check, and persevered in trying to carry out their design of 
' 
taking the city ; but wisely judging that their numbers were 
quite unequal to accomplish this object by force, they had recourse 
to an artifice in which they very nearly succeeded. A body of 
from eighteen to twenty thousand Ghazees attempted to ravage the 
environs of Kandahar, when General Nott immediately took the 
field to drive them back. H e  had only eight incomplete battalions 
with him, and a few horsemen; amongst these were a hundred 
Beloochees, commanded by the same Aga Khan whom the English 
sent into the south of Persia in 1841, and who, having failed in his 
enterprise, undertaken for the purpose of raising an insurrection 
there, joined them again. The Ghazees retired slowly on the 
. 
approach of General Nott, skirmishing all the way, to the moun- 
tainous district of Zemindavar, three days' journey from Kandahar, 
whither the British troops had the imprudence to follow them. 
When the insurgent commanders saw that they had succeeded in 
dra&ng the enemy thus far from the city, they left a few cavally 
in his front to occupy their attention, and rapidly returned with the 
bulk of their troops to Kandahar, the garrison of which then con- 
sisted of only seven hundred sepoys and one hundred English 
soldiers, with a single officer. On this occasion Major Rawlinson 
showed as much intelligence as coolness and decision. H e  placed 
his men most judiciously, the Hid_oos on the walls, the few British 
a t  the gates; and with these dispositions once made waited the 
arrival of the enemy in stern tranquillity. 
Towards evening some Afghans appeared a t  the Herat gate 
mith mules laden mith firewood, brought, they asserted, for the 
use of the town, and declaring themselves friends of the Eng- 
lish. T h e  sepoy sentry on the rampart, foolishly believing their 
story, gave them permission to lie down within cannon-shot of 
the place, which most imprudent conduct, as will be seen, nearly 
led to the capture of the city. At  two o'clock in the dark winter 
morning, the faggots, which they had secretly piled against 
the gates, were fired, and a detachment of the insurgent army 
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rushed forward at  a concerted signal and threw themselves into 
the opening made by. the flames. They were received with a 
sharp volley, which did not, however, prevent a few from pene- 
trating to the centre of the city, where they were soon disposed of. 
The combat, nevertheless, still raged with fury round the gate ; the 
British artillery, ably served, mowed down whole ranks of Ghazees : 
and so many Afghans fell there that, entirely obstructing the 
entrance, the bodies formed a rampart for the besieged. Several 
attacks which they made at  other points were perfectly unsuc- 
cessful; and after six hours' hard fighting they retired, leaving 
more than twelve hundred dead under the ramparts. Intelligence 
of what was taking place was immediately sent to General Nott, 
the rapidity of whose movements soon brought him back to Kan- 
dahar, near which the Afghans dared no longer remain, and 
therefore turned their efforts against the little fortress of Girishk. 
This had been confided to the charge of Mohamed Kooli Khan, a 
son of the famous Vizier Fethi Khan, Mohamedzye, who had 
attached himself to the British cause ; the young serdar was not to 
be intimidated either by the threats or by the greatly superior force 
which held him in a state of siege for many months, during which 
lie made a heroic resistance, and a t  the close remained master of 
the place. 
That the English maintained themselves in Kandahar through 
the whole period of the troubles in Kabul was due, as I have already 
remarked, to the talent and courage of Major Rawlinson, whose 
measures enabled him to surmount the most serious difficulties; and 
wait till the relieving army from India arrived to re-establish the 
prestige of the Indo-British arms in that principality. This expe- 
dition obtained permission to pass through the dominions of the 
Maharadjah of the Punjab, and crossed the Indus about the middle 
of the summer of 1842. A s  soon as information of this fact arrived 
a t  Kandahar, four battalions of the garrison and the Beloocli 
cavalry, commanded by the brother of Aga Khan, escorted the 
heavy baggage and guns to Shilrapoor, whence they proceeded to 
India. The five remaining battalions of General Nott's division also 
quitted the city on the 8th of August, 1842, but marched towards 
Kabul, where they effected their junction with the corps d'arme'e 
which had advanced from Peshawur at the. end of the same 
month. 
The Afghans, corhmanded by Mohamed Akbar Khan, left the 
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capital to meet the English, and fell in with them at the village of , 
Bootkak, a distance of fourteen miles from Kabul. Khan Shireen 
Khan, the Huzzilbash Serdar, had joined him, but after the ex- 
change of a few shots he passed over to the English with the five 
thousand horsemen who were under his orders.* 
T h e  battle of Bootkak, the brunt of which fell entirely upon the 
light troops, lasted nearly five hours, when Mohamed Akbar Khan, 
completely beaten, retired to the mountains and thence to Khulm. 
H e  had with him at this time a British officer, whom he had taken 
prisoner in the beginning of the year, and he at  &st thought of 
putting him to  death, but the fear of reprisals which might be 
taken on his family, still in India and in the power of the English, 
suggested to him a nobler line of concluct, and after his flight to 
Khulm he sent this officer to the British camp, escorted by two 
Afghan horsemen; those who had been made prisoners on the 
same occasion, both men, women, and children, having already 
arrived there. Mohamed Akbar had removed them from Zindeh 
on the 28th of May, in  order that they mizht be the more closely . 
watched, for two chiefs had, it was said, offered the English to 
raise two thousand men and deliver the prisoners. They were, 
therefore, dispersed in various fortresses at about an hour's distance 
from Kabul, near the river Logur, and at this time they were 
better lodged and better fed. But when the British force ap- 
proached, Akbar Khan, dreading that they might be carried off, 
and that he should then lose the best ground for any stipulation 
he could hope to make for his exiled family, sent them away on 
the 29th of August towards Bamian, where they arrived on the 
3rd of September, and met with far worse treatment than they had 
.ever experienced. 
After the battle of Bootkak, however, Khan Shireen Khan caused 
search to be made for them by the I<uzzilbashes, who brought them 
safely into camp at Kabul on the 21st September. H e  had pro- 
cured their liberty by his interposition with Mohamed Shah Khan, 
to whom 20,000 rupees in cash and an annual pension of 2000 
more were promised, but never paid. 
* Khan Shireen Khan, the Serdar lies of this tribe are distributed amongst 
Serdnrane of the Kuzzilbashes, has four different serdars, of whom Gholam 
thonsand families under his command, Hoosein Khau, Atchnr, renowned for 
and is much looked up to and feared by his courage, is one, and has authority 
the Afghans. Six thousand more fami- over one thousand families.-Perrier. 
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The Indo-British army remained some days under the walls of 
I h b u l  before they entered the city, and i t  was not till the 9th 
October that Sir R. Shakespear received orders to take in a com- 
pany of sappers, five companies of Her Majesty's 26th and 33rd, 
and five companies of the 31st, the Bengal light cavalry and the 
3rd Irre,dar cavalry. As the inhabitants had fled at the approach 
of the British troops, there was no one to fight: but this o5cer's 
instructions were to destroy several parts of this fine city. On the 
11th the destruction of the magnificent and glorious edifice of Ali 
Murdane Khan, the great emporium of this part of Central Asia, 
was effected, and soon after that of a mosque near the bazaars; 
the bazaars themselves. and every quarter of the city, with the ex- 
ception of the Bala EIissar and the houses of the Kuzzilbashes, 
were treated in the same manner, and nothing was left but a mass 
of ruins. After having destroyed the city, the army retired upon 
Gundamuck, where they arrived almost without resistance on the 
18th, having desolated the country, burnt the residences of the 
native chiefs and the villages on their line of march. On the 21st 
the 1st division, under General Pollock, arrived a t  Jellalabad, and 
was followed by that of General Nott, which reached it on the 
24th. On the 25th October the engineers blew up the bastions 
of Jellalabad, and all the houses were reduced to ashes-this was 
the concluding operation of the retributary expedition, and the 
force commenced its return to India inlmediately after. 
I shall close this episode of the war in Kabul by a quotation 
from the work of Lady gale, who was herself one of the prisoners, 
and who thus speaks of their captivity while sojourning in the 
mountain f~stnesses of the Khyber :-" A woman's vengeance is 
said to be fearful; but nothing can satisfy mine a.gainst Akbar, 
Sultan Jan, and Mohamed Shah Khan. Still I say that Akhar, 
having for his own political purposes done as he said he would do 
-that is, destroyed our army-letting only one man escape to tell 
the tale, as  Dr. Brydon did, and having got the families into his 
possession-I say, having done this, he has ever .since we have 
been in his hands treated us well-that is, honour has been 
respected. I t  is true that we have not common comforts ; but 
what we denominate such are u~~knonrn to Afghan females-they 
always sleep on the floor, sit on the floor, &c. The wuzeer gives 
us rations of meat, rice, ottah, ghee, and oil, and lately fruit. 
A t  first our food was dressed for us, but it was so greasy, and 
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disgusting, that we asked leave to cook for ourselves. It is 
true we have been taken about the country, exposed to heat, 
cold, rain, kc. ; but so were their own women. He has given us 
common coarse chintz and coarse long cloth, too, wherewith to 
clothe ourselves ; but I do not hesitate to repeat that we have 
always been as well treated as captives could have bcen in such a 
country. But while rendering to Akbar Khan the justice that is 
due to him, I shall never forget the injury he has done to England. 
Had  our army been cut to pieces by an avowed enemy, whether in the 
field or the passes, let them have used what stratagems they pleased, 
all had been fair. Akbar had shone as another William Tell : he had 
been the deliverer of his country from a hateful yoke imposed upon 
them by Kaffirs; but here he stands by his own avowal, freely 
made, the assassin of the envoy, not by proxy, but by his own hand. 
H e  treated with his enemies and betrayed them; he massacred 
under his own eyes thousands of men and women dying of cold and 
hunger, whom he had promised to feed and to defend; therefore 
his name will be devoted to eternal opprobrium." 
I have examined most of the journals and reviews of the time, 
in which the British occupation of Afghanistan was discussed, 
and found that all loudly declaimed against the second expedition 
to Kabul-those of London as well as Paris, and especially the 
English opposition press. But why so much heat ? so much party 
spirit ? mhy distort facts or exaggerate them ? It is certain that 
faults were committed, and that bloody catastrophes, even excesses 
according to our ideas, were the consequtnces of that expedition ; 
but such invectives will not repair them. Let us state them with 
the calmness and dignity of civilized people, instead of becoming 
barbarous ourselves in defending barbarians. I n  the course of this 
narrative blame has been awarded wherever it was justly due, and 
impartiality renders it equally a duty to correct the overcharged 
statements of the events and circumstances that are said to have 
occurred in the second invasion of Kabul. The article in the 
Journal des D&bds of January 8, 1848, though written with a 
certain degree of asperity, is on the whole the most moderate that 
up to that time had appeared on the subject in France, and this 
induces me to insert it here, adding a few remarks of my own :- 
" The principal fact that we find in the Monthly &'ail from India, 
which brings us intelligence from Bombay up to the 1st December, 
1842, is the final evacuation of Afghanistan. 
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" Early in November the Indo-British army of the Indus was con- 
centrated at Peshawur, in the kingdom of Lahore, prepared to return 
within the boundaries of British India, where it was expected the 
last brigade would arrive between the 20th and 25th December. 
"The events by which this evacuation will ever be remembered 
are deplorable. In truth, if we wished to take our revenge for the 
declamations of Lord Palmerston-if we wished to fling back upon 
England all the accusations unceasingly made by her press against 
our generals and the system of warfare which they have been forced 
to adopt in Algiers-the task would be easy, indeed more than 
easy. The retreat of General Pollock's force was marked by bar- 
barities as odious as useless : every man who fell into the hands of 
the troops was put to death; and it was not the Afghans who set 
the example of this cruelty, for they had returned safe and sound 
the prisoners of 1841.* 
"Three towns, one of which contains, or did contain, 60,000 in- 
habitants, have been reduced to shes, and why? for what end ? 
For the fruitless pleasure of satisfying the least honourable passion 
of our nature, the passion of revenge. 
'' I t  was not thus that our soldiers and generds behaved in 
Mica.  If the barbarism of our enemies, who knew not, like the 
Afghans, what it is to make prisoners-if the hard necessities of 
war forced our generals to adopt measures of extreme severity- 
they are, a t  least, in pursuit of a definitive object-positive, honour- 
able, glorious. In those severities the ministers of France may, at 
least, find consolation in the hopes of a brighter future ; they have 
the right to believe that they will some day rescue that colony from 
its barbarous condition. The ever increasing sacrifices made by 
France stand as proofs to the world that it is a real and serious 
undertaking, in which the country looks for better things than the 
gratification of brutal passions ; but in ordering these burnings and 
massacres, what object could that general possibly have who was 
immediately to evacuate Afghanistan for ever? 
" ' Istalif,' says the letter of an English officer, 'is a pretty little 
* But were they not the same Af- lish prisoners were returned, it is true; 
gham who, in defiance of a capitula- but would that have been the case if 
tion, agreed t o  by themselves and their Dost Xohamed had not been the pri- 
chiefs, to allow the British army to soner of Lhe East India Company 2- 
make good its retreat, masacred that Fet-riw. 
army to  the very last man? The Eng- 
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town of 15,000 * inhabitants, against whom we had nothing to say 
unless that their town stood half way between Kabul and Charikar, - 
where one of our Goorkha regiments (irregular cavalry) t was 
destroyed the year before by the Afghans.' As, then, they were 
pressed for time and could not push on to Charikar, Istalif was 
punished. A brigade, under the orders of General MM'Caskill, 
entered it early in September, after a trifling engagement, and 
proceeded to put to the sword every one who had not succeeded in 
making his escape. I t  appears that even the dead and wounded were 
not respected. The sepoy soldiers, in the excess of their unmiti- 
gable cruelty, set fire to the cotton clothing of their victims, and 
thus burned the dead and dying, which would, according to their . 
superstitious notions, call down a curse on the descendants of those 
whose remains were thus disposed of without the honours of sepul- 
ture. After the slaughter six hundred women remained in the 
hands of the victors, who set them a t  liberty. Were they respected, 
as had been the European ladies who fell into the power of the 
Afghans after the disasters at Kabul the winter before 'l' I t  does 
not seem that the soldiers saw their prisoners taken from them 
with much satisfaction. 
"Two soldiers of the 9th infantry of the Royal army had at the 
same moment seized a pretty girl of fourteen years of age, and, not 
wishing to fight for the possession of the prize, they agreed to de- 
cide it with the dice,-with this condition, that the winner should 
make her an honest woman and marry her the first time he should 
meet with a priest to bless their union. The dice thrown, the suc- 
cessful player was walking off with the bride elect on his arm, when 
he received an order to set her at liberty. I n  vain he entreated 
and asserted his good intentions; he was obliged to give her up, 
and it was not without regret. 
" A captain of the 26th, having selected one from amongst a 
group of distracted beauties, ~ u r c h a e d  for his sultana a magnifi- 
cent trousseau of the embroidered vests and trousers worn by 
Afghan women of rank, which after the sack of the town were sold 
for next to nothing ; but scarcely had he time to present them to 
the lady, when the order arrived to set her free : she did not require 
to be told twice, but fled as fast as her legs would carry her. 
* At the outside 4000.-Pem'er. cruited in the hill country at the base 
t Infantry -admirable troops, re- of the Himalaya.-Translator. 
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' Ah,' said the captain, as she disappeared ; ' if I had known all 
the ingratitude of the female heart, they would never have caught 
me buying these garments.' 
" ARer being regularly pillaged, Istalif was given up to the 
flames, and the brigade of General M'Caskill returned to Kabul, 
where another tragedy was to be performed. 
"The work of destruction there was accomplished with a re- 
finement of systematic barbarity and cunning which it is difficult 
to believe. Arriving under the walls of the capital on the 15th of 
September, the English found it deserted ; for the examples they 
had already made put the whole population to flight. Occupied 
entirely with the recovery of the English prisoners, General 
Pollock had never manifested any evil intention against the city ; 
the army was encamped outside, guards were placed at the gates, 
and the soldiers forbidden to pass them : it might have been sup- 
posed that it was a friendly army, .an army of pious devotees, for 
the Rev. Mr. Allen took advantage of the inactivity of the troops 
during these few days of rest to preach several sermons upon the 
mercy of God, who had permitted the return of their captive 
comrades. The event was celebrated by a solemn service, at  which 
all the troops attended, and men selected from the 13th light 
infantry sang the Psalms. The strict discipline of the army, and 
these religious exercises, restored in some degree the confidence of 
the wretched inhabitants, and a great many ventured to return to 
their houses. I t  was then, that is to say on the 9th of October, 
that General Pollock ordered Colonel Richmond Shakespear to 
enter Kabul with his brigade, and, with the exception of the Bala 
Hissar, and the quarter inhabited by the I<uzzilbashes,* who had 
always been friendly to the English, to destroy the city and give it  
up to the flames. 
A t  Jelldabad the same scenes were enacted, and it  isperhaps 
still more difficult to understand why that place was treated with 
such severity. When, in the November of 1841, General Sale, 
harassed by the Ghildjzyes, and almost overcome by numbers, pre- 
sented himself at the gates, the inhabitants opened them to him 
without resistance. He had brought with him only two days' pro- 
visions, but they supplied him as well as they were able-moreover, 
* These Ruzdlbashes me the same favouring whom he considered Dost 
people that Lord Auckland accused of Mohamed guilty of a crime. See his 
being hostile to the British, and in Lordship's Sinla, manifesto.-Eemkr. 
on credit. When he afterwards saw that he could not be relieved 
before the spring and must therefore pass the winter in the tom,  
and found that, to avoid being destroyed with his small garrison 
by famine, he was compelled to drive out the inhabitants, they left 
their homes without a murmur, and their provisions in them. Why 
then was this town so completely destroyed and burnt ?" 
" Here then are 100,000 people whose houses have be'en burnt 
just a t  the commencement of winter, and in a country too where that 
season is almost as severe as in Russia. Frightful as all this is, the 
most odious feature in these cruel transactions is that, in conducting 
the war as they have done upon the inhabitants of the towns only, 
the English have punished the inoffensive part of the population, 
and not the tribes who in 1841 destroyed the army of General 
Elphinstone. I n  Afghanistan, as in Algeria, the warlike tribes 
wander about with their flocks ; the towns are inhabited only by 
Jews, Armenians, Hindoos, Cashmeerians, Tajiks, slaves, merchants, 
workpeople, handicraftsmen, that is to say, by strangers, who by 
nature and interest are peaceable, and who have never been known 
to have a musket in their hands.? 
" In  all the w a s  of which this unhappy country has been so long 
the theatre, these are the people who have to bear the brunt of 
British vengeance : it is unworthy of the nation. As  they had de- 
termined that revenge they would have, those who should have 
been pursued were the Ghildjzyes, the Afreedees, the Chinnarees, 
the Mohmunds, the Othman-Kails-all those, in fact, whom General 
Pollock took care not to seek in their mountain fastnesses, and 
instead wreaked his vengeance upon the citizens. In a word, 
General Pollock has done that which a French General would 
do, who, having to punish a revolt of the Flittas or Beni-amers, in 
Algeria, should burn Mostaganem or Blascara ; he has committed 
barbarities without excuse.$ 
" Nevertheless it should be said that public opinion in India has 
* The necessities of war are inex- of Kabul were as warlike as the no- 
orable ; md withhis knowledge of the mades, and in the whole principality 
Afghan character, General Sale only there are not six Jews or Armenians.- 
did what the dictatetea of prudence corn- Fmier. 
manded for the safety of the troops $ The case is quite otherwise, for 
undorhis orders. After all, it wu only the townspeople in Afghanistan are, as 
what Davoust clid in defending Ham- we have already said, quite as warlike 
burg, and what m y  other general in as those of the country, and are more 
the same position would have done.- dangerous and ferocious in a revolt.- 
Brricr. Fmie~... 
t Utterly erroneous: the inhabitants 
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already raised its voice against these ignoble and atrocious excesses, 
neither do we doubt that in England indignation will be felt by 
every generous heart. However, the Governor-General, Lord 
Ellenborough, is preparing a magnificent reception at Ferozepore 
for the victorious army of Afghanistan. Invitations have been sent 
to all the native princes to attend the military f&tes, which will, it 
is said, eclipse the splendour of the courts of the ancient Mogul 
Emperors ; a magnificent triumphal arch is now in course of con- 
struction, through which the army of the Indus is to defile, followed 
by, as trophies of its victories, the gates of the tomb of Mahmood 
the ~haznevide, that were captured at Ghuznee, and the twenty- 
four pieces of cannon taken in 1839 from Dost Mohamed. This 
last detail is not the least curious part of the ceremony, for it is 
well known that the English army returned from Afghanistan 
having lost its own artillery there ; the guns were either taken by 
the Afghans or destroyed by order of the British Generals, who 
had no means of transport for them." 
" Dost Mohamed and his family, and all the Afghans now 
prisoners in India, will be present a t  these Gtes, after which the 
Governor-General will allow them to return as they may think fit 
to their own country. 
"The government of British India will then believe itself free , 
of all obligation to Afghanistan : it introduced disorder and made 
war there for three years, and left anarchy which may last for 
ages."t 
The Afghans, from whom I sought to procure evidence by 
which to test the truth of all the facts that have been related 
respecting the English occupation of Afghanistan, unfortunately 
confirmed them, but with various modifications, which considerably 
lessen the gravity of some of them. They affirm that, in  spite of 
the cruelties and excesses of which, in 1841, they were guilty to 
the English, the latter showed themselves more humane than could 
have been expected, and that it was just, because they knew they 
deserved the utmost punishment that could be inflicted upon them ; 
* All this display was indeed mis- sion on the Sikhs, the natives of India, 
placed ; i t  was sdiciently painful to and doubtful alliea, and that must have 
be reduced to the hard necessity of so been quite as muchLord Ellenborough's 
severely punishing the Afghans, without object as the gratiiication of a puerile 
adding the mockery of a triumph which -Ferriev. 
could not exist, as there had been is is true, perfectly true. - 
little or no fighting. But the proces- Terrier. 
sion was intended to make an impres- 
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that they abandoned the capital, where the houses were not burnt 
any more than at Istalif, for the simple reason that, being built 
of earth, they are not combustible. But it is true t,hat the bazaars 
at Kabul, which were considered the finest in Afghanistan, were 
mined and destroyed, as well as some of the adjacent houses. I t  
is therefore untrue, as stated by the Journal  des De'bats, that 
100,000 persons were left without shelter. 
I t  is also untrue that the Afghan towns are inhabited by inoffen- 
sive people ; at Kabul the Jews are not tolerated, and at the outside 
there are not more than two or three Armenian families there. 
The mass of the population is of Afghan origin ; and whatever be 
the occupation of an individual of that nation, he is above all 
things warlike, turbulent, a lover of pillage, murder, and devasta- 
tion. Proof of this might be found in a thousand instances, but 
I name but one, the death of the unfortunate Burnes, who was 
attacked in his house by these same shopkeepers who are depicted 
as such peaceable people. As I have said before, it was these ' 
shopkeeper or merchant soldiers" and other Ghazees, who especially 
outraged the English, and who therefore, on their second arrival, 
deserted their homes to take shelter in Istalif, a small fortress 
which they thought was impregnable, but from which they were 
driven after only six hours' fighting. The population of that town 
is 3000 or 3500 souls; and if it held 15,000 when the English 
attacked it, it is to the emigration from Kabul that the augmenta- 
tion must be ascribed. The fugitives proceeded to this little town 
with their families and baggage, believing they would be safe from 
any hostile attempt; the English soon undeceived them, and many 
suffered the fortune of war ; but the Afghans do not estimate 
their loss, both at  Istalif and Kabul, higher than four hundred and 
fifty men. 
As to the sack of Jellalabad, the history of that episode has also 
been exaggerated. The fortifications that General Sale threw up 
for his own defence were demolished in order that the Afghans might 
not benefit by them, and the adjacent houses fell with them. But 
the greatest misconception that exists on the subject is to attribute 
generosity of feeling to Akbar Khan, because he took the English 
ladies under his protection and preserved them from outrage. 
* In Afghanistan the soldiers are not his family, and there are sometimes 
formed into. regiments, they a e  an several thousands of them in a town.- 
undisciplined militia; each man lives in Terrier. 
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I t  has been ascertained by the author, in a manner which admits 
of no doubt, that, although they were respected, that fact in no way 
redounds to the credit of Dost Mohamed's son, for he had more 
than once in his own mind divided them amongst the harems of 
some young serdars, his debauched companions. For himself he 
had reserved the daughter of General Sale, and his confidential 
conversations with others were frequently enlivened by the prospect 
of this distribution. One night in particular, after a series of 
orgies, these ladies were in the most imminent danger, and i t  was 
averted only by a riot in Kabul which suddenly called Mohamed 
Akbar to the scene of action. When, however, this chief was not 
excited by wine, he allowed but little to be said on the subject, 
because he remembered that his father was in the power of the 
British, and he dreaded how far the Dost and the females of his 
family wo~dd be made to suffer if he carried out his brutal inten- 
tions. The English might have been reassured as to the fate of the 
captives in Afghanistan, for the same reasons that caused Akbar 
to respect them ; and when they undertook the second expedition 
to that country, it was not because it was impossible to deliver 
them otherwise, for they could have exchanged the Dost and his 
wives and children for them, but they were determined to prove to 
the Afghans that the disasters they had suffered in 1841 were not 
of a nature to damage their power, and that they were perfectly 
able to take and occupy their country whenever it might please 
them to do so. So convinced of that fact were the Afghans them- 
selves, that they laid down their arms immediately after the battle 
of Bootkak, and the British might again have held Kabul by 
adopting wiser and more politic measures than they did after the 
first invasion. 
But they did not hold it, and were certainly right; for if this 
possession had not proved a dead weight upon their treasury, it 
certainly would not have enriched it. I t  could be of no use to 
them, excepting as an advanced post against the ambitious schemes 
of Russia ; but until the Caucasus is completely subjugated, i t  is 
unlikely that power should undertake any enterprise in earnest in 
Central Asia, and from this time till then Iiabul may be left to 
itself.* After having sought, and with great care, every species of 
information connectect with the second expedition to Kabul, I am 
* Since the English conquered the right bank of that  river east of Kabul, 
upper part of the Indus they have and could take Afghanistan in leas than 
commanded nll the countries on the :L month.-Arrier. 
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convinced that I have obtained proof that the actions attributed to 
the English, and which are to be regretted, took place, but have 
- been g~ossly exaggerated in their consequences. For the rest, 
having stated the pro and con, each reader must form his own 
judgment. I t  will be most difficult to bring those who know the 
character and policy of the Afghans to believe that an Indo-British 
army could follow the one that had been exterminated in that 
country, and be indifferent or forgetful of the cruelties that the 
victims who preceded them had suffered. One would have a rela- ' 
tion, another a friend, to avenge; and then the Indian soldiers, 
with their religious ideas, view these things so differently from 
Europeans, that I believe it would be impossible for their com- 
m a ~ ~ d e r s  to stop the fearful deeds suggested by their love of revenge, 
or rather that feeling which they believe to be their duty. 
1 am far from constituting myself the apologist of these severities ; 
. but I have seen war in Asia and in Africa, and know, unhappily 
by experience, that. it is impossible to conduct it as in Europe, where, 
in the majority of states, the rights of individuals are respected. 
I n  vain may we declaim against bloodshed ; we shall never be able 
to convert the battle-field into a drawing-room, where all parties 
are bent upon the interchange of civilities. When I hear i t  said, 
a how many thousands of Circassians the Russian soldiers have 
slain," or " the French have bathed in the blood of the Arabs !" or 
" the English have sacrificed myriads of Hindoos to their cupidity ;" 
when I hear i t  said that the troops of these nations " are the scum 
of the earth-wretches who have outraged all laws, human and 
divine," I cannot refrain from cursing the people who say so- . 
men, or rather not men, who possess the miserable courage to speak 
in favour of barbarians, while they can find only an accusing voice 
when they speak of the soldiers of their country. Unhappy mad- 
men that  ye are ! do ye not know that such enemies take your 
clemency for weakness, your forbearance for fear ?-that they have 
no gratitude but to the God of Islam, who withholds the infidel 
arm that would have killed them-that their religion enjoins them 
to massacre without pity or remorse? 
T h e  remedy lies precisely in that in which you see the evil. W a r  
has its severities, and they are great, therefore it ought not to be 
undertaken but for sound and legitimate reasons ; that is saying 
enough, and I have not failed to admit that I never approved the 
one undertaken by the English against the Afghans. But the acts 
of a government are not to be confounded with those of its soldiers : 
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to the former all reprobation-to the latter, for their many suffer- 
ings and hardships, a few encouraging words is no more than their 
due. It is easy to forget them in the lazy tranquillity of the closet 
-it is easy to judge of facts, and in a very humane point of view, 
when sitting by the fire in a well-stuffed easy chair; but those who 
endure the misery-who, as the reward of mercy shown in the heat 
of battle, receive a sword-thrust or a bullet in the breast-who have 
submitted to tortures worse a hundred times than death, and who 
then see themselves calumniated and slandered by those who ought, 
on the contrary, to have exalted their deeds-,& them what they 
think of your system ? Ask the many English, French, and 
Russian generals, wearied to death with warring against Mussul- 
mans, or consult the writings of others, and they will tell you what 
is the fruit of your imprudent comments. You destroy the energy 
of national spirit, and set bounds to nothing but the prosperity 
of your country; had I any authority over you, you wretched 
scribblers, I would order you no other punishment than to practise 
the generosity that you preach with so much volubility. Go, bear 
the musket for a couple of years only in Algeria, at  Tiflis, or Cal- 
cutta, and when you return let us resume the conversation. 
I n  assigning to the English expedition of 1842 'the probable 
object of re-establiihing the reputation of the Indo-British arms in 
Afghanistan, I have not pretended to justify it ; but if the govern- 
ment of Calcutta had other and more positive reasons for launching 
into such an increase of expenditure, the public had on its side a 
right to be surprised at the precipitate return of that army without 
having effected more than the death of a few hundred men, and the 
destruction of a bazaar and a few houses. This leaves ground for 
the supposition that they never knew too well why they went to 
Kabul, or why they came lack, and induced one writer to say that 
" the E n g l i i  retired from Kabul with a precipitation resembling 
the retreat of a beaten army as much as t-he march of a victorious 
one." Neither can it be believed that t.hey went simply with the 
intention of reestablishing the legitimate dynasty ; but, if such was 
their intention, then it can only be said that they were not more 
fortunate in the second expedition than in  the first. 
Before the English left Kabul they pressed Fethi Djing Mirza to 
re-assume the regal authority, hoping that, with his own troops and 
their moral support, he might maintain himself in power after their 
return to India. But that prince was not dazzled by the splendid 
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illusion ; he knew full well that, as soon as his nominal protectors 
had departed, he should have Akbar Khan upon his hands, and, ' 
being determined not to expose himself to the danger of a repe- 
tition of the treatment that he had received from that Serdar, he 
declined the offer. I t  was, however, accepted by his young brother, 
Shapoor Mirza, who was very soon destined to see the entire 
destruction of the ambitious hopes in which his inexperienced miud 
had indulged. His  elder brother's anticipations were realised ; for 
scarcely was the last detachment of the British army out of sight 
and across the Indus, when Mohamed Akbar reappeared a t  Kabul, 
attacked and beat the Mirza, carried off his riches, and obliged 
him to take to flight. T o  the English i t  was now indifferent 
whether he held his ground or not;  they had found out though 
late that Burnes was right in rejecting the idea of restoring the 
Suddozyes to the prejudice of the Mohamedzyes; and the proof 
of this assertion is that Dost Mohamed arrived on the 19th 
December a t  Shikapoor, accompanied by Captain Nicholson, who 
was attached to his escort, and was some days after forbally set a t  
liberty. Free to go where he liked or to do what he pleased, 
the Emir hesitated not a moment, but instantly took the road to 
Afghanistan. On his arrival at Lahore he was received with great 
state by Shere Sing, then Maharadjah of the Punjab, and the 
English conjectured that these princes made a secret treaty; 
but this was only one of the grievances of which they always 
assume the existence when they wish to obtain possession of a 
country. T h e  fact was, the Directors were so astounded at the 
deficit in their treasury caused by the Afghan war, that they did 
not know what to be about, and were highly indignant at  the 
brilliant reception given to the Emir of Kabul by the sovereign of 
the Sikhs. 
During the time that the Dost was whiling away precious hours 
in the enjoyment of the pleasures of the court of Lahore, his son 
Mohamed Akbar Khan had infinite trouble in managing the 
various parties that had been formed in Kabul, which, t,hough at 
first subdued, were now becoming rampant. 
Shooja ed Dooulet (the murderer of Shah Shooja), son of Zeman 
Khan, and Chems Eddin his cousin, both nephews of Dost Mo- 
hamed, succeeded in reconstituting the party of Zeman Khan, and 
forced Akbar Khan to retire into the citadel, where they besieged 
him for seventy-three days. Intelligence of this fact and his cri- 
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tical position reached the Dost at Lahore, who, being unable him- 
self to go with sufficient rapidity to Kabul, sent his four sons, 
Mohamed Efzel Khan, Mohamed Akrem' Khan, Mohamed Azim 
Khan, and Goulam Haidar Khan, to the assistance of their be- 
leaguered brother. Furnished with a firman from the Maharadjah, 
and with one attendant only, the ssrdars se t  out inimediat.ely, 
changed their horses a t  every village, and, pursuing their anxious 
journey night and day, scarce drew bridle till they reached 
Kabul, accomplishing the distance in ten days from Lahore. T h e  
great exertions of the princes were indeed all important to the 
cause, for when they arrived Mohamed Akbar was at bay in the 
citadel with only two days' provisions. These four young men had 
been ,brought up in Kabul, and were beloved by the inhabitants, 
who had had many opportunities. of witnessing their youthful 
courage, and their appearance at  once caused a diversion in 
favour of their brother, who eventually triumphed over his ene- 
mies. The return of the Emir himself, which took place very 
shortly after, put an end to all further contest; and on re- 
mounting the throne, from which he had been t.hree years 
banished, he at  once applied himself to the task of effacing the 
sad traces of the anarchy brought into his dominions by the Eng- 
lish invasion. 
A t  Kandahar, which was also abandoned, General Nott and 
Major Rawlinson tried to induce Timoor Mirza, the eldest son of 
Shah Shooja, to remain at  the head of affairs in that principality. 
But the prince coveted not the cares of a throne. Satisfied that the 
royal honours of ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n  were lost for ever to the Suddozyee, 
he thought that dynasty ought to give way to the Mohamedz'yes, 
and refused the offer, preferring to return to India, where he hoped 
to live a life of tranquillity, much more in accordance with his own 
tastes. Upon his declining, the English proposed to his brother 
Seif der Djing that he should assume the government. T h e  
reader will remember that this prince had formerly betrayed 
them, and made common cause with the insurgents, but his union 
with the latter was not of 1ong.duration; the death of his father 
completely destroyed it, and he made his submission to and rejoined 
those whom he had. previously abandoned. The Serdar Mohamed 
Kooli Khan, son of the vizier Fethi Khan, was given him for a 
minister, and by thus dividing the power between a Mohamedzye 
who had always been faithful, to them, and a Suddozye who had 
2 c 
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deserted them, though he became more firmly attached to them 
afterwards-balancing one against the other-the English hoped 
to retain their influence in this important city. But the plan 
proved only one more illusion to be added to those by which they 
had been so often misled, for, about four months after they left 
Seif der Djing to his own resources, Kohendil Khan returned 
from Persia and manifested his intention of regaining if possible 
his principality of Kandahar. For some little time he remained 
on the banks of the Helmund, where he was joined by the Serdars 
Akter Khan, Ser Firaz Khan, Shah Pecend Khan, and others ; 
and, when he saw himself in sufficient force, he marched upon his old 
capital to dispossess Seif der Djing. ,4s to Mohamed Kooli Khan, 
he a t  once abandoned the prince, and passed over to the camp of 
his uncle. Nevertheless, Seif der Djing did not allow himself to 
be discouraged by the defection of his minister, and gave battle to 
Kohendil Khan at Haooz Singsar, twenty-eight miles west of the 
city ; but a t  the very first charge he saw one-half of his army run 
, 
away, and the other fraternise with his enemy. Kohendil Khan 
took immediate possession of the capital, amid the acclamations of 
the inhabitants, who had not, however, the happiest reminiscences 
of his previous administration, and the serdar possibly mistook 
the cause of these congratulations ; they were-not for him, but for 
the success of the principle represented in his person-the choice 
of the masses, to the exclusion of divine right-the one representing 
Afghan liberty, the other English domination. 
Seif der Djing after his discomfiture was unable to reach and 
defend Kandahar, and obliged to turn off the road : it was not 
without di5culty and danger that he gained Shikapoor. Thence 
he went on to India, whither his brothers had preceded him. 
T h e  battle of Haooz Singsar was the last episode connected 
with the British occupation of Afghanistan, whither the East India 
Company had sent its army to die and its treasure to vanish ! 
'' Such was the conclusion," says an intelligent and clever author, 
" of this war, and of the policy of Lord Palmerston, vacillating at  
first, violent a t  the close. Rather than keep the grand and 
straightforward path in which states of the highest order should 
proudly and gracefully tread, in which they can honourably meet 
and encounter each other-rather than meet the Russians face to 
face-he preferred disputing with then1 on distant ground and by 
paltry counter-manmuvres, a policy which could only engulf his 
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fortunes, for that was really the finale of the negotiations 
of which we have gven an epitome, and which terminated the sad 
series of reserve, duplicity, shuffling, and circumspection towards 
Russia. I n  this it all ended. The first consequence of his Lord- 
ship's policy in Asia was the expedition of Lord Auckland, the 
second the massacre of the British army by the Afghans, the third 
reprisals upon the Afghans, and, lastly, the absurd triumph of 
Lord Ellenborough at  Ferozepore. God preserve England from 
any more such ; God preserve her ! But it is not the less true 
that, having exasperated the political animosities and roused the 
religious fanaticism of Central Asia under the pretence of adding 
to the terror of her name, she has reduced it everywhere-she 
has extinguished the hatred of the Russian name that formerly , 
existed-she has destroyed the respect for her own strength, and 
spread the fear of that power which she dared not to attack but 
in an indirect manner-she has herself been- the pioneer of a 
Muscovite invasion." 
Without adopting the deductions of the writer I have just 
quoted, it may be stated, and without fear of contradiction, that 
previously to their ill-starred expedition to Kabul the English 
never met with anything but sympathy in Afghanistan ; opinion is 
now much divided about them, and the majority of the chiefs are 
hostile to them. The feeling in favour of them is rather to be 
found amongst the people, who, with due allowance for their 
fanaticism, have not forgotten the equitable administration of the 
invaders, and still regret that it was not continued by their own 
Afghan rulers. In any c&e England must nob be convinced 
of the soundness of the advice given by Sir Alexander Burnes. 
His antagonists were Sir C. Wade, Sir W. M'Naghten, and Sir 
J. M'Neil, and their policy was accepted by Lord Auckland. 
IJpon these four individuals may England charge the responsibiIity 
of her disasters ; and upon Burnes did their evil counsel bring the 
penalty of death: unhappily the survivors cannot replace to their 
country the loss it sustained in his death and in that of so many 
other officers-men possessing scientific acquirement, indomitable 
courage, aud a hopeful future. 
STATE OF KABUL. 
C H A P T E R  XXVI. 
State of. Kabul after the return of Dost Mohamed- Antagonistic feeling between 
the Emir and his son Akbar Khan -Ambitious projects of the latter- War 
between the Dost and the Walee of Khulm - Reasons for this rupture - Akbar 
Khan wishes to dispossess Kohendil Khan of Kandahar - Also to  join the Sikhs 
against the English-His rupture with the Dost - Marriage of Akbar with the 
daughter of Pa r  Mohamed Khan-Intrigues of Kohendil Khan to prevent this 
union -Demonstration of Akbar Khan against Kandahar - He requests the 
assistance of the Shah of Persia - ~avourable reply of that aovereign-Akbar 
obliges his father to  withdraw from the direction of aEairs- Death of' Akbar 
Khan- Revolt of Nohamed Shah Khan -Dost Mohamed forces him to rehu-n 
-to his duty - Alliance between Persia andKabul - The English are alarmed - 
Embarrassment of the Emir-Sultan Mohamed Khan returns to Kabul- 
Reception by the Dost- The Emir appoints his sou Haidar Khan vizier- The 
Dost joins the Sikhs against the English-Antipathy of the Afghans to the 
Sikhs, and vice versd-Doat Mohamed takes Attock- His cavalry is defeated by 
the English - Owes his escape to the fleetness of his horse. 
IF absolute calm was not the immediate consequence of the return 
of Dost Mohamed to his dominions, it a t  least produced a suspen- 
sion of hostilities amongst the various parties in the state. T h e  
majority of his countrymeu rallied round him, but still it was found 
impossible to re-establish the same governmental unity that had 
existed before the English invasion ; the serdars, especially those 
belonging to the Ghildjzye tribe, rendered an obedience far less 
implicit than before, and, though always commanding the respect 
of his people, the Dost found that he had lost much of that 
, 
veneration of which he had formerly been the object. This was 
a consequence of his residence in India: in the eyes of the 
Afghans he had contracted a kind of pollution from which he 
could never purify himself ; they could not forgive him for 
having appreciated British civilization, and looked upon his efforts 
for their improvement alnlost in the light of a crime. 
Akbar Khan, the heir-presumptive of his power, was far from 
+ '. approving of the new policy. Strongly imbued with the same 
prejudices as the mass of the Afghans, he detested the English, 
',. 
though he was fully sensible of their superiority in the arts of war 
and government. After he had entrapped a r ~ d  murdered Sir TV. 
M'Naghten he felt persuaded that the blood he had shed must be 
redeemed by his 06, and that his enemies could not without dis- 
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honour abstain from taking revenge upon him for that detestable 
crime ; thus circumstances quite as much as his own desire threw 
him into a line of conduct different from that of his father, and he 
persevered in his opposition the more tenaciously inasmuch as it 
was in unison with the opinions of the greater number of his 
countrymen, who lavished upon him much of the affection that had 
hitherto been bestowed upon the Emir. 
Mohamed Akbar vowed therefore an implacable hatred against 
the English, and the tenacity of his opposition to them, in despite 
of all his father's remonstrances, denoted his firm determination 
not to rest until he had given them a check sufficiently important 
to disgust them for ever with the idea of attempting further con- 
quests in the north of Asia. H e  commenced his preparations by 
inflaming the minds of his soldiers with the wi!dest and most 
seductive promises, while his father spared no pains in endeavour- 
ing to calm his imprudent ardour and that of his adherents, to 
extinguish the feuds of the various parties in the principality, and 
to re-establish security in the hope of giving a salutary impulse to 
the interests of commerce and agriculture. But Mohamed Akbar, 
who saw everything through the prism of his own fanatical feelings, 
and was dazzled with the enthusiasm that his success and con- 
stant opposition to the English had excited in the minds of the 
Afghans, ruined, by the support that he gave to his own turbulent 
followers, the wise and ,beneficial measures concerted by his father 
for the improvement, independence, and prosperity of his dominions. 
The post of vizier which had been conferred upon Mohamed Akbar 
by Fethi Djing, and in which his father so imprudently retained 
him, gwe  him great influence in the affairs of government, and he 
used this in a manner very detrimental to their future prospects. 
H e  indulged in dreams of re-establishing the Afghan kingdom in 
the plenitude of its ancient glory and power, and obtaining pos- 
session of the other Afghan principalities, the Usbek Khanats, the 
Punjab, and Beloochistan ; even these would not satisfy his ambition, 
and British India was in his eyes a prize on which he imagined 
that he should be able some day to lay his hands. Little could 
be urged against those day dreams if he had intended to carry 
them out in  the spirit of ameliorating the condition of the nations 
whom he intended to subjugate ; but as  he would only have renewed 
the bloody episodes that have rendered mournfully celebrated the 
reigns of Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane, much cause is there fay 
390 ILL FEELING BETWEEN FATHER AND SON. C ~ A P .  X D I .  
rejoicing that the Emir opposed, with unshaken firmness and a 
sincere desire for peace, these warlike and unreflecting manifes- 
tations of Akbar Khan. 
The disorganization of the Sikhs and the inroads of the British 
on their territory were the occasions of the first serious outbreak 
between the father and son; for the latter, seeing that Dost Mo- 
hamed opposed his marching to the assistance of his neighbours, 
and was unalterably determined not to take the initiative in any 
act of aggression which could again bring the English upon him, 
was a t  one moment on the point of breaking with his father com- 
pletely. H e  was a t  this time about to marry the daughter of Yar 
Mohamed Khan, and endeavoured to interest the vizier in his - 
schemes, informing him that he had decided on withdrawing for a 
time from Kabul, and requesting he would assign him a district in 
his dominions where he could establish himself with those Afghans 
who were attached to him and intended to follow hi's fortunes. But 
, 
Yar Nohamed saw many objections to complying with this de- ' 
mand ; he interfered only so far as to induce the Dost to endea- 
\. 
vour to calm the excitability of his son, and the difficul'ty was 
overcome by a concession on the part of the Dost, who pro- 
mised to send five hundred Afghan horse to his brother and' 
former enemy, Sultan Mohamed Khan. This serdar was serving 
with the Sikhs, for he had been invested with the government of 
Rotas, after Runjeet Sing seized Peshawur ; and as Nawab Djabbar 
Khan, also a brother of the Emir, was suspected of having pre- 
served some sympathy for the English, Mohamed Akbar sought 
to compromise him in their eyes by intrusting to his son, Abdul 
Ghyaz Khan, the command of these five hundred cavalry. Rut 
this demonstration against the Anglo-Indian government was not 
su5cient to satisfy Akbar Khan ; he wanted his uncle Rohendil 
Khan to join him, and on his refusal threatened to invade his 
territory. H e  would probably have carried this threat into execution, 
but for an unforeseen event of which i t  is supposed the Dost was 
not altogether ignorant; his son desired war a t  all risks, and in 
this wish he contrived to indulge him in the following manner :- 
Dost Moharned had not forgotten the ill-treatment he and his 
family had received from the Emir of Bokhara, and manifested a 
desire of taking revenge by proclaiming war against him. He 
also wished to occupy Balkh, then governed by Ichane Suddoor, 
under the suzerainty of Nasser Ullah, but to reach that town it 
CHAP. SXVI. F A R  BET'I.VEEM THE DOST RHULM. 391 
was necessary to traverse the territory of Khulm, and the Walee 
of that principaliCy positively refused to allow the Afghans to 
pass through it, well knowing what would be the result if he 
consented. "If you have any complaint against the Emir of 
Bokhara," he wrote to the Dost, " I will espouse your quarrel and 
fight him myself, but if you violate my territory I will join him * 
against you." 
The  negotiations stood thus, and Dost Mohamed, who remem- 
bered the Walee's kindness to him, was on the eve of withdraw- 
ing his proposition, when Akbar Khan, who also ought to have 
been grateful for the generous conduct of the Walee to himself, 
complicated the whole affair by committing an abduction, which, 
in the opinion of many Afghans, did him more honour than all his 
triumphs over the English. On leaving Khulm,-Mohamed Akbar 
brought with him from thence a youth belonging to the Khan of 
that district for a purpose which shdl be nameless. This fact was 
of sufficient importance to induce the Walee to declare war, and 
Akbar sent his brother, Akrem Khan, at the head of ten thousand 
horse against the Usbeks. Three battles were fought'in 1845 and 
1846, but without deciding the quarrel, nevertheless the Khan of 
Khulm became uneasy, for his rear was threatened by the Emir of 
Bokhara ; he returned 'therefore to his capiial and Akrern Khan 
to Kabul, where his brother continued to spend large sums of 
money upon the creature who had been the cause of the war. 
When Akbar Khan found that he had nothing to fear from the 
exasperated Walee of Khulm, he clung with more obstinacy than 
ever to his project of joining the Sikhs and once more fighting the 
English. The  five hundred cavalry he had sent towards the end of 
1845 to assist the former under his cousin Abdul Ghyaz Khan had 
not arrived in time to be present at  the battle of Sobraon, which in 
1846 determined the fate of the Punjab, and enabled the British 
to enter Lahore as'conquerors ; but Akbar Khan believed that he 
had only to present himself and his troops before that city to turn 
them out, and the cession of Peshawur was promised him as the 
price of his armed intervention. Dost Mohamed was not indifferent 
to this arrangement, which afforded him the opportunity of including 
in his dominions that frontier town, which he had always been so 
unwilling to give up ; nevertheless he felt that it would compromise 
him with the English if he received i t  from the Sikhs in return for 
his co-operation, so he preferred seizing it himself a t  a moment 
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when they were unable to defend it ; but Akbar persisted in his 
wish to cross the Indus. I n  this purpose he was foiled by the 
Dost, who secretly retarded the recruiting of t l ~ e  army, and his 
son was obliged to delay the execution of his projects. T o  make 
up for this disappointment, he determined upon marching against 
Kandahar, alleging that his uncle had sought the alliance of the 
British and fomented discontent in Kabul, which had brought about 
changes most disadvantageous to the interests of Dost Mohamed. 
Several serdars deserted the cause of the Emir on this occasion and 
passed over to the service of his brother; but none of these defec- 
tions was so grievous to him as that of his step-son, the Sultan 
Djan Khan. This young serdar had proceeded to Kandahar with 
five hundred horse, and been well received by Kohendil Khan- 
in Akbar's eyes a sufficient cause for declaring war against his uncle, 
and the Emir had infinite difficulty in preventing him from taking 
this step. These different views on such serious subjects kept up 
the irritation between the father and son, and ended in doing more 
. , 
good to their enemies than to themselves. Akbar, who had not the 
experience of the Emir and was of a restless domineering spirit, 
never hesitated for considerations of any kind, and, being supported 
in his violent opinions by chiefs as turbulent as himself, decided 
on advancing upon Kandahar, in utter disregard of his father's 
disapprobation ; not, however, to drive matters quite to extremity, 
he thought he would strengthen his policy by the alliance of which 
the Dost had himself laid the foundations in the preceding year. 
Yar Mohamed, after having dethroned and strangled Shah 
Kamran, had become all powerful at Herat, and i t  was important 
that the Emir should secure him in his interest; negotiations 
were, therefore, commenced between the two families ; Akbar mar- 
ried in 1846 Bobodjane, the eldest daughter of Yar Mohamed, 
and the Vizier's son, the Serdar Syud Mohamed ,Khan, espoused 
Goher, only daughter of Mohamed Khan, deceased, a half-brother 
of the Emir Dost Mohamed. 
Alrbar ~ h a n ' s  mother went to Herat to bring her daughter-in-law 
to Kabul ; but on her return she was detained a long time at Kan- 
dahar, in consequence of an insurrection that had broken out in the 
district of Kelat-i-Ghildjzye, which prevented her from continuing 
her journey. This insurrection w.as attributed to the intrigues of 
Kohendil Khan, who dreaded the result of the alliances recently 
concluded, for, as his dominions 1a.y between Kabul and Herat, he 
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was henceforth placed between two fires. I-Ie complained loudly 
to Yar Mohamed of his-having given his daughter to Akbar Khan, 
and before the marriage took place demanded her for one of his 
own sons, urging his position as a neighbour of the vizier's, which 
he considered a just ground of preference. But his representations 
produced no alteration in the arrangement, and the inhabitants of 
Kelat-i-Ghikljzye having heard that the Emir had ordered two 
thousand horsemen from Ghumee to march against them, the 
matter ended by their opening the road for the affianced bride of 
Mohamed Akbar Khan. A t  this the indignation of the serdars of 
Kandahar was great, and they revenged themselves by sending 
several thousand cavalry to ravage the plain of Bakooa, belonging 
toHerat (adding that they intended to seize the town itself), 
when they were arrested in their project by a diversion made in 
favour of Mohamed Akbar by his brother Haidar Khan, a t  the 
head of eight thousand horse, who advanced by forced marches 
on Kandahar. The moment Dost Mohamed was infoilned that 
the Kandaharians had retreated, he, to Akbar's infinite regret, 
impkratively recalled him to Kabul. Seizing on this pretext to 
free himself completely from the authority of his father, Akbar 
signified to him in the haughtiest and most insolent manner that 
henceforth he intended to do as he pleased in the principality, and 
requested him for the future not to interfere in its affairs. Unfortu- 
nately Mohamed Altbar Khan was sufficiently powerful to hold this 
language to his sovereign, and the Emir resigned himself to the 
passive position in which his son's conduct placed him. 
T o  relate all the rash and foolish undertalzings projected by 
Akbar Khan from this period would be impossible ; though he a t  
the same time originated several able measures for the consolidation 
of his power. I t  was with this object in view that a t  the close of 
1846 he sent Akhood Zadeh Azim as  ambassador to the Shah of 
Persia to conclude an alliance offensive and defensive with- that 
mon2rch; his father-in-law, Yar Mohamed Khan, followed his 
example, and also sent an agent to Teheran for. the same purpose. 
These two chiefs wrote a joint letter to Mohamed Shah in the most 
pressing termb, showing him how the English were carrying their 
conquests along the whole course of the Indus, and were ready 
to enter Afghanistan; the missive concluded in these words: 
" I f  your majesty hesitates to take part in the war with us 
against the English, Allah will require you to account for the 
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neglect with which you allow the faithful to be swept away by the 
infidels." 
The Shah of Persia, without granting the assistance demanded 
of him, was nevertheless quite inclined to join the projected alliance. 
The envoys of Herat and Kabul were well received, and richly 
jewelled swords and decorations were sent to Dost Mohamed, Akbar 
Khan, and such of their brothers, uncles, and other serdars in the 
principality as were favourable to the cause. 
As to Kohendil Khan, he became daily more discontented with 
Yar  Mohamed and Akbar Khan, and made fresh incursions upon 
the territory of Herat, in the district of Gulistau, the result of 
which was that the vizier advanced upon Wachir and Girishk, 
and made fearful reprisals. Akbar Khan now became anxious 
to support his father-in-law and march against Kohendil Khan, 
but Dost Mohamed opposed this, and a sharp altercation took 
place between the father aud son, during which the latter bitterly re- 
proached the Emir with cowardice, and even threatened to imprison 
, 
him. This quarrel a t  length opened the eyes of Dost Mohamed, 
and proved to him what he had up to that time earnestly wished 
to doubt, namely, the evil disposition of his son ; he withdrew 
therefore from the citadel and took refuge in the kaleh of 
Djevanchir, where Khan Shireen Khan, the Kuzzilbash chief, 
received him with all the warmth and respect due to his rank 
and great misfortunes. Mohamed Akbar threatened, but in vain ; 
he could not induce the Ruzzilbash to give up his guest; and to 
what extremities he might have proceded is unknown, for he was 
carried oft'by a sudden and wholly unexpected death, caused, as it 
is said, by taking two aphrodisiac pills, which were given him by 
a Hindoo doctor. This man had them in a box with some others, 
of which he took two himself in the presence of his victim, who 
therefore swallowed those offered to him without suspicion, and 
died three hours afterwards in horrible convulsions. The conduct , 
of Akbar Khan had scarcely left him the chance of dying a natural 
death ; h e  thought that in forming a powerful party which would 
obey his warlike instincts he could oppose his father and the 
English also, and disdained the prudent warnings often given 
him to be careful for his personal safety. 
Opinions are divided amongst the Afghans as to who was the 
instigator of this deed. Some lay it to the charge of the English, 
without being able to produce any proof thereof; others suppose 
'-A 
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it to have been committed a t  the instigation of Dost Mohamed and 
his sons, whom Akbar delivered 'from the tyranny of the English 
only to make them feel his own more heavily. However this may be, 
the Dost obtained some liberty of action after his decease, though 
not so much as he expected to enjoy. Akbar Khan was dead, 
but his .party was not; some serdars, finding their plans de- 
feated, retired in disgust to their domains, and slighted the old 
Emir; others revolted against his authority, amongst whom was 
Mohamed Shah Khan, Ghildjzye, a chief enjoying great influence 
with the mountain tribes. H e  had followed the fortunes of Dost 
Mohamed and his family when the English seized Kabul, and 
when they returned to Khulm his assistance was most valuable 
in organizing an attempt against Shah Shooja, as well as during 
the insurrection of 1841. T o  this serdar Mohamed Akbar had 
bound himself by an oath of friendship and brotherhood sworn 
upon the Koran and legally attested by a mollah ; the Mus- 
sulman law sanctions ties of this description, so that the two chiefk 
justly considered each other as brothers During the lifetime 
of Akbar, Mohamed Shah Khan received an important c o m n d  
in the hill country to the north of Kabul, and such was the trust 
reposed in him by his friend, and the difficulty of access to his 
mountain-home, that he placed all his wealth in his h a n h  as he 
acquired it, intending thus to secure i t  from any covetous attack 
on the part of his own brothers, or even from the English, should 
they ever return to Kabul ; the good understanding between 
these two chiefs continued uninterrupted till the death of Mohamed 
Akbar Khan. After that event Dost Mohamed claimed the pro- 
perty that his son had confided to Mohamed Shah Khan, but the 
latter obstinately refused to give it up, alleging that the oath 
which boilnd him to Akbar constituted him the legitimate heir 
to the deceased serdar, and that the Emir could not without injustice 
refuse him the title of vizier which he had bestowed upon Akbar ; 
likewise that it gave him the right to marry all his widows in prefer- 
ence to the Dost's sons-Mohamed Shah Khan set up, in fact; an 
infinity of the most unreasonable pretensions, and supported them by 
hostile demonstrations. T h e  Ghildjzyes responded to his appeal 
in crowds, and the Emir was obliged to send an army against 
them, but i t  was numerically insufficient to repress the revolt, for 
it had to operate in a county full of difficulties, with an enemy 
always fighting under great advantages of ground, and the 
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troops were therefore obliged to return and wait for reinforce- 
ments. Dost Nohamed, who mis quite alive to the serious cha- 
racter of the ~ircumstances, redoubled his efforts to collect a 
sufticient force with the utmost rapidity, and in the month of 
April, 1847, had under his standard 25,000 men-veteran war- 
riors brought up in hatred of the Ghildjzye tribe. With 'this large 
army he moved against a comparatively feeble enemy, who had 
hitherto only been able to maintain themselves against their foes 
by the mountainous character of their country, and the Emir now 
determined to strike a decisive blow ; concentrating his troops, 
therefore, he moved towards the point a t  which Mohamed Shah 
Khan  had encamped with the greater number of the insurgents, and 
pressed him so vigorously and closely, that the latter was obliged 
,,, 
to surrender at discretion and give up the disputed treasure to the 
lawful heirs of Mohamed Akbar. The Dost also obliged the Khan 
to enter into and accept other conditions sufficiently humiliating ; 
he seized his sons as  hostages, and left him only the government 
of a small mountain district-measures which rendered another 
revolt on his part almost impossible. The reduction to obedience 
of this rebellious tribe gave peace to the principality of Kabul, and . 
the compromised serdars, dreading the loss of their property, liberty, 
or lives, hastened to join the camp of the Emir, who, after having 
installed his son Goulam Haidar Khan at Jellalabad in the chief 
command of the Ghildjzye territory, returned immediately to his 
capital; there he applied himself earnestly to repair t,he injuries 
that years of civil war had inflicted upon some of the finest pro- 
vinces of Afghanistan, and which originated in the just, though 
dangerous, antipathy to the British alliance that always existed in 
the mind of his son Mohaked Akbar. 
I t  was a t  this juncture that Alchood Zadeh Azim, who had been 
on his embassy to Persia, returned to Kabul ; the Emir could 
not possibly do otherwise than approve of the conduct of his late 
son's envoy, and he accordingly ratified all the steps that Akhood 
Zadeh Azim had taken to perfect. a strict alliance between the 
Afghans and the Persians. 
T h e  Anglo-Indian Government watched with some uneasi- 
ness the increasing good feeling between these two nations. But 
although the hostility of Akbar Khan had been anything but 
encouraging to them, their anxiety was not extreme, for they 
thought his eccentric schemes would probably commit him sooner 
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or later in some manner very detrimental to his power and introduce 
perpetual~discord'and confusion into the Afghan states. Such a 
man a t  the head of affairs in Kabul was almost a piece of good 
fortune for the Company, and it is doubtful whether his violent 
death was in any way satisfactory to them-at the utmost it might 
seem to avenge the murder of Sir W. M'Naghten, of which he 
had been guilty. They might also hope that Dost Mohamed, 
now emancipated from the thraldom of his overbearing son, 
would preserve his neutrality towards them, at least for a time. 
I n  this, however, there lurked perhaps a greater danger, for, 
under the able administration of the Emir, the power of the prin- 
cipality would be increased tenfold in a short time ; influenced by 
him the chiefs would more, easily become united, while under Akbar 
they had always been quarrelling : nevertheless, Dost lMohamed 
might possibly be forced by them to accede to their demands, 
which, as facts subsequently proved, was the case. 
The English thoroughly understood that the tranquillity of Af- 
ghanistan was no advantage to their cause, and in place of Akbar 
Khan provided another brand of discord. 
I t  has been shown in this history that before Dost Mohamed 
attained the sovereignty he struggled through years of trouble 
and wars, and fought many a battle, and, if he triumphed over every 
difficulty, he was not beholden to his family for helping him to 
obtain that result; nearly all his brothers were hostile to him, 
and the one whose hatred was the most unremitting and im- 
placable was Sultan Mohamed Khan, who contended with him to 
the last for the sovereignty of Kabul. I t  has been stated that this 
serdar was obliged to be satisfied with Peshawur, and subsequently 
constrained to cede that province to Runjeet Sing, who made 
him governor of the fortress of Rotas in the Punjab. After the 
death of the Maharadjah, and Shere Sing the last of his sons, 
Sultan Mohamed Khan drew upon himself the enmity of the 
Sikh vizier Djovaker Sing, and was in consequence taken to Lahore 
and detained a prisoner there. But the English watched over him ; 
for no one could better carry out their designs than Sultan Mo- 
hamed Khan, whose constant enmity and opposition to the Emir, \ 
was well known to them, and this led them to hope that they might 
be able to make use of him to counteract his plans. A t  their 
solicitation, therefore, the Afghan serdar was set at liberty, and i t  
was believed that he received from them the promise of a pen-, 
398 RETURN OF MOHAMED KHAN TO KABUL. CHAP. SSVI.' 
sion ; after this he returned to Afghanistan, and having lived 
several months at  Peshawur retired to Kohat, a small town situ- 
ated to the  south of the former city. 
Dost Mohamed was not blind to all this, but testified no resent- 
ment-far from it. After Sultan Mohamed was deprived of the 
government of Peshawur the Emir's heart was softened by his 
misfortunes, and he endeavoured on various occasions to effect a 
reconciliation with him ; but the intractable pride of his brother 
was inaccessible to every attempt of the kind. When he saw him 
return from Lahore he was not too proud to take the initiative 
once more with the same object in view, and he sent his eldest son 
1 &!ohamed Efzel Khan to .Kohat to give his uncle every possible 
guarantee for his securit.y, and endeavour to induce him to return 
to Kabul. This last step entirely succeeded : the old serdar a t  
last promised to forget his ancient hatred, and go to the Dost. H e  
kept this promise, and a short time after the same 'roof sheltered 
these two chiefs of the family of the Mohamedzyes. In thisrecon- 
ciliation the Emir was sincere. Can the same be said of his eldest 
brother ? That  is a problem which can be decided by time only. 
T h e  return of Sultan Mohamed Khan to Kabul took place a t  
. 
the period a t  which a fresh revolt of the Ghildjzyes occurred, 
and Mohamed Shah Khan placed himself once more a t  their head. 
Dost Mohamed now declared his military career was over, that 
he should delegate his authority as a general to his tliird son 
Goulam Haidar Khan, the defender of Ghuznee against the 
English, and should reserve to himself the administration of civil 
affairs only. T h e  serdars received this semi-abdication with 
favour ; Haidar was dear to them for the same reasons as Akbar, 
and was besides the son of the same mother : their braverygas 
equal, and their hatred of the English had been deep and constant. 
On assuming the rank of vizier, Goulam Haidar Khan espoused 
some of the wives of his deceased brother, and amongst them 
Robodjane. T h e  first act of his administration was to assemble 
the chiefs of all the tribes, and make them swear fidelity to his 
family and war to the unsubdued Ghildjzyes; he won the 
affections of the army by increasing the pay of the troops, and 
took advantage of the popular feeling expressed in his favour by 
a t  once pursuing Mohamed Shah Khan, whom he speedily reduced 
to a condition that rendered it. hopeless for him ever again to raise 
the standard of rebellion. 
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The enthusiasm excited by this success, and the warlike tastes 
of their iiew chief, led the Afghans to desire a fresh field for the 
employment of their arms : they loudly called upon Goulam 
Haidar Khan to lead them against the English ; and, such was 
the unanimity of feeling, that it was impossible for the Emir to 
elude or delay the execution of their demands. The Sikhs had 
for many years offered to restore Peshawur to him in return for 
the assistance he had formerly given them, and he now decided 
to accept the proposition which he had till then steadily rejected ; 
for, had he done otherwise, he would perhaps have alienated the 
affections of his countrymen and lost the throne of Afghanistan 
for his family for ever. 
When the British generals who commanded in the Punjab 
learnt that Dost Mohamed had descended into the plain of the 
Indus with 15,000 men, they were anxious as to the course he 
might take. Having at this time to keep in check Tchatter 
Sing and his son Shere Sing, who had raised the Sikhs against 
them on all sides, they were in no position to oppose the invasion 
of the Afghans, who, having taken possession of the fertile plain 
of Peshawur, subsequently marched against Attock, then com- 
manded by Colonel Herbert. This officer, being absolutely with- 
out the means of defending the fortress, was obliged to surrender, 
and the Afghans occupied it immediately. However, instead of 
showing the slightest disposition in favour of the Sikhs, who were 
their allies, and inhabited the town, they pillaged them, forced 
their way into their harems, and violated their wives and daughters, 
in revenge, as they said, for the unheard-of insult of which they 
accused the army of Shere Sing, namely, of having killed pigs in 
all the mosques on their route. 
Dost Mohamed and hi son were utterly unable to restrain 
their soldiers, and were obliged to excuse these excesses as well 
as they could to the allies whose cause they had been brought 
to defend. But the serious nature of the position in which they 
found themselves led the Sikh chiefs to shut their eyes to these 
enormities, and the English were thenceforth convinced that, in 
consequence of their religious antipathies, no alliance could possibly 
exist between the Sikhs and the Afghans ; they were therefore far 
less concerned than they had been at the advance of Dost Mohamed. 
Notwithstanding the prospect which now presented itself to the 
Emir of.seizing Cashmeer, anciently a province of the Afghan 
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kingdom, he appeared by no means anxious to proceed beyond the 
limits of his re-conquered territory, and displayed no desire to sup- 
port the insurrectionary movement of the Sikhs. The possession of 
Attock, where he could concentrate a force sufficient to protect him 
from a coup.de-main, satisfied his ambition, but this was not the 
case vith his soldiers ; they had not followed him simply to encamp 
on the banks of t.he Indus, and to pacify them he sent a contin- 
gent of cavalry to Shere Sing, who had just beaten the English at  
Chillianwallah. ' The  latter, however, soon took their revenge, and 
crushed the Afghans and Sikhs together a t  Goojerat, February 21, 
1849. T h e  vanquished were hotly pursued, but the Sikh com- 
manders, Tchatter Sing and Shere Sing, kept the field for another 
month; they then found they had lost all their positions and the 
greater part of their artillery, and surrendered to Sir Walter 
Gilbert, who disarmed the remainder of the Sikh army. This 
event having set his division a t  liberty, he received orders from 
the General-in-Chief, Lord Gough, to march against, Attock 
and Peshawur, and drive the Afghans beyond the passes of 
Afghanistan. 
If Dost Mohamed had cherished a hope that the English would 
, 
leave him in peaceable possession of the towns which he had just 
taken, the idea was soon dispelled, for to attack and defeat him 
was with them an operation equally prompt and easy. He  was 
even driven to seek safety by a precipitous flight, and for two 
hours the Indian cavalry sent in pursuit of him kept within gunshot 
of the fugitive Emir ; but his gallant horse eventually distanced 
them, and saved his liberty, perhaps his life. 
CHAP. XXVIL'. EXGLISH CONQUER THE PUNJAG. 
C H A P T E R  XYVII. 
The English conquer the Punjab -Dost Mohamed loses Peshawur and Attock- 
He retires to Kabul - Policy of Kohendil Khan at Icandahar after hie return 
from Persia -Retrospective view of affairs a t  Herat-Par Mohamed Khan and 
the English - Major Pottinger and Colonel Stoddart - The latter leaves for 
Bokhara - Inteniew betmen Major Pottinger a d  Shere Dil Khan - Sarious 
conaequences resulting from t h h  - Conduct of Yar Mohamed - Major Todd at  
Herat - Treaty concluded with Shah Kamran -Par Mohamed all-powerful in 
the principality - A scene at Yar Mohamed's dinner-table-Intrigues of that 
chief - His treatment of Shah Kamran- Misunderstanding between Major 
Todd and the vizier - Dine Mohamed Khan - Approbation of Major Todd's 
conduct by the Directors of the Eaat India. Compmy - Official instructions to 
that officer-Bad faith of Par Mohamed -Difficulties of Major Todd's position 
-Treachery of Yar Mohamed- Subsidy to Shah Kamran and his court 
stopped- The vizier makea fresh demands upon Major Todd - Counter pro- 
positions by the latter - He leaves Herat and is escorted out of the city. 
ONCE more in possession of Peshawur and Attock, the English 
installed themselves in a manner to prevent all chance of their'being 
easily removed therefrom ; and Dost Mohamed reached Kabul, 
where he is now less secure thau ever, and less satisfied as to the 
ultimate views of his neighbours. If he has to regret that he could 
not preserve his conquests, he has at.least the satisfaction of hav- 
ing proved to his subjects that he was right in his judgment, and 
that it was imprudent in them to attack the English, who it was 
now evident were more dangerous than ever. His defeat was 
the justification of his past policy; and, having changed that, he 
is in the worst possible position. The  English detest him for 
having borne arms against them in 1848 : to the Afghans he is an 
object of suspicion, and they will ever suspect'that he is ready and 
willing to treat with the East India Company. Indeed his prospects 
011 all sides. are indifferent, and appear as if they were not likely to 
brighten nor his troubles arrive at  any satisfactory conclusion ; the 
fate of the Emir and his kingdom is a problem which time only 
can solve. 
The position of Kohendil Khan a t  Kandahas is far from being 
so embarrassing as that of his elder brother. I t  has been shown 
how, after having beaten the Prince Seif der Djing, he resumed 
possession of his principality. After this he found that, besides his 
quarrels with Akbar Khan and Yar Mohamed, he had revolts to 
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put down amongst the Hazarahs Poocht Kooh and the Beloochees 
who were under his jurisdiction. But the serdars of his province 
are not the same turbulent characters as those of Kabul, and 
therefore he has a far less difficult task in carrying on his govern- 
ment than Dost Mohamed ; his political talents are not nearly so 
good as those of the Emir, but they are sufficient for his position. 
The Serdar Akter Khan was thg only one who could give him the 
least annoyance, but, notwithstanding the services that he had 
rendered to his prince' when he assisted him in re-consolidating 
his power, and the family ties that existed between them, Kohendil 
Khan determined to expel him from the district of Zemindavax ; 
here he was established in the heart of his tribe, the Alizyes, and 
towards the close of 1547 was attacked by him with a very superior 
force, when he was obliged to fly, and escaped to Herat. This was 
a most fortunate event for Yar Mohamed Khan, who was not igno- 
rant of the influence which this. serdar exercised over the Afghan 
tribes established in the south, and the extent to which he might 
turn i t  to his own account against his adversaries, the chiefs of 
Kandahar. The vizier completely neutralised the precautionary 
measures taken by Rohendil Khan by settling Akter Khan in the . 
district of Gour, situated on the frontier of Kandahar and near 
that of Zemindavar, which the tribe of Alizye had quitted almost 
entirely to join its chief in liis new abode. This fact was not cal- 
culated to re-establish the good feeling that had so long been 
interrupted between Kohendil Khan and Yar Mohamed; and from 
this time their intercourse was characterised by constantly increasing 
asperity : but it is very difficult to foresee the results of this rivalry, 
Afghanistan being pre-eminently the country in which nothing can 
be foreseen. 
A wish to avoid the necessity of returning to the history of 
Kabul and Kandahar has induced the author to carry it on without 
. 
interruption ; but, as there is nothing further to add to it, he now 
proposes to return to Herat, and describe the events that took 
place in that city after the siege was raised by Nohamed Shah, the 
period at which the'English proclaimed the restoration of Shah 
Shooja to the throne of ,t&e Suddozyes in Kabul, and the inde- 
pendence of Eierat under Shah Kamran. 
Although the retreat of the Persians and the relief of Herat 
ought to have satisfied British susceptibilities, Lord Aucliland did 
not the less persist in a most unjust invasion of territory. 
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I t  has been related that Shah Shooja, escorted by an Anglo- 
Indian army, first possessed himself of Kandahar ; he had at  that 
time, and in concert with Sir W. M'Naghten, the British resident 
a t  his court, agreed that a few battalions, sufficient to seize Herat, 
should be detached from the expeditionary army to occupy that 
city. Several reasons apparently combined to induce him to give 
up this project, the importance of which was thought secondary 
after the departure of the Persian army ; besides Shah Shooja had 
publicly expressed a hope that his nephew, Shah Kamran, would 
feel grateful for the assistance that he had received from the 
English. But these reasons were given only to dissimulate the 
real state of things, and to anticipate the annoying and disad- 
vantageous moral effect that the truth would produce upon the 
Afghan allies, whose fidelity was very doubtful. The correspond- 
ence of Major Pottinger, who remained a t  Herat after the siege 
was raised, and that of Colonel Stoddart, who joined him there 
after he had carried to the Persian monarch the ultimatum with 
which he had been intrusted, contained assurances which alone 
caused the delay of this measure. They informed Sir W. 
M'Naghten that Yar Mohamed might be considered the real 
sovereign of Herat, and, after having described him as  a man 
equally energetic and opposed to their ambitious views, finished by 
stating him to be the most accomplished villain in* Central Asia. 
However they admitted the power of upsetting him simply with 
the aid of Kamran and the Heratees, and that was the real motive 
which led Sir W. M'Naghten to delay and amend the plan first 
conceived of a military occupation of Herat. They therefore trusted 
to diplomacy to upset the vizier ; but the council a t  Calcutta had 
reckoned too much upon the co-operation of fortune, which up 
to that time had smiled on the execution of their projects in 
Afghanistan, and the vigilance of the distrustful Yar Mohamed 
Khan baffled all their calculations. 
After the retreat of the Shah of Persia, in 1838, Major Pottinger 
continued to pay the troops at  Herat with money supplied by the 
East India Company. His  efforts, and those of Colonel Stoddart, 
were mainly directed to saving the wretched I-Ieratees from famine, 
and preventing Yar Mohamed from selling them to the Usbelrs ; 
but as the revenues of the state were exhausted, and the vizier 
had no means left of raising any funds except by a continuation 
of this inhuman traffic, the English were under the necessity of 
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404 COLONEL STODDART LEAVES FOR BOIIHARA. C ~ A P .  ;YSVII. 
granting a pension to Shah Kamran and the principal chiefs of 
Herat, in order to put a stop to it. This measure, however, 
did not attain the desired object, and the British officers soon 
complained of the ill treatment they had to submit to from 
Yar Mohamed ; the motive for which, in their opinion, was 
the protection they gave the townspeople against their tyrant. 
After having well investigated the matter and obtained informa- 
tion from the best sources, I have come to the conclusion that 
they were in error; these gentlemen hoped that gratitude for 
the support the government of Herat had received from that of 
Calcutta, and also the fear of the British army in the neighbour- 
hood of Kabul, must bring Yar Mohamed Khan to submit to their 
wishes. Colonel Stoddart especially would assume to himself the 
position of a Mentor who expected to be obeyed ; of a violent &s- 
position he frequently gave way to passion before the vizier, which 
impeded rather than served his cause, and only rendered him 
liable to insult. The consequence was, that an imperative order . 
to leave Herat was given him by the king; moreover, his im- 
prudent conduct placed his comrade Pottinger in a false position. 
Stoddart, thus dismissed, went to Bokharn, where he had a missioi~ 
to fulfil, and it was only by great good management that Pottinger 
could obtain leave to remain a t  Herat, where he soon had serious 
difficulties to contend with ; these had reference to some conces- 
sions that he demanded from the vizier in consideration of the 
- 
pecuniary aid that he received from the East India Comp'any. The  
concessions in .question were, the reform of the government at  . 
Herat, and confiding the administration of it to British agents ; 
the occupation of the citadel with two regular battalions of 
Heratees, well organized, and officered by Englishmen; and finally, 
the recapture of the fortress of Gorian, which the Persians had 
held ever since the close of 1837. 
T h e  vizier rejected each and all of these pi-opositions, and the 
good understanding with him, already compromised by Stoddart, 
thenceforth ceased entirely -with Major ,Pottinger. The latter, 
finding that he had failed to obtain any one of his demands, 
ceased to pay the subsidy hitherto furnished to the Afghan chiefs ; 
but Yar Moharned, conceiving that the payments which had been 
made gave him a n  acquired right to their continuance in future, 
looked upon this suppression as illegal and unjust. On the 30th 
of January, 1839, therefore, he sent his brother Shere Mohamed 
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Khan to'Major Pottinger to demand specific explanations of his 
ulterior intentions. The Afghans are not conspicuous amongst 
either European or Eastern nations for their politeness, and it is 
said that the chief executed his mission with such brutal rudeness 
that Major Pottinger ordered one of his servants, a Heratee, to 
show him the door ; a scuffle ensued, and the  servant,^ of Shere 
Mohamed Khan, hearing his shouts, rushed to the assistance of 
their master and rescued him from his undignified position : the 
serdar returned furious into the presence of his brother, his 
attendants dragging after them the luckless servant of the Major, 
whose hand was immediately cut. off by order of the vizier for 
having dared to place it upon an Afghan chief. H e  then ordered 
Sertip La1 Mohamed Khan, Kaleh Beghi, to surround the British 
officer's house with a guard of two hundred men, and never to 
lose sight of him, which order was acted upon forthwith. 
Yar Mohamed Khan was most perfectly informed of all the 
intrigues set on foot by the British envoy to deprive him of his 
power, and he therefore was not sorry to have an opportunity of 
making him feel that as  yet it had not suffered t.he slightest 
diminution from his proceedings ; avarice being, however, a 
dominant feature in his character, he contrived, while asserting 
his independence and resisting the demands of the English, to bend 
sufficiently to allow of a reconciliation after this rupture. I n  adopt- 
ing thisline of conduct he had no other end in view than to enrich 
himself a t  their expense, well resolved that he would have nothing 
more to do with them from the day that they should cease to 
supply his treasury. (' They wanted to despoil me, to ruin me, 
perhaps worse," said Y ar Mohamed to the author ; '( I must have 
been a great fool not to be beforehand with them." 
Major 'Pottinger had a perfect knowledge of the character of the 
Asiatic Mussulmans and the versatility and pliancy of the intellect 
requisite in treating with them ; he was therefore soon relieved 
from the supervision of his guards, and renewed his negotiations 
a t  the court of Shah IZamran, but ,it was o d y  by continuing the 
payment of the ~ubsidies, temporarily interrupted, that he obtained 
his liberty. Although that prince, his court, and his ministers, 
were absolutely maintained by the English, no one appeared to 
appreciate that fact, or to esteem them for it, for they well 
knew that their generosity was exercised much more in their 
own interest than in that of .the Heratees. For his part, Yar 
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Mohamed was never their dupe, and from the month of March, 
1839, he had been in coi~espondence with the court of Persia 
endeavouring to obbain support against them. I t  was at  this 
time that he offered Mohamed Shah to unite his army with that 
of the Prince of Kandahar and oppose the invasion of Shah 
Shooja ; but the rapid march of the British on that town, and 
the tardiness displayed by the Shah of Persia in producing the 
subsidy required to carry on the war, induced the vizier again to 
attach himself to the English alliance, which he found the most 
profitable of the two. I-Iaving formed his plans upon the events 
of the moment, he was one of the first to send his congratulations 
to Shah Shooja upon his success. Major Pottinger knew not 
which way to turn in the midst of all these fluctuations in the 
policy of the vizier, and it was with a feeling of inexpressible 
pleasure that he heard the East India Company were about to 
release him from his fetters by sending him a successor. 
Major d'Arcy Todd, of the artillery, assistant and military 
secretary to Sir W. M6Naghten, was the officer charged by the 
Governor-General to accompany Shah Shooja from Loodiana to 
Shikapoor, .and he  afterwards went with the army to Kandahar, . 
where the embassy of congratulation sent to the Shah by Yar 
Mohamed had already arrived. This officer possessed an intimate 
knowledge of the Persian language, and the affairs of Central. 
Asia, which he had  acquired when in the service of the Shah of 
Persia, and he was therefore selected as envoy to the court of 
Herat, May 15, 1839. The following were the instructions he 
received :- 
1st. T o  ascertain the intentions and sentiments of Shah Kamran 
and his court towards the English. Government, and, if he found 
that i11 spite of the benefits they had received from i t  they favoured 
the Persian Government, to ascertain t.he cause of discontent, and 
, .# 
to do everything in his power to remove it. 
2nd. To negotiate a treaty of alliance with Shah Kamran. 
3rd. T o  give Y a r  Mohamed a written indemnity for his past 
conduct, in order to obtain his confidence for the future, but without 
securirzq to him and his family the perpetualgovernment of the country. 
4th. T o  pay attention to the financial relations of the East India 
Company with the court of Herat. 
5th. T o  take with him engineer and artillery officers to restore 
and repair the fortifications of the town. 
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6th. To  fix, if possible, the frontier which separates Persia from 
the principality of Herat. 
7th. T o  make known the objects of the British policy to the chiefs 
of Bokhara and Khiva ; and after having carried out these instruc- 
tions, to return to Kabul, leaving Major Pottinger as the repre- 
sentative of England at Herat. 
Such were the instructions that were transmitted to the British 
Envoy; but it seems probable that there were secret ones also : 
a t  any rate, the last paragraph of the third article leaves room for 
the supposition-however that might be, Major Todd reached 
Herat in July, 1839. He exerted himself to the utmost to carry 
out the mission confided to him, and to establish a cordial under- 
standing between the Shah Ramran, his vizier, and himself ; and 
his efforts were a t  first crowned with success, for in August, 11339, 
he concluded a treaty of alliance and friendship with the Suddozye 
prince. The independence of the principality of Herat was 
guaranteed by England, and the most substantial advantages stipu- 
lated in favour of its chiefs, on condition that the traffic in slaves 
should be abolished and that all correspondence with other courts ' 
should cease miless carried on with the consent of the British Envoy. 
A monthly sum, equal to the revenues of the principality before the 
siege, was granted for the maintenance of the government, for the 
i soil had remained without cultivation for eighteen months, and 
labour of every kind had been interrupted from the commencement 
of hostilities. 
The East India Company also made considerable advances to the 
agriculturiets, merchants, and shopkeepers to enable them to re- 
commence business, and every description of tax was remitted till after 
the harvest of 1840 ; large sums of money were likewise expended 
in repairing the fortifications. The Anglo-Indian Government could 
hardly have done more had. Herat been a British possession, and 
there can be little doubt they hoped that it would soon become one 
as they behaved with. so much liberality. However, the measures 
they adopted produced the happiest results for the Afghans ; the 
town was quickly re-peopled, the land covered with crops, commerce 
resllmed its activity, caravans poured in rapidly, and security and 
confidence were completely re-established. But the sacrifices made 
by the Company were never compensated by any of the advantages 
they had expected. Yar Mohamed made not a single concession, 
and remained absolute master of the principality ; he tolerated 
the English in it only because they satisfied his thirst for gold.. 
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I t  is true they constantly endeavoured to induce Shah Ramran to 
displace his despotic minister ; but that sovereign could see no other 
way of disposing of his vizier than by putting him to death-a 
measure which Major Todd, of course, would not sanction, and 
the Shah would not commit himself to it unless the English CO- 
operated with him, so that it was very difficult to come to an 
understanding when the views of both were so conflicting. The  
Serdar Shere Mohamed Khan, brother of the vizier, and the 
Ichik Agassi Feiz Mohamed, Alikioozye, both of them warm par- 
tisans of the Persian alliance, were constantly originating reports 
hostile to the English, rendering all hope of coming to a cordial 
feeling utterly abortive. Herat, indeed, abounded in intrigues, 
and, if blood was not shed, it was due only to the loyalty of Major 
Todd, who, constantly pressed by his partisans to consent to the 
assassination of the vizier, as constantly rejected the idea with 
indignation ; could it have been possible for that of ice^ to wish 
to terminate the question in this manner, nothing would have been 
more easy, for, a t  one of the dinners that he gave to Yar Mohamed 
Khan, the vizier, being but a bad ~ u s s d m a n ,  was so intoxicated ' 
as to fall senseless under the table. Here was an opportunity : 
many of the guests, and amongst them Prince Mohamed Yoossoof 
(grandson of Hadji Firooz Eddin), the Serdar Dine Mohamed 
Khan, and the Xazi of Hernt, were his declared enemies ; Hassan 
Mohamed, another guest, suggested that the head of the unconscious 
minister ought to be cut off at  once, and the Major had the greatest 
possible trouble to prevent the company from adopting his proposi- 
tion, being obliged to sit up with him the whole night to save his 
life. It was in'vain that he represented to these chiefs that such 
actions were reprobated by Europeans, and contrary to their reli- 
gion and the rights of men ; they looked upon his conduct as 
simply pusillanimous, and for this reason only several serdars were 
subsequently much less favourably disposed towards the English, 
-that the death of the vizier in a chancemedley or an apoplectic 
fit would not in any way have distressed Major Todd is highly 
probable. The king was exceedingly ill-disposed towards Yar 
Mohamed before the arrivd of the English envoy, and took no 
pains to conceal his opinion ; he thought no more about the Persians 
after they had retreated, and when he found the Feringhees paid 
him his pension with such perfect punctuality and supplied him so 
lavishly with wine and spirits, which constituted the charm of his 
existence, he became their warmest partisan and granted them 
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whatever they desired. But the English required also the ratifica- 
tion of his minister, and the minister would never ratify anything. 
The  government" of India considered it a cfime in Major Tpdd 
that he did not give up the old king and try his powers of per- 
suasion and argument upon the vizier ; but ihere is no proof that 
the British envoy had any chance of success with him, for Y a r ,  
Mohamed had already come to a determination respecting the power 
that the English wanted to exert over him, and the substitution of 
the vizier for his sovereign would have alienated from Major Todd 
the party that supported Shah Kamran. Furthermore, it was to 
the Shah that he was accredited by his Government; it was, there- 
fore, his duty to carry on his negotiations in the regular course, and 
if Shah Ihmran had retained any of the vigour of his youth he 
would a t  the very commencement have settled his differences with his 
minister. Every morning the vizier had an audience, at  which he 
made a report to his sovereign on the position of affairs in general ; 
his servants always remained a t  the gate of the citadel, which was 
also the residence of the king, and it would have been easy for the 
Shah to have had Yar Mohamed arrested and strangled before the 
least assistance could reach him : but instead of taking that step 
he threatened him in the most violent and absurd manner, and 
towards the close of 1839 proceeded to such lengths that the loss 
of his own liberty, and afterwards of his life, were the consequence. 
It happened thus :- 
Shah Kamran, having been informed that the vizier had received 
100,000 rupees, demanded that they should be delivered to him; but 
the minister replied that they were in his charge not only t~ keep, 
but to use for the expenses of his administration. In accordance 
with Eastern custom, Yar Mohamed was at  the time seated on 
his knees and heels before his sovereign, who, being considerably 
into~icat~ed, seized his minister by the beard, dragged him forcibly 
towards him with one hand, drew his dagger with the other, and 
prepared to strike. However, before proceeding to extremity, he 
endeavoured to make him restore the sum that he thought the vizier 
had extorted ; but neither menaces nor promises had any effect upon 
- 
! the prime minister, who maintained the most perfect coolness. 
Strike," he said, " my fate is in your hands. I have spent the 
money for the good of the state, and I have none of it to return 
to you." Kamran, shaken by that extraordinary firmness of de- 
meanour which had maintained so great an influence over him for 
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ten years, replaced the dagger in his belt, and allowed Yar 810- 
hamed to depart. After this the vizier kept a strict watch over 
his sovereign, and never entered the presence alone to converse 
upon matters of state policy. 
This incident created a further estrangement between BIajor 
Todd and Yar Mohamed, and was quickly followed by another . 
event, of which the English were accused of being the instigators. 
After the death of Attar Khan in 1830 his father, the Serdar Dine 
Mohamed, soon repented that he had given up the ~owerful position 
of vizier to his cousin ; his ambition had increased with age, and 
he ranged himself amongst the adversaries of Yar Mohamed. 
Notwithstanding this rivalry the two relatives had not ceased to 
meet and maintain the appearance of friendly intercourse, and 
the wily vizier neglected nothing that might attach Dine Mo- 
hamed to his cause, for none could promote his ambitious views 
better than he. This serdar was the true type of an Asiatic warrior 
-one of those intrepid and fiery chiefs whose sword leaps from the . 
scabbard ere the hand of its master reaches the hilt; his audacity 
had no equal among the Afghans, and none knew better how 
to infuse his own courage and enthusiasm into the breasts of 
others. Yar Mohamed might perhaps have succeeded in securing 
his assistance if the English had not attached him to their party, 
but Dine Mohamed submitted to the influence of their persuasions 
, 
and their gold, and soon fell into their projects. Towards the 
commencement of 1840 this 'serdar sent a messenger to the vizier I 
with an invitation to a feast at his house, which was accepted, and 
arrangements were made by him to seize his cousin 01) his arrival ; 
of this the minister received warning only a t  the moment he was 
passing the threshold of the door, when suddenly retracing his 
steps he returned home, and despatched a body of five hundred 
infantry to surround Dine Mohamed's residence, and take him 
prisoner. Scenes of this description were constantly occurring, 
and added greatly to the difficulties that the British envoy had 
to contend with. 
Much that I have stated relating to Major Todd was taken 
from an article in the Bombay Times of November 14, 1847. By 
incorporating that narrative with my own notes I have hoped to 
make a simple and explicit statement in defence of that brave 
officer, so unworthily treated by the ungrateful Government of 
Calcutta. 
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The Sicret Committee of the Council there had approved of 
the treaty conkluded between their Envoy a t  Herat and Shah 
Kamran; they wrote to Major Todd- to compliment him on the 
ability that he had displayed in these negotiations ; they also sanc- 
tioned all the expenses incurred and promised for fortifying the 
town, for the nlaintenance of the Heratee troops, and other pur- 
poses, and added, " W e  continue to attach the greatest importance 
to the security of Herat, but the sacrifices that we make for Shah 
Kamran will give you the right to a powerful influence over his 
' 
councils and conduct, and we hope that he will show bimself grate- 
ful for d l  the British Government has done for him." The Coun- 
cil deceived themselves wonderfully in expecting '' powerful in- 
fluence a t  Herat ;" that of Major Todd was barely tolerated ; i t  
was far from commanding. The treaty approved by the Council 
was concluded in August 1839, and in the October following the 
smifices to which they alluded in their letter to their envoy 
amounted to six lacs of rupees, 60,000Z. 
But Yar Mohamed appeared indifferent to the liberality of the 
English Government, and a t  the very moment they supposed they 
had his boniijde support he made fresh propositions to the Persian 
.court; the letters which he wrote to Assaf Dooulet, Governor- 
General of Rhorassan, bore in every word the stamp of implacable 
hatred to the British, and he offered to place himself and his 
country under the protection of Mohamed Shah. When Major 
Todd informed the English Resident a t  Kabul of this fresh 
treachery, he. stated his opinion that to maintain friendly relations 
with the court of Shah Kamran was no longer possible, and that it 
was indispensable to the security of the dominion of Shah Shooja 
to annex the p~incipality of Herat. H e  showed also the precarious 
and useless position of himself and his mission in that t o m  in 
comparison with and in despite of the enormous outlay that i t  
entailed, and specially insisted that the Company had no chance 
of reaping the fruits of its expenditure nor of establishing a per- 
manent and solid influence without the presence of an Anglo- 
Inaian army to awe the vizier. He concluded by saying that if, 
contrary to his advice, they persisted in maintaining the independ- 
ence of Herat, the Company would prepaye d@cuZties for  them- 
selves which would attain a femful  hhght. 
Sir W. M'Naghten supported the opinion of Major Todd with 
the Court of Directors, and added that he considered the annexation 
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necessary tu the complete consolidation of the British dominion in 
Afghanistan. But on so serious a subject the Directors thought 
fit to take time for reflection, and after having lost some months in 
deliberation determined upon placing the conduct of Yar Motlamed 
before Lord Auckland, that his Lordship might determine what 
was proper to be done under the circumstances. 
While Major Todd awaited his reply the difficulties became 
daily greater a t  Herat. The  vizier, knowing that his treachery , 
had been discovered, rendered Major Todd's residence there more 
and more disagreeable by making fresh demands in a most im- 
perious tone ; large sums alone would satisfy him, and Major 
Todd was content to pay them to maintain his position. 
In  January, 1840, the payments made to the Shah ICamran, his 
avaricious minister, and his starving people, amounted to 100,0001., 
and yet before that month had expired Yar Mohamed addressed 
another letter to the Shah of Persia, in which he called himself his 
faithful servant, and declared that he permitted the British envoy 
to remain at  Herat  from mere motives of courtesy. At the 
same time he wrote a letter to the Russian minister at  Teheran 
asking him to send an agent of his nation to Herat ;  and so 
great was his hatred of the English that he offered to give up the 
city to the Persian garrison of Gorian. Major Todd, exasperated 
on learning this fact, went instantly to the vizier to expostulate with , 
him, but he could not induce him to forego his intention until he 
placed his pistol at his breast; this attempt was undoubtedly 
imprudent, but the British envoy staked everything upon that last 
throw. Yar  Mohamed, awed by his courage and inflexibility, 
dared no longer resist, and he would probably have behaved with 
a little more humility afterwards if Lord Auckland had better 
appreciated the reports of Major Todd;  but his Lordship's in- 
credible weakness in  his treatment of this barbarian encouraged 
him to re-assume all his former arrogance. I n  his 'reply to the 
British egvoy the Governor-General said that he could only attribute 
the t.reacllerg of Yar Mohamed to a vague idea of danger, and 
recommended him by every means in his power to endeavour to 
bring the minister to a cordial and friendly state of feeling with 
the government of India, and make him clearly comprehend the 
benefits of the British alliance, instead of 'proceeding with the 
duplicity and suspicion which had hitherto marked his conduct 
towards the Company. Lord Auckland added, that, in considera- 
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tion of the vizier's former good services, and his resistance to 
the Persians of several months' duration, he should extend his 
pardon to every offence of which he might have been guilty before 
that letter was received. But as this despatch only reached Herat 
in February, 1840, and Yar Mohamed's last treacherous proceed- 
ing took place in January, 1840, it was considered as included in 
this act of oblivion, and Major Todd was obliged to fulfil the 
painful duty imposed upon him. , H e  gave the vizier the most 
positive and solemn assurances that every past infraction of the 
treaty was forgotten, and Yar Mohamed seemed apparently sen- 
sible of Lord Auckland's kindness ; but unhappily he was secretly 
convinced in his own mind that, whatever might be his future 
conduct to the English, he had acquired impunity for his evil 
deeds, and therefore proceeded on his old plan'of profiting by their 
folly to fill his pockets with their rupees. 
After his rupture with the court of Persia Sir John M'Neil 
had returned to England, leaving his Secretary, Lieut.-Colonel 
Sheil, as chargk d'affaires a t  Erzeroum, who thence kept up an 
active correspondence with the Persian minister, the good under- 
standing between England and Persia remaining dependent upou 
the evacuation of Gorian by the Persians and its restoration to 
the Prince of Herat. Demands the most urgent on this subject 
were sent to Teheran by Colonel Sheil, a t  the same time that 
Yar Mohamed's offer to give the place up to the Shah of Persia 
arrived there, and with it his request to that sovereign to occupy 
Herat. This coincidence had caused much, altercation between 
Major Todd and the vizier; but when the latter received full 
pardon for his delinquencies from Lord Auckland he professed 
unbounded gratitude for such generosity, and swore to prove it 
by some brilliant act of devotion; he therefore requested Major 
Todd to advance him some money, promising that he would em- 
ploy it in an expedition against the fortress of Gorian. The Major, 
in his anxious position, trusted to his sincerity, and advanced two 
lacs of rupees to equip the force, but the cash once safe in the 
vizier's treasury the preparations, which necessitated only a trifling 
expense, proceeded slowly, and in a short time he announced on the 
most frivolous grounds that the undertaking was abandoned. I t  
was afterwards proved in the clearest manner that Yar Mohamed 
had written to the Persian Governor of Gorian to inform him that 
he need not be alarmed at any news of a warlike character, for, 
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though the English had obliged him to promise that he would 
besiege the place, he might dismiss from his mind all fear and 
uneasiness on the subject, for he did not intend to keep his word. 
Major Todd, almost in despair at such utter faithlessness, wrote to 
his Government that the expedition had been given up under cir- 
cumstances of the most perfidious nature. This took place in July, . 
1840, by which time the sums spent in efforts to consolidate this 
most unproductive alliance amounted to 190,000Z. 
The British envoy, seeing the perfect inutility of this vast expen- 
diture, took upon himself to reduce the monthly payment to the court 
of Herat to 25002. ; and Yar Mohamed, wrathful at  the reduction, 
renewed in the following September his intrigues with the Persian 
monarch. A t  his request Mirza Massood, the foreign minister of 
Mohamed Shah, who was a t  Meshed at the time, came as far as . 
Gorian to meet in pewon an agent from the vizier ; but Yar Mo- 
hamed had the address to turn even this perfidious action to his 
own account, by relating it to Major Todd, and pretending that it .. ' 
had been done unknown to him by his brother, the Serdar Shere , 
Mohamed : he obtained fresh advances for this apparent frank- . 
ness, but it must be added that he plucked them from the major's 
hand rather than received them from him. Never was the position 
of a British agent in the East so exasperating as that of this officer 
a t  I-Ierat. Exposed to the craft and cupidity of a man who saw 
through the a.mbitious views of the Anglo-Indian Government upon 
his country, the envoy was entirely a t  his mercy, and the vizier pur- 
posely embittered every hour of every day that he remained a t  Herat, 
and,  rendered endurance scarcely possible. The larger and more 
liberal were the concessions of that Government, the less did Yar 
Mohamed dissemble his hatred and hostility to his improvident 
protectors ; and both these increased, while every check or reverse 
experienced by the British troops in Afgha9;~tan was exaggerated 
by the vizier, and represented as a triumph of Islamism over the 
Infidels: he went so far as to say publicly that he should seize 
the-opportunity of the first great disaster of the British arms to join 
their enemies, At  this period cl6uds hung over the political hori- 
zon of ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n  ; Dost Mohamed had unsheathed his sword in 
the north, and threatened Kabul : in the south the detachment of 
Major Clibborne had been cut to pieces, and Kelat-i-Ghildjzye 
taken from the invaders. The quarrel between the vizier and his 
cousin caused the former, i t  is true, some uneasiness, and prevented 
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him from h t  once taking part against the English ; but he indem- 
nified himself by attachi-ng to his party all the discontented spirits 
of Kabul and Kandahar, with whose assistance. he could easily 
disturb the tranquillity ,of those provinces and impede the establish- 
ment of the dominion of Shah Shooja. It was only by satisfying 
the rapacious and exorbitant demands which Yar Mohamed daily, 
nay, almost hourly, advanced on every possible pretence, that Major 
Todd could retain his footing in Herat at  this critical moment. 
While thus continuing to draw upon the Company's exchequer, 
Yar Mohamed actually discu&ed.in council a project for attacking 
Kandahar, a scheme that he would assuredly have carried out it 
Dost Mohamed had not been at  hand. During all this period 
scarcely a week passed that he did not speak of his alliance with 
Persia and his intention of arresting the English officers ; in the 
month of August their imprisonment was so generally expected, that 
no one would go to their houses, not even persons under great obli- 
gations to them. Shah Icamran himself spoke of it, and publicly, but 
idded, the legation had nothing to fear, that he was their friend, 
and that not one of them would have been alive then but for his 
interference in their favour. This deplorable condition of affairs 
had reached such a point that a crisis became inevitable. The 
money spent upon 'the chiefs and fortifications of Herat  now a ' 
amounted to 300,0001., which, however, in no way prevented Yar 
Mohamed from contiming his intercourse with the Persian court ; 
and in January, 1841, he despatched a confidential agent with a 
numerous suite to Assaf Dooulet, to ask for pecuniary assistance 
and six guns from the Shah of Persia, to enable him to march 
against Girishk, a small fortress in advance of Kandahar, as Gorian 
, 
is of Herat. When Major Todd was certain of the object of this 
expedition, he represented to the vizier the danger to which he 
exposed himself by this new infraction of the eighth article of the 
treaty; and that so flagrant a violation of that solemn engagement 
would be more than t.he long-suffering and patience of his Govern- 
ment could submit to ; he also declared that he should not consider 
himself bound to continue the allowances he had paid up to that 
time-that all the treasure of the Company could not suffice to 
. satisfy his requirements-and that the vizier must propidt: for the 
expenses of his own government until such time as he should see 
fit to act strictly up td the conditions and stipulations of friendship 
existing between the two nations. 
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Following up this declaration, Major Todd withheld the payment 
of 25001. due on the 1st of February, 1841, to the court of Shah 
Kamran. The  vizier, case-hardened by impunity, looked upon this 
suppression as merely temporary, expected he should be pardoned 
his last breach of faith as he had been all former ones, and on the 
8th of the same month addressed to Major Todd the following 
fi-esh demands :- 
1st. Tha t  the British envoy should pardon all his past conduct, 
and leave him under no apprehension for the future. I-  2. T h a t  he should receive immediately 30,0001. from the East 
India Company for the payment of his personal debts. 
3. That  his monthly pension should be augmented and paid a 
year in advance. 
4. T h a t  the British envoy should hand over a written agree- 
ment not to compromise Herat in any foreign war till after the 
harvest in July. 
5. Tha t  the fortifications of the town should be enlarged and 
finished a t  the expense of the East India Cumpany, and that i t  
should provide the Government of Herat with the necessary ' 
funds to enable i t  to reconquer several places which had thrown 
off their obedience to it. 
6. Tha t  the Company should pay and maintain the Heratee 
troops while in the field. 
After his recent infraction of the existing treaty these terms 
appeared so exorbitant, that Major Todd replied it was impossible 
to suppose his Government would consent to make fresh sacrifices, . 
even in  a modified form, unless it was for some corresponding 
advantages, but he offered to grant several of Yar Mohamed's 
demands if he made the following concessions :- 
1. That  Yar Mohamed should never again deviate from the 
spirit of the treaty between the two Governments. 
2. T h a t  the Serdar Syud Mohamed Khan, his eldest son, should 
-take a contingent of troops to Kabul to serve in the British army. 
3. T h a t  as  soon as this serdar had arrived a t  his destination 
the envoy would pay half the vizier's debts and augment his 
monthly allowance. 
4. T h a t  the citadel of Herat should receive a British garrison, 
and that the royal residence of Rooz-bagh, seven miles south of the 
city, with the land belonging to it, should be made over to the 
English to build barracks upon for their own troops. 
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5. That the Vizier should never again expect to receive, and 
distribute himself, the funds appropriated to the maintenance of the 
chiefs of .the.Court of %ah Kamran, and that the sums allotted for 
that purpose should be paid to the individuals themselves by the 
agents of the Company. 
These propositions of Major Todd's were approved by Sir Wil- 
liam M'Naghten, while the Governor-General of India looked 
upon i t  as  a matter of regret that &hey had been made. Yar 
Mohamed appeared quite satisfied, provided the sums he had 
demanded were paid in advance ; but Major Todd knew only too 
well the character of the man he had to deal with to grant his 
request, and the result was a most animated discussion.- The  \ 
Vizier pretended, certainly falsely, that Major Todd had in his 
accounts charged the East India Company with much larger sums 
than he had paid to him, and that he had used the difference in 
largesses to the people in  order to excite them to overturn the 
Government of Herat, and substitute that of the Company. 
Finally-and this seems to be true-that the envoy constantly 
plotted with Shah Kamran the fall of the Vizier from power, 
-and the angry minister declared to Major Todd that his pre- 
sence and that of his subordinates could no longer be tolerated 
in Herat, and that he must depart with the least possible delay. 
Thus ended the anxious and onerous intervention of the Indo- 
British Government at  Herat, and its conclusion was, as might be 
expected, marked by several acts of rapacity on the part of Yar 
Mohamed, who immediately made known his intention of marching 
against Kandahar ; and in order to leave no doubt on this occasion 
of his sincerity, he sent his own brother, the Serdar Shere Mo- 
hamed Khan, as ambassador to the court of Persia, with presents 
for the Shah, and a request that a subsidy might be given him to 
undertake the expedition he had projected. But  it seems evident 
that in making this demand the Vizier was really not more sincere 
than he had been with the English ; his only object was to obtain 
from both as much money as he possibly could for the purpose of 
strengthening his position in his own country. 
The British envoy being driven to the alternative of making fresh 
sacrifices or taring his departure, decided upon the latter, and the 
Vizier having provided him with the transport necessary for his 
journey, sent with him the Serdar Fethi Khan, one of his cousins, 
as his escort to the frontier. Major Todd had, with an object that 
2 E 
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is easy to understand, collected a considerable quantity of corn at 
Herat; but the granaries were pillaged by the people even before 
he had left the town, and a report having been spread that he had 
carried away four boxes of treasure, the Heratees determined to 
plunder him of it, and they would certainly have proceeded to do 
so if the Vizier had not lined the streets and bazaars with troops. 
His son, the Serdar Syud Mohamed Khan, also accompanied Major 
Todd and his party to such a distance on their road as secured 
them against any act of violence. 
CHAP. AXVIII. REACTION AGAINST THE ENGLISH. 
v 
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Reaction against the Engliih at Herat - Ingratitude of the East India Company 
to Major Todd -Death of that officer - Russian expedition against Khiva - 
General Peroffski leaves Orenburg - Disasters and retreat of the Russian army 
- Aga Khan raises a revolt in Kerman - The Kazi of Herat at  Ehiva - 
Converaationwith the Khan -Disgrace of Yacooba Mehter - Allah Rooli Khan 
accepts the English alliance - Snare laid for the Kami - Captain Abbott a t  
Khiva -His mission there - Intrigues of Yacooba Mehter - Captain Abbott 
leaves for Russia - The Usbeks take him prisoner - Akhood Zadeh leaves 
Khiva in search of him -Meeting of Akhood and the captive - The Puss Bashi 
and Hassan Bahadoor - Fresh complication - Captain Abbott reaches Russia 
- Lieutenant Shakespear arrives at Khiva - Obtains the liberation of the 
Russian slaves and brings them to A s t d a n  - Lieut. Shakespear's reception at  
St. Petemburg- Captain Abbott not recompensed - Russia creates di5cultiea 
for Khiva -The Shah demands the Persian slaves - Captain Conolly arrives at 
Khiva - He fails in the object of his mission - Requirements of the Khan. 
AFTER the departure of the British Envoy a grievous reaction took 
place against all those who had participated in the liberality of the 
English, or who, having served them, received pensions : they were 
arrested, imprisoned, robbed of every thing, and reduced to the 
deepest distress. There were but few merchants in Herat who 
hadnot  transacted business with Major Todd, some of whom had 
made large fortunes ; these the vizier confiscated or grossly over- 
taxed to his own profit, and insults and oppression continued 
during several months. 
~naongst the families who were the greatest sufferers was that 
of the Kazi of Herat, I-Iassan Mohamed, ,and his son Akhood 
Zadeh Saleh Mohamed ; they were stripped of a fortune amount- 
ing to 20,0001., and their wives, daughters, and slaves tortured 
to make them disclose where the chief judge had secreted his 
wealth. This venerable old man was actually condemned to 
death, and his life was saved only by thg arrival of a ransom 
of 14001. sent by Major Todd. to procure his release. The  
villanous nature of Yar Mohamed resumed on this occasion all its 
origind cruelty ; and it was in the midst of a sea of blood that he 
seized the property of so many unhappy people-spoils that he con- 
sidered legitimately to belong to him only because they had arisen 
2 ~ 2  
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out of, or were reputed to have done so, the corrupt generosity of 
the English. 
I t  is worthy of remark that nine months before the departure of 
the mission from Herat, Lord Auckland proposed to the Court 
of Directors that Major Todd should be recalled, if the. measures 
which the British Government wished to adopt in the princi- 
pality should be received with suspicion by Yar. Mohamed Khan ; 
and his Lordship observed that by such recall the vizier would be . 
made to feel his false position and to defend the independence of his 
country. But on the arrival a t  Calcutta of the news that the dif- 
ferences between Persia and England had been terminated by the 
restitution of Gorian to Shah Kamran, this proposition was aban- 
doned. D r .  Riach, attach6 to the British embassy in Persia, who 
had retired to Erzeroom, was despatched to Teheran in the month 
of January, 1841, and travelled post to Khorassan, to be there a t  
the surrender of the place; this had been stipulated for in a 
treaty concluded between Great Britain and Persia, the latter 
" 
being compensated by the restitution of the island of Icarrack to 
Mohamed Shah. 
T h e  Court of Directors hoped that this arrangement, and the 
freedom i n  which the new treaty with Persia would oblige the 
Persian monarch to leave Yar Mohamed Khan, would put a stop 
to the intrigues of the latter. But that was an erroneous anticipa- 
tion ; and the departure of Major Todd from Herat a year after- 
wards, and just at  the moment when Lord Auckland had succeeded 
in obtaining an amelioration of his position, occasioned the East . 
India Company bitter disappointment-even resentment, and the 
Secretary of Government received orders to write to Sir William 
McNaghten, British Resident at Kabul, to whom Major Todd was 
attached, that the late envoy at Herat .was considered as incapable 
of yfilling a political appointment, and ought to rejoin his regiment 
with dishonoz~r, 
Here, then, was the recompense which this officer received 
for so much labour and anxiety, so much devotion to his country, 
so many dangers braved. Such are the Co~irt of Directors, men 
who demand of a worthy man full of intelligence and capacity 
an  impossible result-more than impossible ; and because he does 
not obtain i t  - because he did not rid them of Yar Mohamed, 
they cast upon him the imputation of dishonourable conduct, which 
in fact they themselves deserve for the notorious folly and im- 
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becility tbey displayed, not in the affairs of Herat only, but in 
$11 the other provinces of Afghanistan in which they had a 
policy to carry out. Was Major Todd, then, so guilty? Had 
he not well estimated the circumstances when he advised they 
should take everything out of the power of Yar Moharned and 
occupy Herat with a British force ? Are not those Directors inca- 
pable whose avarice was in no degree less than that of Erar No- 
hamed, who knew not how to value their envoy's advice, and 
allowed the vizier to believe that he might do as he pleased with 
perfect impunity ? I t  is disgraceful, scandalous, that writers sh~u ld  
have been found in the British press sufficiently stupid and base t o  
sanction the blame with which they sought to tarnish the name of 
an intelligent and honourable man -blame which could never 
conceal the black ingratitude of the Court of Directors. 
Strong in the consciousness that his conduct at Herat had been 
strictly irreproachable, the unfortunate Major D'Arcy Todd rejoined 
in India the corps of artillery to which he belonged ; but, con- 
.stantly oppressed by thoughts of the infamy with which they had 
so unjustly sought to blast his good name, his laborious life rolled 
on filled with bitterness, and i t  was with real pleasure that he 
received orders to take part in the war that broke out in 1845 
between the English and the Sikhs. H e  went into the field of 
Feroseshah with the impressidn that he should there lay down his 
life, and was conducting himself in the most gallant manner when 
the iron messenger from one of the enemy's @ns realised in a mo- 
ment his mournful presentiment. Before, however, he met a soldier's 
death, Major Todd had long been reinstated in the esteem of his 
countrymen, whose faith in him had for a moment been shaken, 
and they now respect his memory and take a deep interest in the 
events of his distinguished career-an interest which will be eternal. 
I t  will be remembered that when Major Todd went to I-Ierat his 
instructions were also to make known the objects of the British policy 
in Central Asia to the Khans of Bokhara and Khiva. The Eng- 
lish suddenly passed from a state of the most confiding peace- 
fulness to that of the most exaggerated fear, and were no longer 
satisfied that the possession of Afghanistan efficiently secured their 
Indian dominions. Turkestan was the barrier they now wished 
to raise against Russia, by completely establishing their influence 
in the Usbek Khanats. Moments even appeared precious, for, just 
at  the time when the Shah retired from before Herat, Count 
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Simonitch boldly announced that a Russian corps d'arme'e was 
leaving Orenburg and marching upon Khiva, to reduce the Khan 
of that country, and the cabinet of St. Petersburg gave a very 
reasonable motive for this new invasion of Tartary. A great 
number of Russian subjects had been carried off by the Usbelrs 
and sold as slaves in the markets of IChiva, and all negotiations 
for their deliverance had hitherto .proved unsuccessful, for Allah 
Kooli Khan had obstinately refused to give his consent to 
their release. The  Rusian Government at  first sought a remedy 
by making reprisals, and had detained at  Astrakan ever since 
the year 1833 a Khivan caravan, consisting of 200 men and 
800 camels, laden with large quantities of merchandise of great 
value ; but this, instead of rendering the Khan more reasonable, 
only irritated him, and the Emperor therefore determined to employ 
force to obtain his just demands. 
I t  was a t  the commencement of the winter of 1840 that Genera.1 
Peroffsky left Orenburg at the head of 6000 infantry, accompanied 
by 10,000 camels and their army of drivers, to conquer the obsti- 
nate resistance of the Usbek sovereign. This season was chosen 
for the expedition as being the one in which the troops would be 
less distressed than at  any other by the want of water in the arid 
steppes across which they had to march; but, by one of those 
strange chances which occur from time to time, this winter was 
remarkable for its inclemency, and the difficulties that under ordi- 
nary circurnstances would have been by no means serious beca.me 
terrible, even insurmountable, in consequence. The cold was 
intense, and the mercury a t  40° below zero: snow covered the 
earth to a considerable depth, and the vind swept with incredible 
violence over the naked steppes. Several thousand soldiers were 
frost-bitten and lost their legs and arms, and the greater.number, 
both of men and animals, perished even before they reached Ak 
Boolak (a station on the extreme frontier of Russia and Khiva), when 
General Peroffsky wisely retreated, thus avoiding worse disasters. 
Nothing could have served the purposes of the English better, 
and their satisfaction was proportionably great when the discom- 
fiture of the Russian army became known; but, remembering 
that another expedition could be sent which might meet with 
fewer obstacles, and achieve what this had just failed in doing, 
they hastened t30 prevent, if possible, a fisesh advance of the Rus- 
sians, by endeavouring to induce Allah Kooli Khan to give them 
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the satisfiytion they demanded; and, in order to prevent the Shah 
of Persia ftom_making a diversion in favour of the Tzar south of 
Khiva, the British Government created much embarrassment for 
him in his own kingdom. 
I n  speaking of the affairs of Kandahar, mention has been made 
of an Ismaelian Syud " greatly renowned for his bravery, and much 
venerated by the Beloochees, called Aga Khan. This chief, after 
having escorted part of General Nott's baggage to Shikapoor in ' 
1830, marched at the head of a body of cavalry into Kerman, 
where he found no difficulty in establishing himself, for he had a 
great many partisans in that province. His success was so rapid 
and decided, that the Shah of Persia found himself compelled to 
send a body of troops against him, and a year elapsed before he 
could repress the insurrection and drive him from the country. 
While Aga Khan was engaged in this irruption into the south of 
Persia, Major Todd arrived a t  Herat, and, in conformity with 
the instructions he had received, sent Moharned I-Iassan on an 
embassy to the Khan of Khiva. The Major could not possibly 
have selected an envoy better qualified than the Kazi, for, in addi- 
tion to the influence with Mussulmans which he possessed in virtue 
of his ofice of kazi or chief judge, he had also that which arose from 
his belonging to the Djagatais of Turkestan origin,t a tribe greatly 
venerated in its own country. The kazi took with him letters from 
Major Todd, Shah Kamran, and his vizier Yar Mohamed, to the 
Khan of the Usbeks, and the Afghan prince requested him to con- 
clude an alliance with the English ; but, notwithstanding these 
recommendations, the mission was a dangerous and delicate one, 
and it required real courage to accept it, .for it was generally 
known a t  the time that Yacooba Mehter, the vizier of Allah 
Kooli Khan, had hitherto brought about the death of every one 
who had supported the British policy. The brave and intelli- 
gent Kazi reached Khiva in safety, but met with an exceedingly 
rude reception from Yacooba Mehter, which occasioned him 
a momentary regret at having involved himself in this enterprise ; 
he did not lose, however, either his coolness or his prudence. 
Having been presented to the Khan on the day after his arrival, 
* Thia chief is thus called on account 7 t The descendsnta of Djiyatai, a aon 
of his descent from Ismael, the old of Ghengis Khan.-Perriw. 
Man of the Mountain.-Fernier. 
I 
424 CONVERSATION WITH THE KHAN. CEAP. XSVIII'. 
Mohamed Hassan left him to imagine in the first instance that he 
was simply the bearer of a letter from Shah Kamran, which letter 
he gave him. After the customary compliments, the Usbek prince 
assumed an air of severity; and questioned him closely as to the 
object of his journey ; and the following dialogue, which then took 
place, I now relate as the Kazi himself related i t  to me :- 
The -.Khan. Strengthen my belief in you, Oh Icazi, by assuring 
me that you are still a Mussulman. Yet, if you were so, yon would 
never have brought these Kiaffir Frenguis * into the country of 
Islam. 
Eaz i .  I t  is not I who brought them, it is Allah who has 
sent them to us. 
The Ehnn.  How darest thou thus profane the name of Allah, 
by connecting it with such a bad action ? 
53.e Ea.zi. I only tell the truth, and I can prove it to thee. 
f l ~ e  Khan. Prove it, then. 
The Xazi. When the rafezist Kadjars $ laid siege to Herat, our 
illustrious sovereign, who has no equal (bi nnzer), sent letters to 
entreat you to come to our assistance-to us-Soonees like your- 
self, veritable pillars of Islam : Did you come ? 
T ~ M  Ehan.  Never did Mussulman ask my help in vain! My 
victorious army marched immediately on my reception of the first 
letter of Shah Kamran ; but, when I arrived a t  Pindjdeh, Mohamed 
Zeman Khan, Serdar of the Djemcheedis, assured me that my 
troops were not required to save the place-that the Afghans were 
all-sufficient, and I then returned to my own dominions. 
The Kazi .  And who, most mighty Khan, had need of your help, 
Zeman Khan or Shah Kamran? Why attend to the words of the 
former, when the fearful extremity to which the latter was reduced 
was known to all Asia? Not only did you abandon our cause, 
but  you forbade your subjects to bring us provisions. This un- 
happy example was followed by the Bokharians and the Moha- 
medzyes, who, instead of coming to our aid, joined the rafezi 
Kadjars. What  did the Frenguis then, whom you call Riaffirs ? 
They came to aid the true children of Allah, they procured us the 
* Infidel Europeans, sovereign belongs: thua they call the 
f Heretics. Persians, Kadjars; the Kandaharians, 
$ The Afghans, in speaking of a na- Mohamedqes; thesindians, Talpoorae; 
tion, frequently designate it by the the Sikhs, Runcljeeta, &c.-Ferris. 
proper name of the tribe to which the 
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corn that you refused ; they brought us their gold, their blood, and 
their intellect, to defend our ramparts that were crumbling under 
the balls of Mohamed shah, and are now rising again under their 
beneficent care. I t  was they who lent the helping hand to the 
unfortunate, who brought back to us abundance and tranquillity, 
who distinguished themselves by their justice and equity, and pro- 
tected the true Mussulman against the heretics. Which, then, are 
the infidels,-the Persians, who inflicted upon us every kind of 
misery, and whose part you take ; or those whom, deserted as we 
were by our brethren, God sent to protect us, and whose help you 
may want ere long to arrest the progress of the Russians ? 
Th Ehan. I s  it really true, Oh Kazi, that these Frenguis are 
such as you describe them ? Has  Islam found support in them ? 
A t  this point the Kazi, seeing that the warnkh of his discourse 
had made an impression upon Allah Rooli Ehan, drew from 
his pocket the letter of Major Todd, and handed it to him, 
saying, " Doubt it not for a moment, great prince ; receive this 
letter that the most exalted elchee (ambassador) accredited to our 
powerful sovereign addresses to thee ; its words axe so many pre- 
'cious pearls that he has woven into the wreath of friendship, and 
in connexion with which he offeis his prayers with thine to the 
Almighty to grant thee a long and glorious reign." 
The letter was enclosed in a silken bag embroidered with gold. 
The Khan took it, broke the large seal of the British arms with 
'animation, and, after having perused the missive, which contained 
proposals of friendship and alliance, and also of active mediation 
between him and the Russians, his contracted brow gradually ex- 
panded; and from that time he treated the Kazi with great respect. 
Mohamed Hassan seized this favourable opportunity for com- 
plaining of the insolence of the vizier, which brought upon that 
functionary a severe reprimand. The  audience terminated in the 
delivery of the presents sent by Major Todd to the Usbek prince 
-optical instruments and splendid arms, at  the sight of which 
the whole court went into ecstasies; and the English cause was 
further benefited by the disgrace of Yacooba Mehter, their most 
dangerous enemy, who was kept a t  a distance from the scene of 
negotiations. 
After having arranged the preliminaries of a treaty, the Kazi 
'promptly set out on his return to Herat, to render to the British 
envoy an account of the results of hi embassy: but when he 
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reached Merv he fell into an ambush, which nearly proved fatal to 
him. This had been prepared for him by the governor of the town, 
Wiaz Mohamed Khan, uncle of Yacooba Mehter, the exasperated 
minister. Fortunately some persons who were near, hearing the 
Kazi's shouts, hastened to his assistance, and delivered him out 
of the hands of his assassins, though with some severe contusions. 
Niaz Mohamed, as if to testify his regret a t  his misfortune, had 
the hypocrisy to pay a visit to his victim, but no one was deceived 
by that act of apparent courtesy ; the injuries received by the Kazi 
were intended to impress upon his mind the disgrace he had 
brought upon Yacooba Mehter, and for some time they certainly 
answered their purpose. 
A s  soon as Major Todd was informed that the Kazi had suc- 
ceeded in the object of his mission, he dispatched Captain Abbott 
to I<hiva.* His  instructions were, if possible, to induce Allah 
Kooli Rhan to release the Russian prisoners ; and, as soon as he , 
had attained that object, to go to Astrakan and procure the libera- 
tion of the caravan, which had been detained there seven years 
by the Russians. Captain Abbott commenced his journey very 
early in 1340-and a t  a most auspicious moment, for the army of 
General Peroffsky had just been-decimated and obliged to retire, . 
and therefore a fair field lily open to him in which to bring his 
negotiations to a favourable conclusion. 
If the English were prodigal of their gold in facilitating the 
conquest of Afghanistan, they certainly were not less so in their 
endeavours to effect their object in Kurdistan ; and Captain Abbott 
freely employed this means of persuasion. So lavish was he, that a t  
Merv he was obliged to dispatch Akhood Zadeh Saleh Mohamed to 
Hera t, to request Major Todd to send him a further supply of money 
with the utmost dispatch : he did not, however, wait for this, but 
continuing his journey to Khiva, was received there with distinction 
by the Rhan, and this in spite of the intrigues of Yacooba Mehter, 
who had been reinstated in the favour of his sovereign, and who, 
justly or not, was considered a warm partisan of Russia. One 
fact, however, appeared to indicate the contrary ; he exerted him- 
* Captain Abbott published a narra- ing work. His information relating to 
tive of his journey, but, being unac- the British negotiations in Khivais given 
qudnted with the English language, as he received it from the Kazi Hassan 
the anthor could not avail himself of Mohamed, and his son Akhood Zadeh 
the adv.mtage of reading that interest- Saleh Mohnmed.-Perricr. 
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self in evpry way to prevent the liberation of the Russian slaves, 
which 'the English affirm he did only to give the Russians an 
excuse for marching an a h y  to Khiva. In defiance, however, of 
the minister's opposition, the Khan made the concessions required 
of him by Captain Abbott with a view of settling the differences 
with Russia. Nevertheless, and although the definitive convention 
was drawn up, the vizier did not consider himself vanquished; 
the Kaxi of Herat had, it is true, escaped his toils, but such he 
trusted would not be the case with Captain Abbott from those he 
intended to spread for him. 
Aftef having obtained a positive promise that the Russian slaves 
should be restored, the British officer, anxious to terminate his im- 
portant mission as quiclrly as possible, would not wait for the return 
of Akhood Zadeh with the money from Herat ; but, procuring what 
he required on the spot, he set out for Astrakan, accompanied by 
seven servants, a mehmendar,* and a few horsemen furnished by 
the Khan of Khiva,-the mehmendar being an officer of high rank, 
named I-Iassai~ Bahadoor. This official conducted Captain Abbott 
in the first instance to the port of Guedik, and near it was en- 
camped his own tribe, of which he was th; chief. Captain Abbott, 
not -finding any vessel here, determined to proceed to Dach 
Kaleh, four days' journey farther south, occupied by the Russians. 
But I-Iassan Bahadoor refused to accompany him, alleging as a 
reason that his orders from his sovereign were not to go beyond 
Guedik ; and Captain Abbott was therefore obliged to continue ' 
his journey without any escort : as to his servants they were like 
himself, strangers in the country, and consequently ignorant of the 
road. 
The mehmendar was acting upon secret orders from the 
treacherous vizier, who, foreseeing the difficulty in which Captain 
Abbott would be placed if he could not find a ship, sent for- 
ward a messenger with an order that every vessel that might be 
there should leave the port. The unsuspecting officer of course saw 
no danger in going on, though it was on that part of his road that 
those who had sworn his destruction were lying in wait for him ; and 
he was not more than ten hours' march from Dach Kaleh when he 
and his servants were assailed by a   arty of Usbeks, against whom 
* An officer whose duty it ia ,to pro- travelling in some parts of the Eat.- 
cure food and lodging for amba~andors Forriot-. 
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they a t  first made a vigorous resistance; but, being in the end . 
overpowered by numbers, they were seized and stripped. Captain 
Abbott lost two fingers in the meEe and received a gash on the head, 
and in this miserable condition he was carried to a camp of no- 
mades ten miles to the north, almost on the borders of the Caspian 
Sea. His new hosts behaved to him with great cruelty ; his ser- 
vants being all taken from him and dispersed in different camps, 
were made the slaves of those whose hospitality they had claimed. 
While Captain Abbott was thus treated a t  the instigat.ion of the 
villain Yacooba Mehter, Akhood Zadeh arrived a t  Khiva, bringing 
with h i m  a thousand ducats from Major Todd, but his utmost 
diligence had not enabled him to reach that town before Captain 
Abbott's departure ; and when he proposed to follow him, he was 
informed by Yacooba Mehter of the report of the unfortunate 
officer's death : the vizier at  the same time ordered all the letters 
from Major Todd to Captain Abbott to be taken from Akhood 
Zadeh, though being written in English he could not under- 
stand their contents. After Akhood Zadeh had been ten days a t  
Khiva some information he received led him to suppose that Cap- . 
tain Abbott was still alive, and under the influence of this hope he 
fonned the generous determination of going immediately in search . 
of him. Allah Kooli Khan a t  first attempted to prevent him from 
risking his life in so perilous an enterprise ; but, finding him reso- 
lute, he  sanctioned his departure, and ordered him a guard of eight 
horsemen for his personal security. I t  was a rough task that the 
son of the Kazi of Herat undertook ; ignorant of the country 
and the Tar tar  language, he was obliged to wander from tent to 
tent over the arid steppes by tracks scarcely to be distinguished, 
often led astray by false information, and having frequently to 
contend with the ill-will of his escort. But he did not the less per- 
severingly continue to  scour the country in search of the British 
o5cer. On the seventeenth day after he left Khiva, a t  the en- 
campment of Maukeglag, he first came upon traces by which he . 
trusted he should at  last discover Captain Abbott, and he deter- 
mined to press on without delay to the spot indicated as the place 
of his detention, when the escort, acting upon secret orders from Ya- 
cooba Mehter, refused to accompany him, asserting that this part of 
the country mas in such a state, that to go there was to expose them- 
selves to certain death. I-Iowever, the noble Akhood Zadeh was 
not daunted by any of the dangers that were pointed out to him ; 
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he abandoned his camels and provisions to the nomades of Mau- 
keglag, a id  departed alone on his uncertain way across the steppe. 
His sufferings in consequence were terrible, Hourly in dread of being 
robbed and murdered, destitute of water to quench the burning 
thirst of either himself or his horse, or food to alleviate his hunger, 
he felt himself, at the close of the fourth day, perishing from inani- 
tion, when a traveller on foot happily crossed his path, who gave 
him a draught of water and a handful of maize. Thus slightly 
supported, he continued his weary search ; for, such was his devo- 
tion, that he would have died rather than have failed in it. At  length, 
and on the fifth day, he reached the encampment in which C a p  
tain Abbott was detained by the rascals who had plundered him. 
The unfortunate officer was lying on a wretched carpet, suffering 
much from his wounds, and expecting his death every moment, when 
a Rossack entered the tent, and said, '' They come to deliver you ;" 
and he had scarcel) uttered these words when Akhood Zadeh stood 
before him. " Barik Allah," * exclaimed his friend, " my eyes are 
gladdened, for I have found you, and my arrival is the end of your 
misery." The effect of this most unhoped-for deliverance upon 
Captain Abbott's feelings may be imagined. Akhood Zndeh then 
placed in his hands the thousand ducats which he had concealed in 
his belt during the two-and-twenty days that had elapsed after he 
left Khiva, and which he all the time dreaded would be taken from 
him. This act is the more striking, in the eyes of those who know 
the Asiatic character, than.his devotion to the British cause and Cap- 
tain Abbott, for he could so easily have said that he had been robbed, 
and no one would for a moment have doubted his word. Few, 
indeed, are the Afghans who would have acted as he did.t When 
the first outpourings of the heart between Captain Abbott and his 
gallant and self-denying deliverer had passed, the latter presented 
to the chief of the horde the firman of which he was the bearer ; 
* Glory to  Cod. 
t His conduct benefited him but 
little: others, whose services were not 
to be comparedwith his, were rewarded 
liberally, while he obtained scarcely so 
much as he had a right to ex ect. This 
ingratitude on the part of those he 
served so well changed his character, 
and in 1847 he was guilty of an act 
of bad faith that was punished by the 
bastinado, under the orders of the 
governor of Khorassan, Assaf Dooulet, 
to  make him restore some thousands 
of francs which hnd been given him 
by the English for the purpose of 
proceeding to Khulm to seek for some 
English prisoners who were said to be 
there. Akhood Zadeh received the  
money, but remained at home, quietly 
sending reports from time to' time to  
the British Legation, as if he had really 
been occupied in the transaction he had 
engaged to carry out.-Fowior. 
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in  this Allah ICooli Khan enjoined his subjects to aid him in dis- 
covering Captain Abbott, who, as well as his servanta, were to be 
delivered up to him if ever they were found within his dominions. 
T h e  nomades thus perceived, though rather late, that in obeying 
their chief and attacking the British oficer, they had exposed them- 
selves to the anger of their sovereip, for it was clear he had 
been quite ignorant of this miserable business, and the responsi- 
bility therefore was likely to fall uFon themseives. Beseeching 
Captain Abbott t o  pardon them, they overwhelmed him with 
attentions, and conducted him two days' journey on the road to 
I\/Iaukeglag to another encampment; this was composed of two 
portions of different tribes, one of which was commanded by a 
chief named Yuss Bsshi, the other by a son of the villain Hassan 
Bahadoor, and i t  was in the tent of the former that the travellers 
took up their temporary abode. 
Yuss Bashi gave his guest the warmest reception, and the son 
, 
of Hassan Bahadoor soon paid him a visit; but when he found 
the British officer intended to make his father responsible for 
the treatment he had received, he hastened to inform him of 
the fact, and also that their enemy Yuss Bashi was collecting 
evidence against them to aggravate his crime. The mes- - 
senger who carried this letter made such dispatch, that in the 
short interval of four days I-Iassan Bahadoor arrived a t  his son's 
camp, at the head of 150 horsemen, for the purpose of pre- ., 
venting Captain Abbott from returning to Khiva escorted by Yuss 
Bashi, who could do them the greatest possibli. injury in the 
estimation of their sovereign. When he had pitched his tent he 
pressed Captain Abbott to be his guest, on the ground that he 
was his mehmendar, and that i t  was his duty to watch over the 
safety of his person. This officer, however, decidedly refused 
to avail himself of his offer, and rejected the invitation, Yuss 
Bashi supporting his refusal and sharply reproaching Hassan 
Bahadoor with his prwious conduct. The discussion grew warm, 
swords were drawn, and blood would have been shed, but for the 
intervention of Akhood Zadeh, who a t  last prevailed upon his 
friend to inhabit the tent of Hassan a t  night, remaining in the 
daytime with Yuss Bashi. Captain Ahbott now wished to return 
to Khiva, but Akhood Zadeh dissuaded him. " Allah Kooli," 
said he, " is not ignorant that the letters I brought for you were 
taken from me by force ; and he will not fail to be influenced by 
CHAP. XXTUI. LIEUTENANT SHAXESPEAR AT KEITA. 431 
the reports qf Hassan Bahadoor, who is so interested in exculpating 
himself from his criminal proceedings against you. Yacooba 
Mehter will help him, and possibly you may lose by their fresh 
intrigues the fruits of your previous negotiations. Hold, then, to 
what you settled with Allah Kooli Khan ; go on to Dach Raleh 
and Astrakan, while I return to lQiva to watch over your interests, 
and be prepared for whatever may occur." 
This advice the English officer adopted, and by so doing even- 
tually lost all benefit from his clever and courageous conduct on 
this anxious and dangerous embassy. He reached the Russian 
fortress, where his finger was amputated, and as soon as his wounds 
were healed proceeded to Astralcan to confer with the Russian 
authorities, while Akhood Zadeh returned to Khiva, with an escort 
provided by Hassan Bahadoor. 
The report to which Yacooba Mehter gave currency, that Cap- 
tain Abbott had been killed, soon reached Herat; and Major 
Todd, greatly distressed at the misfortune which deprived him of 
the co-operation of so good an assistant and compromised the 
negotiations entered into with the Khan of Khiva, immediately 
dispatchd to his court Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear to com- 
plete them, and to ascertain what had really been the fate of their 
lamented brother-officer. Lieutenant Shakespear, accompariied by 
the Kazi Hassan Mohamed, arrived a t  Khiva at  the commence- . 
ment of June, 1840, on the same day that Akhood Zadeh (who 
the reader will remember was the son of the kazi) reached it from 
Maukeglag, and from him they heard of the dangers that had 
befallen Captain Abbott, and of his unlooked-for deliverance. 
When Lieutenant Shakespear was thoroughly satisfied of his coun- 
tryman's safety, he proceeded with the business that Captain Abbott 
had so well commenced. Allah Kooli Khan, who was at heart 
favourably inclined towards the English, soon gave up the prejudices 
that his vizier had instilled into his mind against them, and he even 
took pleasure in conversing with Lieutenant Shakespear on matters 
connected with their policy. " How is it," he said to him one day, 
6 L  that your nation, whicll is so distant from mine, should wish so, 
much for an alliance with me ? " " We possess India," replied that 
officer; " a  vast garden, and, for fear of a surprise, we wish to 
surround it by walls,-those walls are Khiva, Bokhara, Herat, and 
Kabul." The Khan, satisfied by this answer, which showed him 
there was a possibility of obtaining .support against the Russians, 
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remained from that moment perfectly willing to treat, whatever his 
minister might do to induce him to adopt a contrary part. Yacooba 
Mehter seeing all his plans defeated, sought in every way to multiply 
difficulties and embarrass Lieutenant Shakespear) and, at  the mo- 
ment when the treaty was about to be concluded,rhe had the im- 
pertinence to say to him, " Thou who wishest to ally thyself to a 
Mussulman nation, why dost thou not become a Mussulman ? T h y  
dost thou remain an infidel ? " " Which of us is the infidel ? " said 
the British officer,-" you who, driven by insatiable avarice, daily 
put slaves to the torture, tear the daughter from her father, the 
wife from her husband, and sell them to the highest bidder in your 
bazaars ; or those who, like myself, seek the deliverance of SO many 
unhappy being,  and wish to send them back to their country 
and their families?" Allah Kooli, ashamed of the humiliating ~ 
reproof that his vizier had drawn upon himself, with some appa- 
rent ill-humour, dismissed him with these words: " When tpill 
, 
you cease to expose our vices to strangers? this is one who .will 
make them known to the whole world." Yacooba Mehter, after 
the close of this conference, remained in disgrace for eight days. . 
U p  to this time the Khivan prince had always insisted that the ' 
Tzar  should return the caravan that had been detained a t  Astra- 
kan before he set the slaves at liberty; but Lieutenant Shake- 
spear triumphed even over that resolution, by giving him, as a 
guarantee, a bill of exchange for 44001., endorsed by the Eazi of ' 
Herat, which was to be paid in case the caravan should not be 
restored after the Russians were given up. This arrangement being, 
satisfactorily concluded, the British envoy collected all the subjects 
of the Tzar, amounting to four hundred and twenty-four, and . 
having hired camels and men, left Khiva, but on arriving a t  
old Urghendj, he learned that a Russian woman had: been 
detained in the harem of the Usbek prince. Regardless of the 
consequences that might result from the demand, he imme- 
diately sent an express to Allah Rooli Khan, and such wzls his 
influence with him, that the woman was set a t  liberty, in spite of 
the remonstrances of Yacooba Mehter, and she had the happiness 
of rejoining her countrymen. The restitution of the caravan took. 
place immediately on Lieutenant Shakespear's arrival at  dstrakan 
with the rescued slaves; thence he went to Orenburg, and ,fi.om 
thela .to St. Petersburg. A t  the capital he was received in the most 
courteous manner by the Emperor, and decorated with a Russian 
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order ; by. his own Government he was knighted. Certainly, the 
important results obtained by this officer justified the favour in which 
he was'hela by the Tzar and his own Sovereign; but his good 
fortune is one proof more to be added to the many existing in the 
world that seven-eighths of aur success in this life are the result of 
accident-Sir Richmond Shakespear did but gather the fruits of 
the labours of the Kazi of Herat and Captain Abbott. T h e  
recompense of the former was complete ruin, brought upon him by 
. Yar Mohamed, to punish him for being so useful to the English, 
and he now vegetates in poverty and misery a t  Meshed ; the reward 
of the latter is the loss of two fingers, with other wounds-such 
is the gratitude of governments. Sir Richmond Shakespear, on 
the contrary, makes a journey to Khiva, the difficulties of which 
have been removed; above all, he has the Kazi with him, which 
is a guarantee for his success ; and then, because he succeeds, 
without a thought being bestowed on the exertions of his pre- 
decessors, he becomes the centre of rewards, praises, and compli- 
ments, while the energetic and courageous pioneers, those who 
prepared the way for him, fall into the most complete oblivion. 
What a sad comedy is the world ! 
Was it persuasion only that induced the Khan of Khiva to give 
up his captives? This is a point that we have nut been able to 
verify ; but even if gold did assist the negotiations for the release 
of the Russian prisoners, can we do otherwise than admire the nation 
that obtained that result, and made such a judicious selection of its 
agents to carry out so loyal and noble an enterprise ? England, by 
liberating so many unhappy beings, and restoring them to Russia, 
destroyed her principal reason for undertaking a second expedition 
to Khiva. In re-establishing the good understanding between the 
Tzar Nicholas and Allah Kooli Khan, the English expected to pre- 
serve a powerful influence over the latter; but that ex~ectation 
was completely opposed to the one entertained by the court of 
St. Petersburgh, which Lad a direct interest in subjugating, sooner 
or later, the people of Turkestan, and, therefore, in habituating 
them never to acknowledge any supremacy but that of Russia. By 
underhand means, therefore, Allah Kooli was made to comprehend 
that, if there was danger for him in offending Russia, there was 
equal risk in seeking support at  other hands than hers; and the 
Usbek sovereign had scarcely settled his troubles with Russia, 
when he saw his relations with Persia assume a most unfavourable 
2 S? 
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aspect, for the Shah, in the most imperious manner, demanded of 
him the restoration of 40,000 of his subjects held in slavery in 
the Khivan dominions. I t  is easy to see who instigated this 
demand. Allah Kooli Khan replied that, however desirous he 
might be to preserve a friendly intercourse with the Shah in Shah,* 
it was impossible for him to comply with his demand. " T h e  
greater part of the Persian slaves," he said, " have been legally 
bought of the Turkomans settled on my frontier, who are not 
subject to my laws, and from whom it would be impossible to 
obtain the sums they have received for them. Many of these 
slaves have redeemed themselves, married, and become established 
in my dominions ; have raised up families and interests ; and to 
authorize their return to Persia would create a disturbance amongst 
my subjects that would end in a rebellion, in which I should be the 
first victim. I t  is not, therefore, in my power to grant the demand 
of Mohamed Shah." 
T h e  English once more offered their intervention, in the hope 
of accommodating this difference, and i t  formed the object of 
another embassy, which Sir W. iM6Naghten, the Resident at  the , 
court of Shah Shooja, confided to Captain Conolly, an officer of 
great ability, and who had already distinguished himself on several 
occasions. t Moreover, to give him greater consideration and 
authority, Sir William sent with him an Afghan ambassador, 
Allah D a d  Khan, Popolzye, who was the bearer of letters from his 
sovereign, Shah Shooja, to the Khan of Khiva. 
Escorted by the Hazarahs deh Zingui, Conolly skirted the 
mountains inhabited by them, travelling direct from Kabul to 
Meimana, and from that town he wrote to Major Todd, who was 
then a t  Herat, to forward him some money, of which he was in 
need. T h e  major a t  once despatched Akhood Zadeh with two 
hundred ducats; and as the latter was now so well known a t  
Khiva, and could be of use to him there, Captain Conolly took 
him on to the capital. Here the British officer was received with 
-great honour by the Khan, who gave him many proofs of his 
esteem for himself and his Government, but resisted all his argu- 
ments in favour of the manumission of the Persian slaves, and 
positively refused to liberate them. 
* King of Kinga, the title of the and Afghanistan in 1832. His volume 
Persian monarch.-Forrier. of travels was published in London, 
t He travelled in Persia, Turkestan, Ferrier. 
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Captain conilly had beep four months at  Khiva when a letter 
arrived from Yar Mohdmed, informing the Khan that he had 
expelled Major Todd from ?&rat, and recommended him to imi- 
tate his example and turn Captain Conolly out of his capital. But 
instead of adopting this advice, the Usbek sent him a robe of 
honour, and with i t  the vizier's letter, assuring him that be spurned 
such a proposal, and begged him to consider Khiva as his country, 
and the royal palace as his own house. Captain Conolly failed 
not to endeavour to turn this evidence of good feeling towards 
himself to account by urging again the cause of the poor slaves ; 
but his exertions were utterly thrown away. H e  then took up the 
idea of purchasing these unfortunate persons on account of the 
Indian Government. 
One of the principal causes of the dissatisfaction of Mohamed 
Shah with the English was their refusal to pay a subsidy promised 
to Persia by Mr. MacDonald Kinnear, then British ambassador a t  
the court of Feth Ali Shah, to assist that sovereign in making 
war against Russia. Captain Conolly thought that, if a sum of 
money were applied in the interest of Persia as a ransom for the 
slaves in question, both the Shah of Persia and the Khan of 
Khiva would be equally well satisfied ; and he therefore sent 
Akhood Zadeh to Kabul to induce Sir W. McNaghten to sanction 
the plan, and forward it to Calcutta as the best suggestion he 
could offer for adjusting the difference that had been created by 
the demands of the court of Teheran. T h e  departure of this 
intelligent and faithful friend from Khiva was the signal for a 
thousand intrigues, which put an end to the influence of England 
a t  the court of the Usbek. Sincerely devoted to those whom they 
served, and united to the Turkomans by the ties of religion, none 
could better forward British interests in that part of Turkestan 
than the Kazi of Herat and his son ; when they left, Yacooba 
Mehter regained the ascendant, and Russian interests again 
prevailed. The Khan, though he conceded nothing to Captain 
Conolly, became daily more exacting and difficult to please, and 
finally insisted that he should apply to the Government a t  Calcutta 
for a subsidy for him, inasmuch as they paid one to the sovereign 
of Herat : with this difference, however, that, instead of declining 
the assistance of English officers, he wished for some to organise 
his army and cast guns for him. The British agent endeavoured 
to make him understand that a t  that moment his request could 
2 ~ 2  
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not be granted, as  it would endanger the life of Colonel St.oddart, 
tben a captive at Bokhara, because the Emir would not fail 
to be offended if support were given to one of his neighbours 
whose power he most dreaded. The  Khan, however, could not or 
would not be convinced by Conolly's reasoning, and became less 
and less favourably disposed towards him : finally he made the 
English officer comprehend that he was in his way, and that he 
should not be sorry to see him leave his dominions. 
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Captain Conolly leaves for Kokan - Liberality of that officer -War between 
Bokhara and Kokan - Colonel Stoddart requests Conolly to  come to Bokhasa 
-The Khan of Kokan ie averse to hia going - Nasser Ullah sends a firman to  
Captain Conolly insuring his safety - Conolly leaves Kokan for the E d s  
camp-Colonel Stoddart - ~ a d a u s ~ i c e a  under which he arrives at Bokhara- 
First meeting between Colonel Stoddart and the Emir-Strange proceedings of 
that officer when presented to Nasser Ullah - He treats him with insolence - 
Stoddart ia arrested - Barbarous treatment - The Mir Cheb - Stoddart is 
confined in the Siah-tchah -He turns Mussulman - Russian intervention in his 
favour - Stoical courage' of Stoddart - The Emir changes his conduct towar& 
him - Vicissitudes to which he is subjected - The Sultan interferes in his 
favour - Also the Russian minister a t  Bokhnra and the Khan of -va - 
Replies of the Emir to those who intercede for him. 
AKHOOD ZADEH had left Khiva fourteen days when :Captain 
Conolly determined to quit i t  also and go to Kokan. H e  had 
instructions to explore the road to that town, leaving Bokhara on 
the right, and passing through Altoon Kaleb, Ak-Mesdjid, and 
Achkiane ; a perfect knowledge of that route was of infinite 
importance to England, as the Russians were daily drawing closer 
to it, and it was evidently their object to occupy the points which 
command it in order to be able to act more powerfully upon 
the small Tartar states. The  Cabinet of St. Petersburg had long 
since signified to them its intention of constructing a fortress at Ak 
Mesdjid, for at this spot the three roads diverge which lead from 
the north to Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokan. A careful examination 
convinced Captain Conolly of the danger that would ensue to the 
independence of Turkestan if this encroachment on the -part of 
Russia was permitted, and he advised the Usbek princes to resist 
it to the utmost. The  Emperor Nicholas, however, entirely dis- 
regarded their remonstlmces, and imperatively informed the Khans 
that he allowed them three years to make up their minds to leave 
Ak-Mesdjid and its neighbourhood. This delay expired in 1844; 
and the following year, when I passed through Meshed, the Usbeks 
from the north assured me that the Russian fortress was rising 
fast. . 
Captain Conolly was six weeks in going from Rhiva to Kokan, 
the Emir of which, Mohamed Ali I.han, gave him a brilliant 
reception, and he had no great difficulty in winning him over to 
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the interests of his Government; but it should be stated that his 
presents, amongst which were expensive fire-arms, inlaid and orna- 
mented, and Cashmeer shawls, which he distributed profusely as 
auxiliaries in his negotiations, contributed not a little to produce 
this result. H e  travelled with a train of eighty servants and an 
immense quantity of baggage, and the principal inhabitasts of the 
towns he pwsed through shared in his liberality, as well as the 
Government officials, however low OF high might be their rank. 
This mode of proceeding in a country in which the people are 
characterised by extreme covetousness could not do less than create 
an immense number of partisans; and during the three months 
that Captain Conolly remained at Kokan the inhabitants of that 
town were almost as much under his influence as that of Mohamed 
Ali Khan. 
The Emir of Bokhara presumes to impose his suzerainty over all 
the Usbek Khanats which join his own ; but it often happens that 
those which do not recognise his right to that supposititious 
claim oblige him to place himself on the defensive. The Khan 
of Kokan, now nearly fifteen years ago, showed the greatest 
determination not to submit to his rule; but after having been 
defeated in many engagements, he was obliged to bend to the 
yoke of Nasser Ullah in 1839. I t  would appear that the presence 
of the English officer made Mohamed Ali rather audacious and 
restive, for he suddenly refused to comply with the conditions of 
the treaty which he had made with the Emir; and the latter, 
seeing that negotiation was useless, marched against him at  the 
head of 12,000 men. 
When this expedition was undertaken Captain Conolly was still 
at Kokan, and received about this time a letter from Colonel 
Charles Stoddart, then a prisoner at Bokhara, in which he pressed 
him to go to the camp of Nasser Ullah, who had manifested the 
greatest desire to treat with him for a definitive alliance with Eng- 
land. In this way the Emir hoped he should he able to get Captain 
Conolly into his power, for, believing as he did that that officer was 
the instigator of the war which he was now obliged to undertake 
against the Khan of Kokan, he had a hostile feeling towards him. 
Captain Conolly was by no means blind to the danger that 
lurked under this request of Nasser Ullah's, and he hesitated a t  
first what course he should take ; but the hope of attaching the 
Emir to the British policy, the advantages to be derived therefrom 
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by his Government, and the honour i t  would reflect upon himself, 
made him think lightly of his personal safety, and he determined 
to proceed to the Emir's camp, thoroughly persuaded that i t  would 
be easy to induce him to enter into the league which the other 
Usbek princes had formed against Russia. Nevertheless, before he 
set out he despatched amessenger to request him to send a firman 
insuring his safety on his journey. Nasser Ullah, delighted a t  
the facility with which he was drawing the British officer into the 
snare prepared for him, immediately sent the document, and so 
much importance did he attach to the fact of his receiving it quickly, 
that he promised his liberty to the slave who was the bearer of it, 
across a country covered with the enemy's troops and beset with 
dangers, if he delivered it within a specified time. 
The Khan of Kokan and all the nobles of his court besought 
Captain Conollyo to give up this expedition, and entreated him not 
to place any confidence in the word of Nasser Ullah: they even de- 
tained him a few days by force ; but seeing that he was obstinate 
in his determination, they allowed him to depart, though not with- 
out reget ,  and made him promise to send them an account of his 
journey, and also the Emir of Bokhara's plan of his intended 
- campaign. It is also worthy of remark, that the Khan of Khiva 
had advised the English officer on several ~.ccasions not to risk 
his life and liberty on the territory of Bokhara, let the proposal 
to go there come from whatever quarter it might, for that he 
would there find nothing but danger and bad faith. I t  was then 
something more than imprudence that induced Captain Conolly to 
throw himself into the lion's mouth ; and it is impossible not to 
respect sincerely such exalted ideas of duty. Which, in truth, is 
the most deserving of admiration, the men who push the abnega- 
tion of the principle of self-Preservation to such an extreme solely 
in the interests of their country, or the country which gave them 
birth and produces such glorious instances of patriotism ?-a 
country prodigal of its wealth and the blood of its most intelligent 
and bravest officers, for the merest shadow of an advantage that 
may disappear in the chances and changes of the future. This is 
not the optimism of the greater number of European states,; and 
those amongst them who boast of their power and civilization, 
who shine by their imagination and the wordy eloquence of their 
Governments, who fence for ever in empty space, would do well to 
take example from Great Britain. 
T e n  days after he left Kokan Captain Conolly reached the 
camp of the Emir of Bokhara. The  reception which he met with 
from this prince at Djizak, though coId and haughty, inspired him 
with some confidence, and this led him to attempt a reconciliation 
between the Emir and his vassal. Having succeeded, he left the 
two sovereigns to discuss the conditions of their treaty, and, under 
an escort furnished by the Emir, went on to Bokhara, where he 
took up his residence in the house of a Persian, Abdul Samut 
Khan,* Naib T o p  Khane,? whose abode was outside the walls. 
Here for a time we must leave Captain Conolly to return to 
Colonel Charles Stoddart. The reader will not have forgotten 
that he was attached to the .British embassy at the court of 
Teheran, and was the bearer of the ultimatum sent to the Shah 
by Sir John MbNeil in July, 1838, in which the British Minister 
declared war, in the event of the Shah refusing to raise the siege 
of Herat. After the Persians retired, Colonel Stoddart rejoined 
Major Pottinger a t  Herat, whence he was soon obliged to depart 
on account of the differences that arose between him and Yar 
Mohamed. H e  then went to Bokhara, charged by Sir .John 
M'Neil with the difficult task of inducing the Emir to become the 
chief of a league of the Tartar states against Russia. 
'rhis officer had, and with great justice, the reputation of b e k g  
an excellent soldier-loyal, firm, full of zeal, and of the highest 
courage ; but with these fine qualities there was an impetuosity 'of 
disposition and an imperious tone about him, based upon the con- 
viction that he belonged to the first nation in the world, and that 
* This wretch, who was of Persian 
origin, commenced his military career 
in the army of Abbas Krza  (when that 
prince was viceroy of Azerbaidjan), and 
obtained the rank of lieutenant, which 
he subsequently lost in consequence 
of some disgraceful conduct that a 
French officer thought it his duty to 
report. As t b  waa not the first time 
he had thus offended, Abbaa Mirza 
ordered that one of his ears should be 
cut off, and dismissed him from the 
army. After this punishment he offered 
hia services to the  serdars of Afghanis- 
tan, and by them he wm well received, 
but was in the end obliged to  leave that 
country for various misdeeds. He after- 
wards retired to Peshawur, which then 
belonged to the Mnharadjnh of the Pun- 
jab, but there, as everywhere else, he 
indulged his intriguing disposition, and 
joined a conspiracy that had been set 
on foot against the governor of the 
town, General Avitabile, a Neapolitan 
in the service of Runjeet Sing. Abdul 
Samut and his accomplices were taken : 
some were hanged, and some put to 
death in other ways, but the greater 
number were hamstrung. The rascally 
Kh'm escaped with a severe application 
of the bastinado, and orders to leave 
Peshawur without loss of time. 
I t  was then that he went to Bokharn, 
where to a certaiu extent he organized 
an army for the Emir, of which he 
received the command.-Fmisr. 
t Commander-in.chief of theartillery. 
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all the others ought to bend before him. Other points in his 
character also rendered him but little suited to conduct an embassy 
to the Emir of Bokhara. I t  was an error of Sir John McNeil's 
(who, to say the truth, resembled him in many respects) to select 
such a man to manage negotiations which required the greatest 
address and pliancy of disposition. 
The following details concerning the captivity of Colonel Stoddart 
were related to me by the Kazi of Herat, Akhood Zadeh, and 
several Bokharian chiefs ; and I have seen similar inforination in 
the account given by Dr. Wolf of the Bokhara victims, translated 
by Philarste Charles, which I also make use of here, adding to i t  
whatever seems to me to have been overlooked. This courageous 
traveller describes the Colonel as severe and proud, attached to the 
habits and religion of his childhood and his country, and inflexible 
to everything but military discipline. Stoddart, he says, found 
t himself in contact with beasts of prey, destitute alike of pity 
and good faith, shamelessly perfidious, wedded to the minutis of 
forms, believing themselves justified in doing anything after they 
have said their prayers and performed their ablutions, and de- 
ceiving and killing with perfect tranquillity of conscience. I t  has 
,been already shown that, in wounding the pride of Yar Mohamed, 
Stoddart had made him his enemy, and the vizier subsequently 
wrote a letter to Nasser Ullah, in which he described the British 
officer as a very dangerous spy, full of intrigue and pride, and 
an obstinate man; adding that he must be defeated in his views 
or exterminated. This epistle he sent by one of the colonel's 
suite to the Emir. 
Stoddart, who had no suspicion of the excellent letter of 
recommendation of which one of his servants was t.he bearer, nor 
the habits and customs that he had to encounter, ent.ered the 
territory of Bokhara full of confidence, and arrived in the 
capital of Nasser Ullah two days previously to the fast of 
Ramazan, during which the fanaticism of Mahomedans is always 
much greater than at  any other time. A numerous escort of 
cavalry, preceded by a mehmendar, received and accompanied him 
to the residence which had been appointed him in the house 
of the vizier, Mahzoom Berdi-Reiss, who affected great indig- 
nation that the letters with which Stoddart was furnished were 
addressed to his predecessor instead of to him. But this was 
I only a pretext; for when the colonel left 'Persia the appoint- 
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ment of the new vizier a t  Bokhara was not known there ; however, 
it mas in  this way that the system of intimidation commenced, 
and after the letter of Yar Mohamed was placed in the hands 
of the Emir, the latter sought every opportunity of humiliating 
the stranger who came, as he believed, to meddle in his affairs. 
Stoddart received these affronts haughtily ; the minister did not 
return his visit, and sent him word that he must come to him ; 
the British agent, however, refused to go; and matters were in 
this state when Mahzoom Berdi-Reiss entered the colonel's apart- 
ment one morning with the vehement apostrophe, " Do you know I 
have destroyed all the Emir's enemies ?" '' I rejoice to hear," 
replied Stoddart, with misplaced irony, '' that the Emir has no 
more enemies." After this unsatisfactory commencement they 
went on in the same style on both sides. 
On the first day of Ramazan the colonel received orders to go 
on foot to the Registan, the great square in Bokhara, as the Emir 
wanted to speak to him ; but Stoddart refused to walk there, and 
replied that he  should go on horseback, that force only should 
make him dismount, and that he should do a t  Bokhara just the 
same as he would do in London. 
T o  Nasser Ullah, who was already so ill-disposed against him, 
this answer appeared most insulting ; neither a Christian nor a Jew 
could show himself on horseback in Bokhara, nor any one but 
the Emir himself on the Registan. However, word was sent to the 
Englishman that he might do as he pleased ; and Stoddart, in full 
Europeaxtn uniform, caracolled his horse on the forbidden ground, to ' 
the great scandal and surprise of the populace. But they were 
astounded when the sound of the trumpets announced the approach 
of the E k i r  ; and the stranger, instead of dismounting, settled him- 
self in his stirrups, and received him simply with a military salute. 
T h e  Emir, seeing himself thus publicly defied, fixed one long 
look upon him, and passed on in perfect silence. Some minutes 
afterwards a maharam* was sent to Stoddart by Nasser Ullah to 
ask why he had not dismounted in the presence of the sovereign? 
" It is not the custom of my country," said the colonel. " Eut i t  is 
of ours," replied the officer. " I cannot act otherwise," continued 
Stoddart. " It is well ; the Emir is satisfied, and desires you to go 
to his palace :" and the chamberlain withdrew. 
* Chamberlain. 
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I t  was not thus that the intelligent Alexander Burnes prepared 
for his reception by the Emir of Bokhara. H e  sent a letter, 
in which he  requested "protection and shelter for the traveller from 
that ' Magnificent Sovereign, the Citadel of true Believers, the 
Tower of Islam, the Pearl of the Faith, the Star of Religion, the 
Dispenser of Equity, and Pillar of the Faithful.' " How did 
Burnes, without any official position, manage to make friends at 
Bokhara, and to escape every danger? By respecting their 
bigotry, by conforming to their extravagant etiquette, their 
Chinese love of forms, and amazing hypocrisy. All obstacles gave 
way before him. But Stoddart, on the contrary, appears to have 
taken it into his head to trample under foot every Usbek custom, 
and to exhibit a t  the court of Bokhara.that unbending pride 
which is so dear to the English traveller, and at  which even 
Europeans so often take offence. 
Before receiving the British envoy, the Emir ordered some 
Jews, who had traded in Europe, and knew, or were supposed 
to know, what ceremonies were observed a t  the courts of 
Christian sovereigns when they gave audience to an ambassador, 
to be brought into his presence ; and as they affirmed that the 
salute which Stoddart had made was in conformity with the 
usages of his country, the Emir was satisfied on the point, and 
gave an order that he should be admitted a t  the palace. On his 
arrival there the colonel was led into a that terminated 
at the interior court of the building in which Nasser Ullah held his 
durbar and received petitions. Here a chamberlain approached 
him, and said that he was about to request on his (Stoddart's) 
part the Emir's permission to introduce him and present his 
I?TZ bend2guiani-" the supplication of his slave." T h e  colonel was 
offended at this; he might as well have been offended a t  the 
words '' Your Majesty," which scarcely belong to any but to God, 
or have objected to the ordinary phrase " your very humble 
servant," which signifies nothing. But the stiff and precise i d e a  
of Stoddart thought that such a form of expression was humiliating, 
- 
and he replied with vehemence, "I address my prayers to God 
only ; I am not the slave of any one : tell your master that I will  
communicate what I have to say when he bas received me, and not 
before." The same inflexibility was manifested by several other 
traits of a like nature. The  presence of a sovereign in these 
countries is presumed to have the effect of overwhelming a stranger 
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who comes within reach of the effulgence of his rays ; and in con- 
sequence of this he is supported under the arms when he enters 
the hall of audience in which the monaroh is seated. Stoddart, 
who was compelled to submit to this ceremony, shook off with 
violence the two assistants who introduced him ; and this conduct 
excited the anger of the Bokharians. The master of the cere- . 
monies then approached the colonel to touch his clothes, in order 
to see that he had no arms secreted upon his person with which he 
might attempt the Emir's life, and a vigorous blow from Stod- 
dart's fist that laid him at his feet was , the result of this unfortu- 
nate investigation. Nasser Ullah Khan heard from the inner apart- 
ment all that passed in the antechamber, and the proceedings of 
the English envoy irritated him to the highest degree. A t  the 
door of the audience-chamber is placed an  officer, who, at  the 
mnment a stranger is admitted, repeats the words, " Pray ye all for 
the sovereign," as if, amidst such a ferocious people, death and 
danger were always present. Stoddart, who had never made 
himself acquainted with any of these details, .instead of offering up 
a silent invocation, began reciting in a loud voice a prayer to God 
in Persian, upon which Nasser Ullah, seated on the royal dais, 
stroked his beard, full of hatred for this arrogant stranger, and 
disgusted by his coarse and domineering behaviour. 
The  Emir, having repeated the accustomed Allah 6 Akbar (God 
is great), received from the colonel's hands the letter which he had 
brought from Sir John MiNeil, read it, and informed Colonel 
Stoddart that he could not take into consideration its contents, 
because it would be derogatory in him to treat with a simple dele- 
gate of the British minister. Also, that, in order to continge the 
negotiations, i t  would be necessary the colonel should deliver to him 
credentials signed by the Queen of England herself. Stoddart 
. replied in a dry tone that Sir John MCNeil was likewise the agent 
and acted for the East India Company, and that this Company had 
made treaties with all the sovereigns of Asia ; that their power was 
great, and that he  did not understand. the Emir's objections on 
this head, inasmuch as there was both honour and profit for him in 
becoming the ally of that powerful body. Nasser Ullah was far 
from being satisfied with this reply : he stated that the Emperor 
Nicholas, his neighbour, a monarch whose power a t  least equalled 
that of Queen Victoria, was not too proud to write to him with 
his own hand, and that he knew of no reason which could prevent 
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the sovereign of Colonel+3toddart from doing as much. I can," 
said the Emir to the colonel, " treat only on the grounds of equality; 
nevertheless, while waiting for the instructions which I recom- 
mend you to obtain from London, give me the letters which the 
F e r m a n - F m a r  * has confided to your care for me." The colonel 
was then obliged to admit that he had no letter to give him but 
the one that he had presented from Sir John M'Neil, that he 
was acquainted with the views of the East India Company, and 
had been instructed to state vivi voce to ,  his E-Iighness that the 
Directors would pay a subsidy in money in consideration of a 
promise to be made on the part of the Emir to resist the encroach- 
ments of Russia. Nasser Ullah fixed for a few instants an ironical 
smile on Stoddart, and said, " Very good ; I see that i t  is your 
intention to make me your slave : hhetmet Aha hem hey&-it is 
well, I will serve you. I n  the mean time withdraw." 
This d&ut did not augur a successful termination to the nego- 
tiations. Stoddart, who had done nothing to conciliate the esteem 
and confidence of the Emir, arrived at Bokhara without presenk, 
without escort, armed only by his intrepidity ; he presented him- 
self as a conqueror rather than as an ally or a friend, and his 
character as a political personage was equivocal-he neither repre- 
sented England nor the East India Company. The Emir and his 
vizier took advantage of these circumstances, and two days. after 
this interview Stoddart received a n  intimation to proceed irnme- 
diately to the house of the latter. H e  hastened, singularly enough 
-for the hour was inappropriate-to obey the summons : more- 
over, the colonel had previously refused to attend to a similar 
request 
I t  was evening, and Stoddart on entering the house of Mahzoom 
Berdi confronted twelve armed men stationed in the antechamber 
of the Reiss, who at once seized and threw him down, and, as 
he lay on the ground, tied hand and foot, the vizier with a 
drawn sword in his hand, rushed towards him. " May God 
pardon your sins !" exclaimed the English officer, who thought that 
his last hour was come, when Mahzoom Berdi, with sparkling 
eyes and foaming a t  the mouth, placed the point of his sword a t  
Stoddart's breast, and loaded him with every kind of invec- 
tive. Miserable spy !" he said, " infidel dog I you come here, do 
* Governor-General of India. 
446 ARREST OF STODDART. CHAP. XXlX. 
you, from your English employers to buy Bokhara as you have 
bought Kabul ? You mill not succeed-I will kill you !" and he 
pressed his sabre on the prostrate body of Stoddart ; but the 
Englishman's eye remained firmly fixed on that of the furious 
minister. This scene lasted a few minutes, and whether the 
unmoved countenance of his victim arrested the arm of his execu- 
tioner, or, what is more probable, that this display of force was a 
concerted plan between the Emir and the vizier, the latter suddenly 
turned to his servants, and said, " Take him away !" The rain fell 
in torrents, but the men, some bearing torches, carried him off 
like a corpse, still bound, and amidst profound silence, along the 
deserted streets of the city. Sometimes they let him fall on the 
ground, or drew tighter the cords that confined his bruised limbs ; 
and sometimes they stopped and insulted him with savage gestures 
and laughter. c G  Put  an end to me a t  oncel" cried the unhappy 
prisoner ; in pity, prolong not my sufferings !" On hearing this, 
one of them stooped down, and, bringing his torch nearer to him 
as he lay upon the ground, said, " Of a truth, you are either 
a devil or a sorcerer ; you know beforehand that you are not going 
to be killed; if you were only a man, you would certainly h&e 
been afraid." I n  this way they continued to drag him along the 
streets, and at  length threw him, bound as he was, into a dark . 
room, and barred the entrance. After the unfortunate Stoddart 
had been two hours in this place, alone and stretched on the 
damp floor, the door opened, lights appeared, and some servants 
entered, preceded by a man enveloped from head to foot in woollen 
drapery, which allowed only his eyes to be seen. This personage 
seated himself on a divan a t  the extremity of the apartment, 
the lights being placed in front of him ; and Stoddart followed 
with his eyes every movement of the new comer, who seemed to 
be some great personage, for every one treated him with profound 
respect. Raising himself from the floor as well as his bonds would 
permit, and collecting all his strength, he said, in a firm voice, 
c' I pray that the all-powerful God will pardon you I You have 
done ill to throw into prison an innocent .man, who is charged 
with a mission from his Government to your sovereign. If you 
were not disposed to receive me, you ought not to have alJ,owed 
me to enter your city ; i t  was for the vizier to acquaint me with the 
wishes of his master; if you desire that I should leave Bokhara, I 
am ready to attend to those wishes." After having listened with 
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great attention, the disguised person rose and said, " I will com- 
municate what you have said to the Emir." 
But this individual, who was the Mir Cheb,* or chief of the 
police, left the prisqn to execute the Emir's orders; seized and 
burned the envoy's papers, sold all his effects and horses by auction, 
and subsequently transferred him to the Siah-tchah, or Black Well, 
-a horrible abode. This dungeon, which is in the centre of the 
town, is twenty-one feet in depth ; and here the greatest malefac- 
tors are generally confined. The  descent into i t  is made by 
means of a rope ; and when Stoddart wm let down he found there 
two thieves and a murderer, the latter having been incarcerated 
here for several years. With these criminals for his companions 
the colonel remained two months in this loathsome and filthy hole, 
covered with vermin and surrounded by reptiles, in killing which 
they were constantly occupied. Their food, such as it was, was 
lowered to them, by the rope with which they had themselves 
descend-ed, and much of their time was passed in ~moking. 
When the ferocious caprice of Nasser Ullah had been satisfied, . 
and he thought he had humbled the pride of the Englishman and 
impressed him with the terror of his power, he gave an order to the 
chief of the police to remove him from the Siah-tchah in which he 
had been immured, and keep him a prisoner in his own house ; but 
two days after this the public .executioner came to Stoddart with 
an order to put him to death unless he consented to become a 
f i s u l m a n .  T o  this alternative, borne down by the dreadful 
sufferings he had endured, and the exhaustion of his mental and 
bodily powers, he gave a reluctant consent, repeating the Mohamedan 
confession of faith, after which he was taken to the public square 
and circumcised in the presence of an immense crowd who had 
been attracted there by the novelty of the event. Austere and 
sensitive in his religious feelings, Colonel Stoddart never forgave 
himself this act of wealmess, of which he bitterly repented during 
the remainder of his wretched existence. 
The news of the cruelties that had been perpetrated on the person 
of the envoy were noised abroad, and General peroffsky, Governor 
of Orenburg, instructed the Russian agent a t  Bokhara to request 
Nasser Ullah to liberate his prisoner. On receiving this communi- 
cation the Emir sent for Stoddart, and said, " The  R,ussians claim 
* Prince of the night. 
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you : what will they do with you ? Will they treat you well, and 
shall I place you in their hands ? " " I am sure," said his cap- 
tive, " that the Russians will treat me well ; but if my Government 
demands of your Highness what you have done with me, what 
reply shall you make ? " Such was the answer of this heroic man, 
after the unexampled tortures he had endured during his two 
months' confinement in the Siah-tchah with death so near. The 
Emir, struck by his dignified and bold reply, removed from 
his own person the rich fur cloak that he wore, placed it on 
Stoddart, and ordered that he should be led in triumph on horse- 
back through the stLreets of Bokhara. Restored to health, the first 
act of the British officer was to proclaim everywhere that he was 
a Christian, and had become a Nussulman only from the violence 
offered to him. This conduct was so imprudent, and evinced a 
strength of mind so rare, that Nasser Ullah, Mahzoom Berdi, the 
Wr Cheb, and the inhabitants of Bokhara felt as if vanquished ; 
he had been considered as a spy md dealt with as such, but he 
mas again permitted to-'present himself at  the Emir's palace when 
he gave audience, and received from that barbarian marks of con- 
sideration. 
Several motives must have led to this singular change in the 
Emir's conduct to Stoddart. In the first place, the success of the 
British arms in Afghanistan seemed threatening to Nasser Ullah ; 
he mas now desirous of making it appear that the envoy was the 
object of his munificence, though he had previously made him 
suffer the weight of his tyranny. H e  had conceived a hope that 
he should be able to attach him to his interests, as Runjeet Sing 
had other Europeans. " Those Feringhees," said the Emir, " so 
powerful and clever in the arts and diplomacy, so talented in 
organizing an army, bring everywhere success in their train." 
But though lodged in the palace and feasted and overwhelmed with 
attentions at  Bokhara, Stoddart was a captive within its walls, and 
subjected by turns to the surveillance of Samut Khan, a wretch 
of avaricious disposition, and Abd ul Haleik, the steward of the 
royal residence. A t  this period the envoy was seized with typhus 
fever, and the Emir ordered his own physician to attend him, who 
saved his life ; and subsequently, when on the eve of sending an 
embassy to the Tzar, Nasser Ullah offered the colonel the oppor- 
tunity of accompanying i t  to St. Petersburg, and undertaking a 
special mission for him at that court. Once a t  Orenburg, or 
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rather at the Russian frontier, he would have been out of the 
clutches of the Emir, but Stoddart declined the proposition ; his 
government had not, he said, as yet intimated to him their wish 
that he should quit Rolrhara. Never was the feeling of devotion to 
military or diplomatic duty carried to such a height ; and scruples 
like these under such circumstances were perfectly astonishing. 
Stoddart ought to have ltnown that the great distance from Cal- 
cutta, the war then going on, and the state of politics in Central 
Asia, rendered communication with him almost: impossible; the 
expected despatch might never arrive and this obstinacy renewed 
the suspicions which had been curwnt as to his motive for com- 
ing to Bolchara. One day, when dark shadows came over the 
mind of Nasser Ullah, Samut Khan received an order to poison 
t,he Englishman, who succeeded in preserving his life only by 
satisfying the cupidity of the Naib with t h e  hope of obtaining 
a large sum for his ransom ; and this the villain increased as much- 
as he could by exciting the suspicions of the Emir. At other 
times Nasser Ullah felt better disposed towards his prisoner, and 
sent him tobacco and other presents, requesting him in return to 
replace the quicksilver on his mirrors, to make him a thermometer, 
and candles which,would burn without smoke; Stoddart might 
have turned all these matters to account if he had had as much 
tact as he had courage and piety. 
Nevertheles external events advanced towards their climax in the - 
disasters of the British army in 1841-the defiles of Afghanistan 
were covered with the dead bodies of the troops ; and these untoward 
circumstances made the position of the English agent at  Bokhara 
more and more alarming: moreover war was declared between 
Nasser Ullah and his neighbour Mohamed Ali, the Khan of Kokan, 
and a t  the instigation of the Anglo-Indian-government, a t  least it 
was thought so. The Sultan, acknowledged by the Soonees as 
the spiritual head of all Islam, wrote to the 'Emir of Bokhara to 
order him to release his prisoner ; the Tzar also, through the envoy 
that was about to arrive at  Bokhara, demanded in accordance with 
the chivalrous customs of diplomatic opponents, the restoration of 
Stoddart to his country, and when M. de Boutenieff saw him 
there, he offered him his protection; the Khan of Ehivs like- 
'wise interceded for him ; so that worried by these various applica- 
tions, and knowing scarcely what to do, the despot became h i o u s .  
To  the Sultan, Nasser Ullah replied that he would obey him pro- 
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vided the Queen of England would remain his friend, and mould 
do him no injury ; to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, that his 
prisoner mas only a traveller, without any official status ; and to his 
neighbour of Khiva in these whimsical words : "YOU have an 
Englishman and so have I, why do you wish to take mine?" 
After which the Emir left Bokhai-a to make war against the 
Kokanees. 
During this period several letters that Stoddart wrote to his 
friends, which were entrusted to Khorassanee Kurds, Persians or 
Jews, who sewed them in the hem of their robes, reached their 
destination ; some of them have been printed, and one is surprised 
to find in them the style of the Puritans of Cromwell's days. I n  
these letters diplomatic interests, and the feelings of the soldier, 
take their place far belom the religious sentiment which governed 
the mind and destiny of Stoddart, whose character they invest with 
~ e a l  grandeur. 
CHAP. X n .  CHARACTER OF CONOLLY. 
CHAPTER XXX. 
Character of Conolly - He is full of hope as to the result of his negotiations - 
Naaser Ullah returns to Bokhara-His interviews with the English officers 
-They are both imprisoned-Allah Dad Khan, the Afghan envoy, returns 
to Kabul- He is brought back to Bokhara - His infamous intrigues -M. de 
Boutenieff leaves the city - Alchood Zadeh, the son of the Razi of Herat, and 
his brother Nohamed Davood - Dangers to which the latter is exposed - 
Akhood Zadeh is arreeted at the frontier of Bokhara-He is imprisoned 
by the Emu. -Obstinate conduct of Stoddart - The servants of the Eng- 
lish officers are released from prison-Akhood Zadeh and Allah Dad Khan 
are conlined in the Siah-tchah -They are subsequently released- Joseph, a 
Greek, is executed -Paper and pens are found on Stoddut - Hc receives the 
baatinado -Execution of that officer and Conolly -A register of that event, 
and other circumstances connected with those officers. 
r WE must now return to Captain Conolly, who had, as we have 
already said, fulfilled at Kokan a mission analogous to that of 
stodd&, and subsequently, on .the invitation of the latter, joined 
him a t  Bokhara to share his dangers. This officer united con- 
siderable learning to a splendid character-the q~difications of a 
. distinguished soldier and a clever diplomatist. Notwithstanding 
the grievances that Nasser Ullah Khan fancied he had against him, 
he &a pleased with him a t  their first interview; and the suc- 
cessful manner in which Captain Conolly had terminated his dis- 
agreement with his neighbo;r of ~ o k a n ;  disposed him favourably 
towards that officer. \Then, therefore, he joined Stoddart at  
Bokhara he was full of hope that he should be able to induce the 
Emir to enter into the views of England; but it appears that after 
he left the camp, Abdul Samut ~ h a i  succeeded in &&king s change 
in the capricious mind of Nasser Ullah, who wrote to Bokhara and 
ordered that Captain Conolly should not be permitted to hold any 
communication with Colonel Stoddart. The latter was at  this time 
living in the house of the Russian Ambassador, and the Emir had 
'a suspicion that he might pe;sist in remaining there, and that M. 
de Boutenieff would protect him. His order, therefore, to pre- 
vent Captain Conolly from seeing his countryman, was given with 
no other object than that of inducing Colonel Stoddart to remove. 
to the house of Abdut Samut Khan : this fatal step was taken ; and 
I Colonel Stoddart, naturally anxious to "live with his friend, left 
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the residence of the Russian Ambassador on the 11th of November, 
1840, to take up his abode in that of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the h-tillery. 
On the return of Nasser Ullah from Kokan, which took place 
very soon after the arrival of Conolly in his capital, he found 
himself master of two Englishmen ; and this was what he wished ; 
for the war in Kabul continued, and the people of Central Asia 
were animated with the deepest hatred of the power and in- 
fluence that were brought to bear against them. The conduct 
of the Emir towards Conolly became haughty and threatening, 
and Abdul Samut feared, or rather pretended to fear, that the 
prince's auger would fall upon himself; a house was therefore pre- 
pared for the officers in the interior of the city-that is to say, they 
were treated as prisoners, but an allowance was made them of 
three tellahs * per day. Conolly had, a month previously, asked , 
for a private audience of the Emir, but never obtained it ; however, 
on the 31st of December, the officers were taken to the palace. 
"Where are the letters from your government to m e ? ' s a i d  
Nasser Ullah to Conolly. '( You are a spy ; but remember that 
Bokhara is not so easy to conquer as Afghanistan ; I shall send ' 
you to prison, and your countrymen may come with an army if they 
like and take you out." Conolly replied with as much firmness as 
Stoddart, but with more prudence, and both were dismissed. 
These interviews with the Emir were repeated fur three days in 
succession : the last time they were taken to the citadel, as well 
as seven of their servants (called in Persian ppich Rhetmet, upper 
servants), and there passed a miserable night of suffering and 
anxiety. Their house was ransacked and their servants; to , 
the number of forty-four, arrested and thrown into the Siah- 
tchah (which did not exceed thirteen feet in diameter), for 
every detail of the successful insurrection against the English 
in Kabul was then known at Bokhara, and the Emir had ceased to 
fear them ; the wretched captives were to expiate by the most 
cruel treatment, and finally a barbarous death, the uneasiness 
that the invasion of Afghanistan had created in the mind of the 
Usbek tyrant. 
I t  has been said that when Captain Conolly left Kabul on his 
mission to the Tar tar  princes, he was accompanied by Allah 
* Forty shillings. 
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Dad Khan, the ambassador of Shah Shooja. This personage fol- 
lowed that officer to the Courts of Khiva, Kokan, and Bokhara; 
but when he arrived in the latter city he quickly perceived the evil 
intentions of the Emir towards his master, and endeavoured to 
obtain permission to retire as soon as possible. 
Nasser Ullah had indeed the most profound hatred for the 
Afghans, and more particularly the Suddozyes, and he would not 
have been sorry to chastise the ambassador of Shah Shooja; but 
the fact of his being a Mahomeclan, as well as the interest taken in 
him by the Mollahs of Bokhara who interfered in his favour, 
induced him to allow Allah Dad Khan to return to Kabul, and 
he had been gone only a week when the two unfortunate English 
officers were cast into prison in the citadel. On his road the 
Afghan was treated with every consideration due to his character 
of Envoy, and had safely reached the frontier town of Karchy, 
when he found that the Emir had given an order to the Governor 
to arrest and send him back a prisoner to Bokhara- which 
order was carried into effect; and when he returned to the capital 
he was taken to a place called the Ab-Khaneh,* where the cold 
was so severe that no person could be left in it two nights in 
succession and live. FIappily for Allah Dad Khrtn he was, at the 
expiration of twenty hours, taken out only half dead, and placed 
in a dungeon adjacent to that to which the British officers had been 
transferred on their removal from-the citadel. This prison w a ~  
in the house of Mir Syud Sheriff, Kaleh-Beghi,t and from him 
1 received these details. The removal of the Afghan ambassador 
saved his life, which he so little deserved ; for whether he acted 
by the secret instructions of Shah Shooja as he afterwards pre- 
tended, or upon the suggestions of his own mind, it is averred 
that this wretch instead of assisting Captain Conolly never ceased 
to embarrass his negotiations at  Khiva and at  Kokan, by his 
intrigues and underhand practices. 
Monsieur de Boutenieff had not been indifferent to the misfor- 
tunes of the British officers, and had energetically protested against. 
the treatment to which they were subjected ; but after the disasters 
of the English army in Kabul the Emir, who now believed himself 
perfectly secure in his Kha~iat, considered the intervention of the 
Russian diplomatist extremely uncallcd for, and behaved to him. i,n 
* The water-house. t The commandant. 
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so violent a manner as to make Monsieur de Boutenieff think he 
might be treated as the Englishmen had been : he therefore deter- 
mined to quit Bokhara towards the end of March, 1842. 
I n  the mean time Akhood Zadeh, who was sent to Kabul 
by Captain Conolly before he left IChiva, had returned to the 
latter town, accompa~lied by his brother Mohamed Davood, and 
brought instructions which it was hoped would induce Allah Kooli 
Khan to liberate the Persian prisoners. Instead, however, of 
finding Captain Conolly as he had expected, he rcceived a letter, 
that the former had written to him from Bokhara, requesting 
him to join him there. Akhood Zadeh immediately prepared to 
follow him, but considered it expedient before he set out to send 
his brother back to Kabul to inform Sir TY. M'Naghten of what 
was passing at  Rhiva. Fate  now pressed heavily and cruelly on 
the family of the Kazi of Herat, despoiled and exiled by Yar 
Mahorned, the venerable chief owed his life only to the generosity of 
Major Todd, who redeemed it from the sordid Vizier at  the price of 
14001., and from that moment every member of the family devoted 
himself body and soul to their deliverers. Mohamed Davood 
travelled safely as far as Khulm ; but at  Bamian, four days' journey 
sout,h of it, he found the whole country in insurrection and, EUS- 
pected of being a partisan of the English, was stopped and stripped 
by the Afghans ; with a sword-cut on his head and a wound from 
a ball in his thigh, it mas the merest chance that he escaped death 
and succeeded in gaining Kabul. Arrived there he directed his 
steps to  the entrenched camp, a mile from the city, in which the 
British army was then blockaded by the insurgents, and de- 
livered his despatch to Sir W. M'Naghten, who, anxious to take 
advantage of such rare devotion in a native, allowed him only 
two days' rest, and with wounds yet unhealed, sent him on with 
letters to General Nott, a t  Kandahar. A t  Ghuznee he was seized 
by the Ghazees, thrown into prison, and searched with great care ; 
but he had concealed Sir W. M'Naghten's despatch in the tuft of 
hair which Mahomedans allow to grow a t  the back of the head, 
and although it escaped their vigilant search, and nothing was found 
upon him which could establish his guilt, he was tied to the 
mouth of a gun with the certainty of being blown from it, when 
he  cried out "Allah forgive the murderers of the son of the Razi 
Hassan Mohamed." A t  the sound of that name, so venerated by 
a11 Afghans, the 1\1ollahs commanded that he should be set at 
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liberty ; and after passing through so many dangers he arrived at  
Kandahar in safety with his despatches. 
Less fortunate than his brother, Akhood Zadeh took the road to 
Bokhara : he reached Eljik-otoo, a village situated on the right bank 
of the Oxus, without having heard of the detention of Captain 
Conolly ; and supposing him to be receiving honourable treatment 
at the Court of the Emir, he did not hesitate in stating openly, when 
interrogated by the guard at the frontier, that he was in the service 
of the English and on his way to join one of the officers then at  
the capital. This was quite a sufficient reason for arresting aud 
sending him there nnder an escort, and when he arrived the 
Emir imprisoned him in the citadel, in the house of Syud Nir 
Sheriff, where Allah Dad Khan was already incarcerated - this 
occurred ten days after the imprisonment of Stoddart and Conolly. 
In  the various and distressing circumstances which succeeded one 
F another in connexion with the fate of these officers at Bokhara, as 
much blame was due to the Anglo-Indian government for want of 
foresight as to Colonel Stoddart, who, though an honest and loyal 
soldier, was of an unbending disposition, and his national pride led 
him beyond all reasonable limits ; he was perfectly unsuited to the 
task committed to him, and wanting in the tact and versatility of 
mind to carry out such a difficult undertaking. The line of conduct 
he adopted could not fail to end in his ruin, and his blind confidence 
in the success of the British arms in Central Asia, grieved him to 
the utmost in his last moments, inasmuch as it caused the death 
of one of the noblest of his countrymen. Instead of' sending 
word to Captain Conolly to join him, why did not Stoddart follow the 
instructions of his superiors ? In  vain the authorities of Calcutta 
wrote to him that he was free to leave Bokhara, and advised him to 
seize the first opportunity of flight that presented itself; retained by 
an exaggerated sense of duty, and disregarding these instructions, 
he prolonged the critical circumstances in which he was involved 
till the dangerous period arrived at which the army of his country- 
men perished in Afghanistan, and the massacre at Kabul en- 
couraged the Emir to destroy his prisoners : they had not brought 
him anything that he hoped for, and being demanded from 
. him on a11 sides, were the cause of extreme embarrassment. 
Their fate had indeed excited the greatest interest everywhere- 
neither England nor even Russia had forsaken them : intercessions 
in their behalf arrived from Persia, Khiva, Constantinople, Kabul, 
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and Herat. T h e  Grand Mollah of t.he latter town, requested ,by 
Major Todd to ask for the release of Colonel Stoddart, drew - 
upon himself a violent attack from Nasser Ullah Khan, who dis- 
missed him rudely, and said, " I t  is a disgrace to Islam that there 
should exist amongst the Ulemas one so degraded as to come here 
to intercede for this infidel." The perseverance with which the 
liberation of the British agent had been demanded led the Emir to 
suppose that his life was of great value, and that he might obtain a 
considerable ransom for him ; he even hoped to turn his captivity 
to good account, and asked the Queen of England to add to his 
dominions a certain tei~itory on his frontiers, but received only a 
dilatory reply. Nasser Ullah speculated, in fact, upon his captives, 
and when he saw that he was deceived in all his calculations, his 
irascible nature was exasperated in proportion, and he revenged 
himself in a terrible manner upon the unhappy officers who had 
placed themselves in his power. 
The  forty-four servants of Stoddart and Conolly, who were 
arrested a t  their lodgings on the day their masters were imprisoned 
in the citadel, remained forty-four days in the Siah-tchah bound 
hand and foot to each other, and having for their subsistence only 
a small ration of bad bread. On the forty-fifth they were taken 
from this dreadful hole chained by the neck, eleven to a chain, 
' forming four parties, and marched a t  daybreak to the public square, 
where they remained all the next night exposed to the deep snow 
and piercing cold. Two of them had died in the Siah-tchah, a 
third sunk about noon on the following day from the effects of the 
temperature of that nigh$, and his corpse was left attached to the 
chain till sun-down ; the feet and hands of the greater number of 
his surviving comrades were frost-bitten, and they were waiting 
with great anxiety the execution of the sentence of death which 
had been passed upon them, when, to their infinite amazement, 
they were all set at  liberty. This was owing to the intercession of 
the Grand Mollahs of Bokhara who, moved with pity, when they 
heard of the atrocious order issued by the Emir, went in a body 
to his palace to protest against it. " They are Musulmans like. 
us, and our brethren," said they to Nasser Ullah Khan, " and may 
the wrath of Allah descend upon thy head if thou sheddest their 
blood. They hwe suffered sufficiently for serving the Infidels. 
Give them their freedom if thou wouldest avoid the vengea.nce of 
heaven and perhaps of men!" The Emir somewhat intimi- 
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dated by the opposition of the Mollahs whose support was necessary 
to the maintenance of his power, restored these unhappy beings to 
liberty, but i t  was a ten holm struggle to get them out of his 
hands. 
Some Hindoo and Jewish Shroffs,* who had found the means of 
keeping up a communication with Colonel Stoddart and Captain 
Conolly, intrusted the servants of these officers with letters which 
they were anxious to send to their superiors in India; they also gave 
them some clothes and money, after which many of them departed 
for Kabul. They arrived there in the midst of the strife of the 22nd 
of March, 1842, when Mohamed Akbar Khan, master of the 'capital, 
was besieging Fethi Djing Mirza in the citadel, and remained 
here several months in the greatest anxiety, for they dreaded being 
recognized as individuals who had served the English ; but this 
danger they happily escaped, and when the Anglo-Indian army 
arrived a t  Kabul in the August following, they received their 
arrears of pay, were generously recompensed for their sufferings, 
and some again took service with British officers. Three of them 
were for several years my servants; Mohamed, a Heratee, had 
been with Captain Conolly ; another, Ali Bakhtiari, with Captain 
Vilrovitch; the third, Hadji Semnanee, had been cook' to Dr. 
Wolf, and from them I gathered many details respecting their old 
masters. 
Fear alone had induced the Emir to pardon these unoffending 
men, and he indemnified himself for the blood he could not shed 
then by treating with still more severity the captives remaining in 
his power. Four days after the servants were set at  liberty he  
ordered that Allah Dad Khan and Akhood Zadeh s h o ~ ~ l d  be 
removed from the prison of the Kaleh-Beghi, and lowered into the 
Siah-tchah. I n  this there still remained a Greek from Constanti- 
nople, the head servant of Captain Conolly, named Joseph (whom 
.the other servants used to call Yoossoof Khan), and the seven 
pich-khetmets who had been imprisoned in the citadel, whither 
they had been taken in company with the English officers the day 
they were prevented from returning to their own house. Twenty- 
seven days later the Blollahs obtained the release of these seven 
pi&-khetmets. From that period ninety-two days eIapsed, when, 
and again a t  the earnest intercession of the Mollahs, Nasser Ullah 
* Bankers. 
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exercised once more his reluctant clemency by releasing the Afghan 
Envoy, Allah Dad Khan, and also Akhood Zadeh; the former 
hastened to return to Kabul, and the son of the Kazi of Herat, 
after having for a few days found shelter with a merchant in 
Bokhara, reachcd Persia on foot and joined his father at Meshed, 
where both sought an asylum from the rapacity and cruelty of Yar 
Mohamed Khan who had banished them from their country. 
Joseph mas taken from the Siah-tchah at  the same time as Allah 
Dad Khan and Akhood Zadeh, but the close of his captivity was 
to be that of his life also. The first time he was brought before 
Nasser Ullah he said that he was a subject of the Sultan's, which 
was true ; but as he had not been circurncised' the Emir thought 
that he told a falsehood, being persuaded, or pretending to be so, 
that all the subjects of the Sultan must be Mussulmans, and under 
the impression that he was an Englishman, he ordered him into 
the Siah-tchah. Suffering horribly from the misery he endu,ed in 
this dreadful place, he thought that it might be mitigated if he turned 
Mussulman ; he sent therefore a message to that effect to the Emir, 
who instantly assented to his proposition, but never took him out 
of the Siah-tchah, where the operation and cure were performed. It 
was not until the 17th of June, that he saw the light again, when he 
and the three malefactors, with whom Colonel Stoddart had passed 
the two first months of his captivity, were brought up to be slaugh- 
tered - the execution took place on a Friday, at the hour of 
evening prayer. The news of the massacre of the English in the 
Khyber Pass had been sent' to Nasser Ullah by the Afghan ser- 
dars, who recommended him to get rid of his other prisoners or hand 
them over to them ; and i t  mas their letter which prepared the way 
for the death of the ill-fated British officers, which was hastened, 
however, by another cause. 
Three days after the execution of Joseph, the Emir commanded 
that they should be taken from the citadel to a building near the 
Siah-tchah, but they were not lowered into the well. The guard 
then forced them t,o strip off all their clothes, and on inspecting 
them very closely, found in a small pocket sewn under the top of 
the sleeve of Colonel Stoddart's tchoha," a pencil, s o m ~  steel pens, 
a small phial filled with ink, and some sheets of paper, which were 
taken to the Emir. Some days previously the police at the fron- 
* Bokharian robe. 
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tier had seized aletter which the Colonel had sent to Mr. Thomp- 
son, under-secretary to the British legation a t  Teheran, who was 
going to Khiva to continue the negotiations commenced by Captain 
Conolly ; and when this letter was taken to Nasser Ullah he 
wanted Stoddart to translate it, and also to tell him the use of the 
articles that had been found upon him. Nothing excites more dis- 
trust in Oriental nations than the habit that Europeans have of 
writing down or sketching, what they see or hear, and in the ques- 
tionable position in which these officers stood, the double discovery 
that had been made, could not but exasperate the Emir more and 
more against them ; moreover, Colonel Stoddart a t  once refused to 
give the required translation, and he Gas cruelly beaten with rods on 
the soles of his feet for three days in succession without overcoming his 
resolution-he simply declared that the intercepted letter contained 
nothing hostile to the Emir. But Nasser Ullah would not believe 
him, and it being his conviction that the purport of the letter was 
to induce the Khan of Khiva to make war upon him, he condemned 
the two prisoners to death. No  word of weakness escaped Colonel 
Stoddart when he was informed of the fate that awaited him, but 
he completely gave way to the violence of his disposition, exhausting 
the whole vocabulary of personal abuse in Persian against the 
Emir and his executioner, and ceased not thus to apostrophise them 
but in yielding his latest breath. H e  mas put to death like a 
sheep, in some ruins at  the back of his prison, and in the presence 
of a few passers-by who had been attracted to the spot by his cries 
and his invectives. The officer who was charged with the execu- 
tion of the sentence then declared to Conolly, who had witnessed 
his countryman's death, that Nasser Ullah would grant him his 
life if he would become a Mussulman, but the Englishman replied 
without fear, as without boasting, " Stoddart and Yoossoof turned 
Mahomedans and you put them both to death ; your proposal 
is a snare, for you will not spare me any more than you did them. 
I have no confidence in your promises ; I will be no renegade. I 
die firm in my faith. Finish your work! " They did so, and 
the bodies of these two heroic men were placed in a common grave 
that had been dug before their eyes. I t  was on a-Friday evening, 
the 24th of June. 
These sad details were communicated to me by Akhood 
Zadeh, the Syud Mir Sheriff, whom I saw at Meshed in  1845, 
.my Heratee servant, who had also been Conolly's, and was im- 
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prisoned forty-four days in the Siah-tchah, and by many other 
Bokharians, to whom the particulars of the captivity and death of 
the British officers were perfectly well known. Dr. Wolf thinks that 
they mere executed on the 17th of June ; but, after much investi- 
gation, I consider that the event took place seven days later, which 
is proved by the following dates furnished by the persons aboye 
mentioned :- 
Stoddart and Conolly were imprisoned in the 
citadel . Jan. 2, 1842. 
Forty-four days after, their servants were released, 
namely, on . Feb. 15, ,, 
Four days later Akhood Zadeh and Allah Dad 
Khan were imprisoned in the Siah-tchah . Feb. 19, ,, 
Twenty-seven days after, the seven pich-khet- 
mets were released . . Mar. 17, ,, 
Ninety-two days elapsed up to the death of YOOS- 
soof and the deliverance of Akhood Zadeh . June 17, ,, 
Seven days later, Colonel Stoddart ancl*Captain 
Conolly were executed . . June 24, ,,,, 
This statement is strictly correct; and was copied from the 
police register at Bokhara by the Syud Mir Sheriff. 
Akhood Zadeh, without being so precise himself, acknowledges 
the accuracy of these dates ; he believed the deat,h of the British 
officers to have taken place on the 2ntl of Djemadee el Ewal, or 
Djemadee el Sanee, some days afte~ t l ~ e  appearance of the $rst 
apricots-such is the Asiatic mode of marking events 
CHAP. YXXI. MOIIAMED SHAH THREATENS KHIVA. 461 
CHAPTER X S X I .  
Mohamed Shah of Persia threatens Khiva-Mr. Thompson, the British min- 
ister, al~ives at t h ~ t  city -He fails in his negotiations -Nasseli Flores, a 
Neapolitan, comes to Teheran -Travels to Bokhara, and is thrown into prison 
there-The Naib, Abdul Samut Khan-Nasseli is condemned to death-Abdul 
S m u t  esperiences the same fate - Reasons that led to his esecution - The 
matchmaker, Orlando Giovanni - The Emir  orders him to be put to death - 
Character of Nasser Ullah Khan -Measures taken in England to ascertain the 
fate of Stoddart and Conolly - Dr. Wolf - Policy of Par Mohmed after the 
English left Herat- The Shnh Kamran in a m s  against the Vizier-Yar Mo- 
hamed besieges him in the citadel -The Serdw Dine Mohamed Khnn-Kamrm 
is made prisoner, and plundered by Yar Mohamcd- The Shah Zadeh 
Mohamed Yoossoof - The diamond vest - Negotiations regarding it--Mohamed 
Yoossoof Mirza the dupe of Par Mohamed - He flies to Meshed-Revolt to  
i set Kamran at liberty - Par Mohamed assassinates his sovereign. 
SOME months before the terrible tragedy related in the last 
chapter occurred, namely in the winter of 1841, the British 
Minister at  Teheran made a last effort to induce the Khan of 
Khiva to give up the Persian slaves; the case was urgent, for 
Mohamed Shah mas marshalling his battalions on the borders of 
the Atrak and the Gourghan, and threatened to penetrate the heart 
of IChiva if Allah Kooli Khan persisted in detaining his subjects., 
any longer. The Shah had been driven to this demonstration by 
the fresh inroads made upon his territory by the Turcomans, who 
at  the instigation of the Khivans, plundered several Persian 
villages and carried off their inhabitants ; in one of these raids, 
they surprised Mohamed Walee Khan, a cousin of the Shah's, 
and brought him to Khiva, where he was kept a close prisoner. ' 
At the time,that Mr. Thompson went to that city, accompanied by 
the Persian envoy Mohamed Ali Khan KiaEoor, a Russian agent 
left Orenburg for the same destination, to combine his efforts.witli 
theirs in the hope of bringing about a pacific solution of the affair ; 
and notwithstanding the threatened invasion Allah Kooli Khan 
received them all haughtily. To Mr. Thompson he said, " London 
is too far off for me to have any intercourse with it, or expect any 
help from there. Twenty times I have asked the English for 
instructors of artillery, and they have tantalized me with promises 
whiah I have never seen realized ; I cannot understand why they- 
. - 
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interfere in my affairs." IIe was not so arrogant with the Russian, 
in whose favour Yacooba Mehter had been endeavouring to pre- 
possess him ; but he addressed that ambassador thus : Petersburg 
is nearer to Khiva than London, but the bones of the soldiers 
that the Tzar sent from Orenburg last year to subjugate this 
country still cover the steppes upon your frontiers, and remain, 
whitening in the sun, a proof that that undertaking is not easy to 
carry out." Then, turning to the Persian, he said, "As to 
Mohamed Shah he may be the cat's-paw of England or Russia, 
whichever he pleases; Allah Kooli Khan will never imitate his 
example. You have all taken the trouble to come here to ask me 
to release the Persian slaves, which I am resolved never to do." 
And the three ambassadors left Khiva without having in the 
least advanced their cause. 
At Merv Mr. Thompson happily escaped the malevolence of-the 
Emir of Bokhara and Yacooba Mehter, who had sent assassins to 
the neighbourhood of that town to murder him, but chance and bad 
information prevented them.* While he was here, Mr. Thompson 
delivered from captivity a Neapolitan named Nasseli Flores, who 
had been incarcerated by the Governor Niaz Mohamed Beg. When 
this young man passed through Teheran he was told by a p a t  
many persons, that, in taking the road to Bokhara, he mas rush- 
ing upon certain death ; but he would not listen to their advice, 
and fate drove him on to his destruction. For many months 
Flores had enjoyed the hospitality of M. Anitchkoff, the Russian 
Consul-General at  Tauris, and when he put into execution his 
project of going to Lahore through the Usbek states, Sir John 
M'Neil, who had a few months previously qeturned to Teheran, 
conceived some suspicions against him; he even opened a corre- 
spondence with Count de Medem, the Russian Minister, and 
complained of the direction Nasseli intended taking, protected 
by a passport which had received the visa of the Russian autho- 
rities. H e  said that he considered the journey of Flores across 
Tartary concealed intentions hostile to England, and offered to send 
him safely to Lahore free of expense if he would consent to go 
there by the Persian Gulf and India, but nothing could overcome 
the obstinacy of the traveller; and the Count de Medem to 
* After this was written, Mr. Thomp- order to get a good reward for saving 
son. informed me that that this story his life, invented the tale.-Fw-ier. 
nraa not true. An Usbek woman, in 
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set at rest the suspicions of the British envoy, was obliged to erase 
the Russian visas on his passport, and state thereon in Persian 
that the Neapolitan travelled unprotected by Russia. Floreshad not 
been long enough in Asia to understand the character of Asiatics ; 
he expected to find on his arrival at  Bokhara a people resembling 
the Turks or Persians, and notwithstanding the impediments 
thrown in the way of his journey, he persisted in his determination 
and left Teheran with only one servant. H e  remained some time 
. a t  Meshed, and I received a letter from him, from this city, 
probably the last that he ever wrote. The ~erusa l  of this may 
be interesting to the reader. It is dated Meshed, May 22, 
1842 :- 
" When I left Teheran I promised to let you hear from me 
$ when I reached this city. I have been here now a fortnight, and 
arrived after a fortunate journey of twenty-nine days. Nature has 
been very niggardly to Persia ; but in the Khorassan there is more 
vegetation than in the provinces of Azerbaidjan and Irak. Should 
circumstances ever bring you to Meshed I advise fou, when you 
get to Nishapoor, to take the mountain road. You will find 
villages in the rich valleys ; through these water flows in abun- 
? dance, and a double row of trees following the course of the 
stream form a pleasing shade for the traveller. Between Nisha- 
poor and this are two small lakes, which I assure you are very 
picturesque. 
" General Semineau, to whom I previously wrote, will have p r e  
sented my sincere regards to you and have given you a description 
of this country. I am forced to remain here until the caravan for 
Bokhara is ready. The days seem an everlasting length ; the time 
passes so slowly when one is obliged to wait and has an object in 
view. 
"Meantime I am in very good company ; your countryman 
M. Jacquet, surgeon of the. regiment of Hamadan in garrison here, 
a person of great merit, is very hospitable to me, and we pass 
whole days in conversation. H e  was not aware that there were any 
French officers in the Persian army; and he will be enchanted, 
after the report I have given him of your amiable disposition, to 
make your acquaintance. Yon can, and with reciprocal advantage, 
exchange the news of Europe with that of Central Asia, which. 
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never fails to reach this frontier city. I am desired by him to say 
a thousand obliging things on his part, so it now remains for you 
to write to him, and I. assure you that you will be very pleased to 
know him. 
a T h e  Turcomans often visit the villages near the city-they are 
a perfect nightmare to the Persians ; last year they surprised the 
Vizier of the Governor in a garden out of the town and sold him 
to the Khan of Khiva. Five months after Assaf Doowlat, the. 
Governor, desirous of malting reprisals on a Turcoman tribe in the 
mountains to the right of Nishapoor, went there with 3000 men of 
all .arms and seven guns to surprise them, but though he made a 
rapid march the greater part of the cnemy were gone, leaving 
behind them only a few old clothes, swords, and still older camels, 
and several hundred men within the entrenchment. The powder 
was not spared ; several Turcomans were killed and wounded; also 
some Persians, but  the Governor on the second day fearing an 
attack from a body of the enemy's cavalry, ordered an assault 
without making a breach ; judge from that how war is conducted 
in this country. 
"The other day the Governor blew a Turcoman from the mouth 
of a gun and cut-off the hands of seven others in the service of 
Persia who had plundered travellers in the mountains. 
" M y  departure will, Inshallah! be after to-morrow with a nu- 
merous caravan. Pmy tell General Semineau that as soon as I 
got here I sent him a letter by a messenger whom Ferez Ullah 
Khan sent to Teheran. I would write to him again did time 
permit, but I should only weary him; I beg you to offer him my 
sincere gratitude and respect. Remember me to your comrades. 
I do not forget our prince Malek Kassem Mirza; present to him 
my compliments and tell him that I have given his letters to the 
Governor, who received me very politely. Adieu, my dear 
M. Ferrier. May God grant that we meet again in another 
country rich and happy. 
" Ever yours, 
" NASSELI FLORES. 
<' To the General Ferrier." 
Flores left, as he intended, with the caravan for Merv, where he 
had the good fortune to be found by Mr. Thompson, who, as we have 
said, procured his release, and he t.hen continued his journey towards 
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Bokhara. His servant-the only one he had-declined to follow 
him beyond Merv; but this incident, instead of opening his eyes, 
appeared only to confirm him in his resolution to meet the diffi- 
culties and dangers of his undertaking, and he marched on to 
certain death, with the self confidence of a conqueror. I t  was 
twelve days after the death of Colonel Stoddart and Captain 
Conolly that Akhood Zadeh had the happiness of leaving the city 
of Bokhara : on his journey from that scene of horrors he met at 
Tchardjooee, on the left bank of the Oxus, Nasseli Flores, and 
used every argument he could think of to turn him from his pur- 
pose of going on to that capital, relating to him succinctly all that he 
had so lately witnessed and suffered ; but Nasseli understood not 
a word of any eastern language, and his efforts therefore were 
utterly vain-he sought to supply the place of words by signs, but 
he addressed one both deaf and blind. The though! crossed the $ mind of the energetic Afghan that he would bind him and c a y  
him back to Meshed by force ; but he was alone and on foot, devoid 
of resources of every description, how then could he hope to 
succeed ? moreover such an act on his part might expose him to 
the danger of being taken himself and sent back to Bokhara. He 
could therefore do nothing but pray to Allah for the safety of.the 
young traveller, who so confident and light-hearted, was surely going ' - to take his place in the Black Well, and with a heavy heart Akhood 
Zadeh wended his weary way towards Khorassan. His fears were 
I ' 
just; the infatuated Italian continued his journey, and he had 
scarcely been an hour in .the city of Bokhara when he was seized, 
i stripped, and lowered into the Siah-tchah ; here he was kept eight days, and fed upon a meagre pittance purchased with the money that had been found on him. H i  was afterwards brought before the 
Emir to be present at the investigation bf his papers, and as Flores 
did not understand either Turkish or Persian, an Italian renegade 
named Giovanni Orlando was ordered to interpret the conversa- 
tion ; the chief of the Artillery, Abdul Samut Khan, * the mortal 
enemy of all Europeans who had the temerity to go to Bokhara, 
was also in attendance. 
* "I think it well," remarks Dr. M. le Qe'ndrd Court, he was em- 
Wolf, " to give you a sketch of the life ployed there for a while by Mohamed 
of this Abdul Samut Khan. He was Ali Mirza, the celebrated son of Feth ' 
born at Tabreez in the year 1784, nnd, Ali Shah. On account of some mis- 
having acquired some smattering of conduct of Abdul Samut Khan, Mo-. 
I military acience a t  Rermanshah from hamed Ali Mirza ordered his ears to 
2 H 
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W e  have seen how grievously the intrigues of this villain 
influenced the fate of Colonel Stoddwt and Captain Conolly and 
aggravated the sufferings of their imprisonment and death ; but' in 
his conduct to them he acted quite as much from a sordid love of 
gain by setting a daily price upon their lives, as from his hatred 
to all  Feringhees : besides, these two unhappy travellers constantly 
revived in his mind the memory of the most unfortunate events of 
his existence-the loss of his ears a t  Tauris and the infliction 
of the bastinado a t  Peshawur-both of wbich occurred in con- 
nexion with Eurdpeans, and he had sworn to revenge his injuries 
on every one of them that might fall into his power. I t  was 
enough that Nasseli mas an European for him to incur the deadly 
hate of the Naib ; he had also the fault, in his eyes, of being a. 
soldier, for as Abdul Samut was exceedingly ignorant of the mili- 
tary art, he dreaded lest the Emir should keep Flores i n h i s  
service, and that in comparing the knowledge of Both, the result 
would be very much to his own disadvantage. H e  had deter- 
mined to compass the death of Nasseli from the moment that 
he  entered the palace of the Registan : and the fatality which 
seemed to follow the unfortunate Neapolitan pursued him even 
here, for the  letter of introduction to his countryman Avitabile 
s t  Lahore was found amongst his papers; that reudered Abdul 
Samut perfectly furious, and sentence of death was pronounced 
be cut off. The khan then deserted, 
.and went over to Ali Mohamed Mima's 
antagonist, Abbas Mirza, at Talmeez, 
but  was soon obliged to escape from 
there. When I arrived at Cabul, in 
1832, I met Sir Alexander Burnes, and 
in  conversation he told me: ' When you 
come to  Peshawur be on your guard 
against a person there who calls himself 
the vizier of Sultan Mohamed Khan ; 
his name is Abdul Samut Khan, a great 
rascal, who, if he can do auy harm to 
an Englishman, he will do ao ; for he 
knows that we lookupon him with con- 
tempt.' Therefore, on my arrival at 
Peshawur I never came near him, but 
saw him only for one moment, mhen 
he  called upon me in the company of 
Sultan Mohamed IClian. A short time 
after this he intrigued against this 
prince, fled from Peshawur, and took 
service with Dost Mohamed Khan ; 
he endeavoured to excite a revolt 
hgninst that personage, but he ww clis- 
covered, and fled to Bokhara, where 
the wise and good Haken Beyk, the 
Goosh-Beghee of Bokhara (when I was 
there in 1352) procured him service 
with the Ameer, to teach the soldiers 
the military discipline. He lives in 
great pomp outside the t o m ,  and hag 
acquired during the nine years he has 
been there a fortune of 60,000 tellahs, 
that is, ducats. He is commander-in- 
chief of the artillery, and has the title 
of Nayeb. The Ameer retains by force 
at Bokhara a certain Giovami Orlando, 
of Pasma. I had obtained the Ameer's 
permission to take him with me when I, 
left that city; but having heard that 
Abclul Samut intended to assassinate 
me on my road, he requested me to 
'inform the Austrian minister at Con- 
stantinople of his position at Bokhara. 
Abdul Samut had paid ten nssassins to 
kill me on my way to Meshed; and the ' 
fact is so certain thnt ,I am acquainted 
with the names of the ten individuals!' 
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against the unhappy traveller. The Emir was only too well 
inclined to order his execution, and on leaving this audience 
Flores met with the same Gte as the lamented Stoddart and his 
friend. 
Prot-idence often takes upon itself to supply the deficiencies of 
human justice ; of that fact the death of Abdul Samut Khan in 
1847 is a proof, and this in spite of the services that he had 
rendered the Emir of Bolrhara. He too well knew the character 
of Nasser Ullah to believe in hie gratitude, and like every high 
personage in an Asiatic Court, he had no lack of enemies who 
daily excited his master's suspicions against him. Aware of this, 
and. being a cunning fellow, he sent to his brother, a merchant a t  
Meshed, all the money that he had amassed, whether honestly or 
dishonestly, at Bolthara, and in 1847 this amounted to nearly 
40,0001. For many years he had wished to return to Persia, and 
k enjoy at his ease the fruits of his rapacity ; but though he had 
been on the look out for an opportunity of leaving, it never pre- 
sented itself, and hampered as he was vith heavy baggage and 
several women and children, flight was difficult. To send them 
away before him would be to reveal his project to the Emir, who 
indeed had long suspected it, and had given an order that he 
Y should be closely watched. Nasser Ullah felt that he was more in 
the power of the Naib than he liked to be, and had often thought 
of putting him to death ; but then he was so useful-it was only 
by his assistance that he had been able to impose his suzerainty 
on the Khans of Cher Sebz, of Rokan, and Balkh, and to deprive 
himself of his services when he had no other general capable of 
commanding his army, might prove exceedingly injurious to his 
interests ; he waited therefore, but he was full of suppressed fury 
against the Persian heretic who had the audacity to be necessary 
to him. Abdul Samut, however, finding that temporizing did not 
advance his project of flight, determined to take other means of 
securing it. I n  1847 the Emir marched against the Khan of Cher 
b Scbz, who was in arms to throw off the suzerainty that Nasser Ullah 
had imposed upon him, and Abdul Samut, thinking that a good 
opportunity had presented itself for attempting his escape, placed 
himself in communication with the refractory Khan, and told him 
that when the armies met he might charge the Bokharians without 
any anxiety about the artillery, for he would have the guns loaded 
1 with powder only, u and then," he added, " as soon as you have 
2 I3 2 
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forced your way through our lines, I will turn the guns upon the 
Emir and his troops and we shall crush them at once.'' This 
letter was enbusted for delivery to a Persian artilleryman, but he 
carried i t  to Xasser Ullah Khan, when the Naib was instantly 
- 
sent for, and put to death in his presence ; his wives and children 
were given up by the Emir to the merciless soldiery, under whose 
cruelties many of them lost their lives. 
One European still remained at Bokhara-Giovanni Orlando, 
the Italian renegade already mentioned. This poor fellow, who 
was by trade a watchmaker, was living at Teheran in 1839, when an 
ambassador arrived there from the I . a n  of Kokan, by whom he 
was persuaded to follow him to the court of his master. Giovanni 
was well treated by Mohamed Ali ; but scarcely had he felt the 
advantages of his new position when the Emir of Bokhara attaclr_ed. ' 
Kokan, and carried him off to his capital, where he obliged him 
to mend all the broken watches of his court for nothing. This 
treatment was widely different from the kindness he had received 
from the Khan of Rokan; but, as it was impossible for him to 
escape, he submitted to his sad fate. When Dr. Wolff was at 
Bokhara in 1844, the Emir consented to allow the watchmaker 
to return to Persia with him ; but on the day appointed for his 
departure ~ iovanhi  was seized with a sudden panic : an idea that 
assassins had been placed on the road to murder him had taken 
such firm possession of his mind that he would not leave, and . 
he thus lost his only chance of returning to Europe. Three 
years rolled on after this misfortune, and he continued to repair 
the Emir's old watches: however, in the course of time his 
tools wore out, and it was utterly impossible to replace them ; 
his work, therefore, of course, became inferior, but Nasser Ullah 
would accept no excuses, insisting upon its being as well done 
as when he first arrived at  Bolrhara, and for various failures in- 
flicted the bastinado. One day the Emir's watch stopped in the 
middle of his prayers, on remarking which he dashed it against the 
wall, and, furious, ordered the unfortunate Italian to be brought . 
before him. H e  was obeyed. " Kill him," he thundered to the 
guard; and tbe third stroke of a club ended Giovanni's troubles 
and his life. 
The Emir of Bokhara, Nasser Ullah Khan Bahadoor, Melik el 
Moumenine, is a monster of ferocity. The titles he bears are thus 
translated :-Nasser Ullah, Khan, The Victory of God ; Bahadoor, 
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T h e  Victorious ; Melik el Moumenine, Prince of Believers. H e  
raised himself to the throne by a series of frightfill murders 
amongst his kindred, and other crimes from which even Bokharians 
recoiled with horror; his bad faith became proverbial amongst 
them, and his name was pronounced with terror by the people. 
The Bokharians, however, are now apparently indifferent to the 
atrocities committed by the Emir, orthc disgusting character of his 
vices, the extent of which is beyond all that can be imagined, and 
they consider that he is justified by his position in gratifying every 
passion in any way that he pleases. A n  increase in the taxation 
is the only thing upon which they are in the least sensitive ; but as 
on that point Nasser Ullah keeps strictly within the commands of 
the Koran, and generally speaking the duties are rarely above 
2+ per cent., which is fixed by the Zelriat, the Bokharians are 
satisfied, and do not think the virtue of their wives or daughters 
b of any importance so far as the sovereign is concerned. Besides, 
the ~nollahs were the first to set the example of base submission, 
and the Kazi of Bolrhara issued a fetvo proclaiming that Nasser 
Ullah was by the will of God the absolute master of all the women 
in his territory, that he had a right to do what he liked with them, 
and that it would be a crime to oppose his wishes; singularly 
1 enough, the Kazi was the first person to feel the effects of the doc- 
trine he preached, for his daughter fell a victim to the Emir's 
brutal passions. One must, therefore, conclude from all this that 
the inhabitants, though so perfidious and cruel, are in regard to 
their prince the most easy-going people in existence; of this he 
seems so perfectly convinced, that when he leaves his yalace he 
never has any escort to attend him, and two or three times a-week 
the Emir may be seen walking through the bazaars in the dress of 
a dervish, accompanied only by one servant. The shopkeepers are 
aware of the order he has given that no one shall pay him the least 
respect, or treat him otherwise than as one of the public, and for 
this reason nobody moves away at his approach : he walks from 
I one shop to another inquiring the price of grain or other rnerchan- 
dise for sale ; makes here and there a purchase ; and, if he finds 
a tradesman playing tricks, he never offers a remark at  the time, 
but on the following day sends for the delinquent at  his public 
audience, and inflicts the punishment that he thinks he merits. 
I n  the year 1845 he appeared to be about thirty-four years of 
I 
age. This is the man whom the English hoped to make the 
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docile instrument of their vishes; but their agent, as we have 
already said, was ill-chosen to effect this object, and the sacrifice 
of his life was the result. The presence of Europeans, Russian or 
English, alarmed, and not without reason, h s e r  Ullah Khan, but 
though a monster, his jealous terror was the result of reflection, 
and learning that an English envoy was coming to Bokhara, he 
resolved to give him the most terrible idea of his power: by this 
means he hoped to neutralise for the future any desire the English 
might have to meddle in his affairs, and he determined to keep 
their agent a, prisoner, to be made use of as an hostage in case His 
countrymen should feel disposed to annoy him-this was not bad 
reasoning for a barbarian. 
The communications with Bokhara being cut off, the Indian 
Government was for a long time ignorant of what had befaJJen 
Stoddart and Conolly, and it had also been absorbed in preparing 
the second expedition to revenge the disasters of 1841 in Afghan- 
istan ; when, therefore, some months after, the Governor-General, 
in announcing his successes and the punishment of the Afghans, 
demanded the diplomatic agents of England from the Emir of 
Bokhara, he found they were no longer in this world ! 
After the murdcr of these two officers was ascertained, the 
Indian Government was utterly a t  a loss how to avenge it. A 
large army would be required to attack and successfully punish 
Nasser Ullah Khan;  i t  must leave in its rear the Sikhs, the 
Afghans, and all the banditti on the left banks of the Indus 
and the Oxus. Once at  Bokhara, this army would find in its 
front the advanced posts of Russia, the Cossacks of the Steppes ; 
and Persia and Kokan, obliged to make common cause with 
the sovereign of Bokhara, a country half as large as Europe with 
its norna.de and warlike mountaineers, would have risen as one 
man. Certainly -there was room for reflection, and the English 
press and the opposition were not asleep ; they pointed o ~ l t  with 
force the dangers of such an expedition, and this time the Direc- 
tors dared not oppose the opinion entertained against i t  on all 
sides. Nevertheless, the uncertainty which existed as to the fate 
of Stoddart and Conolly awakened the sympathies of their friends, 
and steps were taken to ascertain the truth ; a Protestant mis- 
sionary, Dr. Wolff, volunteered to go to Bokhara, and with 
admirable courage risked his own life upon the bare hope of 
saving the lives of others. After having exposed himself to great 
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dangers, he has returned to Europe firmly convinced of the death 
of these two officers, though many persons are still doubtful of the 
fact; as to myself, who followed closeIy the steps of Dr. Wolff in 
Tartary and Afghanistan, I can only confirm his statement as one 
that cannot be controverted. 
The narrative of the British negotiations in Bokhara is so inti- 
mately connected with the history of Afghanistan as to have made 
it requisite for me to give some details of i t ;  but I must now 
resume that of Herat, which will put the reader in possession of 
the remaining information that I have been enabled to collect 
respecting Afghanistan. 
The  British mission had scarcely left Herat when Yar Mohamed, 
who had been warmly solicited to expel Major Todd by Assaf 
Dooulet, Governor of Khorassan, claimed the fulfilment of his pro- 
mise to pay him a subsidy in money, and gave him sii guns and 
I some thousands of firelocks to enable him to march on Kandahar. 
Assaf Dooulet knew him too well to comply with his wishes; ' 
the gifts would, he was aware, be received with the liveliest 
demonstrations of gratitude, but all mould end there, and, under a ' 
host of pretences, more or less admissible, he would not take a 
single step beyond the walls of Herat. The Governor of Kho- 
raasan, therefore, evaded his request, but in terms by no means 
hostile ; Yar Mohamed, however, would not consider himself 
beaten, and renewed his demands more than once without success. 
The vizier never forgave this refusal, or the just estimate that 
Assaf Dooulet had formed of his character ; he swore eternal 
hatred to him and his family, and the consequence of this fracas to 
the Governor of Khorassan will be related hereafter. 
Unsuccessful with the Persian, Yar Mohamed was obliged to con- 
tent himself with the money that he had extorted from the English, 
and thought no more of invading Kandahar, but he determined to 
pursue to its completion a scheme that the presence of Major Todd 
had hitherto absolutely obliged him to delay-there was nothing 
now to prevent him from compassing the death of the Shah Kam- 
ran, and establishing himself on the throne of Herat. This prince 
a t  once saw that t ~ e  could not withstand the sinister projects of his 
minister without the help of the English ; he therefore energetically 
declared that they ,should remain a t  his court and carry out their 
own views ; but as such an arrangement did not suit the uizier, he 
paid not the slightest regard to his sovereign's wishes. 
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Shah Kamran had a presentiment that his end was approaching, 
though after Major Todd's departure he roused himself to avert his - 
sad destiny, and at length determined openly to confront his tyrant 
minister. 1 5 s  supporters and advisers in this bold attempt were 
his four sons-Iskander Mirza, Nadir Mirza, Zeman Mirza, and 
Saadat Mulook Mirza, also his cousin Yoossoof Mirza, a grandson 
of Hadji Firooz Eddin. These princes secretly assembled at night 
all those in whom they could place confidence, and, having with 
their aid overcome the vizier's guard, took possession of the citadel 
for the king, retiring with him within its walls. I t  was defended 
by five hundred devoted soldiers, and as the garrison had provisions 
for a year, and munitions of war more than necessary to hold it 
for a longer period, the princes hoped that this stroke of policy 
would have brought about a reaction against the minister, and that 
the population of the country would have besieged him in the 
town, thus rendering them masters of his person. But events 
entirely falsified their calculations, for the vizier hearing just 
before midnight that the Suddozyes had talcen up arms, with- 
out loss of time despatched all the cavalry that he was able to 
collect a t  the moment to hold thc surrounding country in check, , 
and invested the citadel with six Battalions, upon whose fidelity he 
could depend. From that moment the cause of the Suddozye 
dynasty became desperate a t  Herat:  its fatal hour had come. 
Nevertheless, Shah Kamran, or rather his sons, wonld not succumb ; 
they repulsed the attacks of Yar Mohamed with a perseverance 
and bravery worthy of a better result, and the vizier finding his 
attempts were fi-uitless against the energy of their defence, was 
obliged to commence a regular siege. 
Before he retired to the citadel Shah Kamran despatched a 
messenger to the English at  Ihndahar  to apprise them of this 
crisis in his affairs, and to beg them to send him troops, promising 
to hold the forkess till their arrival, and to place it in their 
hands. Unfortunately at  this period, the spring of 1841, symp- 
toms of agitation had already shown themselves at Kandahar, and 
the Resident could not without imprudence detach any of the force 
then stationed in that principality ; however, the Anglo-Indian 
Government were not indifferent to the appeal of their ally, and 
spared neither money nor promises in their endeavours to induce 
the Afghans of I-Ierat to exert themselves in his favour. 
I t  has been related that Dine Mohamed Khan, the cousin of the 
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vizier, had been arrested by his order towards the close of 1840, 
but a t  the expiration of five months this serdar succeeded in 
escaping to the mountains of Gour, where he  married the daughter 
of Moustapha Khan, an independent chief of the tribe of 
Eimak Taymoonis, . which gave him great influence in the sur- 
rounding country ; this made the enmity of Dine Mohamed of 
soine importance to Yar Mohamed, and, as that serdar had always 
been a partisan of Shah Kamran, Najor Rawlinson, the British 
Resident a t  Kandahar, thought he could not do better than 
request him to assemble such of the Afghans as were disposed 
to help their sovereign, and march on E-Ierat. H e  also sent 
Dine Mohamed 1000 Russian ducats ; but whether, as the serdar 
pretended, the money arrived too late, or, as others have said 
with more probability he remained irresolute too long, when he 
declared himself ready to march the opportunity of saving Shah 
1 Kamran was lost. The Suddozyes, however, though abandoned 
to their owA resources, behaved with the greatest intrepidity; they 
held the citadel for fifty days, and gave in only when the artillery 
and mines had partly destroyed the walls, and the d4bt.i~ having 
filled the ditch, the besiegers had obtained an easy access into the 
body of the place. 
In  the first moments of success Yar Mohamed acted with some 
moderation, and sent the four sons of the Shah out of the terri- 
tory of Herat without doing them any personal injury. As to his 
sovereign, who entircly lost the little liberty that he had enjoyed, 
the vizier thenceforth treated him as a state prisoner, and, as soon 
.as he felt that the king was completely in his power, he proceeded 
to despoil him of his treasures, and seized some splendid diamonds, 
I 
of the value. of more than 240,0001., which, were known to have 
been taken by Shah Ma.hinood from the crown of Kabul when he 
,reigned in that country. But the deposed prince resisted his 
dem%ds with more determination than he expected, and refused 
to tell him where he had concealed his riches. 
Yar Mohamed knew his old master so well as to be perfectly 
.sure that 'neither torture nor death would make him. reveal the 
place ; he therefore employed stratagem, trusting that it would 
succeed better than theats. The  vizier acted with less generosity 
to Mohamed Yoossoof, the Shah's cousin, than to the other princes, 
for he retained him a prisoner a t  Herat., but he now determined 
to make use of him in his endeavours to conquer the obstinacy of 
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Shah Kamran. He  therefore sent for Mohamed Yoossoof, and, after 
having given him his liberty, informed him that it had never been 
his wish to usurp the royal power; that he always intended to 
substitute a prince of the blood-royal in place of the Shah, that 
his thoughts had always turned upon him, Mohamed Yoossoof; 
and finally, that his determination was to give him his eldest 
daughter in marriage, and declare him sovereign of the principality. 
The only conditiou, he said, that he should attach to these dazzling 
promises was that the Prince should endeavour to prevail upon Shah 
Kamran to divulge where he had hidden his gold and jewels. 
The old Shah always had a great affection for his cousin, who 
possessed his entire confidence, and he, therefore, not unwillingly 
entrusted him with part of the desired information. Mohamed 
Yoossoof, like a wary man, took one-half of the money wh2ch had 
thus been placed in his way by his confiding sovereign, and carried 
the other to the vizier, who did not conceal his gratification at  this 
first success. What he most coveted, however, was not yet forth- 
coming: this was a woman's vest, decorated with precious stones, 
the value of which was 160,0002. Before Iiamran retired to the 
citadel he thought this lady's waistcoat would be no longer safe with 
him, and gave it into the care of one of his wives, who, uneasy at  
the responsibility thus thrown upon her, handed it over to her 
steward, named Nasser Ullah Beg. This trustworthy man had, in 
the first instance, removed to the country ; but, three days after the 
princes retired to the citadel he went to Meshed, carrying the 
precious waistcoat with him. Mohamed Yoossoof Mirza was 
ignorant of the latter circumstance, though he knew that the gar- 
ment had been given to the Shah's wife, and he told the vizier 
of this, who put the poor creature to the torture, to force her to 
give i t  up ; but she bore the agonising trial rather than reveal 
the secret. H e  then tried the effect of domestic influences, 
and signified to her that her only daughter by Shah Kamrau 
should the next day be married to his son, the Serdar Syud 
Mohamed +Khan;  but when the unhappy girl heard who was to 
be her husband, she poisoned herself to escape the detested nup- 
tials. A t  last Yar Mohnmed discovered that the object of his 
search was at  Meshed, and made every effort to get it back, but 
without success ; he then revenged himself on the miserable wife 
of his sovereign, whom he imprisoned in the citadel, and subjected 
to daily torture, and it was not till 1846 that she m s  released, on 
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the reiterated demands of the Shah of Persia. She then fled to 
Teheran, and joined her brother, the Serdar Chems Eddin Khan, 
who had long since been driven to take service in the Persian army 
by the tyranny of the vizier. As for the valuable vest, it never fell 
into the possession of those who had a right to it. I n  December, 
1845, when I was a t  Meshed, the faithful depositary of the trea- 
sure, Nasser Ullah Beg, died of cholera ; he had been ill same 
time previously, and Assaf Dooulet, seeing his end approaching, 
appointed him his steward, giving him a t  the same time one thou- 
sand tomauns with which to purchase camels. Nasser Ullah, laid 
up by sickness, was unable to execute the commission ; and when 
he died, the governor of I<liorassan, under the pretence that the 
deceased had' funds .of his in his hands, seized everythiug in his 
house, and the royal vest thus became his property. It is true 
that the claims of the Serdar Chems Eddin were supported by the 
Shah of Persia, and that he ordered his uncle to restore it to him ; 
but Assaf Dooulet settled the question of its restoration by the 
payment of several thousand tomauns. Since that period he has 
been deprived of his command in Khorassan, and with the wealth 
that he accumulated during the thirteen years that he governed 
that province, his son the Sipahi Salar, created a powerful party, 
with whose support he raised the standard of revolt against the 
Shah of Persia, and kept his army in check from 1547 to 1850. 
A t  the same time that Yar Mohamed tortured the faithful wife 
of Kamran, he disposed of the other wives of that sovereign-and 
in the Shah's lifetime-to his own friends and partisans ; and a s  
they were, for the most part, young and rich, their new husbands 
were well satisfied with this arrangement, though it is reprobated 
by the laws of Islam. I was informed of one action of the vizier's 
of which I should scarcely have believed him guilty, had it not 
been mentioned to me by his most intimate friends, namely, that 
he sold three or four of the daughters of Shah Kamran, as well 
as the eldest of his wives, to the Turcomans, who disposed of them 
again in the markets of Rhiva and Bokhara. 
But to return to the Prince Mohamed Yoossoof : after having exe- 
cuted, so far as he had,the power, the behests of the vizier, he claimed 
the performance of the promises which he had made him. Yar Mo- 
hamed declared himself ready to fulfil them, but objected that Mo- 
hamed Yoossoof had only p d y  carried out his engagement, and 
that much of the treasure had yet to be recovered ; he did not, he 
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said, intend to alter his determination on account of that disappoint- 
ment, if the prince would give him a decisive proof of his devotion 
by having hi cousin, the Shah Kamran, put to death. Mohamed 
Yoossoof now saw clearly the snare into which the vizier wished to 
dram him, and subsequently throw upon him all the odium of the 
murder of his relative, for it was in this manner that Yar Mohamed 
intended to clear for himself, and at the prince's expense, the road 
to the sovereign power, and thus avoid the disgrace of the crime of 
regicide. Mohamed Yoossoof at  once perceived the danger of reject- 
ing  the proposals of a man like Yar Mohamed, hardened in every 
crime, and, to lull his vigilance, consented to all that he demanded ; . 
in  the evening, however, under the pretence of enjoying the fresh 
air, he went out for a ride, escorted by a few servants, and escaped - 
to Meshed, where the Persians received him in the kindpt  and 
most generous manner. Before leaving Herat he took the precau- 
tion to write letters to several of his Fiends, in which he warned 
them of the vile deed meditated by the vizier ; but the Heratees 
had long been accustomed to submit to his tyranny, and were 
indifferent to, or, a t  any rate, took no interest in any schemes 
that he might have against the Shah Kamrin, whose conduct 
had made them callous to his fate. Some few chiefs, who were 
in favour of a legitimate monarch, endeavoured to revive in the 
people the prestige which attached to their ancient line of kings ; 
but they could only excite a partid movement, which Yar 
Mohamed speedily suppressed. This manifestation, however, 
baffled him in his treasonable plans, and he waited till he should 
so perfect his combinations that a failure in them would be im- 
possible. His  first preparatory measure was to remove Shah 
I<amran.to the citadel of .Kussan, thirty-six miles west of Herat, 
confiding his safe keeping to his cousin, the Serclar Dad Khan, 
and for some months after this the miserable existence of the de- 
throned monarch was passed in this fortress in the midst of 
continual orgies; the vizier commanded that- he should be freely 
supplied with mine and spirits and exciting drugs, in the hope that 
they would conduct him more quickly to the grave, and also that, 
- in  his fits of intoxication he would say or write something that 
would lead to the discovery of the famous jewelled vest. But his 
hopes were disappointcd, for, however intoxicated the Shah might 
be, he always recovered the most perfect self-possession when- 
ever his hidden wealth was alluded to. A t  last Yar Mohamed 
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commanded that torture should be resorted to to vanquish his 
obstinacy; but this also was fruitless. " Let me go on a pil- 
grimage to Mecca," said the old man, " and I will send you a 
rich ransom when I reach Meshed." The vizier was too well 
versed in the value of Afghan promises to trust to this one, and 
finding that his prisoner was utterly useless for his principal pur- 
pose, and might even create trouble for him, he at  length resolved 
to put the Shah out of his way. The moment was favourable to 
his project; the defiles of Kabul had witnessed the destruction 
of one British force, the division in Kandahar could think only 
of its own safety, Shah Shooja had lost his Life, and his death 
was the forerunner of that of his nephew, the Shah Kamran. 
After an unsuccessful attempt made by the inhabitants of Kussan 
to deliver him in the spring of 1842, this unhappy prince was 
again tortured and cruelly beaten, and at the close of March, Yar 
Mohamed commanded that he should be suffocated. The Serdar 
Dad Khan was the executioner, and when he placed the cushion 
on the poor old man's face, he made no resistance ; on the contrary, 
he testified a certain degree of satisfaction that the moment which 
mas to terminate his sufferings had arrived. 
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C H A P T E R  X X  
Sons of Shah Kamran- Hadji Firooz Edilin-.Hh sad end, and that of bis son 
E l e k  I k s e m  &za-Afghan princes in Persia- Conduct of Russia and Eng- 
land with re,prd to Hertt-Par Mohamed, now sovereign Prince of Herat, 
attends to the welfare of the Hentees -Strengthens his power, and prepares to  
attack Gour - Dine Mohamed Khau plunders some caravans - Par Mohamed 
takes possession of the province of Gour - Differences with Xandahitr - Sub- . 
jogates the Hazarah Zeidnats -Marches against the Usbek Rhannts -He is 
recalled to the south - Privations suffered by hi army - Equilibrium between 
the states of Central Asia- Mohamed Shah of Penia supports ICohendil Khan . 
in his quarrel with P a r  Nohamed - The latter assists the Shah of Persia in his - 
mar mith Khorassm -Death of the Persian monarch - Alliance of Par Mo- ' 
hamed mith the Shah of Persia. 
TH.E assassination of the Shah Kamran is the vilest of the many 
atrocious crimes that stain the character of Yar  Mohamed Khan. 
H a d  he waited but a short time longer, the death of his aged 
sovereign, whose constitution was broken up by excesses and tor- 
tures, must have taken place naturally. T o  Europeans the cowardly . 
deed appeays in the most odious colours : not so to the Afghans. ' 
I n  their eyes it mas simply the exercise of a right-the right of the 
strongest ; it was perfectly reasonable that the vizier should kill his 
enemy, if he could ; and the tone in which they would say to each 
other, " the vizier has killed the Shah Ramran," seemed to express 
a n  opinion that he  deserved commendation for his conduct, and 
- 
had by this act added to the glory of his career rather than that 
he  had done anything worthy of reproach. 
A t  his death the Shah left ten sons : their names were as follows :- 
Djehanguir Mirza. 
Se'if ool Moolk Kizcl. . 
Saadet Mulook Mirza. 
Alemguir Mirza. 
Ahmed Ali Mirza. 
Djellal Eddin Mirza. 
Iskander Wrza. 
Chahab E z a .  
Zeman Mirza. 
Nadir Mirza. 
Iskander and Zeman died of cholera a t  Teheran in 1846. - 
The  eldest son, Djehanguir Nirza, who ought to have succeeded 
Shah Kamran, will be remembered by his revolt against his father 
at the time that the latter went to quell disturbances in t,he pro- 
vince of Furrah, and by the cruel sentence that he pronounced 
against his envoy, Meuvalee Khan. H e  showed, however, that 
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the bIood of the Suddozyes flowed in his veins, for, like all that 
family, he was brave, though restless and debauched. Some time 
after the siege of Herat by the Persians, he declared himself inde- 
pendent in the district of Furrah, of which he was governor, and Yar 
Mohamed mas obliged to send troops to subdue him ; which having 
been accomplished, he was brought to Herat, where he had only half 
his liberty. When, however, Shah Ramran was removed to Kussan, 
the Mirza succeeded in escaping, and took refuge in Persia. A t  
Teheran he lived utterly lost to all sense of his own dignity ; and 
at the time he was residing in the low quarter of the Niguaristan, 
inhabited by the Berbers, he thought only of drinking arraclr and 
smoking opium, where, completely brutalised, he still lives on a 
small pension granted him by the Shah of Persia. 
The other sons of Ramran are effeminate men, 'more or less 
polluted by the same vices as their elder brother. Sei'f ool 
Moolk and Saadet Mulook, after the ruin of their house, retired 
first into the district of Gour, and then into that of Zemin-. 
davar, in the principdity of Kandahar. Nadir Mirza established 
himself at Bagdad. Alemguir and Ahmed Ali took refuge 
in India, and are .the most intelligent princes of this family. 
The remaining brothers, Djehanguir, Djellal Eddin, Iskander, 
Chahab, and Zeman went to Teheran, where the three who 
survive owe their daily bread to the generosity of their cousin, the 
Shah of Persia. ' Mohamed Yoossoof Mirza, also 'their cousin, 
though much inclined to drunkenness, is superior to them in 
capacity, and is distinguished by the same qualities that won for 
his grandfather, Hadji Firooz Eddin, the esteem and affection of 
the Heratees. That prince, it will be remembered, reigned sixteen 
years in Herat, to the general satisfaction of the population, whom 
he treated in the most paternal manner. After having been 
vanquished by Moustapha Khan, he went to Meshed, and resided 
there in great retirement upon the bounty of the Persian Govern- 
ment. One morning a party of serbaz broke into his garden, and 
were proceeding to pillage it, when he went to remonstrate with 
them ; but the simplicity of his attire so completely deceived the 
villains as to his identity, that they supposed him to be a servant ; 
and to prevent him from returning to the house to give the alarm, 
one of them killed him on the spot with a stroke of his kandjar. 
The fate of his son, Malek Kassem Mirza, was not less sad. 
This prince was attached to the expeditionary corps which, under 
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the command of Abbas Mirza, marched 'against I-Ierat in 1833. 
Being detained by business at Meshed, he followed the arniy a 
few days after i t  had left, accompanied by only ten servants, and 
was attacked half-way between Meshed and Herat, by a party of 
Turcomans ; in this murderous conflict he had the misery of 
seeing one of hi sons fall beside him mortally wounded, and the 
next moment he was seized, bound, and dragged off to Khiva, 
where .he was sold in the public market-place for a slave. 
Information of this fact having reached the Khan of Khiva, he.  
purchased him immediately, and gave him the revenues of a vil- 
lage for his support, though he would never allow him to leave 
his dominions ; and he died there in 1840. Mohamed Yoossoof, 
the son of Nalek Kassem Mirza, obtained a grant of land from 
Assaf Dooulet, -and, accompanied by some Heratees, who had 
attached themselves to his fortunes, he raised the little village of 
Singbest from the ruins in which it had lain for more than two 
hundred years. 
Mohamed Ali, Shah of Persia, sheltered and protected all the 
members of the Suddozye-family in the hope of one day mal& use 
of them against Herat, the possession of which he had not ceased to 
covet, but his successor, Nasser Eddin Shah, harassed by the intes- 
tine divisions of his kingdom, was far less taken up with the idea of 
extending i t  towards the east: but the Suddozye princes and a few 
Afghan chiefs still remain on the list of state pensioners; though 
i tmay now be affirmed that not one amongst them has the capacity 
necessary to induce the Afghans to place him on the throne of 
his ancestors. The  influence that Russia or England may one 
day exercise in this part of Asia, renders anticipations of this kind 
very unimportant, for those powers will respectively attach to 
their own interests such of the Afghan chiefs as will bend with 
the greatest docility to their views of dominion, without con- 
sidering the qualifications of the individuals whom they place at  
the head of the principalities The cruelty of Yar Mohamed 
Khan was great ; great, also, were his ambition and his avarice, 
which had been the source of a thousand evils to the Heratees ; 
nevertheless they joyfully beheld him attain the sovereign power, 
hoping that when they were relieved of Shah Kamran, for whom 
contempt was the only feeling they entertained, the vizier.would 
give them banquillity and security ; and they were not dis- 
appointed. As soon as he had proclaimed himself master of the 
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principality, under the simple title of Vizier Saheb Hebir,* he 
exercised his authority with a firm hand, and introduced a great 
many reforms, which in his intercourse, with the English he had 
found would be profitable to his treasury, as well as to the people ; 
the taxes, police, customs, and all that related to them, were 
placed upon a fresh basis, and every one gained by these reforms. 
When he was firmly established he ceased to be cruel, even to 
those who were opposed to him, but he showed thieves and 
assassins no mercy. He had the tact to procure the recognition of 
his usurped power by his neighbours, with the greater number of 
whom he lived on good terms. The serdars of Herat, who up to 
that time had sold him their support, were reduced to complete 
obedience: some of the most turbulent he put down, replacing 
them by others from the tribe of Ali Rioozye, to which he 
belongs, and he eventually became absolute over the g ~ e a t  vassals, 
and the nomade population under his jurisdiction. It was more 
by address than by severity that he obtained this result, and 
as no one dared to dispute with him the sovereignty he had 
usurped, his power was soon limited .only by his will. The town 
of Herat, destroyed by the siege of 1838, rose by degrees from 
its ruins, thanks to the gold that the English had so profusely 
scattered around them; Yar Mohamed continued the improve- 
ments they had so happily commenced, and applied prompt re- 
medies to the evils under which the population still suffered. He 
especially encouraged agriculture and commerce, placed a very 
light duty upon the sale of corn and the necessaries of life, and 
further relieved the poorer classes by setting them to work at the 
fortifications of the town, which were rebuilt in accordance with the 
plans of the English engineers. Finally, he completely checked the 
pillage that had beeli carried on, not only in the principality, but even 
up to the gates of I-Ierat. The means that he employed to attain 
this end were so terrible that to this day, when any article is by 
accident dropped on the roads, or even in the fields, no one dares 
to take it up; the first person who finds it informs, with the 
utmost speed., the nearest officer of police of the fact, whose duty 
it is to seek out the owner, and return it to him, without putting 
the ,careless proprietor to any expense. Yar Mohamed Khan had 
become wealthy at this period-excessively wealthy ; his rapacity, 
* Grand Vizier. 
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without being extinguished, was a little abated, and lie wished \ 
that the people, who now felt the advantages of his beneficial 
- administration, should g;ve him all the honour and gratitude due 
for i t ;  while by throwing the blame of the previous anarchy on 
the weakness of Shah Kamran, in whose r e i p  he ~retendcd he 
could never realise the improvements he proposed, he contrived to 
render odious the memory of that unworthy though unfortunate - 
monarch. Yar  Mohamed mas thus o h p i e d  in consolidating his 
power in Herat, when the chiefs of some distant districts, who had 
only nominally recognised the sovereignty of Shah Kamran, raiscd 
the standard of revolt, and he therefore resolved to strike vigorously, 
in order to annihilate any disposition of the kind for the future. After 
having confided the city to his son, the Serdar Seif Mohamed Kh-an, . 
and a picked garrison, he proceeded to the district of Kaleh- . ' 
noon, inhabited by the Hazarah Zeidnats; but the Serdar Kerim 
D a d  Khan, their chief, feeling that he was not strong enough to 
confront the approaching danger, went to offer his submission to 
the Vizier, engaged to recognise his suzerainty, also to pay him a 
, 
tribute in barek and horses, and gave him one of his brothers and 
several Hazarah chiefs as hostages for his fidelity. This happy 
settlement of the disturbances in Kaleh-noon enabled Yar Mohamed 
to turn his arms against Gour, the state of which province caused 
him considerable uneasiness. 
This district was governed by two independent chiefs, the 
Serdars Moustapha and Ibrahim Khan, who, being open to more 
than one influence adverse to the interests of the new sovereign 
of Herat., now and then made a raid upon his dominions a t  the 
instigation of Kohendil Khan, Prince of Kandahar. They might 
have been acting in support of some discontented serdars, but on 
the present occasion the danger to the vizier was more imminent, 
for he had to unravel the plots of Seif 001 Moolk and Saadet 
. 
Mulook, sons of Shah Kamran, who, when driven from the citadel 
of Herat, had taken refuge with Ibrahim Khan. This chief warmly 
embraced their cause, an alliance the more vexatious for the vizier 
as the country of Gour presents a t  every step admirable positions 
for an army on the defensive and is intersected by high and 
rugged mountains, very precipitous, and covered with forests ; lying 
between them are beautiful valleys, inhabited by the nomade 
, 
population, and in the villages which are also scattered on the steep 
sides of these mountains, a few men in ambuscade might easily hold 
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a very considerable army in check. To  these advantages, which 
enabled the fugitive princes to h a r s s  the usurper of their rights, 
and, in case of discomfiture, retire to a formidable position, there 
was added another, scarcely less important; the intrepid cousin 
of the vizier, Dine Mohamed Khan (who, as we have already said, 
married the daughter of Moustapha Khan, the other Taymoorii 
Serdar), also consented to join their party. And we must here 
digress for a moment to give a brief account of his subsequent 
career. 
After his flight from Herat, Dine Mohamed Khan soon wearied 
of the life that he led in the mountains of Gour, where he had been 
found by the messenger of Major Rawlinson when he brought him 
the proposal that he should march to the relief of Shah ICamran, 
then besieged in the citadel of Herat. He afterwards took advan- 
tage of the return of the Mohamedzyes to Kandahar to resume 
his active life ; and when the English left that city, and Koheu- 
dil .Khan proceeded there t o  take it from Self der Djing, Dine 
Mohamed appeared at Kandahar to offer his services to the son of 
Shah Shooja, who was under the protection of the British. The  
prince accepted them with gratitude; and in the battle which 
took place a t  Haooz Singsar, in which SeIf der Djing was de- 
feated, Dine Mohamed distinguished himself by hi accustomefi 
bravery. With two hundred chosen men he for two hours 
sustained the attack of the entire army of Kohendil Khan, amount- 
ing to six thousand men ; but in the end, finding himself obliged 
to yield, he retired to the mountains, where no one thought of 
disturbing him. His little band being soon destitute of every- 
thing, he proceeded to the plain of Bakoos, near the Kach- 
rood, and placed himself in ambush on the side of the I<oohi 
Duzd (Robber's Mountain), where he waited for a caravan of several 
thousand camels and mules, which was expected to pass that way ; 
When it arrived he captured the whole, and upon this plunder 
maintained his troop during the winter. I n  the course of the two 
following months he completely restored his finances by pillaging 
- other caravans, after which he returned to the mountains of Gour, 
where he found the sons of Kamran, with whom he made common 
cause. 
When  Yar Mohamed marched against Gour he with his usual tact 
began his operations by sowing dissension among his enemies, and 
.Bloustapha Khan, who supported Dine Mohamed, and Ibrahim, 
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who took the part of the princes, quarrelled-nay, fought. I n  this 
conflict Ibrahim Khan was worsted, which led to thesubjugation of ' 
the country ; and the princes having lost the support of Moustapha 
Khan, and Ibrahim having fled to the mountains, they were 
obliged to retire to the district of the Serdar Akter Khan a t  
Zemidavar, in the territory of Kandahar, where they were soon 
surrounded. 
A s  to Dine Mohamed Khan, he grew tired of the harassing 
life h e  had passed for two years, and willingly gave his sanction to 
a reconciliation which several chiefs wished to bring about between 
him and the Vizier ; but remarking, as he thought, a coldness in 
his reception by Yar Mohamed, he feared that he might be be- 
trayed, and fled from his camp the same night. On arriving a t  
Meshed he was kindly welcomed by Assaf Dooulet, who irnme- 
diately availed himself of his acknowledged bravery by sending 
him with his Afghans to pacify the southern part of Khorassan, 4 
then in revolt, and the chief has since remained in the service 
of Persia. 
Y a r  Mohamed had afterwards little trouble in reducing the 
disunited serdars of Gour. Ibrahim Khan, driven from one posi- 
tion to another, retired to a fortified rock in the mountain of 
Tchalap Dalan, which had the reputation of being impregnable ; 
there, reduced by famine, he surrendered at  discretion and swore 
obedience to the Vizier; but a few days after, however, he 
contrived to escape, and returned to the hills, where he lived for 
some time by pillage. This chief had about 7000 families of 
Taymoonis under his rule, and Yar Bhhamed, after having 
completely devastated the country they occupied, removed them 
to Herat, where he established some in the city and the remainder - 
in the suburbs ; they were afterwards organized into several bat- 
talions of serbaz, and, being very brave, are now the best troops 
in his army. Moustapha Khan having assisted Yar Mohamed 
against Ibrahim Khan, the vizier spared his life, but this was 
not the only reason that dictated his generosity; the district 
inhabited by the former chieftain is the most impracticable in the 
country, and the difficulties that Yar Mohamed would have had to 
surmount in any attempt to reduce it, spoke far more in Mous- 
tapha's favour than the gratitude of the Vizier of Herat. 
Having obtained these satisfactory results from his expedition, 
the Vizier returned to his capital- and occupied himself in ex- 
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tending his frontier towards the north. In the commencement of 
1846 he marched with his army in the direction of the Moorgab, 
on the banks of which river were encamped some Hararah 
Zeidnats, commanded by one of the brothers of Icerim Dad Khan, 
of Kaleh-noon, the chief of the whole of that tribe, but these 
nomades decamped at the approach of the vizier, and retiring into 
the Persian territory, put themselves under the protection of Assaf 
Dooulet, who gave them the village of Kariz on the frontier of 
Herat. This act was not of a nature to allay the hatred felt 
by Yar Mohamed for the Governor of Khorassan: he did not 
forget it, and at a later period made him pay dearly for the 
vexatious opposition. 
The Vizier allowed his cavalry to graze their horses in the fine 
pastures watered by the Moorgab, and afterwards returned to 
Herat to be present at the departure of his daughter Bobojane 
for Kabul, whose marriage with Mohamed Akbar Khan 'was,' it 
will be remembered, very nearly causing a serious conflict between 
the Vizier and the Prince of Kandahar. The latter desired nothing 
better than to seize this pretext for extending his territory at the 
expense of Yar Mohamed, but each time that he sent his troops 
towards the frontier of Herat, Mohamed Akbar as a devoted son- 
in-law, immediately made a corresponding movement towards that of 
Kandahar, with the army placed in observation a t  Ghuznee, which 
at once checked the ambitious aspirations of his uncle, Kohendil 
Khan. Nevertheless Yar Mohamed was anxious to take revenge for 
the depredations that had been committed by Lhe Randaharians, 
in the south of his principality, and ravaged the border villages 
of' Kandahar. After this, and towards the middle of 1846, he 
marched into the Gour country, where disaffection had again 
manifested itself, and did not leave it till order was perfectly re- 
stored in the province. I t  was about this time that the Serdar 
Akter Khan, Alizye, attacked and beaten by Kohendil Khan, who 
feared his influence and his power, took refuge with Yar Mohamed, 
who g.ave him the government of the district of Gour, where 
he was rejoined by his tribe which had been dispersed, and it , 
is still established there. Since that period Rohendil Khan has not 
dared to renew his~incursions upon the Heratian territory. 
Towards the close of the year 1846, the intrigues of the prime 
minister of theShah of Persia, having induced his royal master to 
aeprive Assaf Dooulet of the government of Khorassan, and the 
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consequence of that measure having been the entire ruin of his 
family, one of his sons, as I have said before, raised the stanclard . 
of revolt, and all Khorcasan responded to his appeal. The fa11 of 
Assaf Dooulet greatly assisted the cause of Yar Mohamed, whose 
power increased considerably. For thirteen years the Vizier had 
been held in check by him ; he had never permitted him to extend 
his rule over the small Usbek Khanats situated to the north 
of his dominions, and he went even so far as to counteract openly 
that which he more legitimately exercised over the Hazarah Zeid- 
nats. As soon as Yar Mohamed heard that Assaf Dooulet had left 
for Teheran, and that he had therefore nothing to fear from him 
he marched once more against Kerim Dad Khan, whose submission . 
had hitherto been only nominal. This time the Hazarah chief deter- 
mined upon making open war with his suzerain; he assembled a 
chosen band of 12,000 of his  best cavalry, and Yar Mohamed led 
to the attack in the open country of Kaleh-noon 8000 horse, GOO0 
foot, and a battery of six guns. The  combat, a most sanguinary 
one, lasted nine hours ; but the Hazarahs were at  length crushed, 
and many chiefs lost their lives on both sides : the gallant Kerim 
Dad Khan, weakened by the loss of blood that streamed from 
many wounds, escaped with great difficulty, and was accom- 
panied only by one single horseman of the brave men he had 
commanded, when he reached the Persian territory a t  Toorbut 
Sheikh Djam. 
Yar  Mohamed encamped upon the field of battle, and in the 
space of eight days collected ten thousand families of the Hazarah 
Zeidnats whom he removed from their native soil to that part 
of the district of Herat, reaching from Obeh to Gorian, where 
he settled them on the banks of the Herirood. By these forced 
immigrations of the Taymoonis and Hazarahs, the principality 
became more populous than it had been previously to the siege of 
Herat  in 1838, and Yar Mohamed obtained the further advantage 
of keeping under his eye the most turbulent inhabitants of his 
dominions. H e  made excellent soldiers of these Eimaks and by 
their amalgamation with the Afghans it became almost impossible 
for the former to betray him. 
After having installed them in their new abode, and fixed the 
tax they should pay a t  three tomaums for each tent, Yar Mohamed 
again took the field, and marched upon Meimana, a small indepen- 
dent Khanat lying north of Icaleh-noon, of which there were two 
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chiefs, brothers, Eukmet Khan and Shere Khan, who admitted 
his suzerainty without hesitation. T h e  Vizier then pushed on to 
the rich Rhanats of Serpeul, Chibberghane, Andekhooye, and 
Akhtche, and their respective khans, who up to that period had 
nominally been vassals of the Emir of Bokhara, also submitted. 
From Akhtche Yar Mohamed sent an ambassador to that sovereign, 
and also to the Caliph of Merv, to inform them that they must 
with the least possible delay give up all the Heratee slaves then in 
their territories ; he also warned them that-if there was the slightest 
armed demonstration on their part, or on that ofthe Khanats which 
he had subjugated, he would march straight upon their capitals. 
Although Yar Mohamed had nothing to fear from the Shah of 
Persia in thus extending his dominions, he considered it politic to 
inform him of his march into the UsLek country, and assure him 
that these conquests could not but contribute to augment his power 
, and renown, inasmuch a they were made in hi; name by the 
most humble of his vassals. Mohamed Shah having the revolt in 
I<horassan on his hands, and being unable to repress it, was obliged 
to put up with these lying protestations, and he endured what he 
could not prevent. 
Yar Mohamed subsequently marched upon Balkh, when a 
courier brought h i p  information that the gallant Kerim Dad Khan, 
having placed himself a t  the head of some fugitives of his tribe 
who had joined him in Rhorassan, was ravaging the district of 
Gorian from one end to the other-his letters also brought him 
other news not less vexatious. Shah Pecend Khan, an independent 
Afghan chieftain and lord of Laush-jowaine (a fortress on the 
north of Lake Roustem), who was allied to the serdars of Kan- 
dahar, had a t  their instigation, and with the aid of some nomade 
Beloochees, pillaged the camps and villages in the district of 
Furrah and Bakooa This untoward intelHgence obliged the Vizier 
rapidly to retrace his steps, and move with the mass of his forces 
towards the quarter threatened. But, after the first five daysy 
march, the Usbeks that he had incorporated into his army deserted, 
and the IChanats, which had so recently submitted, proclaimed their 
independence, a t  the same time massacring the garrisons that had 
been left in them. To  complete his misfortunes, the cold set in 
with such intensity, that before he could reach Roochk a large pro- 
portion of his soldiers and four-fifths of his horses had perished ; 
provisions suddenly failed, and hunger was added to the other 
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miseries his army had to suffer. These difficulties, which occurred 
simultaneously, were certainly great, but Yar Mohamed was only 
three days' march from his capital ; he had obtained a large sum 
of money in the countries through which he had passed, so that it 
was easy for him to repair these disasters, and from the moment 
of his return to Berat his activity and vigilance triumphed over 
them. 
This success against the Usbeks naturally excited tehe jealousy 
of Persia and all the independent chiefs, his neighbouw, who, 
dreading lest his influence and power should trench upon their 
own,. formed a league against him ; and Kandahar, obeying 
the impulse given by Persia, allied itself to the chiefs of Bokhara, - 
Khulrn, and Balkh, to oppose his projects and those of his ally, the 
Emir of Kabul. The mutual hostility of these states is the impe- 
rative result of their respective positions, and that circumstance is 
the cause which has for so many years prevented the union of the 
Afghan principalities in one kingdom. I f  Kabul or Herat attacks , 
Kandahar, a diversion is made on the north by Balkh and 
Khulln in support of that principality ; if it is on Ichulm or 
Balkh that the central states direct an attack, then Kandahar aod 
Persia will make a diversion in favour of the established equi- . 
librium - the balance of power in Central Asia. Herat and 
Kabul have for some time reciprocally assisted each other; but 
it must be added that these alliances are modified and vary ac- 
cording to the interests that are engaged on either side. A short 
time before Yar  Mohamed's expedition to the north, he was - 
alarmed lest his friendly connexion with Kabul should be broken 
off by the death of his son-in-law Mohamed Akbar Khan ; but as 
his widow Bobojane then became the wife of Goulam Haidar 
Khan, another son of Dost Mohamed's, and who also succeeded 
Mohamed Akbar in the post of vizier of Kabul, these fears were 
gradually dissipated, and, when he marched towards the south to 
put down the revolt of the chief of Laush-jow+ne, his new son- 
in-law so completely overawed Kandahar that it gave him confi- 
dence in his intentions. The  Vizier, however, knew by long 
experience that family ties are of little value in the eyes of 
Afghans, and that the smallest conflicting interest neutralises them , 
completely ; he therefore endeavoured, while preserving the friend- 
ship of the chiefs of Kabul, to secure the support of Persia, her 
sovereign having till that period been hostile to him. To attain 
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1 were engaged in repressing the revolt in Khorasgan at the head of which were the sons of Asaf Dooulet ; and in thus acting he also indulged the hatred that he felt for all the members of his family. 
This alliance with Persia was a fresh proof of the far-sighted cha- I. racter of the vizier's policy, but the friendly manifestation had very little effect upon Mohamed Shah, who detested him from 
' , 
his heart's core, and an opportunity of showing this feeling 
having presented itself, the Persian monarch did not allow it to 
escape him. 
On the 6th of August, 1848, a messenger from the Prince 
Hamzeh Mirza, commander'-in-chief of the Persian forces in Kho- 
rasaan, brought two letters to the Shah. One of these missives 
came from Kohendil Khan, who declared himself the very ] humble vassal of the Shah of Fersia, and as such requested the 
E .  permission of the King of Kings to march against Herat with 
h, 
1 15,000 men, and take it. " For a long time," said the Serdar, " the great men of that city have been constantly asking me  to assist them in putting an end to the tyranny of the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan ; but I will not undertake the expedition without 
the authority of your majesty." The other letter was from Yar 
Mohamed, who expressed himself in equally devoted terms, and 
requested the assistance of the Shah against the hostile demonstra- 
tions of his neighbour of Ihndahar. He represented, judiciously 
. 
enough, that the position taken by the English near the right bank 
of the Indus at  Dadur, near the Bolan Pass, was at so short a 
I distance from the former city that they necessarily possessed, and could exercise whenever they pleased, a most powerful influence over the political conduct of Kohendil Khan, who had no means 
'I., of releasing himself from it ; also, that in furthering the designs 
of the Prince of Kandahar upon Herat, the Shah of Persia 
i would be acting in direct opposition to his own interests, for the 
English would then be able by his means to enter Persia a t  
any moment they imperatively intimated a wish to that effect. 
'1' Mohamed Shah knew that thevizier told the truth, for experience 
: 
, had long since proved that in maintaining the three princi- 
. palities in Afghanistan, and upholding the independen&? of some 
of the smaller chiefs, his government could exercise a much greater 1 .  ascendency over them than by uniting them under one sovereign ; 
he could thus enter into their quarrels, and control them alter- 
! <[ 2 K I i. 
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nately through each other. But his antipathy to Yar Mohamed ' 
overpowered every other consideration, and he had decided on 
supporting Kohendil Khan when death put an end to his earthly 
career on the 4th of the following September, and arrested the. 
execution of the orders he had sent to his army in favour. of.  
the Prince. of Kandahar. A t  the time the Shah of Persia came 
to this unwise decision the Vizier was a t  Meshed, assisting Prince 
Hamzeh Mirza, who was besieging it. The Afghan army per- 
formed prodigies of d o u r  in many successive assaults, but what 
could 8000 men do against a city the inhabitants of which had, a. 
century before, and for two years consecutively, resisted the efforts 
of 60,000 Afghans, under Ahrned Shah, Suddozye, and finally 
obliged him to raise the siege. When the news of the death of 
Mohamed Shah reached Meshed, the Persian troops became demo- 
ralised, and two bahl ions  which occupied the citadel'evacuated 
it, and rejoined the besieging army, which, subject to daily attacks. 
from the enemy, and starving, had very soon no other resource left 
than to retire into the territory of Herat, where Yar Mohamea 
received Prince I-Iamzeh Mirza most hospitably, maintaining his 
soldiers for many months ; and when, in consequence of the recall 
of their commander to Teheran a t  the commencement of 1849, they 
quitted the principality, the prince presented four pieces of cannon 
to the Vizier in testimony of his gratitude for the treatmentthat 
he and his troops had received. 
Nasser Edclin, the successor of Mohamed Shah, adopted a policy 
entirely different from that of his father. Towards the middle of 
1549 he sent to Yar Mohamed a sword richly set with jewels, and 
his highest decoration, accompanied by a letter in whica he. 
stated that h e  considered the Vizier as his most faithful ally. 'fie.. 
latter was not tardy in returning these professions of friendship, 
and in the spring of 1850 a colossal elephant, that had been pre- 
sented by Yar Mohamed to his suzerain, was frequently seen prome- 
nading the streets of Teheran : in fact, the best understanding existed 
- 
between Nasser Eddin and Yar Mohamed. Those who know the. ' 
Vizier see i n  these demonstrative sympathies for Persia nothing 
more than a n  additional instance of his ability, but they remain.. 
still conviiced that he will never give her his support so completely. 
as to enable the Persians effectually to subdue the revolution in 
Khorassan under the Salar. That  revolt is a great piece of 
good fortune for Yar Mohamed ; he now gives the l a y  to all the 
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I smaller chiefs around his dominions, and he is too clever not to see 
. that the pacification of Khorassan would be a disadvantageous 
I 
event for him-he therefore secretly feeds the fire, though he pre- I tends lie is endeavouring to quench it-but it is with a cupful of 
water. 
As to Kandahar, there is less chance than ever of its receiving 
support from Persia ; and a t  this time, 1850, the attention of 
i Kohendil Khan, as well as that of the Emir of Kabul, is chiefly directed to the results 'that have followed the extension of terri- tory acquired by the English at  the expense of the Sikhs, and i conseq~~ently their nearer approach to Afghanistan. Their present north-west frontier is the Indus, along the whole of its navigable . course ; and they have crossed i t  a t  two points-Peshawur on the 
1 north, and Shikapoor on the south. These are tdtes-de-pont which command the passage of that river, and give to the Anglo-Indian 
B government the power of exercising the greatest influence over 
" the policy of the chiefs of Kandahar p d  Kabul-may Europe 
never have cause to repent that she has permitted those conquests 
which will render Great Britain and Russia all-powerful over this 
planet. i 
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